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This	  dissertation	  traces	  the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  that	  
has	  resulted	  with	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system,	  focusing	  on	  the	  
postwar	  period	  to	  2016.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Ontario	  
and	  across	  Canada	  has	  been	  decreasing,	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  ability	  of	  this	  system	  to	  
provide	  adequate	  retirement	  income	  for	  future	  workers.	  Currently,	  large	  private	  and	  
public	  sector	  employers	  such	  as	  Air	  Canada,	  General	  Motors	  Canada	  and	  Canada	  Post	  
are	  seeking	  to	  replace	  secure	  defined	  benefit	  plans	  with	  less	  secure	  defined	  contribution	  
plans.	  Given	  these	  trends,	  policymakers	  at	  the	  provincial	  and	  federal	  levels	  have	  
attempted	  to	  remedy	  the	  insecurity	  produced	  by	  diminishing	  coverage	  rates.	  Using	  
Ontario	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  examine	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system,	  this	  dissertation	  
asks:	  Why	  has	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  shifted,	  and	  what	  factors	  have	  driven	  
this?	  Drawing	  from	  22	  semi-­‐structure	  interviews	  with	  pension	  professionals,	  descriptive	  
statistics,	  and	  Hansard	  Parliamentary	  transcriptions,	  several	  findings	  are	  established.	  
First,	  although	  risk	  has	  been	  increasingly	  individualized	  since	  the	  1990s,	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  
to	  how	  much	  risk	  workers	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  before	  political	  coalitions	  form	  to	  
demand	  government	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  establishing	  retirement	  income	  security.	  Risk	  
transfer	  is	  thus	  contingent	  on	  union	  power,	  retiree	  activism,	  business	  lobbying,	  and	  the	  
ideological	  position	  of	  governing	  parties.	  Second,	  the	  rise	  of	  individualized	  risk	  is	  
generating	  new	  provincial/federal	  political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pension	  policy,	  in	  
which	  the	  failure	  of	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  is	  impacting	  the	  welfare	  state	  
politics	  of	  Canada,	  pointing	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  period	  of	  pension	  politics.	  This	  
finding	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada,	  the	  assertion	  
by	  risk	  theorists	  that	  globalizing	  forces	  are	  transforming	  the	  welfare/citizenship	  nexus	  
away	  from	  a	  model	  premised	  on	  risk	  sharing	  to	  one	  in	  which	  the	  state	  must	  facilitate	  the	  
needs	  of	  rational,	  risk	  taking	  citizens	  does	  not	  adequately	  describe	  recent	  trends	  in	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CHAPTER	  1	  -­‐	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
	  
“…pensions	  constitute	  a	  central	  link	  between	  work	  and	  leisure,	  between	  earned	  income	  and	  
redistribution,	  between	  individualism	  and	  solidarity,	  between	  the	  cash	  nexus	  and	  social	  rights.	  
Pensions,	  therefore,	  help	  elucidate	  a	  set	  of	  perennially	  conflictual	  principles	  of	  capitalism”	  
(Gøsta	  Esping-­‐Andersen:	  1990: 79-­‐80).	  
	  
“[Welfare	  capitalism]	  had	  created	  islands	  of	  security	  within	  the	  economy,	  with	  high	  waters	  all	  
around”	  (Jennifer	  Klein	  2004:	  58).	  
	  
	  
2016	  was	  a	  pivotal	  year	  for	  Canadian	  pension	  policy,	  in	  which	  labour	  negotiations	  were	  
characterized	  by	  an	  intensifying	  struggle	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  over	  the	  
future	  of	  defined	  benefit	  (DB)	  workplace1	  pension	  plans.	  On	  18	  September	  2016,	  Unifor	  
announced	  a	  new	  deal	  with	  General	  Motors	  of	  Canada,	  agreeing	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  
implement	  less	  secure	  defined	  contribution	  (DC)2	  plans	  for	  new	  hires	  in	  exchange	  for	  
new	  hires,	  wage	  increases	  and	  future	  investments	  in	  several	  manufacturing	  plants	  in	  
southern	  Ontario.	  In	  the	  public	  sector,	  a	  protracted	  impasse	  is	  currently	  unfolding	  
between	  Canada	  Post	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Union	  of	  Postal	  Workers	  (CUPW),	  in	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Workplace	  pensions	  are	  also	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “employer-­‐sponsored”,	  “occupational”	  
and/or	  “private”	  pensions.	  The	  term	  “workplace”	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  this	  dissertation	  to	  
refer	  to	  pensions	  that	  are	  provided	  by	  employer	  contributions	  in	  both	  private	  and	  public	  sectors.	  	  
2	  In	  a	  defined	  benefit	  pension	  plan	  (DB),	  a	  member	  is	  guaranteed	  a	  preset	  benefit	  during	  the	  
course	  of	  their	  retirement.	  In	  a	  defined	  contribution	  plan	  (DC),	  an	  employer	  will	  contribute	  
money	  to	  a	  retirement	  income	  account	  for	  each	  individual	  worker.	  However,	  once	  retired,	  the	  
worker	  must	  decide	  how	  to	  invest	  account	  to	  provide	  retirement	  income	  throughout	  the	  
remaining	  duration	  of	  their	  life.	  The	  employer	  is	  no	  longer	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  retirement	  
income.	  Baldwin	  (2008)	  highlights	  DB	  and	  DC	  sit	  at	  each	  end	  of	  a	  spectrum,	  where	  most	  plans	  




CUPW	  has	  refused	  to	  agree	  to	  introduce	  DC	  plans	  for	  new	  hires.	  This	  conflict	  has	  been	  
ongoing	  since	  postal	  workers	  were	  locked-­‐out	  in	  2011	  (Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016).	  In	  the	  
realm	  of	  public	  policy,	  on	  20	  June	  2016,	  Canada’s	  finance	  ministers,	  with	  the	  exception	  
of	  Quebec	  and	  Manitoba,	  agreed	  in	  principle	  to	  a	  Canada	  Pension	  Plan	  (CPP)	  
enhancement	  to	  expand	  benefits	  for	  Canadian	  workers.	  The	  enhancement,	  starting	  1	  
January	  2019,	  will	  increase	  income	  replacement	  from	  one	  quarter	  to	  one	  third	  of	  
pensionable	  earnings3,	  along	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  income	  
subject	  to	  CPP	  by	  14	  percent4	  (Department	  of	  Finance	  Canada	  2016).	  Consequently,	  
within	  just	  a	  few	  months,	  public	  pensions	  expanded	  as	  private	  pensions	  contracted.	  
These	  events	  illustrate	  the	  ongoing	  transformation	  of	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  
system	  (RIS)	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  define	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  
retirement	  income	  security	  (i.e.	  employers,	  the	  state	  or	  the	  individual).	  Accordingly,	  risk,	  
and	  who	  should	  bear	  the	  responsibility	  for	  risk	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  pension	  policy	  debates.	  	  	  
Within	  this	  context,	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  intersection	  between	  risk,	  
individualization,	  policymaking,	  and	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada,	  with	  special	  focus	  given	  to	  
Ontario.	  The	  political	  intersection	  between	  workplace	  and	  public	  pension	  systems	  is	  
thus	  a	  central	  focus,	  tracing	  how	  the	  decline	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  is	  resulting	  in	  a	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  government-­‐sponsored	  pensions.	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  pension	  policy	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  is	  investigated,	  
exploring	  how	  government	  policymaking	  both	  reflects	  the	  ideas	  and	  interests	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For	  example,	  a	  Canadian	  with	  $50,000	  throughout	  their	  working	  life	  will	  receive	  a	  yearly	  
pension	  benefit	  of	  $16,000	  rather	  than	  the	  $12,000	  they	  would	  currently	  receive.	  
4	  Increase	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  income	  subject	  to	  CPP	  by	  14	  percent,	  projected	  to	  equal	  




broader	  class	  struggle	  over	  pension	  provision,	  and	  how	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
structures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  saving	  for	  retirement	  is	  individualized.	  Ontario	  during	  the	  
period	  of	  1987	  to	  2016	  is	  used	  as	  a	  major	  case	  study,	  a	  period	  in	  which	  two	  rounds	  of	  
reforms	  to	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  occurred.	  The	  PBA	  is	  examined	  within	  a	  
broader	  legislative	  framework	  of	  policymaking	  that	  includes	  federal	  and	  provincial	  
jurisdictions	  and	  the	  interplay	  across	  policy	  fields	  such	  as	  tax	  law,	  trustee	  law,	  family	  law	  
and	  public	  pension	  policy.	  Indeed,	  changes	  to	  workplace	  pension	  legislation	  must	  be	  
understood	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  other	  policy	  jurisdictions	  and	  related	  statutes.	  
Pension	  legislation	  and	  regulation	  is	  viewed	  here	  as	  the	  codified	  expression	  of	  
the	  struggles	  between	  labour	  and	  capital,	  ultimately	  deciding	  by	  statute	  who	  is	  
responsible	  for	  managing	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement.	  Therefore,	  the	  question	  
arises,	  whose	  ideas	  and	  whose	  interests	  have	  shaped	  pension	  policy	  and	  why?	  In	  broad	  
terms,	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  pension	  policymaking	  reflects	  and	  
produces	  the	  individualization	  of	  risk	  in	  contemporary	  Canadian	  society.	  The	  primary	  
research	  question	  asks:	  Why	  has	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  shifted,	  and	  what	  
factors	  have	  driven	  this?	  	  
As	  illustrated	  by	  the	  recent	  events	  discussed	  above,	  employers	  in	  public	  and	  
private	  sectors	  are	  either	  exiting	  the	  provision	  of	  secure	  retirement	  income	  or	  are	  
attempting	  to,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  governments	  are	  taking	  on	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  
providing	  retirement	  income	  security.	  Given	  these	  trends,	  some	  government	  officials,	  
pension	  experts,	  the	  media,	  and	  others	  question	  the	  future	  of	  DB	  plans	  in	  Canada,	  




the	  cancellation	  of	  DB	  plans	  for	  new	  hires	  (Gindin	  2016a;	  Murninghan	  2016;	  Ryan	  2016).	  
Many	  predict	  Unifor’s	  concession	  to	  General	  Motors	  of	  Canada	  will	  have	  “widespread	  
ramifications”	  for	  other	  bargaining	  units	  within	  the	  auto	  industry,	  continuing	  the	  trend	  
that	  “the	  next	  generation	  of	  union	  employees	  must	  brace	  for	  a	  world	  in	  which	  they	  will	  
shoulder	  the	  risk	  of	  their	  company	  pension	  plan”	  (Gollom	  2016:	  1).	  	  
These	  trends	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  relationship	  to	  previous	  political	  economic	  
conditions	  in	  Ontario	  and	  Canada.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  and	  intensifying	  after	  the	  
global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008,	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  have	  shrunk	  
as	  employers	  have	  sought	  to	  offload	  the	  cost	  and	  risk	  of	  providing	  DB	  pension	  plans	  to	  
their	  employees.	  This	  is	  a	  trend	  that	  had	  been	  developing	  since	  the	  late	  1970s,	  where	  
pension	  coverage	  for	  men	  in	  Canada	  has	  shrunk	  from	  over	  50	  percent	  in	  1980	  to	  
approximately	  37	  percent	  today	  (Statistics	  Canada	  2015).	  Conversely,	  during	  this	  same	  
period,	  women	  have	  seen	  pension	  coverage	  expand	  from	  36	  percent	  in	  the	  late-­‐1970s	  
to	  just	  over	  40	  percent	  today,	  reflecting	  the	  viability	  of	  public	  sector	  pension	  plans	  
dominated	  by	  female	  workers	  compared	  to	  private	  sector	  jobs	  dominated	  by	  male	  
workers	  (Statistics	  Canada	  2015).	  	  
Overall,	  however,	  the	  rate	  of	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  is	  shrinking	  in	  Canada.	  
This	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  expanding	  use	  of	  other	  RIS	  schemes.	  For	  instance,	  new	  two-­‐tier	  
hiring	  policies	  offer	  a	  different	  retirement	  package	  to	  incoming	  workers,	  and	  hybrid	  
pension	  plans	  containing	  DB	  and	  DC	  benefits	  are	  becoming	  more	  common.	  Accordingly,	  




pension	  plans	  between	  employees	  and	  employers	  continues	  to	  characterize	  the	  present	  
pension	  sector	  in	  Canada.	  	  	  
	   These	  broad	  structural	  changes	  to	  Canada’s	  and	  Ontario’s	  economies	  and	  labour	  
markets	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  individual	  worker	  and	  are	  part	  of	  the	  changing	  
terrain	  of	  class	  struggle	  as	  unions	  are	  forced	  to	  make	  strategic	  choices	  regarding	  pension	  
benefits.	  The	  general	  trend	  of	  decreasing	  secure	  DB	  plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  creates	  
new	  risks	  for	  working	  Canadians	  who	  are	  saving	  for	  retirement.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  secure	  
DB	  plan	  means	  workers	  must	  initiate	  a	  savings	  plan	  of	  their	  own,	  developing	  financial	  
literacy	  skills	  and	  a	  general	  understanding	  of	  their	  own	  life	  expectancy	  and	  demographic	  
trends	  to	  calculate	  how	  much	  to	  save	  for	  retirement.	  These	  changes	  also	  require	  the	  
individual	  to	  consider	  how	  changing	  employment	  conditions	  of	  less	  secure	  work	  and	  
heightened	  worker	  mobility	  will	  impact	  their	  ability	  to	  save	  for	  retirement	  and	  shape	  the	  
decisions	  they	  need	  to	  make	  in	  how	  to	  invest	  for	  their	  golden	  years.	  These	  are	  some	  
ways	  in	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  is	  individualized	  onto	  the	  shoulders	  of	  
the	  worker.	  And	  this	  is	  experienced	  differently	  depending	  on	  one’s	  gender,	  race,	  age,	  
and	  other	  socially	  determining	  factors.	  
	   This	  process	  of	  individualized	  risk	  is	  linked	  to	  broader	  changes	  in	  labour	  forces	  
across	  advanced	  industrialized	  societies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  neoliberal	  regulatory	  
practices.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  labour	  markets,	  this	  is	  most	  noticeably	  observed	  
through	  transformations	  in	  the	  standard	  employment	  relationship	  towards	  flexible	  and	  
precarious	  employment	  within	  expanding	  service-­‐based	  economies	  (see	  Jessop	  2007;	  




characterized	  by	  the	  “rolling-­‐back”	  of	  Canada’s	  welfare	  state	  (Finkel	  2012;	  Rice	  and	  
Prince	  2013).	  As	  neoliberal	  governance	  practices	  responded	  to	  global	  economic	  events	  
beginning	  in	  the	  1960s,	  questioning	  the	  legitimacy	  the	  Keynesian	  welfare	  state,	  
workplace	  pensions	  have	  been	  challenged.	  	  
As	  such,	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  have	  impacted	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  
individuals	  experienced	  when	  saving	  for	  retirement.	  What	  is	  less	  clear,	  however,	  are	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  the	  policymaking	  process	  has	  shifted	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  and	  
the	  mix	  of	  factors	  that	  has	  driven	  pension	  policy	  change	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  This	  
dissertation	  investigates	  these	  issues.	  	  
Canada’s	  RIS	  is	  constituted	  by	  three	  pillars.	  Pillar	  One	  is	  comprised	  of	  publically	  
funded	  pensions	  (i.e.	  Old	  Age	  Security,	  the	  Guaranteed	  Income	  Supplement,	  and	  
spousal	  allowance);	  Pillar	  Two	  consists	  of	  compulsory	  public	  pension	  plans	  administered	  
by	  the	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  (i.e.	  Quebec	  and	  Canada	  Pension	  Plans);	  and	  
Pillar	  Three	  represents	  voluntary	  personal	  savings,	  such	  as	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  
These	  pillars	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  The	  focus	  this	  
dissertation	  will	  examine	  risk	  and	  individualization	  that	  occurs	  in	  Pillar	  Three,	  the	  
location	  in	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  in	  which	  this	  process	  primarily	  occurs.	  
This	  is	  because	  pillar	  three	  is	  voluntary.	  Although	  there	  are	  “minimum	  standards”	  
contained	  within	  provincial	  and	  federal	  statutes	  that	  must	  be	  followed	  by	  employers	  
who	  do	  provide	  a	  pension	  for	  their	  workers,	  employers	  are	  not	  required	  by	  law	  to	  
provide	  pensions	  to	  their	  employees.	  Historically,	  workplace	  pensions	  have	  been	  




and	  to	  control	  labour	  unrest.	  But	  if	  an	  employer	  deems	  that	  their	  company	  pension	  is	  
too	  costly,	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  provide	  one.	  Therefore,	  as	  economic	  conditions	  change,	  
many	  employers	  attempt	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  sponsored	  pension	  plan	  to	  
manage	  the	  volatility	  and	  costs	  of	  these	  benefits	  –	  which	  is	  what	  is	  occurring	  today.	  It	  is	  
here	  where	  the	  collectivization	  of	  risk	  is	  most	  vulnerable.	  	  
The	  Ontario	  government’s	  central	  role	  over	  the	  past	  six	  years	  in	  establishing	  
recent	  proposed	  CPP	  changes	  was	  catalyzed	  by	  the	  dire	  conditions	  of	  the	  workplace	  
pension	  system	  in	  Ontario	  (McFarland	  and	  McGugan	  2016).	  This	  “agreement	  in	  
principle”	  to	  enhance	  CPP	  benefits	  illustrates	  the	  policymaking	  relationship	  that	  exists	  
between	  different	  pillars	  within	  the	  RIS	  and	  how	  issues	  of	  risk	  traverse	  the	  boundaries	  
between	  different	  pillars.	  Put	  differently,	  if	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk	  amongst	  different	  
pillars	  is	  skewed	  and	  deemed	  problematic,	  new	  policy	  ideas	  will	  arise	  to	  remedy	  this	  
issue,	  politically	  connecting	  the	  policies	  embedded	  within	  each	  pillar.	  As	  such,	  the	  
individualization	  of	  risk	  that	  occurs	  within	  Pillar	  Three	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  
relationship	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  RIS.	  Therefore,	  the	  shifting	  relations	  between	  these	  
pillars	  are	  investigated	  from	  a	  sociological	  perspective	  to	  understand	  how	  risk	  is	  
structured	  into	  Canada’s	  RIS.	  	  
	   To	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  policymaking,	  risk	  and	  individualization,	  a	  
mixed-­‐method	  approach	  is	  used	  drawing	  from	  three	  data	  sources:	  interview	  transcripts	  
produced	  from	  twenty-­‐two	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  pension	  professionals;	  
descriptive	  statistics	  retrieved	  from	  Statistics	  Canada	  and	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  




the	  Legislative	  Assembly	  of	  Ontario	  retrieved	  online.	  Appendix	  One	  provides	  a	  full	  
elaboration	  on	  how	  this	  data	  was	  accessed,	  analyzed,	  along	  with	  an	  explanation	  and	  
justification	  on	  why	  this	  data	  was	  used.	  	  
The	  timeliness	  of	  this	  topic	  is	  paramount,	  given	  the	  multitude	  of	  social	  
implications	  that	  characterize	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking.	  Significant	  social	  
factors	  such	  as	  Canada’s	  aging	  population,	  low	  fertility	  rates,	  growing	  employment	  
precarity,	  deepening	  income	  inequality,	  the	  impact	  of	  expanding	  housing	  costs,	  the	  
movement	  of	  women	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  workplace	  due	  to	  child	  rearing	  and	  care	  taking,	  
—these	  are	  critical	  issues	  in	  contemporary	  Canadian	  society	  that	  connect	  to	  issues	  of	  
retirement	  income	  security.	  In	  this	  light,	  investigating	  the	  relationship	  between	  pension	  
policy	  and	  individualized	  risk	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  the	  present	  and	  future	  conditions	  
of	  economic	  security	  for	  Canada’s	  workers.	  	  
As	  Chapter	  Two	  will	  illustrate,	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  over	  the	  past	  
twenty	  years	  has	  escaped	  comprehensive	  scholarly	  examination,	  highlighting	  one	  novel	  
contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  Moreover,	  this	  analysis	  is	  made	  unique	  by	  the	  broad	  
range	  of	  factors	  that	  are	  considered	  when	  investigating	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  
moving	  beyond	  established	  political	  economic	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  state,	  class,	  capital,	  
and	  now	  gender	  to	  include	  the	  role	  of	  ideas,	  interests,	  and	  institutions.	  This	  breadth	  of	  
factors	  provides	  analytical	  nuance	  beyond	  narrow	  political	  economic	  and	  institutionalist	  
explanations	  of	  policy	  change.	  	  
As	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  latter	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  Canada’s	  RIS	  is	  




bargaining	  trends	  and	  CPP	  expansion	  discussed	  above.	  The	  research	  presented	  below	  
investigates	  the	  historical,	  political,	  and	  economic	  conditions	  that	  have	  shaped	  these	  
events,	  while	  more	  importantly,	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  risk	  is	  distributed	  
between	  individuals,	  employers,	  and	  the	  state.	  As	  this	  distribution	  changes,	  this	  
dissertation	  provides	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  how	  and	  why	  these	  trends	  
have	  developed.	  	  
Given	  this	  focus,	  this	  research	  contributes	  to	  sociological	  literature	  on	  the	  
intersection	  of	  public	  and	  private	  social	  benefits;	  Canadian	  literature	  on	  the	  history	  and	  
politics	  of	  workplace	  pension	  policy;	  scholarship	  on	  Ontario	  policymaking;	  and	  literature	  
on	  social	  policy,	  risk,	  and	  individualization.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  organized	  as	  follows:	  Chapter	  Two	  reviews	  secondary	  
research	  on	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context.	  This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  
introduction	  to	  Canada’s	  RIS	  to	  elucidate	  how	  retirement	  income	  systems	  are	  organized	  
and	  the	  implications	  this	  has	  for	  different	  policymaking	  jurisdictions.	  Following	  this,	  a	  
review	  of	  scholarship	  specifically	  examining	  Ontario	  pension	  policy	  is	  provided,	  
highlighting	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  has	  been	  under	  researched.	  
Discussion	  then	  turns	  to	  literature	  that	  examines	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  systems	  in	  
Canada	  in	  relationship	  to	  broader	  historical	  and	  political	  processes,	  often	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  welfare	  state	  formation.	  	  
Chapter	  Three	  introduces	  the	  theoretical	  lens	  and	  methodological	  approach	  that	  
are	  used	  to	  analyze	  risk	  and	  individualization	  and	  the	  policy	  process.	  Here,	  the	  




Anthony	  Giddens	  is	  discussed.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  introduces	  the	  
approaches	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  and	  ideational	  analysis.	  This	  section	  explores	  
the	  role	  of	  institutions	  and	  ideas	  in	  shaping	  the	  extent	  and	  character	  of	  policy	  change	  
and	  how	  these	  approaches	  can	  be	  used	  to	  analyze	  policy	  change.	  The	  chapter	  ends	  by	  
introducing	  feminist	  political	  economy	  literature	  to	  understand	  how	  gender	  and	  
inequality	  are	  structured	  into	  advanced	  industrial	  welfare	  systems.	  	  
Chapter	  Four	  lays	  out	  the	  historical	  and	  institutional	  development	  of	  pension	  
systems	  across	  industrialized	  countries	  following	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  with	  specific	  
reference	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.	  This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  historical,	  
material,	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  workplace	  pension	  
plans.	  Although	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  systems	  have	  emerged	  historically	  along	  
different	  institutional	  trajectories,	  a	  description	  is	  provided	  of	  how	  each	  system	  has	  
informed	  the	  development	  of	  the	  other	  through	  economic	  expansion,	  class	  tensions,	  
and	  labour	  political	  mobilization.	  	  
Chapter	  Five	  draws	  from	  interview	  data	  with	  pension	  experts,	  Hansard	  debate	  
transcriptions,	  and	  statistical	  data	  to	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  pension	  policy	  
development	  in	  Ontario	  from	  1945	  to	  the	  present	  period.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  pension	  
policymaking	  process	  in	  Ontario	  will	  begin	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  policy	  change	  affects	  the	  
extent	  and	  character	  to	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  has	  been	  individualized	  
(see	  Appendix	  Two	  for	  a	  timeline	  of	  key	  events	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario).	  One	  key	  
focus	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act,	  where	  following	  its	  enactment	  in	  1965,	  




2010.	  Another	  key	  focus	  will	  be	  the	  political	  dynamics	  between	  provincial	  and	  federal	  
policymaking	  processes,	  how	  the	  interplay	  between	  these	  two	  jurisdictions	  and	  the	  
distribution	  of	  risk	  can	  drive	  policy	  change.	  Throughout	  the	  chapter,	  the	  institutional	  
environment	  of	  pension	  policy	  development	  will	  be	  linked	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  broader	  
global	  political	  economy,	  in	  which	  the	  relationship	  between	  economic	  cycles,	  class	  
forces,	  policy	  ideas,	  and	  legislative	  design	  is	  explored.	  	  
Chapter	  Six	  examines	  the	  major	  drivers	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  by	  
considering	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideas,	  institutions,	  and	  group	  interests.	  The	  first	  
section	  provides	  a	  theoretical	  sketch	  of	  different	  variables	  that	  drive	  the	  policymaking	  
process,	  conceptually	  exploring	  the	  interplay	  between	  variables.	  Section	  two	  describes	  
the	  growing	  influence	  of	  pension	  professionals	  as	  a	  source	  of	  ideation,	  while	  analyzing	  
the	  relationship	  between	  professionals	  and	  interest	  groups	  (i.e.	  union	  and	  employer	  
clients)	  as	  another	  factor	  that	  shapes	  policy	  debates	  and	  policy.	  To	  ground	  the	  
theoretical	  discussion	  provided	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  sections,	  section	  three	  examines	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP).	  Institutional	  and	  
ideational	  processes	  are	  discussed	  to	  illustrate	  how	  particular	  ideas	  became	  policy	  in	  
Ontario	  during	  the	  work	  of	  the	  OECP.	  	  
Chapter	  Seven	  draws	  from	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  risk	  has	  shifted	  from	  employers	  to	  employees	  both	  with	  and	  
without	  workplace	  pension	  benefits	  in	  Ontario	  and	  other	  Canadian	  jurisdictions.	  The	  
first	  section	  provides	  a	  descriptive	  statistical	  sketch	  of	  the	  RIS	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  




disputes	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada	  in	  2011	  are	  used	  as	  mini-­‐case	  studies	  to	  
expound	  how	  the	  struggle	  to	  share	  risk	  is	  shaped	  by	  broader	  institutional	  and	  political	  
economic	  processes.	  The	  final	  section	  surveys	  what	  various	  professionals	  in	  the	  pension	  
field	  perceive	  as	  the	  different	  types	  of	  risks	  facing	  the	  pension	  industry	  and	  individual	  
workers	  and	  how	  these	  risks	  have	  changed.	  	  
Chapter	  Eight,	  the	  concluding	  chapter,	  returns	  to	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  
of	  this	  dissertation.	  Drawing	  from	  social	  theories	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization,	  a	  
description	  of	  how	  workers	  experience	  individualization	  in	  the	  risk	  society	  is	  provided,	  
highlighting	  the	  new	  responsibilities	  and	  ontological	  realities	  facing	  individual	  workers	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  deciding	  how	  to	  save	  for	  retirement.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  examining	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Ontario	  and	  federal	  pension	  policymaking	  processes	  as	  it	  relates	  
to	  individualization.	  This	  section	  questions	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individualization	  has	  
occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  private	  and	  public	  pension	  policymaking.	  Given	  the	  recent	  
proposed	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  benefits,	  and	  the	  leading	  role	  the	  Ontario	  government	  
played	  in	  establishing	  these	  reforms,	  this	  dissertation	  research	  ultimately	  reveals	  that	  
we	  have	  entered	  a	  new	  period	  pension	  politics,	  in	  which	  the	  public/private	  nexus	  of	  
Canada’s	  pension	  system	  is	  shifting.	  The	  struggle	  over	  who	  should	  shoulder	  the	  risk	  
associated	  with	  retirement	  income	  is	  contested	  by	  workers,	  employers,	  and	  
governments,	  and	  is	  contingent	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  union	  power,	  retiree	  
activism,	  business	  lobbying,	  and	  the	  ideological	  assumptions	  of	  governing	  parties.	  As	  the	  
broader	  context	  of	  pension	  politics	  is	  characterized	  by	  economic	  and	  labour	  market	  




leading	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  collectivization	  that	  challenge	  neoliberal	  policy	  proposals,	  
fuelling	  demands	  on	  government	  to	  provide	  more	  retirement	  income	  security	  as	  secure	  





CHAPTER	  2	  –	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
	  
	  
To	  navigate	  the	  sprawling	  research	  that	  touches	  upon	  pensions,	  this	  chapter	  reviews	  
scholarship	  examining	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  and	  across	  Canada	  and	  its	  
relationship	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process5.	  Literature	  on	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  
policy	  will	  be	  considered	  to	  illustrate	  the	  structural	  relationship	  between	  both	  pension	  
systems.	  First,	  however,	  to	  provide	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  pension	  systems	  and	  policy	  jurisdictions,	  the	  following	  section	  provides	  a	  
description	  of	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  (RIS).	  Following	  this,	  a	  review	  of	  
macro-­‐societal	  perspectives	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  systems	  will	  commence,	  focusing	  
on	  provincial,	  federal	  and	  other	  scholarship	  that	  investigates	  the	  relationship	  between	  
ideation	  and	  policymaking.	  This	  literature	  review	  also	  highlights	  the	  lack	  of	  recent	  
scholarship	  on	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario,	  risk,	  and	  individualization.	  
	  
Canada’s	  Retirement	  Income	  System	  
	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  is	  composed	  of	  three	  supporting	  pillars.	  Pillar	  one	  is	  
comprised	  of	  a	  publically	  funded	  pension	  program	  financed	  by	  tax	  revenues	  to	  eliminate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Theories	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  where	  I	  will	  also	  





poverty	  through	  wealth	  redistribution.	  These	  programs	  include	  Old	  Age	  Security	  (OAS)	  
and	  the	  Guaranteed	  Income	  Supplement	  (GIS),	  and	  smaller	  programs	  for	  spouses	  and	  
surviving	  spouses	  of	  OAS/GIS	  recipients	  (Klassen	  2013).	  Pillar	  two	  consists	  of	  the	  Canada	  
Pension	  Plan	  (CPP)	  and	  Quebec	  Pension	  Plan	  (QPP),	  which	  is	  a	  pair	  of	  compulsory	  
contribution	  plans	  based	  on	  contributions	  made	  by	  employees	  and	  their	  employers	  and	  
is	  a	  joint	  federal	  and	  provincial	  program	  administered	  by	  the	  Federal	  government.	  Pillar	  
three	  represents	  voluntary	  personal	  savings	  of	  Canadians,	  including	  employer-­‐
sponsored	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  and	  other	  tax-­‐assisted	  individual	  retirement	  savings.	  
This	  includes	  any	  registered	  pension	  plan	  (RPPs)	  provided	  by	  employers	  or	  unions,	  and	  
programs	  such	  as	  Registered	  Retired	  Savings	  Plans	  (RRSPs),	  Tax	  Free	  Savings	  Accounts	  
(TFSAs),	  and	  any	  other	  form	  of	  personal	  savings.	  	  
	  
Table	  2.1:	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  and	  risk	  distribution	  
	  
Pillar	  1	  (federal)	   Pillar	  2	  (federal/provincial)	   Pillar	  3	  (provincial)	  
Canada’s	  public	  
pension	  system:	  Old	  
Age	  Security	  (OAS)	  
payments	  and	  the	  
Guaranteed	  Income	  
Supplement	  (GIS).	  
Canada’s	  Pension	  Plan:	  
contributory	  Canada	  
Pension	  Plan	  (CPP)	  and	  the	  
Quebec	  Pension	  Plan	  in	  
Quebec	  (QPP).	  
Private	  retirement	  savings:	  
registered	  pensions	  plans	  
(RPP),	  registered	  retirement	  
savings	  plans,	  and	  other	  
personal	  savings	  (such	  as	  
defined	  contribution	  
pensions	  benefits).	  
Risk	  is	  distributed	  
across	  Canadian	  society	  
(funded	  by	  tax	  dollars).	  
Risk	  distributed	  across	  
Canadian/Quebec	  labour	  
force	  that	  contribute	  to	  
C/QPP.	  
Risk	  is	  either	  distributed	  
across	  contributors	  of	  a	  RPP,	  
or	  individualized	  within	  
personal	  savings	  vehicles	  







This	  project	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  one	  aspect	  of	  pillar	  three:	  employer-­‐
sponsored	  workplace	  pensions.	  As	  illustrated	  by	  Table	  2.1,	  in	  pillars	  one	  and	  two,	  risk	  is	  
broadly	  distributed	  across	  Canadian	  society	  through	  public	  pension	  systems	  including	  
OAS,	  GIS,	  and	  CPP/QPP.	  Pillar	  one	  (OAS	  and	  GIS),	  risk	  is	  assumed	  by	  the	  Canadian	  
government,	  or	  Canadian	  taxpayers	  in	  which	  funds	  for	  these	  programs	  come	  directly	  
from	  federal	  government	  coffers.	  Pillar	  two	  (CPP)	  is	  the	  largest	  pension	  plan	  in	  Canada	  
representing	  the	  largest	  collectivization	  of	  risk	  in	  which	  most	  workers	  contribute	  to	  a	  
pension	  plan	  that	  distributes	  risk	  across	  the	  entire	  labour	  force.	  However,	  pillar	  three	  is	  
where	  the	  individualization	  of	  risk	  in	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  is	  more	  
pronounced.	  This	  is	  because	  pillar	  three	  is	  voluntary.	  Although	  there	  are	  “minimum	  
standards”	  contained	  within	  provincial	  and	  federal	  statutes	  that	  must	  be	  followed	  by	  
employers	  who	  do	  provide	  a	  pension	  for	  their	  workers,	  employers	  are	  not	  required	  by	  
law	  to	  provide	  pensions	  to	  their	  employees.	  Historically,	  workplace	  pensions	  have	  been	  
offered	  for	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  such	  as	  retaining	  loyal	  workers,	  accessing	  tax	  shelters	  and	  
to	  control	  labour	  unrest.	  But	  if	  an	  employer	  deems	  company	  pensions	  as	  too	  costly,	  
they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  provide	  one.	  Therefore,	  as	  economic	  conditions	  change,	  many	  
employers	  attempt	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  sponsored	  pension	  plan	  to	  manage	  
the	  volatility	  and	  costs	  of	  these	  benefits	  –	  which	  is	  what	  is	  occurring	  today	  (as	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  This	  is	  where	  the	  collectivization	  of	  risk	  is	  most	  
vulnerable,	  and	  therefore	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  project.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  this	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  shifting	  relations	  




risk	  is	  structured	  into	  Canada’s	  RIS.	  The	  development	  of	  pillar	  three,	  as	  described	  above,	  
was	  the	  product	  of	  intense	  struggle	  between	  capital	  and	  labour,	  in	  which	  capital	  
successfully	  established	  private	  pension	  schemes	  as	  a	  major	  component	  of	  the	  RIS	  in	  
North	  America.	  However,	  since	  the	  1970s,	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  has	  been	  
diminishing,	  where	  many	  employers	  now	  seek	  to	  exit	  their	  involvement	  in	  workplace	  
pension	  plans,	  shifting	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  onto	  individual	  workers.	  Within	  
this	  context,	  particularly	  since	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  calls	  for	  expanding	  the	  CPP	  have	  
grown,	  in	  which	  Ontario	  has	  played	  a	  central	  role.	  Consequently,	  pillar	  two	  is	  now	  
playing	  a	  more	  prominent	  role	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  benefits	  in	  2016.	  	  
	  
Locating	  Ontario	  Pension	  Policymaking	  	  
	  
Beginning	  in	  the	  1980s,	  due	  to	  changing	  demographic	  patterns,	  journalists,	  scholars	  and	  
policymakers	  have	  described	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada	  as	  a	  ticking	  “time	  bomb”.	  
Corporate	  restructuring	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  constraints	  relating	  to	  economic	  
globalization	  and	  regional	  integration	  escalated	  this	  perception.	  Indeed,	  many	  have	  
written	  on	  pension	  systems	  in	  Canada,	  their	  political	  context	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  
retirement	  income	  security	  in	  the	  future	  (Bryden	  1976;	  Deaton	  1989;	  Myles	  1989;	  
Gifford	  1990;	  Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  1992;	  Weitz	  1992;	  Orloff	  1993;	  Battle	  1997;	  Béland	  
and	  Myles	  2005;	  Boychuk	  and	  Banting	  2008;	  Little	  2008;	  Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013;	  Shilton	  
2016).	  Yet	  in	  Canada,	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  has	  only	  been	  given	  limited	  




framework	  that	  have	  examined	  private	  pension	  system	  across	  Canada	  (Weitz	  1992;	  
Shilton	  2016),	  analyzed	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  public	  pension	  policymaking	  at	  the	  
national	  level	  (Bryden	  1974;	  Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  1991;	  Little	  2008;	  Myles	  2013),	  or	  used	  
as	  an	  example	  to	  discuss	  the	  social	  investment	  of	  pension	  capital	  (Deaton	  1989;	  Quarter	  
et	  al.	  2001).	  Indirectly,	  provincial	  political	  dynamics	  are	  mentioned	  in	  international	  
comparative	  research	  of	  national	  pension	  systems	  (Esping-­‐Anderson	  1990;	  Orloff	  1993;	  
Marier	  and	  Skinner	  2008).	  Some	  studies	  have	  given	  aspects	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  
more	  attention	  than	  others.	  Weitz	  (1992)	  provides	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  political,	  
economic,	  and	  institutional	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  
Act	  in	  1965	  and	  development	  of	  Ontario’s	  Pension	  Benefit	  Guarantee	  Fund	  (PBGF)—
Canada’s	  only	  government	  funded	  pension	  insurance	  program—in	  1980	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
broader	  discussion	  about	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada.	  Balcer	  and	  Sahin	  (1984)	  
briefly	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  pension	  reform	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Pensions	  in	  Ontario	  in	  1977	  and	  its	  implications	  
during	  the	  early	  1980s.	  However,	  this	  analysis	  is	  contextual	  for	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  their	  
project	  that	  conducted	  economic	  modeling	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  different	  pension	  
proposals.	  Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  (2013)	  provide	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  historical	  
development	  of	  Ontario	  pension	  law	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  PBA	  and	  successive	  rounds	  of	  
legislative	  reform	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Other	  historical	  accounts	  of	  pension	  
policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  can	  be	  found	  in	  commissioned	  reports,	  including	  the	  Haley	  




Indeed,	  one	  must	  draw	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines	  and	  literature	  sources	  to	  
piece	  together	  an	  account	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  from	  different	  periods	  of	  
time.	  What	  is	  missing,	  however,	  is	  sociological	  scholarship	  that	  places	  Ontario	  pension	  
policy	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  analysis.	  This	  dissertation	  addresses	  this	  gap	  by	  conducting	  a	  
systematic	  analysis	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  up	  to	  the	  current	  period	  from	  a	  
political-­‐economic	  perspective,	  drawing	  from	  social	  theories	  of	  risk	  and	  
individualization.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  reviews	  relevant	  literature	  that	  speaks	  
to	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  systems	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  
	  
Pension	  Systems	  and	  Macro	  Societal	  Perspectives	  
	  
One	  overarching	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  political,	  economic,	  
institutional,	  and	  ideational	  factors	  that	  inform	  Ontario’s	  pension	  policymaking	  process.	  
Therefore,	  macro	  societal	  perspectives	  analyzing	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  
provide	  a	  useful	  starting	  point,	  in	  that	  they	  examine	  Canada’s	  public	  and	  private	  systems	  
together	  and	  draw	  comparisons	  to	  other	  national	  systems,	  often	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
welfare	  state	  formation	  and	  economic	  globalization.	  Within	  this	  field,	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  
focus,	  in	  which	  analyses	  use	  either	  institutional	  and/or	  power	  resource	  models	  to	  
explore	  the	  impact	  of	  industrialization	  and	  globalization	  on	  national	  and	  local	  
economies.	  Here,	  the	  history	  of	  social	  policies	  is	  brought	  into	  consideration,	  connecting	  
pension	  policymaking	  to	  labour	  markets,	  economic	  development,	  state	  politics,	  and	  the	  




	   In	  the	  Canadian	  context,	  Kenneth	  Bryden	  (1974)	  depicts	  both	  universal	  and	  
wage-­‐related	  pension	  policymaking	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  “politics	  of	  income	  
redistribution”	  and	  the	  “income	  maintenance	  for	  the	  aged	  in	  Canada”	  (1).	  As	  Canada’s	  
economy	  has	  industrialized	  alongside	  mass	  urbanization,	  new	  “patterns	  of	  demand”	  
appeared,	  pressuring	  political	  systems	  to	  respond	  (1974:	  11).	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
industrializing	  nations	  have	  seen	  similar	  policy	  outputs,	  policymaking	  is	  not	  
predetermined.	  Rather,	  policy	  outputs	  are	  contingent	  on	  the	  “processing	  of	  demands	  
through	  the	  political	  system”	  and	  the	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  these	  political	  systems	  
occur	  (1974:	  11).	  Broadly	  speaking,	  policy	  outputs	  are	  characterized	  by	  environmental	  
want	  and	  the	  “market	  ethos”,	  representing	  two	  major	  tensions	  in	  civil	  society	  that	  have	  
led	  to	  public	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada.	  However,	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  pension	  
policymaking,	  these	  “environmental	  wants”	  produced	  by	  industrialization	  encountered	  
deep-­‐rooted	  resistance	  characterized	  by	  Victorian	  notions	  of	  self-­‐help	  that	  legitimized	  
prevailing	  economic	  interests.	  Bryden	  concludes	  that,	  “public	  pension	  in	  Canada	  were	  
unmistakably	  stamped	  with	  the	  market	  ethos”	  (1974:	  1).	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Harry	  Weitz	  (1992)	  argues	  that	  industrialization	  is	  key	  to	  
understanding	  the	  development	  of	  the	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  
support	  workers.	  The	  workplace	  pension	  was	  the	  first	  program	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  increasing	  leisure	  time	  offered	  by	  industrialized	  automation,	  expanding	  
life	  expectancy	  and	  general	  acceptance	  of	  retirement	  as	  a	  normal	  and	  desirable	  life	  
stage.	  Consequently,	  workplace	  pensions	  developed	  as	  an	  institutional	  response	  to	  




particularly	  for	  emerging	  industrial	  bureaucracies	  corporations	  with	  large	  workforces.	  
However,	  Weitz	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  periods	  before	  and	  after	  WWII.	  As	  the	  
post-­‐war	  period	  unfolded,	  legislation	  took	  on	  a	  more	  prominent	  role	  as	  pension	  systems	  
were	  identified	  as	  having	  a	  clearer	  social	  policy	  objective.	  During	  this	  period,	  minimum	  
standards	  legislation	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system,	  
including	  the	  C/QPP,	  OAS	  and	  GIS	  were	  introduced	  as	  the	  number	  of	  pension	  plans	  
rapidly	  grew	  (see	  Figure	  2.1).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.1:	  Growth	  of	  Pension	  Plans,	  1938	  -­‐	  1988	  
	  
Source:	  1938	  –	  Industrial	  Retirement	  Plans	  in	  Canada,	  1938	  (Queen’s	  University);	  1947	  –	  Survey	  
of	  Pensions	  and	  Welfare	  Plans	  in	  Industry	  1947	  (Dominion	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics);	  1960	  –	  Pension	  
Plans,	  Non-­‐Financial	  Statistics,	  1960;	  1965	  –	  Survey	  of	  Pension	  Plan	  Coverage	  1965;	  1970-­‐88	  
Pension	  Plans	  in	  Canada,	  various	  issues	  (Statistics	  Canada).	  Cited	  from	  Weitz	  (1992).	  
	  
John	  Myles	  (1989)	  argues	  that	  examining	  old	  age	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  
political	  foundations	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  including	  pension	  policy.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  



























access	  to	  state	  entitlements	  premised	  on	  their	  age.	  Consequently,	  politics	  will	  
increasingly	  change	  as	  populations	  continue	  to	  age,	  since	  “…the	  contemporary	  welfare	  
state	  in	  capitalist	  democracies	  is	  largely	  a	  welfare	  state	  for	  the	  elderly”	  (Myles	  1989:	  
2)(original	  emphasis).	  The	  state	  therefore	  must	  reconcile	  the	  contradictory	  tensions	  
between	  the	  market	  economy	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  democratic	  polity.	  Pension	  policy	  
can	  thus	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  state’s	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  these	  opposing	  
forces	  and	  determine	  the	  way	  policymakers	  direct	  social	  policy	  within	  capitalist	  
democracies.	  Ultimately,	  the	  tensions	  surrounding	  old	  age	  security	  will	  not	  be	  
determined	  by	  demographic	  trends,	  but	  rather	  the	  direction	  and	  extent	  to	  which	  
political	  forces	  align	  in	  a	  post-­‐Keynesian	  political	  economy.	  In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  in	  
comparison	  to	  countries	  such	  as	  Norway	  and	  Sweden,	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system	  
was	  not	  well	  developed,	  due	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  income	  inequality	  amongst	  older	  groups.	  	  
As	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  unfolded	  in	  the	  1990s,	  scholarly	  analysis	  of	  pension	  politics	  
published	  during	  this	  time	  predicted	  a	  bleak	  economic	  future	  for	  older	  age	  groups	  (Gee	  
and	  McDaniels	  1991;	  Battle	  1997).	  This	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  “Great	  
Pension	  Debate”	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  to	  provide	  progressive	  pension	  reform,	  in	  which	  
labour	  groups	  and	  other	  activists	  pushed	  for	  a	  doubling	  of	  CPP	  to	  50	  percent	  income	  
coverage,	  up	  from	  25	  percent	  (this	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  
Although	  this	  campaign	  had	  developed	  considerable	  momentum,	  it	  ultimately	  failed	  by	  
the	  early	  1980s	  under	  recessionary	  economic	  conditions,	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  “claw-­‐
backs”	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  (1991)	  argue	  that	  the	  public	  pension	  




remove	  universal	  social	  benefits,	  shifting	  “responsibility	  for	  pensions	  to	  individuals	  and	  
employers”	  (Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  1991:	  469).	  Rather	  than	  bolstering	  Canada’s	  public	  
pension	  system,	  the	  federal	  government	  during	  the	  late	  1980s	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  
private	  system	  through	  workplace	  pension	  reform	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  
personal	  savings	  vehicles	  (such	  as	  RRSP	  limits).	  At	  the	  time,	  however,	  Gee	  and	  
McDaniels	  point	  out	  that	  the	  private	  system	  excluded	  more	  than	  one-­‐half	  of	  Canadians	  
and	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Canadian	  women.	  The	  authors	  concluded	  that	  pension	  reforms	  
attempting	  to	  place	  more	  risk	  onto	  individual	  workers	  threatened	  the	  future	  income	  
security	  of	  elderly	  Canadians,	  particularly	  those	  of	  women,	  thereby	  perpetuating	  
economic	  inequality.	  	  
Ken	  Battle	  (1997)	  also	  documents	  the	  attempt	  to	  claw-­‐back	  pension	  benefits	  
during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  Battle	  describes	  the	  policy	  actions	  of	  the	  federal	  
government	  as	  “social	  policy	  by	  stealth”	  (1997:	  531),	  whereby	  technical	  changes	  such	  as	  
partial	  indexation	  of	  OAS	  were	  used	  to	  hide	  increases	  to	  income	  taxes	  that	  few	  
Canadians	  understood.	  This	  targeting	  of	  benefits	  through	  stealthy	  social	  policy,	  
“…introduced	  new	  inequity	  into	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system”	  (Battle	  1997:	  532).	  
Unlike	  Gee	  and	  McDaniel,	  Battle	  points	  to	  globalization	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  pension	  
policymaking	  through	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  identifying	  factors	  such	  as	  government	  
deficits,	  debt,	  and	  stagnating	  wages.	  As	  Canadian	  businesses	  increasingly	  had	  to	  
compete	  on	  a	  global	  level,	  this,	  Battle	  contends,	  created,	  “…a	  chilly	  climate	  that	  froze	  
out	  advocates	  of	  larger	  pension	  programs	  that	  would	  require	  higher	  payroll	  taxes	  for	  




could	  limit	  which	  policy	  ideas	  were	  deemed	  “realistic”,	  altering	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
pension	  debate	  in	  a	  period	  that	  Paul	  Pierson	  (1996)	  described	  as	  the	  “politics	  of	  
austerity”.	  This	  perspective	  runs	  parallel	  to	  analyses	  of	  Canada’s	  welfare	  state	  during	  
this	  time,	  in	  which	  the	  welfare	  state	  is	  described	  as	  existing	  in	  a	  state	  of	  crisis	  shaped	  by	  
economic	  globalization	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  	  
Myles	  (2013),	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  describes	  the	  reform	  attempts	  of	  the	  
1980s	  and	  1990s	  as	  a	  series	  of	  failed	  assaults	  on	  the	  “universality”	  of	  the	  pension	  
system.	  Mulroney	  and	  Chrétien	  both	  attempted	  to	  introduce	  “targeted”	  measures	  
based	  on	  means-­‐testing	  that	  ultimately	  failed,	  illustrating	  what	  Myles	  views	  as	  the	  
“path-­‐dependency”	  of	  Canada’s	  pension	  structure	  that	  have	  made	  policy	  reform	  difficult	  
(2013:	  324).	  A	  broad	  consensus	  of	  oppositional	  forces	  that	  spanned	  from	  the	  left	  to	  
right	  (embodied	  through	  the	  Retirement	  Income	  Coalition)	  stymied	  these	  attempted	  
reforms.	  Instead,	  Canada’s	  pension	  policy	  has	  not	  undergone	  any	  significant	  change,	  but	  
rather	  “drift”	  –	  small	  incremental	  changes	  that	  maintain	  the	  existing	  system6.	  In	  
opposition	  to	  Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  (1991),	  and	  Battle’s	  (1997)	  earlier	  prediction	  that	  
reforms	  would	  perpetuate	  or	  even	  deepen	  inequality	  in	  Canada’s	  pension	  systems	  
compared	  to	  other	  advanced	  industrial	  countries,	  Myles	  highlights	  how	  Canada’s	  
pension	  system	  has	  been	  effective	  at	  keeping	  seniors	  out	  of	  poverty	  while	  costing	  less7.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  argument	  is	  similar	  to	  Béland	  and	  Myles	  (2005),	  arguing,	  “relatively	  little	  has	  changed	  to	  
the	  basic	  pension	  design	  constructed	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s”	  (p.	  253).	  
7	  This	  has	  occurred	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Since	  Canada	  did	  not	  implement	  a	  “pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go”	  
system	  in	  which	  current	  government	  pensions	  are	  funded	  by	  tax	  deductions	  from	  current	  
workers,	  instead	  using	  general	  tax	  revenue	  to	  fund	  OAS	  and	  GIS,	  the	  burden	  for	  paying	  pensions	  
is	  distributed	  more	  broadly,	  avoiding	  intergenerational	  tensions	  of	  redistribution.	  This	  will	  be	  




Although	  Banting	  and	  Myles	  (2013)	  contend	  that	  redistributive	  politics	  in	  Canada	  have	  
“faded”	  and	  resulted	  in	  deepening	  inequality	  in	  the	  new	  millennium,	  “The	  core	  
architecture	  that	  has	  reduced	  poverty	  and	  maintained	  retirement	  living	  standards	  
among	  Canadian	  seniors	  remains	  largely	  intact”	  (Myles	  2013:	  313).	  This	  was	  also	  the	  
case	  in	  other	  industrial	  democratic	  societies,	  where	  the	  push	  to	  privatize	  pension	  policy	  
faced	  considerable	  resistance	  from	  activists,	  voters,	  and	  researchers,	  demonstrating	  the	  
resistance	  of	  pension	  politics	  to	  neoliberal	  ideas	  (Blackburn	  2002).	  Béland	  and	  Myles	  
(2005)	  contend	  neoliberal	  pension	  reformers	  in	  Canada	  have	  been	  unsuccessful	  since	  
they	  face	  the	  “challenge	  of	  legitimacy”	  when	  questioning	  the	  fairness	  of	  Canada’s	  
system.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  goes	  to	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  the	  
income	  ladder,	  “providing	  precious	  little	  room	  for	  such	  a	  rhetoric	  [of	  unfairness]	  to	  take	  
hold”	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005:	  254).	  	  
This	  literature	  describes	  important	  political,	  economic	  and	  institutional	  factors	  
that	  have	  driven	  Canadian	  pension	  policy	  during	  different	  historical	  periods.	  However,	  
the	  tendency	  of	  existing	  scholarship	  to	  claim	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada	  
is	  characterized	  by	  policy	  “drift”	  and	  “path-­‐dependency”	  is	  disputed	  by	  events	  in	  2016	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  One	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  
factors	  that	  have	  established	  a	  new	  period	  of	  pension	  policymaking,	  a	  period	  in	  which	  
policy	  change	  has	  accelerated	  beyond	  the	  status	  of	  “drift”.	  Moreover,	  the	  scholarship	  
reviewed	  here	  analyzes	  provincial	  pension	  policymaking	  processes	  through	  a	  national	  
lens,	  thus	  overlooking	  many	  local	  factors	  that	  inform	  national	  pension	  debates.	  This	  




novel	  analytical	  starting	  point	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada	  in	  recent	  
scholarship.	  	  
	  
Ideation	  and	  Pension	  Policy	  
	  
In	  recent	  years,	  scholarship	  on	  pension	  policy	  has	  emphasized	  the	  important	  role	  of	  
ideas	  in	  policymaking,	  thus	  providing	  a	  new	  methodological	  contribution	  to	  the	  study	  of	  
policy	  change,	  while	  critiquing	  the	  institutional	  and	  class	  focus	  of	  macro-­‐societal	  
perspectives.	  For	  example,	  Babich	  and	  Béland	  (2009)	  analyze	  the	  pension	  reforms	  that	  
led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Canadian	  and	  Quebec	  pension	  policies	  (C/QPP)	  during	  the	  
1960s	  through	  the	  explicit	  consideration	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  ideas	  on	  policy	  change.	  Here,	  
institutional	  factors	  (such	  as	  the	  development	  of	  Canadian	  federalism	  and	  electoral	  
conditions)	  and	  economic	  factors	  (such	  as	  rising	  inflation)	  are	  identified	  as	  conditions	  
that	  propelled	  policymakers	  to	  explore	  new	  ideas	  concerning	  economic	  and	  social	  policy	  
(Babich	  and	  Béland	  2009:	  256).	  These	  authors	  contend	  that	  the	  new	  ideas	  that	  emerged	  
during	  this	  period	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  during	  the	  policymaking	  process	  that	  established	  
the	  C/QPP	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  illustrating	  “how	  paying	  systematic	  attention	  to	  ideas	  can	  
enrich	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  change”	  (2009:	  254).	  	  
Likewise,	  Bradford	  (2000)	  examines	  the	  policy	  influence	  of	  economic	  ideas	  on	  
major	  policy	  changes	  in	  Canada.	  Why	  did	  certain	  economic	  ideas	  prevail	  at	  critical	  policy	  
junctures	  during	  the	  postwar	  period	  over	  that	  of	  others,	  leading	  to	  the	  institutional	  




ideas	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  analytical	  focus	  to	  explain	  policy	  change,	  Bradford	  mapped	  
“the	  flow	  of	  new	  ideas	  through	  political	  institutions	  bounded	  by	  economic	  structures”	  
(2000:	  51).	  Although	  he	  concludes	  economic-­‐structural	  and	  institutional-­‐political	  factors	  
“determine	  which	  ideas	  really	  make	  a	  difference”	  (Bradford	  2000:	  74),	  the	  analytical	  
focus	  on	  ideas	  provides	  a	  broader	  examination	  about	  social	  policy	  change	  and	  the	  
relationship	  between	  ideas,	  interests	  and	  institutions.	  	  
The	  trend	  towards	  ideation	  to	  explain	  pension	  change	  is	  also	  exemplified	  in	  Jane	  
Jenson’s	  (2013)	  recent	  scholarship	  that	  investigates	  the	  political	  drivers	  of	  Canada’s	  
welfare	  regime	  by	  analyzing	  “institutions,	  instruments,	  and	  ideas”	  (2014:	  43).	  Political	  
actors	  operate	  in	  and	  are	  limited	  by	  their	  institutional	  context,	  providing	  the	  toolbox	  of	  
policy	  instruments	  that	  are	  available.	  But	  these	  political	  actors,	  Jenson	  argues,	  are	  
influenced	  by	  two	  sets	  of	  ideas:	  (a)	  the	  constitutional	  division	  of	  powers	  and	  relationship	  
of	  communities	  set	  out	  by	  federalism;	  and	  (b)	  ideas	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  
mix	  of	  responsibilities	  for	  producing	  welfare	  (between	  markets,	  families,	  the	  voluntary	  
sector	  and	  the	  state)	  (Jenson	  2014:	  43-­‐44).	  These	  ideas	  subsequently	  “refract”	  decisions	  
around	  policy	  reform.	  
To	  defend	  her	  use	  of	  ideational	  analysis,	  Jenson	  describes	  how	  previous	  
Canadian	  scholars	  such	  as	  John	  Porter	  and	  Gad	  Harowitz	  operationalized	  the	  ‘power-­‐
resource	  approach’	  to	  explain	  the	  politics	  of	  Canada’s	  welfare	  state.	  The	  power	  resource	  
approach	  identified	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  success	  rates	  of	  left	  parties	  aligned	  with	  
unions	  and	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  spending.	  Esping-­‐Anderson	  (1990)	  adopted	  both	  power-­‐




link	  between	  political	  coalitions	  and	  institutional	  governing	  frameworks.	  Institutions	  
such	  as	  federalism	  have	  structured	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  CCF-­‐NDP	  as	  a	  third	  political	  
party	  have	  asserted	  reformist	  pressures,	  while	  also	  identifying	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  
institutional	  arrangements,	  such	  as	  the	  political	  jurisdiction	  imposed	  by	  federalism	  
originating	  in	  the	  British	  North	  America	  Act.	  These	  approaches	  critiqued	  earlier	  
functionalist	  approaches	  by	  examining	  the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  changes,	  rather	  
than	  simply	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  determinants.	  However,	  Jenson	  claims	  that	  power-­‐
resource	  and	  new	  institutionalist	  approaches	  are,	  “…less	  helpful	  in	  accounting	  for	  
change	  over	  time”	  (2013:	  45).	  
	   A	  distinction	  is	  made	  between	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  following	  WWII	  
when	  Canada	  established	  its	  social	  infrastructure	  –	  such	  as	  retirement	  provision,	  public	  
health	  care,	  unemployment	  insurance	  and	  family	  allowance	  –	  and	  the	  politics	  following	  
the	  1970s	  of	  welfare	  state	  retrenchment.	  This	  new	  wave	  of	  the	  “politics	  of	  distribution”	  
began	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  with	  neoliberal	  reform	  and	  the	  “rolling	  back”	  of	  social	  benefits.	  
Rather	  than	  a	  creative	  political	  process	  of	  welfare	  development	  based	  on	  class	  politics,	  
the	  welfare	  politics	  following	  the	  1980s	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  interest	  groups	  
and	  the	  tightening	  of	  eligibility	  –	  for	  example,	  a	  politics	  dominated	  by	  pensioner	  groups	  
instead	  of	  unions	  (Jenson	  2014:	  45).	  However,	  Jenson	  notes	  that	  writers	  of	  this	  ‘new	  
politics’	  (such	  as	  Pierson	  1996;	  Maioni	  1997;	  and	  Banting	  2006)	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  retrenchment	  was	  occurring	  rather	  than	  giving	  attention	  to	  
goals	  –	  i.e.	  the	  ideas	  for	  achieving	  a	  new	  vision	  for	  a	  new	  social	  architecture.	  These	  




based	  on	  their	  particular	  notion	  of	  social	  architecture.	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  (2011)	  argue	  that	  
ideation	  serves	  to	  frame	  and	  problematize	  an	  important	  issue	  and	  to	  pose	  a	  set	  of	  
alternatives.	  Similarly,	  Jenson	  also	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  how	  political	  groups	  
frame	  issues,	  claiming:	  “…the	  ways	  in	  which	  political	  actors	  interpret	  problems	  and	  
identify	  solutions	  are	  important”	  (2014:	  46).	  	  By	  bringing	  ideation	  into	  the	  analytical	  mix	  
with	  institutions	  and	  policy	  instruments,	  Jenson	  asserts	  one	  can	  better	  explain	  policy	  
change	  over	  time.	  	  
	   The	  inclusion	  of	  ideation	  into	  the	  examination	  of	  social	  policy	  broadens	  the	  
factors	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  why	  specific	  policy	  changes	  occur,	  deepening	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  institutions,	  political	  actors	  and	  interest	  
groups.	  Accordingly,	  one	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  it	  examines	  ideation	  as	  
an	  important	  factor	  that	  drives	  the	  policymaking	  process	  in	  Ontario.	  However,	  this	  
dissertation	  moves	  beyond	  the	  claim	  that	  ideas	  are	  important	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  policy	  
change	  by	  providing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  how	  actors	  interpret	  problems	  and	  
identify	  solutions.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  exploring	  the	  institutional	  tensions	  between	  
different	  “political	  actors”	  (Jenson	  2013),	  differentiating	  between	  policy	  advisors,	  
regulators,	  political	  staff	  and	  research	  consultants.	  Indeed,	  government	  officials	  
involved	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process	  is	  a	  heterogeneous	  group,	  located	  within	  different	  
institutional	  locales	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  state,	  each	  with	  different	  professional	  
mandates.	  Exploring	  the	  ideas	  of	  these	  different	  groups	  provide	  new	  insight	  into	  







The	  scholarship	  reviewed	  in	  this	  chapter	  contextualizes	  the	  macro-­‐societal	  factors	  that	  
shape	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  systems	  in	  Canada	  and	  scholars	  that	  have	  investigated	  the	  
role	  of	  ideation	  to	  analyze	  pension	  and	  social	  policy	  change	  in	  Canada.	  Macro-­‐societal	  
approaches	  establish	  policymaking	  as	  historically	  situated	  in	  economic-­‐structural	  and	  
institutional-­‐political	  contexts	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  welfare	  
state	  formation.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  can	  be	  
examined.	  This	  literature	  review	  also	  highlights	  the	  gap	  in	  research	  on	  Ontario	  pension	  
policy,	  particularly	  since	  the	  1990s.	  By	  adopting	  ideation	  as	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  
pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario,	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  unique	  examination	  of	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  provincial	  policymaking	  in	  Canada	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  federal	  pension	  
policy.	  	  	  
What	  is	  also	  absent	  from	  this	  literature	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  risk	  
and	  individualization	  and	  pension	  systems	  (Beck	  1992;	  1999;	  Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  
2001;	  Beck,	  Giddens	  and	  Lash	  1994).	  How	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  risk	  understood	  by	  
policymakers	  and	  stakeholder	  groups	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  this	  shape	  
individualization?	  Put	  differently,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  pension	  policy	  reflects	  the	  struggles	  to	  
distribute	  the	  risk	  of	  income	  security	  in	  old	  age,	  how	  can	  Ulrich	  Beck’s	  concept	  of	  the	  
“risk	  society”	  be	  used	  to	  further	  understand	  processes	  pension	  policy	  change?	  The	  
following	  chapter	  will	  turn	  focus	  to	  social	  theories	  of	  risk,	  individualization	  and	  









What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  policy	  change	  and	  individualization	  within	  the	  context	  
of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  advanced	  industrial	  societies?	  More	  specifically,	  what	  is	  the	  
relationship	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  institutional	  
conditions	  that	  shape	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
individualization	  of	  risk	  for	  saving	  for	  retirement?	  The	  previous	  chapter	  reviewed	  
scholarship	  that	  considered	  how	  political,	  economic,	  and	  institutional	  conditions	  shape	  
the	  pension	  policymaking	  process	  and	  inequality.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  focus	  will	  shift	  to	  
an	  examination	  of	  social	  theories	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization.	  The	  overall	  purpose	  is	  to	  
establish	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  methodological	  approach	  that	  can	  examine	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  and	  policymaking	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  saving	  for	  retirement	  can	  be	  individualized.	  	  
The	  first	  substantive	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  social	  theories	  of	  risk	  and	  
individualization	  developed	  by	  Urlich	  Beck	  and	  Anthony	  Giddens.	  This	  section	  sets	  the	  
conceptual	  frame	  for	  this	  dissertation	  by	  discussing	  these	  theories	  of	  modernity	  to	  
describe	  how	  advanced	  industrial	  societies	  have	  transformed	  the	  relationship	  between	  
individuals	  and	  institutional	  structures	  of	  social	  provision.	  This	  illustrates	  the	  




occurred	  and	  how	  risk	  is	  individualized.	  The	  second	  substantive	  section	  develops	  the	  
methodological	  approach	  that	  is	  used	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
Here,	  historical	  institutionalism	  and	  ideational	  analysis	  are	  discussed	  as	  two	  
perspectives	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  policy	  change	  within	  a	  
broader	  political	  economic	  approach.	  Furthermore,	  this	  section	  discusses	  how	  ideation	  
can	  be	  examined	  within	  a	  historical	  materialist	  approach,	  arguing	  that	  although	  ideas	  do	  
not	  alone	  drive	  policy	  change,	  ideational	  analysis	  can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  how	  
notions	  of	  risk	  and	  processes	  of	  individualization	  materialize	  in	  policy	  change.	  Feminist	  
political	  economy	  approaches	  that	  have	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  pension	  
systems,	  politics,	  gender	  and	  inequality	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  These	  perspectives	  will	  be	  
summarized	  and	  critiqued,	  concluding	  with	  a	  discussion	  about	  how	  this	  study	  of	  
Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  is	  informed	  by	  principles	  from	  these	  perspectives.	  	  
	  
Modernity,	  Risk	  and	  Individualization:	  Urlich	  Beck	  and	  Anthony	  Giddens	  
	  
Risk	  
The	  concept	  of	  risk	  as	  an	  analytical	  problematic	  within	  social	  theory	  has	  dominated	  the	  
field	  over	  the	  past	  three	  decades.	  Social	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  scholarship	  has	  
examined	  the	  processes	  of	  risk,	  including	  approaches	  such	  as	  realism,	  constructionism,	  
phenomenology,	  and	  poststructuralism	  (Denney	  2005).	  Moreover,	  analysis	  of	  risk	  has	  




(Giddens	  1998)	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  finance	  and	  insurance	  industries	  in	  the	  private	  
sector8.	  	  
The	  breadth	  of	  this	  topic	  is	  reflected	  in	  what	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “risk”.	  For	  
example,	  many	  things	  can	  be	  deemed	  a	  “risk”	  if	  they	  pose	  psychological	  or	  physical	  
threat	  to	  a	  community	  or	  person’s	  health.	  This	  can	  include	  traditional	  risks	  such	  as	  war,	  
famine,	  and	  old	  age,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  recent	  risks	  such	  as	  global	  warming,	  nuclear	  
meltdowns,	  terrorism,	  pollution	  etc.	  Importantly,	  it	  can	  also	  include	  new	  risks	  that	  have	  
been	  produced	  by	  transformations	  in	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  family	  and	  employment.	  
Many	  scholars	  examine	  risk	  through	  the	  social	  transition	  from	  traditional	  post-­‐war	  
industrial	  modernity	  to	  post-­‐industrial	  modernity,	  occurring	  roughly	  over	  the	  past	  30-­‐40	  
years.	  A	  central	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  have	  become	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  
industrial	  society	  and	  thus	  reflect	  upon	  issues	  of	  personal	  risk	  more	  frequently,	  
impacting	  our	  actions	  and	  consciousness	  at	  an	  individual	  level.	  Two	  prominent	  social	  
theorists	  of	  risk	  are	  Urlich	  Beck	  and	  Anthony	  Giddens.	  It	  is	  this	  last	  set	  of	  social	  risks	  that	  
this	  chapter	  concerns	  itself.	  	  	  
	  
Modernizing	  modernity:	  emergence	  of	  risk	  society	  
There	  are	  three	  major	  concepts	  and	  processes	  of	  Urlich	  Beck’s	  (1992;	  1994;	  1998;	  2002)	  
social	  theory	  of	  modernization:	  “risk	  society”,	  “reflexive	  modernization”	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  an	  extensive	  review	  of	  different	  epistemological	  positions	  on	  risk	  and	  how	  these	  
approaches	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  different	  professional	  fields	  such	  as	  policy	  and	  insurance	  




“individualization”.	  The	  following	  sections	  elaborate	  on	  these	  keys	  points	  of	  Beck’s	  
theory	  of	  modernization.	  	  
The	  risk	  society	  represents	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  second	  stage	  of	  modernity	  that	  is	  
“post-­‐traditional”.	  The	  first	  period	  of	  modernity	  followed	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  in	  
which	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  premised	  on	  private	  property	  and	  technological	  
development	  was	  initiated,	  eventually	  establishing	  the	  institutions	  of	  modern	  industrial	  
society	  such	  as	  the	  nation	  state,	  corporate	  organization,	  nuclear	  family	  and	  class.	  Here,	  
the	  individual	  was	  released	  from	  feudal	  lords	  into	  an	  industrialized	  wage	  labour	  
employment	  relationship	  within	  an	  urban	  environment.	  Pre-­‐industrial	  risks	  such	  as	  
famine,	  war	  and	  old	  age	  were	  typically	  dealt	  with	  at	  the	  family	  or	  village	  level	  (Beck	  
1992;	  Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2002).	  	  
The	  risks	  posed	  by	  industrial	  society	  prior	  to	  the	  1970s	  were	  caused	  by	  
technological	  advancement,	  the	  expansion	  of	  wage	  labour,	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  
individual	  from	  the	  safety	  net	  of	  the	  family	  and	  community.	  These	  new	  risks	  included	  
unemployment,	  old	  age,	  work	  related	  injury	  and	  education.	  Subsequently,	  a	  new	  social	  
architecture	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  insurance	  systems	  was	  established	  to	  protect	  
workers	  and	  legitimize	  the	  pursuits	  of	  industrial	  capitalist	  society.	  However,	  Beck	  argues	  
this	  legitimacy	  eroded	  as	  industrial	  capitalism	  continued	  to	  expand,	  “creatively	  
destroying”	  older	  industries	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  new	  ones,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  to	  
establishing	  new	  risks	  posed	  by	  technological	  advancements	  that	  threatened	  personal	  
well-­‐being	  and	  the	  environment.	  The	  benefits	  of	  economic	  and	  scientific	  “progress”	  




The	  limitations	  of	  industrial	  society	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  different	  
modernization	  began	  during	  the	  1970s.	  Risks	  produced	  by	  industrial	  society	  –including	  
ecological	  disasters	  (such	  as	  acid	  rain;	  nuclear	  plant	  meltdowns),	  impoverishment	  and	  
military	  technologies	  (such	  as	  nuclear	  war)—eventually	  become	  acknowledged	  and	  
deemed	  problematic.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  moment	  the	  “risk	  society”	  appears.	  This	  uncertainty	  
becomes	  a	  new	  state	  of	  permanence	  for	  individuals,	  in	  which	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  risk	  
society	  represents	  a	  clear	  break	  from	  earlier	  periods.	  The	  emancipatory	  promises	  of	  the	  
Enlightenment	  through	  scientific	  and	  technological	  development	  are	  no	  longer	  viewed	  
as	  benevolent,	  but	  rather	  disruptive	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  human	  security.	  In	  the	  Dialectic	  of	  
Enlightenment,	  Horkheimer	  and	  Adorno	  (1947)	  argued	  domination	  in	  industrial	  society	  
was	  facilitated	  through	  the	  absence	  of	  reflexivity,	  where	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  
Enlightenment	  became	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy,	  legitimizing	  unbridled	  economic	  
industrial	  development.	  However,	  the	  continuous	  success	  of	  industrial	  expansion	  
ironically	  led	  to	  the	  risk	  society,	  thus	  compelling	  society	  to	  reflect	  on	  these	  very	  
promises	  of	  scientific	  and	  industrial	  development	  –	  a	  new	  form	  of	  disenchantment.	  	  
	  Unlike	  earlier	  risks	  of	  industrial	  society,	  these	  new	  modern	  risks	  were	  
experienced	  on	  a	  global	  level,	  rather	  than	  distributed	  along	  social	  class	  lines	  at	  the	  
national	  or	  sub-­‐national	  level.	  Instead	  of	  a	  distribution	  of	  goods	  along	  a	  social	  class	  
hierarchy,	  in	  the	  risk	  society	  there	  is	  a	  distribution	  of	  “bads”	  that	  transcends	  social	  class	  
and	  geographical	  lines,	  threatening	  the	  institutions	  of	  production	  and	  private	  property.	  
For	  instance,	  a	  nuclear	  reactor	  meltdown	  and	  the	  radioactive	  poisoning	  that	  is	  caused,	  




global	  warming,	  are	  risks	  that	  are	  experienced	  by	  all	  groups	  of	  society.	  This,	  for	  Beck,	  
signifies	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  second	  modernity	  premised	  on	  disorder,	  what	  he	  terms	  
‘reflexive	  modernity’.	  	  
	  
Reflexive	  modernity	  and	  the	  welfare	  state	  
Beck	  defines	  reflexive	  modernization	  as	  the	  ‘modernization	  of	  modernization’	  or	  the	  
‘radicalization	  of	  modernity’	  (Beck	  1994:	  3-­‐4),	  and	  used	  the	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  
transition	  from	  industrial	  society	  to	  risk	  society	  (Rosa	  et	  al.	  2014).	  ‘Reflexive	  modernity’	  
is	  therefore	  a	  theory	  of	  societal	  change.	  According	  to	  Beck,	  social	  change	  does	  not	  come	  
through	  revolution	  and	  moments	  of	  extreme	  social	  crisis.	  Rather,	  it	  happens	  unnoticed	  
and	  incrementally	  as	  industrial	  societies	  grow	  under	  orthodox	  industrial	  social	  forms.	  
Industrial	  forms	  destroy	  themselves,	  unplanned,	  creating	  new	  social	  relations	  that	  are	  
post-­‐traditional	  and	  premised	  on	  the	  individualization	  of	  choices	  within	  a	  context	  of	  a	  
risk	  society.	  This	  change	  is	  surreptitious,	  bypassing	  political	  debates	  and	  government	  
decision-­‐making	  (Beck	  1994:	  3).	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  Beck	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  
standard	  industrial	  employment	  relationship	  towards	  precarious	  and	  causualized	  
working	  conditions	  was	  initially	  overlooked	  by	  policymakers	  and	  social	  scientists	  while	  
occurring	  in	  different	  industries	  and	  occupations.	  Eventually,	  this	  shift	  in	  employment	  
was	  identified	  and	  reflected	  upon	  by	  various	  social	  groups,	  government	  officials	  and	  
researchers,	  but	  not	  until	  it	  was	  a	  well-­‐formed	  practice.	  These	  changes	  open	  up	  a	  new	  
path	  of	  modernity	  that	  is	  born	  from	  the	  success	  of	  industrial	  modernity.	  However,	  once	  




question	  industry’s	  ability	  to	  provide	  secure	  employment	  arise,	  thereby	  undercutting	  
the	  foundation	  of	  institutional	  legitimacy	  on	  which	  previous	  industrial	  relations	  had	  
been	  able	  to	  flourish.	  	  
	   In	  this	  context,	  the	  intersection	  among	  citizenship,	  welfare	  policies,	  and	  
individual	  choice	  intersects	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  risk	  society.	  In	  the	  epoch	  of	  
reflexive	  modernization,	  ‘traditional’	  welfare	  states	  premised	  on	  risk	  sharing	  and	  citizen-­‐
recipients	  become	  challenged	  by	  shifts	  to	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  globalization	  
(Edwards	  and	  Glover	  2001).	  The	  emergence	  of	  flexible	  labour	  markets,	  international	  
economic	  competition,	  global	  speculative	  capital	  markets	  (or	  financialization),	  and	  the	  
spread	  of	  multinational	  corporations	  has	  challenged	  established	  national	  economies	  and	  
traditional	  welfare	  states	  premised	  on	  a	  citizen-­‐recipient	  model	  (Beck	  1992,	  1999;	  
Giddens	  1991,	  1994,	  1998).	  	  Politically,	  transnational	  political	  regimes	  and	  emerging	  
international	  jurisdictions	  override	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  control	  of	  social	  
provision.	  And	  culturally,	  the	  shrinkage	  of	  time	  and	  space	  through	  communication	  
technologies	  facilitate	  the	  heightened	  convergence	  of	  cultural	  practices	  and	  lifestyles	  
globally.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  globalizing	  forces	  is	  the	  intensification	  of	  reflexive	  
modernization.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  expert	  knowledges	  that	  prescribe	  
what	  is	  good	  for	  citizens	  is	  demystified	  and	  questioned	  in	  the	  epoch	  of	  reflexive	  
modernization.	  This	  questioning	  occurs	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  as	  citizens	  increasingly	  
reflect	  on	  the	  new	  risks	  posed	  by	  globalization	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  to	  




choices…”	  (Edwards	  and	  Glover	  2001:	  5).	  Citizenship	  thus	  shifts	  from	  passive	  citizen-­‐
recipient	  to	  rational	  citizen-­‐consumer.	  	  
	  
The	  politics	  of	  reflexive	  modernity	  
One	  effect	  of	  reflexive	  modernization	  is	  a	  new	  politics,	  or	  what	  Beck	  calls	  “sub-­‐politics”	  
–	  that	  is,	  a	  politics	  from	  “below”.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  risk	  society	  means	  risks	  begin	  to	  
dominate	  the	  public	  domain:	  “What	  happens	  here	  is	  certain	  features	  of	  industrial	  
society	  become	  socially	  and	  politically	  problematic”	  (Beck	  1994:	  5).	  Industrial	  
institutions	  traditionally	  responsible	  for	  managing	  political,	  economic	  and	  individual	  risk,	  
such	  as	  the	  welfare	  state,	  can	  no	  longer	  effectively	  monitor	  and	  protect	  individuals	  
against	  the	  risks	  produced	  by	  industrial	  society.	  This	  uncertainty	  becomes	  a	  new	  state	  of	  
permanence	  for	  individuals	  in	  reflexive	  modernity.	  As	  reflexive	  modernization	  facilitates	  
the	  development	  of	  rational	  welfare	  consumers,	  Giddens	  and	  other	  Third	  Way	  
proponents	  assert	  the	  state	  must	  turn	  from	  providing	  social	  provision	  (i.e.	  ‘traditional’	  
welfare)	  towards	  actively	  promoting	  individuals’	  ability	  to	  manage	  risk	  (Giddens	  1998).	  
Here,	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  traditional	  welfare	  state	  becomes	  problematized	  as	  a	  threat	  
to	  the	  efficiency	  of	  markets,	  entrepreneurialism	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  citizens	  to	  mitigate	  
risk	  on	  their	  own	  (Culpitt	  1999).	  Third	  Way	  activists	  view	  collectivized	  social	  provision	  as	  
enabling	  ‘welfare	  dependency’	  and	  is	  therefore	  anti-­‐rational,	  inappropriate	  and	  harmful	  
(Edwards	  and	  Glover	  2001).	  Instead,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  should	  break	  the	  shackles	  of	  
prescriptive	  traditional	  social	  policy	  to	  enable	  rational	  citizens	  to	  actively	  seek	  self-­‐




Beck	  argues	  that	  threats	  and	  uncertainty	  created	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  risk	  
society	  has	  a	  democratizing	  power.	  Given	  new	  risks	  transcend	  social,	  economic	  and	  
geographical	  boundaries,	  there	  is	  a	  “potential	  for	  new	  alliances	  that	  provide	  heightened	  
opportunities	  for	  public	  participation”	  (Rosa	  et	  al.	  2104).	  This	  potential	  is	  also	  facilitated	  
by	  increased	  media	  coverage	  of	  global	  risks	  that	  depicts	  individuals	  and	  societies	  as	  all	  
belonging	  to	  one	  “shared	  space	  of	  threats”	  with	  no	  exit	  (Beck	  2009:	  56).	  This	  point	  is	  
particularly	  salient	  with	  the	  intense	  global	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  2015	  United	  Nations	  
Climate	  Change	  Conference	  held	  Paris	  that	  amplified	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  single	  global	  
community	  that	  is	  equally	  threatened	  by	  the	  destruction	  of	  global	  warming.	  Institutional	  
sources	  of	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  industrial	  society	  come	  under	  the	  microscope	  and	  
create	  openings	  for	  new	  sources	  of	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  from	  below.	  	  
This	  creates	  new	  opportunities	  for	  democratic	  political	  engagement	  from	  a	  
global	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  social	  movements	  and	  a	  growing	  NGO	  sector	  that	  
operates	  beyond	  national	  boundaries.	  New	  social	  groups	  and	  movements	  begin	  to	  
materialize	  around	  particular	  issues	  to	  problematize	  them	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  entering	  
juridical	  political	  and	  legislative	  debates.	  Environmentalist	  groups,	  business	  lobbies	  and	  
retirement	  groups	  organize	  around	  different	  issues	  beneath	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  
of	  political	  power	  and	  attempt	  to	  insert	  their	  interests	  into	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  
For	  example,	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  unions	  to	  represent	  retiree	  interests,	  seniors’	  groups	  
begin	  to	  mobilize	  around	  pension	  issues,	  forming	  associations	  and	  lobby	  organizations.	  	  
Beck	  argues	  that	  risk	  society	  thus	  becomes	  the	  management	  of	  ‘goods’	  (income,	  




meltdown,	  impoverishment).	  Older	  ethical	  and	  legal	  principles	  and	  categories	  of	  risk	  
management	  become	  antiquated	  and	  the	  old	  industrial	  political	  order	  is	  subverted,	  as	  
political	  action	  from	  below	  transcends	  traditional	  boundaries	  of	  the	  private	  and	  public	  
divide	  of	  the	  political.	  This	  is	  a	  crisis	  of	  industrial	  society	  and	  the	  security	  it	  supposedly	  is	  
able	  to	  provide,	  and	  thus	  provides	  new	  openings	  for	  political	  action	  based	  on	  
uncertainty.	  This	  uncertainty	  becomes	  a	  new	  state	  of	  permanence	  for	  individuals	  in	  
reflexive	  modernity.	  	  
	  
Individualization	  
Beck	  defines	  individualization	  as	  a	  “concept	  which	  describes	  a	  structural,	  sociological	  
transformation	  of	  social	  institutions	  and	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  society”	  
(Beck	  2001:	  203).	  In	  other	  words,	  individualization	  is	  an	  explanation	  for	  what	  is	  
happening	  in	  society	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  relationship	  between	  individuals	  and	  
transforming	  institutions.	  It	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  describes	  how	  people	  manage	  their	  
identity,	  status,	  and	  consciousness	  in	  this	  emerging	  context	  of	  reflexive	  modernization.	  	  
If	  reflexive	  modernization	  is	  the	  external	  expression	  of	  how	  to	  mitigate	  new	  risks	  
in	  a	  globalized	  world,	  the	  process	  of	  individualization	  is	  the	  internal,	  private	  expression	  
of	  globalization,	  where	  risk	  is	  experienced	  in	  everyday	  life.	  Whereas	  risks	  posed	  by	  pre-­‐
industrial	  traditional	  society	  were	  typically	  dealt	  with	  at	  the	  village	  or	  family	  level,	  
people	  must	  now	  experience	  risks	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  make	  decisions	  individually	  on	  how	  
to	  best	  mitigate	  new	  risks	  posed	  by	  risk	  society.	  Consequently,	  “People	  have	  become	  




mutable	  subjectivities,	  and	  crises	  are	  seen	  as	  individual	  problems	  rather	  than	  socially	  
based”	  (Tulloch	  and	  Lupton	  2003:	  4).	  This	  is	  the	  transformation	  of	  how	  one	  lives	  and	  
experiences	  industrial	  life.	  	  
Individualization	  can	  be	  both	  liberating	  and	  constraining	  in	  reflexive	  
modernization.	  Individuals	  are	  liberated	  by	  the	  de-­‐traditionalization	  of	  social	  class,	  in	  
which	  women,	  for	  example,	  are	  freed	  from	  the	  “‘status	  fate’	  of	  compulsory	  housework	  
and	  support	  by	  a	  husband”	  (Beck	  2001:	  202).	  However,	  to	  escape	  traditionally	  
prescribed	  statuses,	  individuals	  are	  constrained	  by	  becoming	  more	  dependent	  on	  the	  
market,	  thus	  infiltrating	  every	  aspect	  of	  one’s	  life.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  individual	  must	  
cobble	  together	  his	  or	  her	  own	  life	  and	  find	  “biographic	  solutions”	  to	  “systemic	  
contradictions”	  posed	  by	  risk	  society	  (Brodie	  2007:	  159).	  Put	  differently,	  collective	  social	  
problems	  are	  now	  viewed	  as	  individual	  problems	  requiring	  personal	  responses.	  	  
Traditional	  discourses	  and	  cultural	  practices,	  nevertheless,	  live	  on	  in	  the	  risk	  
society.	  Although	  individuals	  are	  liberated	  from	  social	  class	  and	  assigned	  statuses,	  
individual	  choices	  are	  still	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  “traditional”	  expectations,	  ranging	  
from	  religious	  values	  about	  marriage	  and	  family	  to	  understandings	  of	  a	  woman’s	  role	  
within	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  of	  life.	  So	  while	  individuals	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  free	  to	  
make	  life	  choices,	  this	  freedom	  is	  understood	  in	  one’s	  consciousness	  rather	  than	  
unfettered	  or	  unconstrained	  social	  behavior.	  The	  traditional	  institution	  of	  the	  family,	  
Beck	  argues,	  “is	  still	  extremely	  valued	  in	  a	  very	  classical	  sense”	  (Beck	  2001:	  204).	  
Although	  people	  are	  free	  to	  make	  choices	  about	  their	  family	  structure,	  individuals	  may	  




within	  the	  context	  of	  reflexive	  modernity.	  This	  tension	  has	  some	  explanatory	  potential	  
for	  women	  who	  “want	  it	  all”:	  i.e.	  a	  successful	  professional	  career	  and	  multiple	  children.	  
Beck	  defines	  traditional	  concepts	  like	  family	  and	  class	  that	  linger	  in	  this	  new	  context	  of	  
individual	  risk-­‐taking	  as	  “zombie	  categories”	  (Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2001).	  	  
Another	  constraint	  posed	  by	  individualization	  is	  the	  incalculability	  of	  risk,	  in	  that	  
the	  individual	  does	  not	  have	  the	  expertise	  and/or	  time	  to	  adequately	  consider	  all	  
avenues	  of	  action.	  Life	  changes	  thus	  become	  probabilistic	  and	  uncertain	  (Lash	  2001).	  
Individuals	  must	  often	  choose	  fast,	  make	  quick	  decisions	  for	  which	  they	  do	  not	  know	  the	  
outcome	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  make	  ‘reflexive’	  decisions	  that	  are	  qualitatively	  precarious	  
and	  metaphorically	  nomadic.	  Indeed,	  decisions	  about	  one’s	  retirement	  income	  security	  
are	  often	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  uncertainty,	  where	  one’s	  lack	  of	  financial	  literacy	  
facilitate	  financial	  decisions	  that	  lead	  to	  unintended	  risks	  later	  in	  life.	  	  
Beck’s	  theory	  premised	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  a	  second	  stage	  of	  
modernity	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  structuralism	  and	  of	  class	  analysis,	  or	  collectivist	  social	  theory.	  
This	  is	  because	  “…individualization	  is	  becoming	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  second	  modern	  
society	  itself”	  (Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2001:	  xxii).	  Collectivization	  is	  now	  constituted	  
by	  “reciprocal	  individualization”	  (Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2001).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  
rejection	  of	  class	  altogether,	  but	  a	  reconceptualization	  of	  class	  that	  is	  splintered	  into	  
small	  units	  where	  inequality	  is	  experienced	  individually.	  One’s	  consciousness	  is	  





Individualization	  also	  has	  implications	  for	  social	  policy.	  Brodie	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  
individualization—as	  a	  discourse	  and	  political	  rationality—has	  become	  embedded	  into	  
neoliberal	  social	  policy	  reform	  in	  Canada.	  The	  turn	  from	  a	  rights-­‐based	  and	  
redistributive	  model	  of	  social	  governance	  to	  one	  premised	  on	  the	  management	  of	  
human	  capital,	  social	  investment,	  labour	  force	  participation	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency	  
illustrates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individualization	  has	  informed	  social	  policy	  reform.	  	  
	  
Giddens:	  ‘high	  modernity’	  and	  ontological	  security	  
Anthony	  Giddens	  is	  another	  prominent	  social	  theorist	  who	  was	  a	  leading	  figure	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  social	  theories	  of	  risk,	  making	  significant	  contributions	  to	  early	  debates	  
identifying	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  risk	  society.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Giddens	  work	  is	  discussed	  below.	  
However,	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  dissertation	  will	  draw	  primarily	  from	  the	  theoretical	  
concepts	  of	  Beck.	  	  
Instead	  of	  using	  the	  term	  ‘reflexive	  modernity’,	  Giddens	  (1991)	  describes	  ‘high	  
modernity’	  or	  ‘late	  modernity’	  as	  the	  new	  post-­‐traditional	  order	  that	  has	  constituted	  the	  
distinct	  social	  forms	  present	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  societies.	  Giddens,	  however,	  focused	  
more	  on	  effect	  of	  modernity	  on	  the	  self,	  the	  ontological	  reality	  and	  the	  existential	  
dilemmas	  that	  are	  posed	  by	  high	  modernity	  in	  a	  post-­‐traditional	  society.	  This	  is	  the	  
connecting	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  broad	  social	  structures	  of	  modernity,	  exploring	  how	  new	  
forms	  of	  modern	  social	  organization	  and	  coordination	  that	  are	  shaped	  by	  economic	  
development,	  mass	  production,	  mass	  media	  and	  labour	  market	  development	  shape	  the	  




“apocalyptic”	  because	  it	  introduces	  new	  risks	  current	  generations	  have	  not	  experienced,	  
thus	  generating	  a	  malaise	  of	  existential	  isolation	  amongst	  individuals.	  Similar	  to	  Beck’s	  
notion	  of	  the	  risk	  society	  as	  the	  unplanned	  and	  disorderly	  destruction	  of	  the	  social	  
relations	  of	  industrial	  production,	  Giddens	  describes	  modernity	  as	  a	  “juggernaught”	  that	  
is	  unsteerable	  and	  escapes	  control.	  
	   There	  are	  three	  main	  elements	  of	  modernity	  according	  to	  Giddens.	  First,	  the	  
separation	  of	  time	  and	  space	  –	  time	  is	  standardized	  and	  coordinates	  organization.	  
Giddens	  describes	  this	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  “one	  world”	  in	  which	  communities	  are	  brought	  
together	  through	  communication	  technologies.	  Second,	  the	  disembedding	  of	  social	  
institutions	  –	  i.e.	  removing	  social	  relations	  from	  local	  contexts.	  Expert	  knowledge	  
systems	  replace	  localized	  knowledge	  systems,	  bracketing	  time	  and	  space,	  and	  deploying	  
technology	  and	  knowledge	  that	  “penetrate	  all	  aspects	  of	  life”	  (Giddens	  1991:	  16).	  Third,	  
reflexivity	  –	  the	  need	  to	  continuously	  revise	  our	  lifestyle	  and	  politics	  as	  individuals	  are	  
confronted	  with	  new	  information	  and	  knowledge.	  These	  three	  elements	  of	  ‘high	  
modernity’	  are	  thus	  characterized	  by	  a	  local/global	  dialectic	  in	  which	  global	  expert	  
systems	  are	  deployed	  and	  connect	  everyday	  consciousness	  with	  the	  globalized	  risk	  
society.	  	  	  	  
	   Similar	  to	  Beck,	  Giddens	  describes	  a	  modern	  world	  that	  nudges	  individuals	  to	  a	  
precipice	  of	  choice	  in	  which	  fate	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  action	  that	  is	  calculable	  in	  terms	  
of	  risk.	  ‘How	  shall	  I	  live?’	  becomes	  a	  daily	  concern	  that	  must	  be	  reflected	  upon	  leading	  
to	  a	  ‘calculative	  attitude’	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  action	  (Giddens	  1991:	  28).	  We	  thus	  




Giddens	  argues	  that	  security	  must	  be	  designed	  by	  the	  individual	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
‘protective	  cocoon’	  from	  the	  tribulations	  posed	  by	  late	  modernity.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  our	  
existential	  selves	  are	  altered	  and	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives	  are	  “radically	  altered”	  as	  
individuals	  must	  continually	  make	  decisions	  on	  how	  to	  best	  live	  a	  secure	  life	  (Giddens	  
1991).	  The	  personal	  experiences	  of	  ‘trust’	  and	  ‘security’	  become	  paramount	  in	  a	  
person’s	  life,	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  planned,	  or	  what	  Giddens	  calls	  ‘reflexively	  
organized	  life-­‐planning’.	  It	  becomes	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  moral	  issues	  to	  be	  pushed	  
to	  the	  side.	  Individuals	  must	  develop	  their	  own	  ‘life	  political	  programme’	  to	  mitigate	  the	  
threats	  to	  trust	  and	  security	  that	  are	  posed	  by	  high	  modernity,	  which	  leads	  to	  new	  
forms	  of	  political	  engagement	  with	  emerging	  social	  movements.	  This	  can	  be	  observed	  
through	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  ‘new	  politics’	  (Pierson	  1996)	  of	  welfare	  state	  restructuring	  and	  
the	  various	  social	  movements	  that	  organize	  around	  campaigning	  for	  a	  specific	  issue.	  
Examples	  could	  include	  an	  anti-­‐fracking	  organization;	  a	  pro-­‐life	  group	  that	  dissuades	  
women	  from	  accessing	  new	  contraceptive	  technologies	  and	  having	  abortions;	  or	  a	  
seniors’	  lobby	  organization	  to	  protect	  their	  defined	  benefit	  workplace	  pension	  plan.	  Put	  
differently,	  lifestyle	  choices	  must	  be	  continuously	  made,	  from	  voting	  for	  a	  political	  party	  
to	  dietary	  choices	  based	  on	  environmental	  and	  animal	  rights	  issues.	  Indeed,	  these	  are	  
new	  decisions	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  pre-­‐modern	  societies.	  For	  Giddens,	  the	  ‘life	  political	  
programme’	  is	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  emancipatory	  project	  of	  the	  Enlightenment,	  just	  in	  





Ideas,	  Institutions,	  Gender,	  and	  Pension	  Policy	  Change	  	  
	  
The	  political	  process	  of	  policymaking,	  and	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  this	  process	  
occurs	  requires	  other	  theoretical	  tools	  to	  explain	  why	  policy	  changes.	  Thus,	  the	  
theoretical	  approaches	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  and	  ideational	  analysis	  are	  
considered	  to	  theorize	  change	  within	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Furthermore,	  feminist	  
perspectives	  on	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  pensions	  systems	  and	  welfare	  states	  
more	  broadly	  will	  be	  discussed	  to	  consider	  how	  gender	  inequality	  shapes	  policy	  debates	  
and	  structures	  pension	  systems.	  	  
	  
Historical	  institutionalism	  
Historical	  institutionalism	  provides	  a	  useful	  lens	  to	  conceptualize	  how	  historically	  
constructed	  institutions	  condition	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  policymaking	  
process.	  This	  approach	  (Amenta	  1998;	  Immergut	  1998;	  Orloff	  1993;	  Skocpol	  1992;	  
Pierson	  1994;	  Steinmo,	  Thelen,	  and	  Longstreth	  1992;	  Streek	  and	  Thelen	  2005)	  is	  
predominantly	  the	  product	  of	  American	  Weberian	  scholarship	  beginning	  in	  the	  1970s	  
that	  views	  historically	  constructed	  institutions—such	  as	  government	  agencies,	  political	  
party	  systems	  and	  democracy—as	  profoundly	  conditioning	  the	  actions	  of	  policymakers	  
and	  interest	  groups.	  At	  a	  general	  level,	  institutions	  are	  viewed	  as	  both	  “formal	  
organizations	  and	  informal	  rules	  and	  procedures	  that	  structure	  conduct”	  (Steinmo,	  
Thelen	  and	  Longstreth	  1992:	  2).	  Institutions	  are	  a	  space	  of	  social	  struggle	  between	  rule	  




institutional	  rules	  enables	  “play”,	  in	  that	  rules	  are	  challenged,	  manipulated	  and	  interact	  
with	  exogenous	  forces	  (Streek	  and	  Thelen	  2005).	  Moreover,	  power	  is	  typically	  seen	  as	  
situated	  within	  administrative,	  state	  and	  social	  institutions,	  thus	  adopting	  a	  Weberian	  
notion	  of	  power	  (Skocpol	  1992;	  Amenta	  1998).	  This	  differs	  from	  Beck	  and	  Giddens	  who	  
view	  power	  as	  dispersing	  outwards	  from	  traditional	  sites	  of	  power	  such	  as	  government	  
into	  emerging	  practices	  of	  “sub-­‐politics”,	  or	  a	  politics	  from	  below	  characterized	  by	  
growing	  activist	  groups	  within	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  
Historical	  institutionalism	  belongs	  to	  a	  larger	  theoretical	  program	  termed	  ‘new	  
institutionalism’	  that	  represents	  a	  turn	  back	  to	  institutions	  from	  the	  ‘behavioral	  
revolution’	  in	  American	  social	  sciences	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  This	  behavioral	  
revolution	  rejected	  the	  ‘deeply	  normative’	  analysis	  of	  ‘old	  institutionalism’	  that	  
compared	  and	  contrasted	  analysis	  of	  different	  configurations	  of	  administrative,	  legal,	  
and	  political	  structures	  (Steinmo,	  Thelen,	  and	  Longstreth	  1992:	  3).	  During	  this	  time,	  
behaviorists	  argued	  that	  one	  should	  simply	  not	  only	  examine	  formal	  attributes	  of	  
institutions,	  but	  also	  the	  informal	  behaviors	  of	  political	  actors,	  attitudes,	  etc.	  to	  
understand	  motivations.	  The	  intent	  was	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  formal	  structures	  “of	  old	  
institutionalists	  and	  especially	  the	  reified	  structures	  of	  Marxist	  theories	  of	  capitalist	  
domination,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  actual,	  observable	  beliefs	  and	  behaviors	  of	  groups	  and	  
individuals”	  (Steinmo,	  Thelen,	  and	  Longstreth	  1992:	  4).	  This	  behavioral	  revolution	  also	  
reflected	  the	  broader	  trend	  of	  positivism	  that	  was	  penetrating	  the	  “deep	  culture”	  of	  the	  





However,	  beginning	  the	  1970s	  and	  into	  the	  1980s	  in	  several	  American	  social	  
scientific	  disciplines—such	  as	  political	  science	  and	  comparative	  historical	  sociology—
‘new	  institutionalism’	  emerged.	  This	  new	  approach	  embodied	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  
perspectives	  (such	  as	  rational	  choice	  institutionalism,	  organizational	  institutionalism	  and	  
historical	  institutionalism9).	  These	  perspectives	  represented	  a	  growing	  set	  of	  
approaches	  that	  were	  critical	  of	  using	  observed	  behavior	  as	  the	  “basic	  datum	  of	  political	  
analysis”,	  rejecting	  on	  methodological	  grounds	  that	  observing	  behavior	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
explaining	  the	  actions	  of	  governments	  (Immergut	  1998:	  6).	  “Behavior”,	  to	  the	  new	  
institutionalist	  is	  more	  complicated	  than	  the	  summation	  of	  individuals’	  preferences:	  
why,	  for	  example	  do	  political	  actors	  choose	  one	  definition	  of	  their	  interests	  over	  
another,	  and	  why	  do	  some	  political	  actors	  support	  legislation	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
maximize	  their	  own	  interests?	  
Unlike	  other	  forms	  of	  institutionalism,	  historical	  institutionalism	  emphasizes	  the	  
historical	  legacy	  of	  past	  decisions	  on	  policymakers.	  Scholars	  of	  this	  perspective	  point	  to	  
the	  path	  dependency	  of	  policies,	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  “institutional	  rigidity”,	  where	  
once	  a	  policy	  is	  institutionalized,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  change	  as	  there	  are	  different	  individuals	  
and	  organizations	  whose	  interests	  are	  to	  defend	  the	  ideas	  behind	  these	  institutions.	  
Some	  depict	  change	  as	  occurring	  abruptly	  during	  moments	  of	  crisis	  or	  significant	  policy	  
junctures.	  These	  moments	  are	  defined	  by	  intense	  political,	  economic	  and/or	  social	  crisis,	  
some	  exogenous	  force	  compelling	  policymakers	  to	  break	  from	  existing	  policy	  and	  
institutionalize	  a	  new	  set	  of	  policies	  (Steinmo,	  Thelen	  and	  Longstreth	  1992;	  Hall	  1993).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





In	  recent	  years,	  others	  view	  change	  as	  continuous,	  pointing	  to	  how	  change	  often	  occurs	  
incrementally	  through	  processes	  such	  as	  layering,	  drift,	  diffusion	  and	  conversion	  
(Campbell	  2004;	  Peters,	  Pierre	  and	  King	  2005;	  Streek	  and	  Thelen	  2005).	  These	  concepts	  
attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  institutions	  can	  gradually	  transform—
surreptitious	  changes	  that	  can	  often	  go	  unnoticed	  over	  extended	  periods	  of	  time—
through	  various	  processes	  of	  adaptation.	  These	  changes	  can	  potentially	  come	  from	  
endogenous	  forces,	  in	  that	  change	  can	  come	  from	  within	  governance	  structures	  of	  
decision	  makers.	  This	  is	  a	  place	  in	  which	  historical	  institutionalism	  and	  ideational	  
analysis	  (discussed	  below)	  can	  overlap.	  	  
Some	  who	  draw	  from	  historical	  institutionalism	  (Battle	  1997;	  Hacker	  2005)	  view	  
pension	  policy	  change	  as	  occurring	  incrementally,	  in	  which	  policymakers	  use	  different	  
strategies	  depending	  on	  the	  institutional	  constellation	  they	  find	  themselves.	  For	  
example,	  Hacker	  argues	  pension	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  changed	  through	  a	  
process	  of	  “layering”	  where	  conservative	  politicians	  pushed	  for	  new	  tax	  breaks	  for	  
individualized	  retirement	  benefits	  while	  advocating	  for	  a	  shift	  away	  “from	  traditional	  
fixed-­‐benefit	  pension	  structures	  toward	  higher	  risk	  investment	  accounts”	  (2005:	  63).	  
Rather	  than	  overhauling	  existing	  pension	  policy	  (which	  would	  have	  been	  fraught	  with	  
political	  opposition),	  Hacker	  illustrates	  how	  the	  Republican	  Party	  successfully	  introduced	  
a	  new	  voluntary	  private	  pension	  system	  that	  was	  layered	  on	  top	  of	  existing	  public	  
pension	  system.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  higher	  income	  earners	  being	  more	  able	  to	  benefit	  
from	  these	  changes,	  while	  pension	  coverage	  for	  medium	  to	  low	  earners	  has	  




Similarly,	  Battle	  (1997)	  describes	  Canadian	  pension	  reform	  during	  the	  1980s	  as	  occurring	  
by	  “stealth”,	  where	  the	  Conservative	  federal	  government	  surreptitiously	  made	  changes	  
to	  various	  policy	  instruments,	  such	  as	  the	  move	  to	  partial	  indexing	  from	  full	  indexing	  of	  
particular	  taxes,	  circumventing	  more	  contentious	  attempts	  to	  de-­‐index	  Old	  Age	  Security	  
that	  galvanized	  Canadian	  seniors.	  	  	  
Historical	  institutionalists	  also	  point	  to	  the	  timing	  and	  character	  of	  change	  in	  
pension	  policy	  as	  contingent	  on	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  governmental	  structures,	  
typically	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  For	  example,	  scholars	  discuss	  the	  “fragmented”	  structure	  
of	  the	  American	  federal	  government	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  state	  
and	  federal	  constitutions	  that	  has	  made	  the	  introduction	  of	  welfare	  policies	  difficult	  due	  
to	  the	  multiple	  “veto”	  points	  for	  oppositional	  political	  actors	  to	  block	  new	  legislation	  
(Skocpol	  1992;	  Orloff	  1993;	  Amenta	  1998;	  Lieberman	  2002).	  This	  argument	  is	  used	  to	  
explain	  why	  the	  development	  of	  the	  American	  welfare	  state	  has	  lagged	  behind	  countries	  
such	  as	  Sweden	  and	  England	  whose	  governmental	  structures	  do	  not	  provide	  similar	  
opportunities	  for	  opponents	  to	  stop	  welfare	  reforms.	  	  	  
	  
Ideational	  analysis	  
The	  development	  of	  ideational	  analysis	  as	  a	  distinct	  perspective	  in	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  
studies	  has	  grown	  largely	  from	  critiques	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  (Wier	  1992;	  Hall	  
1993;	  Lieberman	  2002;	  Campbell	  2004;	  Babich	  and	  Béland	  2009;	  Jenson	  2014).	  Various	  
materialist	  approaches	  (such	  as	  Marxist,	  rational	  choice	  and	  institutionalist	  theories)	  




viewing	  them	  as	  epistemologically	  less	  important	  in	  examining	  and	  explaining	  processes	  
of	  political	  and	  policy	  change.	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  (2011)	  argue	  in	  their	  edited	  volume,	  Ideas	  
and	  Politics	  in	  Social	  Science	  Research:	  “…as	  an	  object	  of	  scientific	  inquiry,	  ideas	  have	  
held	  a	  beleaguered	  status	  often	  derided	  as	  imprecise	  or	  placed	  lower	  in	  status	  than	  
material	  interests	  as	  motives	  for	  political	  and	  social	  action”	  (6).	  Ideas,	  beliefs,	  
understandings	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  ideation	  are	  difficult	  to	  examine	  empirically,	  
therefore	  often	  relying	  on	  theoretical	  descriptions.	  Rather	  than	  completely	  dismissing	  
the	  veracity	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  as	  a	  valid	  analytical	  approach,	  proponents	  use	  
ideational	  analysis	  to	  widen	  the	  epistemological	  lens	  of	  their	  institutional	  analysis.	  
Drawing	  from	  a	  constructionist	  approach,	  ideational	  policy	  analysis	  (Béland	  and	  
Cox	  2011;	  Heclo	  1994;	  Lieberman	  2002;	  Wier	  1992)	  contends	  that	  ideational	  processes	  
significantly	  impact	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  providing	  novel	  research	  opportunities	  for	  
ideation	  analysis.	  For	  example,	  ideational	  analysis	  examines	  how	  specific	  policy	  issues	  
are	  constructed	  as	  problematic.	  It	  can	  investigate	  how	  ideational	  processes	  provide	  
policy	  alternatives	  to	  experts	  and	  politicians	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  institutional	  settings.	  
Finally,	  this	  approach	  can	  examine	  how	  ideas	  “can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  cultural	  and	  
discursive	  frames	  that	  actors	  use	  to	  challenge	  or	  justify	  existing	  policy	  arrangements”	  
(Béland	  2009).	  As	  such,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  interplay	  between	  new	  ideas	  and	  existing	  
institutional	  rules	  that	  must	  be	  brought	  under	  consideration	  together	  when	  examining	  
the	  character	  and	  direction	  of	  policy	  change.	  
Lieberman	  (2002)	  discusses	  how	  ideas	  have	  been	  brought	  “back	  in”	  beginning	  in	  




discipline.	  The	  social	  sciences	  “utterly	  failed”	  to	  predict	  major	  changes	  in	  world	  politics,	  
such	  as	  the	  collapse	  of	  communism	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  paradigm.	  
Consequently,	  these	  shortcomings	  have	  compelled	  social	  scientists	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  
of	  ideas	  and	  ideology	  more	  seriously.	  Lieberman	  argues	  that	  policy	  change,	  which	  at	  
times	  can	  seem	  puzzling,	  “…lies	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  ideas	  and	  institutions	  and	  in	  the	  
tension	  between	  ideological	  traditions	  and	  institutional	  capacities”	  (2002:	  709).	  This	  
explains	  how	  a	  policy	  may	  outlive	  the	  conditions	  that	  led	  to	  their	  creation,	  but	  will	  
persist	  although	  they	  are	  dysfunctional.	  Put	  differently,	  this	  model	  rejects	  the	  
conception	  of	  policy	  change	  as	  a	  linear	  process.	  Instead,	  policy	  change	  is	  characterized	  
by	  a	  series	  of	  political	  orders	  that	  are	  layered,	  where	  institutions	  and	  ideas	  intersect	  in	  a	  
disorderly	  fashion.	  This	  approach	  explains	  change	  as	  a	  confluence	  of	  both	  the	  path-­‐
dependency	  of	  established	  policies	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  new	  ideas	  are	  able	  to	  
challenge,	  circumvent	  or	  alter	  older	  ideas	  that	  have	  already	  been	  codified.	  It	  is	  the	  
ideational	  process	  that	  will	  catalyze	  new	  proposals	  for	  policy	  change.	  As	  such,	  
Lieberman	  claims	  that	  new	  policies	  do	  not	  simply	  replace	  old	  ones,	  but	  are	  “layered”	  
onto	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  ideological	  paradigms.	  	  
Others	  also	  emphasize	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideas	  and	  institutions.	  Béland	  
and	  Cox	  (2011)	  claim	  “…ideas	  are	  the	  foundation	  of	  institutions”	  in	  that	  it	  is	  ideas	  that	  
give	  rise	  to	  actions	  that	  lead	  to	  routine,	  which	  in	  turn	  give	  rise	  to	  institutions	  (2011:	  9).	  
Similarly,	  Heclo	  (1994)	  and	  Walsh	  (2000)	  point	  to	  the	  “interrelationship”	  between	  ideas,	  
interests	  and	  institutions	  to	  provide	  a	  broader	  perspective	  to	  better	  account	  for	  change	  




policymaking	  as	  “social	  learning”	  to	  describe	  how	  social	  groups	  from	  civil	  society	  (such	  
as	  the	  media	  and	  interest	  groups)	  have	  successfully	  developed	  and	  implemented	  ideas	  
into	  policy,	  challenging	  some	  institutionalist	  state-­‐centric	  theories	  about	  policymaking.	  	  
The	  assertions	  made	  by	  proponents	  of	  ideational	  analysis	  hark	  back	  to	  earlier	  
debates	  between	  idealists	  and	  materialists	  about	  what	  drives	  historical	  social	  
transformation.	  However,	  this	  dissertation	  asserts	  that	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  can	  be	  
undertaken	  within	  in	  a	  broader	  historical	  materialist	  approach.	  In	  his	  definition	  of	  
Marxist	  political	  economy,	  Clement	  argues:	  “Ideas	  have	  an	  important	  place	  within	  
political-­‐economic	  accounts,	  but,	  unlike	  idealist	  approaches,	  which	  begin	  with	  values,	  
beliefs,	  or	  attitudes	  and	  from	  these	  explain	  society’s	  workings,	  the	  materialist	  approach	  
contends	  that	  the	  realm	  of	  ideas	  itself	  requires	  explanation”	  (1997:	  4).	  Indeed,	  idealist	  
and	  materialist	  approaches	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive	  if	  ideas	  are	  understood	  
as	  being	  linked	  to	  material	  conditions.	  Analysis	  of	  ideational	  processes	  allows	  one	  to	  
consider	  how	  notions	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization	  enter	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  
process,	  providing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  policy	  change.	  	  
Arguably,	  the	  strength	  of	  ideational	  analysis	  lies	  in	  its	  critique	  of	  institutionalist	  
approaches	  that	  treat	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  in	  an	  ad	  hoc	  way.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  
analytically	  separate	  the	  examination	  of	  ideas	  from	  institutions	  given	  their	  integrated,	  
symbiotic	  relationship,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  ideas	  should	  simply	  be	  ignored.	  If	  anything,	  
ideational	  analysis	  provides	  more	  textured	  analysis	  of	  policy	  change,	  providing	  
additional	  attention	  to	  the	  motivations	  of	  different	  competing	  groups	  as	  they	  work	  




pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario,	  ideational	  analysis	  is	  useful	  in	  inquiring	  how	  competing	  ideas	  
for	  policy	  reform	  motivated	  different	  stakeholder	  groups,	  from	  unions	  to	  the	  insurance	  
and	  finance	  sectors,	  and	  how	  these	  ideas	  intersect	  with	  existing	  institutional	  structures	  
of	  policymaking	  to	  frame	  particular	  issues.	  How	  did	  political	  actors	  interpret	  problems	  
and	  identify	  solutions	  when	  reforming	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  again	  in	  
the	  2010s?	  While	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  social	  reproduction	  and	  
economic	  expansion	  profoundly	  shape	  the	  ideas	  that	  emerge	  within	  policy	  debates,	  
these	  ideas	  must	  not	  be	  ignored,	  nor	  be	  viewed	  as	  epiphenomenal.	  The	  political	  and	  
economic	  framework	  outlined	  in	  this	  dissertation	  dismisses	  a	  rigid	  base/superstructure	  
model	  of	  some	  historical	  materialism.	  Rather,	  although	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  
policymaking	  process	  is	  embedded	  in	  and	  conditioned	  by	  political	  economic	  and	  
material	  forces,	  ideas	  are	  viewed	  here	  as	  constitutive	  variable	  of	  policy	  change.	  As	  such,	  
this	  project	  combines	  ideational	  analysis	  with	  institutionalist	  and	  political	  economic	  
approaches	  when	  examining	  Ontario’s	  pension	  policymaking	  process.	  	  
	  
Feminist	  perspectives	  
Feminist	  scholarship	  identifies	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  social	  policy	  has	  historically	  been	  
developed	  along	  gendered	  lines.	  While	  this	  dissertation	  does	  not	  specifically	  examine	  
the	  relationship	  between	  gender	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking,	  it	  does	  
acknowledge	  the	  constitutive	  role	  gender	  plays	  in	  this	  relationship.	  Therefore,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  gender,	  pension	  coverage	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  




role	  of	  gender	  on	  policy	  reform.	  This	  literature	  is	  also	  useful	  in	  conceptualizing	  how	  
inequality	  is	  structured	  in	  to	  pension	  systems,	  which	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  Seven.	  	  
	   McDonald	  (1997),	  Cheal	  and	  Kampen	  (1998),	  Gaszo	  (2005)	  and	  Kodar	  (2012)	  
discuss	  how	  senior	  and	  elderly	  women	  are	  structurally	  disadvantaged	  economically	  (and	  
socially)	  compared	  to	  men	  during	  retirement.	  Reasons	  relating	  to	  social	  reproduction	  
such	  as	  child	  rearing,	  caretaking	  for	  aging	  family	  members	  and	  economic	  reasons	  such	  
as	  unequal	  income	  compensation	  and	  limited	  labour	  market	  participation	  have	  been	  
identified	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  women’s	  poor	  pension	  coverage	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  
higher	  poverty	  amongst	  women	  during	  retirement.	  Because	  women	  have	  been	  and	  
continue	  to	  be	  predominantly	  responsible	  for	  the	  social	  reproduction	  of	  labour	  forces	  in	  
Western	  advanced	  industrial	  countries,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  participate	  equally	  in	  the	  
labour	  market.	  Even	  when	  they	  do,	  they	  are	  paid	  less,	  often	  working	  in	  occupations	  with	  
less	  prestige,	  with	  low	  pay,	  and	  poor	  job	  security	  (Kodar	  2012).	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  issues,	  unpaid	  work	  by	  women	  remains	  a	  problem	  revealing	  how	  
pension	  systems	  have	  been	  structured	  to	  maintain	  established	  male-­‐breadwinner	  ideas	  
of	  the	  household	  that	  has	  led	  to	  men	  being	  more	  secure	  than	  women	  during	  retirement	  
(see	  Gaszo	  2005;	  Kodar	  2012,	  Cheal	  and	  Kampen	  1998).	  This	  has	  aided	  in	  the	  
consolidation	  of	  power	  for	  older	  men	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  women.	  McDaniel	  argues:	  “The	  
paradox	  is	  that	  the	  development	  of	  public	  pensions,	  intended	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  all	  
in	  old	  age,	  has	  had	  the	  effect,	  together	  with	  recent	  social	  and	  economic	  shifts	  in	  social	  
and	  employment	  policies,	  of	  consolidating	  power	  bases	  among	  men	  in	  older	  




power	  structurally	  disadvantaging	  one	  group	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  other	  along	  
gendered	  lines.	  	  
Drawing	  from	  a	  feminist	  and	  political	  economic	  perspective	  to	  examine	  the	  
relationship	  between	  gender	  and	  shifts	  in	  social	  policy,	  Porter	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  
gender,	  “…has	  to	  do	  not	  only	  with	  ideology,	  meaning,	  and	  representation,	  but	  also	  with	  
power,	  institutional	  structures,	  the	  allocation	  of	  material	  resources,	  efforts	  to	  contest	  
visions	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  ways	  that	  material	  resources	  that	  shape	  women’s	  lives	  have	  
been	  distributed”	  (5).	  Consequently,	  gender	  must	  figure	  centrally	  within	  a	  political	  
economic	  analytical	  framework	  that	  draws	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  the	  tension	  of	  unpaid	  
domestic	  labour	  of	  social	  reproduction	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  market	  labour	  force.	  This	  
connection	  therefore	  has	  implications	  for	  state	  practices	  and	  policy	  change	  since	  gender	  
as	  a	  set	  of	  social	  practices	  is	  a	  source	  of	  tension	  between	  state,	  family,	  and	  work	  that	  
has	  played	  a	  determining	  role	  in	  the	  shifts	  of	  state	  policy	  from	  Keynsian	  to	  neoliberal	  
governing	  practices.	  	  
	   While	  this	  literature	  has	  primarily	  focused	  on	  public	  welfare	  state	  policies	  at	  the	  
national	  level,	  it	  is	  useful	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  private,	  employer-­‐sponsored	  workplace	  
policy	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  in	  Ontario.	  For	  example,	  the	  growing	  participation	  of	  
women	  into	  the	  workforce	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  role	  of	  gender	  have	  generated	  tensions	  
within	  the	  policymaking	  process	  at	  the	  national	  and	  provincial	  level.	  For	  example,	  the	  
Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Women	  Report	  tabled	  in	  1970	  drew	  national	  
attention	  to	  women	  living	  in	  poverty,	  highlighting	  the	  gendered	  assumptions	  of	  the	  




Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  amended	  the	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  that	  redefined	  “spouse”	  from	  
married	  couple	  or	  “man	  and	  women”	  to	  “two	  persons”,	  requiring	  Ontario	  to	  reform	  the	  
PBA.	  Also,	  the	  nexus	  between	  gender,	  home,	  education,	  and	  work	  is	  reflected	  in	  
patterns	  of	  pension	  coverage.	  Since	  the	  1970s	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada	  
has	  declined	  from	  52	  percent	  to	  37	  percent	  among	  men,	  while	  among	  women,	  coverage	  
has	  risen	  from	  36	  percent	  to	  40	  percent	  (Statistics	  Canada	  2015).	  In	  2012,	  33	  percent	  of	  
employed	  women	  and	  24	  percent	  of	  employed	  men	  aged	  25	  to	  54	  were	  covered	  by	  
more	  secure	  DB	  plans.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  larger	  percentage	  of	  women	  work	  in	  public	  
sector	  jobs	  with	  higher	  coverage	  rates,	  such	  as	  educational	  services,	  health,	  and	  public	  
administration.	  The	  types	  of	  work	  men	  and	  women	  engage	  in	  are	  structural	  factors	  that	  
drive	  policy	  change,	  giving	  impetus	  to	  current	  debates	  about	  what	  governments	  should	  
do	  to	  improve	  coverage.	  Which	  industries	  have	  better	  coverage	  and	  who	  works	  in	  these	  
industries	  all	  factor	  in	  government	  policymaking.	  These	  tensions	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  
current	  pension	  debates	  over	  market-­‐based	  government	  proposals	  such	  as	  the	  Pool	  
Registered	  Pension	  Plan	  (PRPP)	  or	  expanding	  the	  CPP/QPP	  and	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  
Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP).	  	  
Importantly,	  this	  analysis	  of	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  recognizes	  that	  institutions	  
are	  invariably	  “gendered”	  and	  that	  this	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  when	  examining	  how	  risk	  
is	  individualized.	  Thus,	  feminist	  perspectives	  on	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  social	  







If	  one	  assumes	  that	  the	  current	  context	  of	  modernity	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  risk	  society	  
characterized	  by	  reflexive	  modernization,	  and	  that	  processes	  of	  individualization	  
represent	  the	  wider,	  social-­‐cultural-­‐political	  context	  in	  which	  policy	  change	  occurs,	  one	  
can	  use	  historical	  institutionalism	  and	  ideational	  analysis	  to	  examine	  these	  processes.	  
One	  can	  use	  historical	  institutionalism	  to	  consider	  how	  institutions	  can	  condition	  the	  
actions	  of	  policymakers	  and	  stakeholders,	  and	  ideational	  analysis	  to	  discern	  how	  notions	  
of	  risk	  and	  processes	  of	  individualization	  materialize	  in	  policy	  change.	  In	  other	  words,	  
this	  is	  a	  framework	  that	  examines	  the	  interaction	  between	  ideas,	  material	  interests	  and	  
existing	  institutional	  practices	  at	  the	  policymaking	  level	  to	  understand	  how	  
individualization	  occurs.	  	  	  
Using	  this	  framework,	  this	  dissertation	  draws	  from	  Beck	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  
through	  adopting	  the	  ontological	  perspective	  of	  “reflexive	  modernity”	  to	  theorize	  the	  
institutional	  context	  in	  which	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  is	  situated.	  Second,	  
by	  exploring	  how	  reforms	  to	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  pose	  a	  new	  set	  of	  risks	  to	  
individual	  workers	  in	  Ontario.	  Individualization	  is	  used	  to	  theorize	  the	  effect	  that	  
diminishing	  pension	  benefits	  have	  had	  on	  workers’	  sense	  of	  security,	  and	  how	  this	  
informs	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking.	  As	  such,	  Beck	  will	  be	  used	  to	  theorize	  how	  
transformations	  to	  retirement	  income	  systems	  as	  a	  set	  of	  transforming	  institutions	  




While	  the	  sociological	  theories	  of	  Beck	  and	  Giddens	  are	  useful	  in	  describing	  the	  
institutional	  transformations	  between	  post-­‐industrial	  modernity	  and	  the	  individual,	  
these	  perspectives	  do	  not	  fully	  capture	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  
that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  1970s.	  One	  major	  limitation	  of	  Beck’s	  framework	  is	  how	  
Beck	  eschews	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  class	  in	  his	  theorization	  of	  political	  change.	  This	  
dissertation	  questions	  the	  extent	  that	  Beck’s	  concept	  of	  “sub-­‐politics”	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  
analysis	  of	  pension	  policy	  change.	  As	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  chapters	  Four	  and	  Five,	  the	  
changing	  terrain	  of	  class	  power	  illustrates	  the	  ongoing	  role	  that	  labour	  unions	  play	  in	  the	  
protection	  of	  pension	  benefits.	  Given	  pensions	  developed	  historically	  through	  the	  
employer/employee	  wage-­‐labour	  relation,	  and	  given	  the	  extensive	  contribution	  by	  the	  
labour	  movement	  to	  policy	  debates	  regarding	  pension	  reform,	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  
policy	  is	  not	  best	  understood	  through	  Beck’s	  notion	  of	  “sub-­‐politics”.	  For	  this,	  the	  
political	  economic	  scholarship	  of	  pension	  systems	  and	  welfare	  states	  reviewed	  in	  
chapter	  two	  will	  be	  used.	  This	  means	  that	  I	  examine	  relationships	  among	  risk,	  
individualization	  and	  policymaking	  by	  considering	  the	  wider	  historical	  social	  formation.	  	  
The	  remaining	  chapters	  operationalize	  this	  framework.	  The	  following	  chapter	  
analyzes	  the	  historical	  material	  conditions	  leading	  to	  the	  institutional	  establishment	  of	  
pension	  systems	  in	  industrializing	  countries.	  Here,	  new	  risks	  posed	  by	  industrialization	  





CHAPTER	  4	  –	  OLD-­‐AGE,	  INDUSTRIALIZATION,	  AND	  THE	  HISTORICAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  OF	  
PENSION	  SYSTEMS	  	  
	  
	  
“[T]oday’s	  politics	  are	  rooted	  in	  yesterday’s	  social	  policy	  legislation”	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013:	  41).	  
	  
“The	  social	  relations	  under	  which	  capitalist	  production	  takes	  place	  embody	  a	  structural	  
antagonism	  between	  employers	  and	  employees”	  (Panitch	  and	  Swartz	  2003:	  9).	  
	  
	  
Workplace	  pension	  systems	  are	  a	  product	  of	  class	  struggle,	  gender	  relations,	  ideology,	  
institutions,	  economic	  markets	  and	  the	  industrial	  revolution’s	  transformative	  effects	  on	  
the	  social	  relations	  of	  work	  and	  family.	  In	  other	  words,	  pensions	  reflect	  the	  tensions,	  
struggles	  and	  contradictions	  between	  an	  expanding	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  
material	  reproduction	  of	  social	  formations.	  Pension	  policy,	  both	  public	  and	  private,	  
characterizes	  an	  institutional	  response	  to	  reconcile	  social	  dilemmas	  historically	  
produced	  by	  developing	  capitalist	  societies	  –	  how	  does	  an	  industrializing	  society	  
respond	  to	  a	  rapidly	  growing	  and	  urbanizing	  population,	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  wage	  labour	  
workforce,	  increased	  social	  mobility	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  an	  expanding	  cohort	  of	  
pauperized	  and	  other	  exploited	  workers?	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  pension	  system,	  similar	  
to	  that	  of	  growing	  demands	  for	  health	  care,	  education	  and	  sanitary	  systems,	  became	  an	  
arena	  of	  ideological	  and	  political	  struggle	  over	  who	  should	  provide	  the	  resources	  to	  




capitalist	  expansion	  challenged	  pre-­‐industrial	  ideas	  of	  economic	  independence	  and	  the	  
role	  the	  state	  should	  play	  in	  providing	  relief	  from	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  
industrialization.	  Once	  these	  pension	  systems	  were	  established	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  twentieth	  
century,	  extending	  coverage	  remained	  a	  problem	  for	  many	  disadvantaged	  groups,	  
particularly	  women	  and	  immigrants	  due	  to	  the	  single	  earner	  model	  that	  was	  embedded	  
in	  pension	  design	  and	  residency	  requirements	  (Bryden	  1974;	  McDonald	  1997;	  Cheal	  and	  
Kampen	  1998;	  Gaszo	  2005;	  Marier	  and	  Skinner	  2008;	  Hum	  and	  Simpson	  2010;	  Kodar	  
2012).	  Indeed,	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  pension	  systems	  have	  been	  premised	  on	  
the	  assumption	  that	  the	  household	  earner	  is	  male,	  in	  which	  women	  were	  relegated	  to	  
the	  private	  sphere	  of	  social	  reproductive	  labour.	  Immigrants	  and	  racialized	  groups	  were	  
have	  also	  been	  historically	  excluded	  from	  pension	  systems,	  structuring	  a	  gender	  and	  
racial	  bias	  into	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  retirement	  income	  system.	  The	  intent	  of	  this	  
chapter	  is	  to	  describe	  in	  general	  terms	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  
Canada	  and	  other	  industrializing	  countries,	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  
in	  Canada	  and	  Ontario.	  This	  historical	  analysis	  will	  also	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  how	  risk	  has	  
developed	  and	  been	  conceptualized	  in	  industrial	  society	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  old	  age	  and	  has	  been	  
distributed	  along	  the	  public/private	  axis	  of	  social	  benefits	  (Béland	  and	  Gran	  2008).	  The	  
risks	  facing	  retirees	  and	  those	  close	  to	  retirement	  today	  have	  been	  historically	  
constructed	  through	  industrial	  expansion	  and	  the	  post-­‐industrial	  casualization	  of	  the	  
standard	  employment	  relationship,	  a	  context	  reflective	  of	  reflexive	  modernization.	  This	  




risk,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  risk	  is	  individualized	  in	  the	  risk	  society	  
during	  the	  postwar	  era.	  	  
Pension	  policy	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  include	  both	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  
systems.	  While	  both	  systems	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  provide	  retirement	  income,	  in	  
Canada	  and	  elsewhere,	  each	  system	  has	  a	  distinct	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  political,	  
economic	  and	  legislative	  development.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  public	  pensions	  in	  
Canada	  are	  administered	  by	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  within	  the	  public	  
domain,	  and	  include	  the	  programs	  of	  OAS,	  GIS,	  and	  CPP/QPP10.	  Workplace	  pensions,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  are	  understood	  as	  formal	  arrangements	  between	  employee	  and	  
employer	  for	  income	  during	  retirement	  in	  consideration	  of	  past	  services	  (Weitz	  1992:	  
xxviii),	  and	  fall	  under	  provincial	  jurisdiction11.	  This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  describing	  how	  
industrialization	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  wage	  labour	  transformed	  how	  communities	  cared	  for	  
the	  elderly.	  This	  section	  also	  discusses	  how	  retirement	  became	  legitimized	  as	  a	  life	  
stage.	  Next,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  across	  Canada	  and	  other	  
advanced	  industrial	  countries	  is	  explored,	  by	  considering	  four	  distinct	  periods	  beginning	  
in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  to	  the	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  The	  jurisdictional	  
boundaries	  between	  public	  and	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  relationship	  to	  Canadian	  
state	  development	  is	  also	  discussed	  to	  illuminate	  the	  historical	  institutional	  context	  on	  
which	  current	  reforms	  to	  Ontario’s	  pension	  policy	  are	  taking	  place.	  Furthermore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  There	  are	  other	  supplementary	  programs	  belonging	  to	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system,	  such	  
as	  the	  Spouse’s	  Allowance	  (1975,	  1985)	  for	  low-­‐income	  couples	  where	  only	  one	  person	  receives	  
OAS/GIS.	  
11	  The	  exception	  are	  employees	  with	  occupational	  pension	  plans	  who	  work	  in	  federally	  
regulated	  industries	  in	  Canada	  such	  as	  transportation,	  banking,	  telephone,	  radio	  and	  television	  




throughout	  this	  historical	  narrative,	  the	  role	  of	  class	  struggles	  and	  the	  changing	  degrees	  
of	  class	  power	  are	  documented,	  illustrating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  public	  and	  private	  
pension	  benefits	  were	  the	  result	  of	  a	  shifting	  political	  economy	  and	  balance	  of	  class	  
power.	  	  
	  
Pre-­‐Industrial	  Institutional	  Care	  for	  the	  Elderly:	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Laws,	  Poorhouses	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  industrialization	  on	  old	  age	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  historical	  
development	  of	  pension	  policies.	  The	  effects	  of	  industrialization	  on	  old	  age	  have	  been	  
the	  focus	  of	  significant	  scholarship	  (Burgess	  1960;	  Bryden	  1974;	  Uhlenberg	  1978	  
Graebner	  1980;	  Quadagno	  1982;	  Myles	  1989;	  Weitz	  1992;	  Orloff	  1993).	  It	  is	  generally	  
understood	  that	  the	  advent	  of	  industrialization	  transformed	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  model	  of	  
the	  extended	  family	  home,	  replacing	  it	  with	  the	  nuclear	  family	  unit,	  generating	  new	  
gendered	  roles	  between	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  of	  social	  life.	  Freiderich	  Engels	  
(2010[1884])	  describes	  how	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  nuclear	  family	  was	  consolidated	  in	  
the	  class-­‐based	  society	  of	  the	  1800s,	  in	  which	  men	  left	  the	  family	  farm	  in	  search	  for	  paid	  
labour	  opportunities,	  while	  women	  were	  relegated	  to	  the	  private	  sphere,	  in	  which	  care	  
for	  the	  elderly	  increasingly	  fell	  to	  the	  hands	  of	  women.	  	  During	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  
as	  subsistent	  family	  farms	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  home	  production	  were	  replaced	  with	  
industrial	  wage-­‐labour	  production,	  rapid	  urbanization	  occurred.	  Consequently,	  the	  




extended	  family	  home,	  eventually	  became	  the	  dominion	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  (Bryden	  
1974;	  Quadagno	  1982).	  	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  questioned.	  
As	  Quadagno	  (1982)	  points	  out,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  the	  cohesion	  of	  extended	  families	  
in	  preindustrial	  Western	  societies	  was	  not	  contingent	  on	  working	  together	  as	  a	  single	  
economic	  unit.	  Rather	  it	  was	  based	  on	  local	  customs	  of	  generational	  exchange	  of	  
property,	  where	  “…children	  had	  to	  care	  for	  retired	  parents	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  right	  to	  
marry	  and	  take	  over	  the	  farm”	  (1982:	  15).	  Full	  ownership	  of	  a	  farm	  sometimes	  did	  not	  
occur	  until	  the	  father	  died,	  or	  contractual	  obligations	  were	  designed	  that	  promised	  
food,	  lodging	  and	  income	  to	  parents	  or	  a	  widow.	  These	  arrangements	  could	  cause	  
significant	  tensions	  between	  generations,	  and	  “when	  other	  work	  opportunities	  became	  
available,	  children	  chose	  other	  options”	  (Quadagno	  1982:	  15).	  As	  such,	  the	  
transformations	  of	  work	  and	  the	  development	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  retirement	  did	  not	  
occur	  uniformly	  across	  industrializing	  societies,	  but	  varied	  over	  time	  and	  space,	  greatly	  
depending	  on	  local	  customs	  and	  economic	  activity.	  Retirement	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  
product	  of	  industrial	  capitalism,	  but	  also	  existed	  in	  pre-­‐modern	  times	  with	  specific	  
arrangements	  involved	  in	  the	  passage	  of	  property	  and	  wealth	  from	  fathers	  to	  their	  sons.	  
	   Poverty	  had	  also	  existed	  in	  pre-­‐modern	  times,	  typically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
pauperization.	  In	  England,	  the	  Elizabethan	  poor	  law	  of	  1601	  (formally	  known	  as	  the	  Poor	  
Relief	  Act)	  was	  established	  as	  a	  set	  of	  guiding	  principles	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  aged	  poor,	  
bequeathing	  responsibility	  to	  the	  parish	  level	  of	  local	  administrators.	  Rather	  than	  simply	  




consigning	  those	  who	  were	  in	  need	  of	  relief	  to	  work.	  The	  poor	  were	  distinguished	  into	  
two	  groups:	  those	  who	  were	  able-­‐bodied	  and	  could	  work,	  and	  the	  impotent,	  and	  relief	  
occurred	  either	  through	  out-­‐relief	  or	  workhouses.	  Those	  deemed	  able	  bodied	  were	  
often	  sent	  to	  workhouses,	  had	  work	  created	  for	  them,	  or	  were	  consigned	  to	  local	  
employers.	  The	  impotent,	  those	  physically	  unable	  to	  work,	  would	  either	  receive	  out-­‐
relief	  (a	  small	  stipend)	  if	  they	  had	  somewhere	  to	  live,	  or	  be	  sent	  to	  workhouses	  as	  a	  last	  
resort	  if	  they	  lacked	  any	  familial	  support.	  In	  both	  cases,	  either	  form	  of	  relief	  was	  usually	  
humiliating	  for	  the	  recipient	  and	  always	  parsimonious.	  This	  was	  because	  poverty	  was	  
viewed	  as	  an	  individual	  problem	  –	  those	  in	  need	  were	  so	  because	  they	  lacked	  diligence	  
and	  foresight	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  small	  few.	  Conditions	  of	  relief	  were	  designed	  to	  
encourage	  individuals	  to	  avoid	  asking	  for	  help.	  Workhouses,	  for	  example,	  were	  made	  to	  
be,	  “as	  bleak	  and	  degrading	  as	  possible	  so	  that	  a	  job—any	  job	  at	  any	  wage—would	  be	  
attractive	  by	  comparison”	  (Bryden	  1974:	  21).	  	  
	   Poor	  laws	  were	  administered	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  the	  degree	  and	  extent	  to	  
which	  these	  laws	  practiced	  varied	  considerably.	  In	  England	  during	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  
century,	  there	  was	  concern	  that	  too	  many	  elderly	  workers	  were	  receiving	  out-­‐relief,	  
thus	  encouraging	  certain	  individuals	  and	  their	  families	  to	  shirk	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
working	  hard	  and	  practicing	  due	  diligence	  in	  saving	  for	  their	  old	  age.	  This	  perspective	  
was	  influenced	  by	  Malthusian	  theory	  (that	  saw	  poverty	  as	  a	  ‘corrective’	  for	  self-­‐
improvement	  and	  abstention)	  and	  Bentham’s	  doctrine	  of	  utilitarianism	  (that	  claimed	  
the	  success	  of	  a	  policy	  should	  be	  measured	  as	  securing	  the	  greatest	  happiness	  for	  the	  




economy	  premised	  on	  self-­‐interest)	  (Fraser	  2009).	  Poor	  laws,	  therefore,	  should	  be	  
reformed	  to	  deter	  individuals	  from	  seeking	  relief	  so	  the	  wages	  of	  other	  workers	  would	  
not	  be	  used	  to	  subsidize	  the	  poor.	  The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  of	  1834	  concluded	  that	  allowance	  
systems	  “not	  only	  demoralized	  labor	  and	  depressed	  wages	  but	  also	  encouraged	  
idleness”,	  influencing	  individuals	  to	  leave	  working	  classes	  for	  pauperism	  (Quadagno	  
1982:	  97).	  This	  new	  law	  centralized	  administration	  away	  from	  local	  authorities,	  provided	  
a	  new	  universal	  model	  of	  relief	  administration	  and	  deepened	  the	  stigmatization	  of	  those	  
receiving	  help	  to	  deter	  others	  from	  applying	  for	  relief.	  Out	  relief	  became	  more	  difficult	  
to	  acquire	  and	  life	  in	  workhouses	  often	  became	  so	  appalling	  that	  families	  avoided	  
sending	  their	  elderly	  members	  to	  these	  places	  at	  all	  costs.	  For	  those	  who	  did	  live	  in	  
poorhouses,	  these	  places	  were	  described	  as	  “human	  warehouses”	  where	  the	  aged	  went	  
to	  die,	  living	  in	  large	  rooms	  crammed	  with	  beds,	  where	  individuals	  were	  forced	  to	  work	  
and	  received	  very	  little	  in	  food	  rations.	  Many	  saw	  workhouses	  as	  the	  “ultimate	  
disgrace”,	  where	  concerns	  of	  incarceration	  and	  death	  were	  feared	  more	  than	  the	  
stigmatizing	  effects	  of	  living	  in	  one	  of	  these	  places	  (Quadagno	  1982:	  106-­‐107).	  
	   Elizabethan	  poor	  law	  was	  not	  officially	  adopted	  in	  Canadian	  colonies	  during	  pre-­‐
Confederation,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Nova	  Scotia	  and	  New	  Brunswick,	  “where	  it	  was	  
only	  indifferently	  applied”	  (Bryden	  1974:	  22).	  But	  Canada	  did	  adopt	  the	  implicit	  
assumption	  that	  being	  poor	  was	  a	  quality	  of	  poor	  character	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  individual	  
(Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  As	  Bryden	  points	  out,	  “in	  the	  ad	  hoc	  expedients	  devised	  to	  deal	  
with	  welfare	  problems	  [in	  Canada],	  one	  can	  detect	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  principles	  both	  




(reform	  of	  1834)”	  (1974:	  22).	  As	  urbanization	  and	  industrial	  developed	  following	  
Canadian	  confederation,	  places	  such	  as	  Ontario	  were	  slow	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  changing	  
social	  conditions.	  Relief	  in	  Protestant	  Ontario	  took	  the	  shape	  of	  local	  charities	  premised	  
on	  private	  donations.	  Institutional	  responses	  to	  growing	  labour	  problems	  in	  industry	  
during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  assumed	  a	  deeply	  rooted	  view	  that	  government	  help	  
would	  encourage	  slothfulness.	  As	  Bryden	  (1974:	  22)	  notes,	  “The	  underlying	  attitude	  
continued	  to	  prevail	  that	  only	  a	  very	  few	  were	  genuinely	  incapable	  of	  providing	  for	  
themselves,	  and	  in	  addition	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  primacy	  of	  family	  responsibility	  had	  if	  





This	  moralizing	  perspective	  that	  stigmatized	  aged	  workers	  receiving	  relief	  increasingly	  
came	  under	  attack	  in	  England,	  Canada,	  and	  elsewhere	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  
century.	  Populations	  in	  modernizing	  countries	  expanded	  with	  a	  growing	  industrial	  
workforce	  and	  social	  mobility	  through	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Demographically,	  more	  
people	  were	  living	  past	  the	  age	  of	  sixty	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  with	  declining	  
mortality	  rates	  (Uhlenberg	  1978:	  65,	  cited	  from	  Quadagno	  1982:	  17).	  The	  sheer	  number	  
of	  the	  aged	  living	  in	  poverty	  subsequently	  became	  too	  large	  to	  ignore.	  This	  put	  new	  
pressures	  on	  existing	  Elizabethan	  poor	  laws	  that	  served	  old	  paupers,	  the	  destitute	  and	  




relief	  to	  the	  aged.	  Moreover,	  the	  harsh	  treatment	  and	  demoralizing	  poorhouse	  
conditions	  in	  which	  society’s	  oldest	  workers	  were	  forced	  to	  live	  in	  took	  hold	  of	  the	  
public’s	  sympathy.	  Opposition	  to	  poor	  laws	  also	  coincided	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  
voting	  rights	  to	  working	  classes	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  labour	  movements	  who	  could	  
articulate	  the	  travails	  of	  older	  workers	  in	  industrial	  society.	  Public	  debate	  over	  who	  
should	  provide	  for	  society’s	  oldest	  and	  most	  destitute	  members	  pitted	  poor	  law	  
philosophy	  against	  new	  demands	  for	  better	  treatment	  of	  the	  elderly.	  	  
	   In	  England	  in	  1895,	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Aged	  Poor	  was	  formed	  to	  
examine	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  aged	  (Quadagno	  1982:	  103).	  Similarly,	  in	  Canada	  pressure	  for	  
political	  action	  for	  a	  national	  pension	  scheme	  to	  alleviate	  poverty	  for	  older	  workers	  was	  
also	  growing	  (see	  section	  below).	  Several	  countries	  across	  the	  industrializing	  world,	  
including	  Germany,	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  Denmark	  implemented	  the	  first	  national	  public	  
pension	  plans	  before	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  signaling	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
nation-­‐state’s	  role	  in	  providing	  institutional	  support	  against	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  industrial	  
life.	  As	  such,	  pensions	  represented	  a	  “pivotal	  transformation	  of	  state	  activities”	  (Orloff	  
1993:	  22).	  
	  
Establishing	  Canada’s	  Public	  Pension	  System	  
	  
The	  development	  of	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system	  occurred	  within	  a	  context	  of	  
emerging	  social	  welfare	  policies	  following	  Confederation.	  Pressured	  by	  the	  social	  and	  




the	  aged,	  the	  sick,	  children	  and	  people	  with	  mental	  disabilities	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  
Public	  school	  boards	  and	  libraries	  were	  also	  the	  norm	  by	  1900,	  along	  with	  new	  
legislation	  regulating	  industrial	  working	  conditions.	  Debates	  between	  individual	  
responsibility	  and	  a	  growing	  role	  for	  government	  were	  prevalent,	  with	  social	  
transformation	  characterized	  by	  urbanization	  and	  industrialization	  as	  its	  backdrop.	  
However,	  institutional	  responses	  to	  those	  in	  need	  were	  slow	  and	  uneven	  across	  
provinces.	  
Canada	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ‘laggard’	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  old	  age	  
pension	  system	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  many	  European	  countries.	  This	  
can	  be	  linked	  to	  Canada’s	  history	  as	  first	  a	  colony	  of	  Britain,	  then	  as	  member	  of	  the	  
British	  dominion,	  in	  which	  the	  legacy	  of	  this	  colonial	  history	  shaped	  Canadian	  state	  
formation.	  Canada,	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  was	  a	  vast	  geographical	  space,	  sparsely	  
populated,	  lacking	  a	  strong	  polity.	  British	  and	  Canadian	  elites,	  who	  were	  concerned	  with	  
American	  annexation	  of	  Canadian	  territory	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  American	  political	  culture	  
of	  republicanism,	  used	  the	  Canadian	  federation	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  protect	  Canadian	  
and	  British	  interests	  (Brodie	  and	  Jenson	  1988).	  	  
Local	  elites	  adopted	  the	  cabinet	  system	  and	  parliamentary	  government	  to	  
centralize	  power	  into	  a	  court-­‐style	  arrangement	  of	  elitism	  that	  gave	  power	  to	  colonial	  
governors	  and	  local	  notables	  (Orloff	  1993:	  246).	  The	  Canadian	  state	  became	  dominated	  
by	  practices	  of	  patronage	  to	  serve	  these	  political	  interests	  that	  opposed	  majoritarian	  
democracy	  and	  universal-­‐suffrage.	  Given	  that	  Canada’s	  polity	  was	  small	  and	  




political	  debate	  of	  social	  welfare,	  there	  was	  little	  resistance	  to	  these	  governing	  practices	  
at	  the	  time.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  arrangements	  was	  that	  state	  capacities	  remained	  
undeveloped	  and	  political	  parties	  unprogrammatic	  (Orloff	  1993:	  245),	  where	  these	  early	  
features	  of	  Canadian	  state	  formation	  would	  continue	  from	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  
until	  WWI.	  	  
	   Canada’s	  early	  social	  architecture	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  British	  North	  
America	  Act	  (BNA)	  of	  1867.	  Matters	  of	  social	  welfare	  were	  regarded	  by	  the	  Act	  as	  local	  
and	  private,	  thus	  giving	  provincial	  governments	  jurisdiction	  over	  social	  policy	  (Jenson	  
2013;	  Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  Poor	  relief	  practices	  did	  not	  substantially	  change	  after	  
Confederation	  beyond	  granting	  provincial	  authorities	  with	  legal	  jurisdiction.	  Canadian	  
relief	  continued	  in	  multiple	  forms	  across	  different	  provinces	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  
practices	  including	  municipal	  relief,	  private	  charity	  (typically	  administered	  by	  religious	  
organizations),	  or	  institutional	  care.	  Private	  charities	  were	  crucial	  to	  individuals’	  survival	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  comprehensive	  redistributive	  social	  policies.	  In	  Ontario,	  prior	  to	  the	  
1830s,	  private	  charities	  were	  the	  only	  institutions	  providing	  refuge	  to	  the	  infirm	  and	  
desolate	  (Maurutto	  2004).	  As	  government	  funding	  grew,	  charities	  were	  funded	  to	  
provide	  increasing	  support.	  Public	  welfare	  in	  Ontario	  began	  with	  government	  subsidies	  
and	  new	  tax	  systems	  that	  allowed	  municipalities	  to	  collect	  taxes	  on	  ratable	  property	  to	  
erect	  houses	  of	  refuge,	  highlighting	  the	  important	  institutional	  role	  charities	  played	  in	  
the	  early	  administration	  of	  public	  welfare	  (Maurutto	  2004).	  	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  relief	  practices	  were	  often	  premised	  on	  local	  religious	  




poor	  relief	  development	  and	  their	  respective	  practices	  in	  each	  of	  the	  provinces	  followed	  
different	  paths12.	  Although	  there	  was	  some	  poor	  relief	  infrastructure,	  the	  dominant	  
underlying	  attitude	  continued	  that	  saw	  poor	  relief	  as	  facilitating	  and	  promoting	  
slothfulness	  and	  profligacy,	  thus	  limiting	  any	  sustained	  policy	  response	  from	  provincial	  
government	  officials.	  Given	  that	  the	  current	  patchwork	  of	  poor	  relief	  was	  not	  
adequately	  addressing	  the	  hardship	  of	  those	  in	  need,	  this	  philosophy	  could	  not	  prevail	  
indefinitely.	  Consequently,	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  poverty	  in	  old	  age	  would	  
eventually	  challenge	  the	  doctrine	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  codified	  in	  Elizabethan	  
poor	  laws.	  	  	  
	   By	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  provincial	  governments	  began	  to	  legislate	  new	  
institutional	  responses	  for	  providing	  poor	  relief	  to	  the	  infirm,	  the	  aged	  and	  others	  who	  
could	  no	  longer	  work	  (Bryden	  1974;	  Maurutto	  2004;	  Finkel	  2012).	  The	  social	  fabric	  of	  
Canadian	  society	  was	  changing,	  resulting	  with	  new	  economic	  and	  social	  realities	  for	  
older	  workers.	  Occupations	  that	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  breadwinners	  over	  the	  age	  of	  
65	  had	  typically	  included	  farming	  and	  small	  business.	  With	  rapid	  urbanization	  in	  the	  
early	  twentieth	  century	  from	  the	  farm	  to	  the	  city,	  these	  older	  occupations	  decreased	  in	  
importance.	  The	  physical	  demands	  of	  urban	  industrial	  jobs	  made	  working	  past	  the	  age	  
of	  65	  more	  difficult,	  and	  many	  were	  not	  suited	  to	  work	  in	  large	  bureaucratic	  
establishments	  that	  often	  refused	  to	  hire	  workers	  past	  the	  age	  of	  45	  (Bryden	  1974).	  
What’s	  more,	  the	  65-­‐69	  and	  70-­‐and-­‐over	  age	  groups	  were	  growing	  as	  life	  expectancy	  
expanded.	  These	  social	  and	  economic	  conditions	  of	  older	  workers	  were	  thus	  generating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




a	  new	  set	  of	  challenges	  for	  policymakers.	  Industrialization,	  urbanization,	  demographic	  
changes	  and	  the	  diminishing	  viability	  of	  the	  three-­‐generation	  family	  farm	  were	  leaving	  
many	  older	  workers	  behind	  to	  live	  their	  final	  years	  impoverished.	  With	  no	  national	  
pension	  scheme,	  coupled	  with	  the	  uneven	  and	  unreliable	  administration	  of	  local	  poor	  
relief	  distribution	  that	  often	  stigmatized	  those	  in	  need,	  the	  hardship	  of	  many	  workers	  
became	  more	  conspicuous.	  In	  1903,	  an	  act	  was	  passed	  in	  Ontario	  that	  required	  all	  
counties,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  neighboring	  counties,	  to	  establish	  homes	  for	  the	  poor	  
(Bryden	  1974:	  22-­‐23).	  This	  legislation	  was	  reenacted	  in	  1912	  that	  significantly	  expanded	  
facilities	  in	  1912,	  thus	  consolidating	  Ontario’s	  charity	  sector	  and	  increasing	  Ontario’s	  
institutional	  response	  to	  the	  poor	  (Maurutto	  2004).	  	  
These	  problems	  were	  not	  unique	  to	  Canada.	  Beginning	  in	  1889,	  other	  
industrializing	  countries	  had	  begun	  establishing	  various	  types	  of	  national	  pension	  
systems,	  including	  Germany	  (1889),	  Denmark	  (1891),	  New	  Zealand	  (1898),	  France	  (1910)	  
and	  Australia	  (1911).	  A	  campaign	  had	  been	  underway	  since	  the	  1870s	  in	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  to	  establish	  an	  old	  age	  pension	  system.	  These	  developments	  did	  not	  go	  
unnoticed,	  particularly	  in	  Anglophone	  Canada,	  which	  drew	  inspiration	  from	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  (Bryden	  1974).	  As	  other	  industrial	  countries	  established	  national	  pension	  
systems,	  social	  reformers	  in	  Canada	  were	  increasingly	  demanding	  ‘social	  insurance’	  in	  
the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  including	  the	  policy	  proposal	  of	  a	  universal	  non-­‐
contributory	  pension	  system.	  Pension	  legislation	  was	  eventually	  introduced	  into	  the	  
Canadian	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  by	  several	  




federation	  (Orloff	  1993:	  256).	  This	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  initial	  hearings	  about	  the	  need	  
for	  public	  action	  to	  relieve	  the	  needy.	  	  
The	  Trades	  and	  Labour	  Congress	  of	  Canada	  (TLC)	  and	  the	  National	  Trades	  and	  
Labour	  Congress	  (NTLC)	  in	  the	  early	  1900s	  also	  took	  up	  the	  cause	  of	  public	  pensions.	  In	  
1905,	  the	  TLC	  made	  its	  first	  formal	  pronouncement	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  public	  pensions	  and	  
in	  1907,	  “…instructed	  the	  executive	  to	  increase	  its	  efforts	  to	  secure	  enactment	  of	  
pension	  legislation”	  (Bryden	  1974:	  48).	  The	  TLC	  executive	  sought	  to	  forge	  a	  common	  
trade	  union	  policy	  across	  the	  country	  by	  sending	  material	  to	  its	  constituent	  bodies.	  For	  
the	  next	  eight	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  WWI,	  the	  TLC	  and	  NTLC	  made	  regular	  submissions	  to	  
the	  federal	  Cabinet	  that	  called	  for	  government	  support	  for	  non-­‐contributory	  public	  
pensions.	  This	  strategy	  was	  in	  part	  motivated	  by	  labour’s	  suspicion	  of	  the	  employer	  
pension	  plans	  that	  did	  exist	  at	  this	  time,	  where	  pensions	  were	  viewed	  as,	  “…company	  
weapons	  to	  fight	  unionization	  and	  prevent	  strike	  action”	  (Weitz	  1992:	  42).	  The	  legality	  
of	  the	  right	  to	  strike	  was	  in	  doubt	  and	  for	  workers	  who	  did	  strike,	  it	  was	  not	  unusual	  for	  
strikers	  to	  lose	  their	  pension	  rights.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1910	  striking	  employees	  of	  the	  
Grand	  Trunk	  Railway	  lost	  their	  pensions,	  and	  in	  1919	  Prime	  Minister	  Robert	  Borden	  sent	  
his	  minister	  of	  labour	  to	  Winnipeg	  to	  suppress	  postal	  worker	  involvement	  by	  
threatening	  to	  take	  their	  pensions	  away	  (Weitz	  1992).	  The	  use	  of	  private	  pensions	  as	  a	  
weapon	  against	  union	  organization	  motivated	  demands	  by	  labour	  organizers	  to	  lobby	  
for	  a	  government	  sponsored	  pension	  plan.	  
However,	  no	  action	  came	  from	  either	  the	  governing	  Liberal	  party	  or	  the	  




lacking,	  and	  so	  was	  interest	  amongst	  many	  Canadian	  politicians	  who	  claimed	  that	  any	  
able-­‐bodied	  industrious	  man	  should	  be	  able	  to	  care	  for	  himself	  and	  his	  family	  if	  given	  
the	  chance.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  the	  case	  in	  older	  industrialized	  societies	  such	  as	  Europe	  that	  
pensions	  were	  needed.	  But	  in	  the	  vast	  country	  of	  Canada,	  rich	  with	  natural	  resources,	  
individuals	  should	  be	  able	  to	  forge	  a	  successful	  life	  from	  early	  adulthood	  to	  old	  age.	  
Indeed,	  this	  ideology	  had	  been	  adopted	  from	  British	  notions	  of	  individualism	  and	  was	  a	  
convenient	  response	  to	  social	  reformers	  to	  do	  nothing,	  particularly	  since	  establishing	  a	  
national	  pension	  scheme	  cost	  money.	  Canada’s	  patronage	  system	  still	  dominated	  
Canadian	  politics,	  a	  characteristic	  of	  institutional	  drift	  from	  earlier	  Canadian	  state	  
formation.	  Although	  labour	  federations	  such	  as	  the	  TLC	  and	  NTLC	  invested	  significant	  
resources	  to	  lobby	  for	  a	  national	  public	  pension	  plan,	  regional	  differences	  within	  the	  
Canadian	  labour	  movement	  hindered	  this	  movement.	  Furthermore,	  no	  third	  political	  
party	  existed	  that	  could	  successfully	  focus	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  working	  classes	  across	  the	  
federation	  to	  apply	  sustained	  pressure	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  old	  age	  pensions.	  	  
As	  Canada	  became	  involved	  with	  preparing	  for	  WWI,	  debate	  for	  a	  Canadian	  
public	  pension	  was	  shelved.	  Moreover,	  the	  philosophy	  towards	  welfare	  and	  poor	  relief	  
that	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  market	  perspective	  prevailed,	  where	  resistance	  amongst	  
federal	  and	  provincial	  government	  officials,	  including	  Sir	  Wilfrid	  Laurier,	  was	  strong	  
(Bryden	  1974:	  24).	  The	  cost	  of	  a	  proposed	  old	  age	  pension	  was	  also	  not	  attractive	  to	  
many	  government	  officials	  who	  felt	  Canada’s	  economic	  and	  social	  conditions	  were	  




elsewhere,	  there	  were	  no	  policy	  innovators	  within	  the	  Canadian	  state	  capable	  of	  
bridging	  cross-­‐class	  alliances	  to	  negotiate	  policy	  reforms	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Before	  WWI,	  instead	  of	  non-­‐contributory	  pensions,	  the	  Canadian	  government	  
responded	  with	  government	  annuities.	  The	  Liberal	  administration	  attempted	  to	  fill	  the	  
gap	  left	  by	  no	  federal	  program	  with	  the	  Government	  Annuities	  Act	  of	  1908.	  This	  allowed	  
workers	  to	  buy	  annuities	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  government	  at	  a	  more	  favorable	  rate	  than	  
was	  offered	  by	  private	  insurance	  companies	  as	  a	  means	  to	  prepare	  financially	  for	  
retirement.	  As	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day	  saw	  it,	  “Annuities	  would	  simultaneously	  allow	  
the	  working	  class	  to	  practice	  the	  virtue	  of	  thrift,	  prevent	  corrupt	  business	  interests	  from	  
profiting	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  poor,	  and	  keep	  the	  state	  from	  having	  to	  initiate	  large	  
spending	  programs”	  (Orloff	  1993:	  258).	  Although	  this	  program	  did	  provide	  a	  new	  
mechanism	  for	  Canadians	  to	  save	  for	  retirement,	  government	  annuities	  also	  served	  
ideological	  needs	  of	  the	  Liberal	  federal	  government	  that	  refused	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
realities	  facing	  aging	  workers	  who	  saw	  public	  pensions	  as	  a	  “socialistic	  experiment”	  
(Bryden	  1974:	  49).	  Although	  no	  pension	  would	  be	  established,	  government	  annuities	  
legitimized	  the	  notion	  that	  government’s	  role	  was	  to	  help	  facilitate	  workers	  to	  save	  
within	  a	  market	  economy	  rather	  than	  collect	  and	  administer	  retirement	  income	  to	  
workers	  –	  as	  many	  still	  believed,	  institutionalizing	  help	  would	  discourage	  initiative	  and	  
resourcefulness	  while	  encouraging	  dependency	  and	  slothfulness.	  But	  this	  program	  did	  
little	  to	  help	  Canadian	  workers.	  Only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  workers	  bought	  government	  
annuities,	  and	  because	  this	  program	  was	  voluntary,	  many	  who	  could	  afford	  them	  did	  




savings	  and	  participation	  in	  private	  pensions.	  Yet	  in	  the	  in	  Canada	  at	  this	  time,	  Bryden	  
predicted	  that	  private	  pension	  coverage	  was	  only	  about	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  labour	  force,	  
although	  there	  is	  no	  official	  statistical	  information	  for	  the	  period	  before	  1936	  (1974:	  39).	  
Given	  the	  lack	  of	  viable	  institutional	  options	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  and	  the	  voluntary	  
nature	  of	  these	  programs	  –	  both	  annuities	  and	  private	  pensions	  –	  Canadian	  workers	  had	  
limited	  options	  for	  saving	  for	  old	  age.	  	  
It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1920s	  that	  a	  cross-­‐class	  political	  coalition	  was	  able	  to	  
implement	  Canada’s	  first	  old	  age	  pension.	  Canada’s	  participation	  in	  WWI	  had	  a	  
transformative	  effect	  on	  Canadian	  political	  culture	  and	  democratic	  participation	  (Bryden	  
1974;	  Brodie	  and	  Jenson	  1988;	  Weitz	  1992;	  Orloff	  1993).	  Prior	  to	  WWI,	  the	  Trades	  and	  
Labour	  Congress	  (TLC)	  was	  the	  leading	  voice	  in	  progressive	  reform	  and	  had	  
unsuccessfully	  lobbied	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  continue	  discussion	  of	  developing	  an	  
old	  age	  pension.	  In	  1906,	  the	  TLC	  changed	  tactics	  and	  called	  upon	  provincial	  executives	  
to	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  provincial	  partisan	  labour	  parties	  across	  Canada	  to	  challenge	  
Canada’s	  political	  patronage	  system	  (Bryden	  1974:	  see	  ch.	  4).	  These	  attempts	  of	  the	  TLC	  
ultimately	  failed,	  but	  this	  sentiment	  of	  social	  reformers	  found	  success	  in	  electing	  a	  
number	  of	  federal	  and	  provincial	  candidates	  who	  continued	  to	  insert	  these	  demands	  
into	  public	  policy	  debates.	  	  
Following	  WWI,	  major	  tensions	  were	  exposed	  within	  Canadian	  society	  from	  
dislocations	  of	  war	  and	  post-­‐war	  adjustment	  (Bryden	  1974).	  Frustration	  with	  Canada’s	  
two-­‐party	  system	  was	  mounting	  across	  different	  regions	  in	  Canada,	  where	  many	  




caucuses	  in	  Ottawa.	  This	  discontent	  was	  particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  western	  provinces,	  
where	  prairie	  farmers	  began	  to	  revolt,	  organizing	  the	  United	  Farmers	  Party	  at	  the	  
provincial	  level	  and	  the	  Progressive	  and	  Labour	  parties	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  thus	  
destroying	  the	  federal	  two	  party	  system	  (Macpherson	  1953).	  The	  radicalization	  of	  
labour	  organizing	  found	  expression	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  One	  Big	  Movement	  in	  Western	  
Canada	  and	  the	  Winnipeg	  General	  Strike	  of	  1919,	  symbolizing	  acute	  discontent	  with	  
working	  conditions,	  where	  workers	  increasingly	  demanded	  protection	  from	  
unemployment	  and	  from	  economic	  insecurity	  due	  to	  sickness	  and	  old	  age.	  Politicians	  
took	  heed,	  where	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  events	  (and	  others)	  served	  to	  catalyze	  new	  
studies	  and	  policymakers	  to	  reconsider	  establishing	  an	  old	  age	  pension	  system	  in	  
Canada.	  This,	  along	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  third	  federal	  political	  party	  and	  overall	  
expanding	  democratic	  participation	  served	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  cross-­‐class	  political	  
coalition	  required	  to	  establish	  a	  government-­‐sponsored	  pension	  system.	  
In	  1927,	  Canada’s	  first	  national	  pension	  scheme	  was	  enacted	  by	  the	  federal	  
government	  with	  the	  Old	  Age	  Pensions	  Act.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  program	  was	  shared	  
between	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  provinces,	  but	  administered	  by	  the	  provinces	  due	  
to	  constitutional	  responsibility	  set	  out	  in	  the	  BNA	  of	  1867.	  This	  non-­‐contributory	  plan	  
was	  paid	  to	  men	  and	  women,	  was	  means-­‐tested,	  paying	  up	  to	  $20	  per	  month	  based	  on	  
income	  and	  assets	  to	  British	  subjects	  70	  years	  and	  older	  and	  who	  had	  twenty	  years	  of	  
residence	  in	  Canada.	  This	  new	  legislation	  established	  what	  is	  today	  the	  first	  pillar	  of	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  –	  a	  public	  pension	  scheme	  that	  considerably	  




groups	  and	  citizens	  with	  less	  than	  twenty	  years	  of	  residency	  in	  Canada	  were	  excluded.	  
The	  eligibility	  requirements	  shed	  light	  on	  which	  individuals	  and	  which	  types	  of	  workers	  
were	  most	  valued	  by	  Canadian	  society,	  highlighting	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  nation	  building	  
in	  Canada	  was	  built	  on	  racism.	  Indeed,	  white,	  British	  men	  were	  the	  most	  valued	  workers	  
in	  Canada,	  where	  female	  entitlements	  were	  understood	  through	  their	  marital	  status	  to	  
a	  man,	  often	  as	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  widow	  during	  old	  age.	  Alternatively,	  immigration	  policy	  
(such	  as	  the	  Chinese	  Head	  Tax)	  excluded	  some	  who	  settled	  in	  Canada,	  while	  blatantly	  
excluding	  indigenous	  groups	  from	  redistributive	  social	  policy.	  Consequently,	  pension	  
politics	  that	  emerged	  at	  this	  time	  bolstered	  the	  nation	  building	  of	  a	  “White	  Canada”.	  	  	  
For	  those	  who	  did	  meet	  the	  criteria,	  many	  were	  discouraged	  by	  the	  means	  test,	  
which	  many	  found	  degrading.	  The	  test	  undertaken	  by	  provincial	  authorities	  calculated	  
all	  aspects	  of	  a	  senior’s	  income	  and	  any	  “perks”	  they	  may	  receive,	  such	  as	  free	  room	  and	  
board.	  They	  also	  had	  to	  prove	  that	  their	  children	  could	  not	  support	  them	  and	  did	  not	  
take	  into	  account	  how	  much	  money	  was	  spent	  on	  basic	  staples	  such	  as	  food,	  shelter,	  
clothing,	  fuel,	  and	  utilities.	  Moralizing	  and	  stigmatization	  was	  embedded	  in	  this	  system;	  
there	  are	  stories	  of	  provincial	  pension	  officers	  recommending	  seniors	  sue	  their	  children	  
if	  they	  refused	  to	  help	  their	  parents	  financially	  in	  old	  age	  (Canadian	  Museum	  of	  History).	  
If	  a	  senior’s	  annual	  income	  was	  above	  $365,	  they	  were	  not	  eligible	  for	  an	  old	  age	  
pension.	  These	  calculations	  were	  inconsistent	  across	  different	  provincial	  jurisdictions	  
and	  a	  pension	  could	  be	  rescinded	  once	  given.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  workers	  and	  other	  
social	  activists	  would	  call	  on	  government	  to	  dispose	  of	  means	  test	  practices	  (Canadian	  




The	  harsh	  economic	  realities	  endured	  by	  Canadians	  through	  the	  Great	  
Depression	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  the	  economic	  expansion	  that	  followed	  with	  Canada’s	  
involvement	  in	  WWII	  transformed	  Canada	  electorate	  and	  political	  party	  system,	  leading	  
to	  a	  more	  active	  state.	  The	  dire	  economic	  experience	  of	  the	  1930s	  fostered	  a	  growing	  
belief	  that	  government	  had	  to	  provide	  assistance	  for	  those	  who	  could	  not	  protect	  
themselves	  against	  unemployment	  and	  other	  risks	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  The	  product	  
of	  these	  changing	  political	  dynamics	  was	  a	  new	  “social	  contract”	  emerged	  during	  the	  
Great	  Depression,	  where	  intergovernmental	  relations	  evolved	  to	  establish	  more	  social	  
welfare	  policies.	  Policies	  included	  the	  expansion	  of	  some	  old-­‐age	  pension	  benefits13,	  
grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  to	  provinces	  for	  unemployment,	  federal	  assistance	  for	  housing	  construction	  
for	  the	  poor14,	  and	  new	  legislation	  providing	  action	  on	  unemployment	  insurance	  and	  
health	  care15.	  	  
Politically,	  the	  rise	  of	  radical	  socialism,	  communism,	  and	  other	  progressive	  left-­‐
leaning	  politics	  grew	  during	  this	  period.	  Western	  farmers,	  radical	  trade	  unionists	  and	  a	  
growing	  population	  of	  urban	  labourers	  came	  to	  represent	  a	  new	  electoral	  force	  that	  
demanded	  new	  social	  policies	  that	  could	  be	  administered	  by	  the	  state.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  more	  labour	  forces	  were	  integrated	  into	  unions	  and	  regional	  differences	  within	  
the	  labour	  movement	  diminished,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Quebec	  (Brodie	  and	  Jenson	  
1988).	  The	  labour	  movement	  also	  became	  increasingly	  political	  with	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Old	  Age	  Pensions	  Act	  (1937).	  This	  extended	  pensions	  to	  blind	  persons	  
aged	  forty	  and	  over.	  
14	  The	  Dominion	  Housing	  Act	  (1935).	  
15	  Employment	  and	  Social	  Insurance	  Act	  (1935).	  This	  legislation	  was	  eventually	  declared	  
unconstitutional	  in	  1937	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  in	  Britain	  (at	  that	  time	  




confidence	  and	  power	  buoyed	  by	  the	  economic	  demands	  for	  war	  production.	  The	  
labour	  surplus	  of	  the	  1930s	  turned	  into	  a	  labour	  shortage	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  industrial	  
development	  sharply	  increased.	  The	  Canadian	  Congress	  of	  Labour	  (CCL)	  who	  demanded	  
increased	  collective	  bargaining	  rights	  and	  higher	  wages	  abandoned	  the	  non-­‐partisan	  
approach	  of	  the	  TLC.	  Labour	  also	  found	  new	  political	  expression	  with	  the	  inauguration	  
of	  the	  Co-­‐operative	  Commonwealth	  Federation	  (CCF)	  that	  provided	  a	  third	  option	  to	  the	  
two-­‐party	  system	  that	  had	  defined	  Canadian	  federal	  politics.	  The	  CCL’s	  direct	  
endorsement	  of	  the	  CCF,	  along	  with	  an	  expanding	  labour	  movement	  and	  coalition	  of	  
social	  reformers	  demanding	  security	  from	  capitalist	  expansion	  threatened	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	  the	  traditional	  two	  party	  system.	  	  
In	  this	  postwar	  context,	  social	  democracy	  grew	  within	  industrial	  countries	  
internationally	  and	  became	  a	  potent	  force	  in	  Canada	  with	  the	  development	  of	  welfare	  
politics.	  Although	  the	  CCF	  would	  fail	  win	  a	  federal	  election,	  its	  ascendency	  as	  a	  “third	  
option”	  impelled	  the	  Liberal	  and	  Conservative	  parties	  to	  adopt	  platforms	  of	  social	  
reform	  acknowledging	  the	  need	  for	  a	  postwar	  settlement	  between	  capital	  and	  labour.	  
As	  Brodie	  and	  Jenson	  claim,	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  the	  CCF	  in	  Canadian	  politics	  had	  clearly	  broadened	  the	  range	  of	  
political	  alternatives	  available	  to	  the	  population.	  Politics,	  for	  a	  time,	  was	  no	  longer	  
merely	  a	  question	  of	  growth,	  or	  the	  National	  Policy,	  or	  of	  being	  French	  of	  English.	  It	  now	  
included	  the	  possibility	  of	  individual	  benefits	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  the	  state,	  social	  
responsibility	  for	  subordinate	  classes	  and	  regulation	  of	  capital.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
politics	  of	  the	  major	  parties…was	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  from	  those	  who	  wanted	  to	  
raise	  new	  issues	  (1988:	  204).	  	  
	  
The	  political	  agitation	  characterizing	  this	  period	  provided	  new	  ideas	  that	  fundamentally	  




new	  postwar	  consensus	  was	  emerging,	  where	  more	  and	  more	  Canadians	  were	  
demanding	  a	  nationwide	  social	  security	  system.	  From	  the	  late	  1930s	  to	  early	  1970s,	  
Canada’s	  welfare	  state	  expanded	  incrementally,	  implementing	  new	  social	  programs	  
responding	  to	  various	  needs.	  Social	  reforms	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  were	  influencing	  
policymakers	  in	  Canada,	  along	  with	  recommendations	  of	  six	  key	  reports	  published	  from	  
1940	  to	  1945	  leading	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  social	  policies	  and	  standards.	  These	  
included	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  in	  1940	  (Rowell-­‐Sirois	  Commission)16,	  a	  health	  and	  
medical	  insurance	  scheme	  (Heagerty	  Report)17	  in	  1943,	  a	  universal	  family	  allowance	  
program	  in	  1945	  (Marsh	  Report)18,	  a	  housing	  and	  community	  planning	  (Curtis	  Report)19	  
in	  1944,	  a	  Keynesian	  consensus	  regarding	  conduct	  of	  public	  finances	  (The	  White	  
Paper)20,	  and	  establishing	  national	  standards	  for	  public	  services	  (The	  Green	  Book)21	  
(Prince	  and	  Rice	  2013).	  	  
Indeed,	  a	  national	  pension	  system	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  implementation	  of	  
Canada’s	  particular	  form	  of	  welfare	  state,	  where	  the	  postwar	  welfare	  politics	  led	  to	  new	  
legislation	  in	  1951	  with	  the	  Old	  Age	  Security	  Act.	  Keynesian	  economics	  took	  root	  
amongst	  Canadian	  policymakers	  and,	  following	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  WWII,	  
governments	  across	  the	  industrial	  world	  were	  now	  seen	  to	  play	  a	  growing	  role	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Rowell,	  Newton	  Wesley	  and	  Joseph	  Sirois.	  1940.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Dominion-­‐Provincial	  
Relations.	  
17	  Health	  Insurance	  Report.	  1943.	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Health	  Insurance.	  Chaired	  by	  John	  J.	  
Heagerty.	  Leonard	  March	  was	  involved	  as	  a	  researcher	  and	  editor.	  
18	  Marsh,	  Leonard.	  1943.	  Report	  on	  Social	  Security	  for	  Canada.	  	  
19	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  Subcommittee.	  1944.	  Chaired	  by	  C.A	  Curtis	  of	  the	  Subcommittee	  of	  the	  
Housing	  and	  Community	  Planning.	  
20	  White	  Paper	  on	  the	  Budget.	  1939.	  Department	  of	  Finance	  (Federal).	  




ensuring	  social	  security.	  The	  Marsh	  Report	  was	  published	  in	  early	  1943,	  categorizing	  
pension	  benefits	  as	  a	  basic	  minimum	  to	  protect	  what	  he	  termed	  as	  “universal	  risks”	  
posed	  by	  modern	  economic	  development	  (Marsh	  1943;	  Bryden	  1974:	  110).	  In	  response	  
to	  some	  of	  these	  pressures,	  the	  BNA	  Act	  had	  been	  amended	  to	  allow	  the	  federal	  
government	  full	  administration	  of	  a	  new	  universal	  pension	  scheme	  of	  $40	  per	  month	  
that	  was	  financed	  out	  of	  federal	  coffers.	  Residence	  requirements	  were	  loosened,	  along	  
with	  means	  testing,	  which	  many	  had	  found	  humiliating.	  Payments	  began	  in	  1952	  and	  
were	  taxable.	  Also	  in	  1951,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  lower	  entitlement	  age	  from	  70	  to	  65,	  the	  
federal	  government	  passed	  the	  Old	  Age	  Assistance	  Act	  that	  provided	  $40	  per	  month	  to	  
retirees	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  65-­‐69.	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  program	  was	  shared	  fifty-­‐fifty	  
between	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  and	  required	  an	  eligibility	  test.	  	  
	  
Quebec/Canada	  Pension	  Plan	  
	  
Although	  most	  Canadians	  had	  access	  to	  an	  old	  age	  pension	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  many	  Canadians	  who	  lived	  above	  subsistence	  during	  their	  working	  
lives	  encountered	  a	  significant	  decrease	  in	  living	  standards	  when	  they	  retired.	  This	  was	  
largely	  because	  many	  of	  these	  workers	  survived	  through	  the	  economic	  hardships	  of	  the	  
Great	  Depression	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  then	  WWII	  through	  the	  early	  1940s	  during	  their	  
highest	  earning	  years.	  Many	  still	  did	  not	  have	  a	  workplace	  pension	  plan,	  and	  those	  who	  




vesting	  rights.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  calls	  for	  a	  public	  contributory	  national	  
pension	  plan	  grew.	  	  
By	  international	  standards,	  Canada	  was	  a	  laggard.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  many	  
western	  European	  countries	  offered	  contributory,	  earnings-­‐related	  pensions.	  Consensus	  
was	  mounting	  across	  political	  parties	  and	  civil	  society,	  largely	  motivated	  by	  a	  growing	  
sense	  of	  duty	  to	  older	  Canadians,	  who	  had	  endured	  the	  Great	  Depression	  of	  the	  1930s	  
and	  six	  years	  of	  “sacrifice	  and	  privation”	  during	  WWII.	  Many	  government	  officials	  
deemed	  expanding	  OAS	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  too	  expensive.	  Instead,	  calls	  grew	  for	  a	  
portable,	  government	  sponsored	  contributory	  plan	  that	  expanded	  coverage	  to	  all	  
workers	  as	  an	  alternative	  remedy.	  In	  1965,	  the	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  
introduced	  the	  Canada	  Pension	  Plan	  (CPP),	  Canada’s	  first	  national	  compulsory	  
contributory	  plan	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Quebec,	  which	  launched	  its	  own	  scheme	  
simultaneously).	  The	  CPP	  covered	  92	  percent	  of	  the	  workforce	  and	  required	  employee	  
and	  employer	  contributions	  (Little	  2008).	  CPP	  was	  designed	  to	  supplement	  other	  
retirement	  savings,	  replacing	  up	  to	  only	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  average	  industrial	  wage.	  	  
The	  politics	  surrounding	  the	  establishment	  of	  CPP	  was	  shaped	  in	  part	  by	  
Canada’s	  federal	  political	  institutional	  structure,	  a	  piece	  of	  provincial	  legislation	  from	  
Ontario,	  and	  regional	  interests.	  Quebec	  and	  Ontario	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  how	  CPP	  
was	  structured,	  albeit	  for	  two	  different	  reasons.	  Originally,	  the	  minority	  federal	  
government	  led	  by	  Lester	  Pearson	  proposed	  a	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐	  go	  scheme	  (also	  commonly	  




workers	  entering	  retirement.	  This	  would	  help	  fast-­‐track	  older	  workers	  at	  the	  time	  access	  
decent	  benefits	  from	  the	  new	  plan.	  	  
In	  1968,	  around	  the	  same	  time	  Pearson	  developed	  his	  proposal	  for	  CPP,	  the	  
government	  of	  Ontario	  led	  by	  Premier	  John	  Robarts	  introduced	  Canada’s	  first	  provincial	  
legislation,	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  that	  would	  regulate	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  
Before	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  national	  plan,	  Ontario	  viewed	  the	  PBA	  as	  the	  key	  piece	  of	  
pension	  lawmaking	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  Nearby	  in	  neighboring	  Quebec,	  the	  Quiet	  
Revolution	  was	  in	  full	  swing	  in	  Quebec	  fueling	  separatist	  sentiments.	  Within	  this	  
context,	  Premier	  Jean	  Lesage	  was	  exploring	  policies	  that	  could	  develop	  Quebec’s	  
financial	  and	  economic	  independence.	  As	  such,	  Lesage	  was	  interested	  in	  Ontario’s	  
recent	  PBA	  that	  regulated	  workplace	  pension	  plans,	  conducting	  a	  review	  of	  Ontario’s	  
legislation.	  When	  Lesage	  caught	  wind	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  plan	  to	  introduce	  a	  
pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  CPP,	  his	  government	  quickly	  developed	  their	  own	  provincial	  strategy	  that	  
called	  for	  a	  Quebec	  plan	  to	  build	  up	  a	  large	  fund	  that	  would	  use	  the	  savings	  of	  Quebec’s	  
workforce	  to	  invest	  in	  provincial	  economic	  development	  (Little	  2008:	  25-­‐26).	  Ontario,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  was	  promoting	  the	  expansion	  of	  its	  private	  pension	  system	  as	  an	  
alternative	  to	  CPP.	  This	  position	  was	  driven	  in	  part	  by	  Ontario’s	  strong	  life	  insurance	  
industry	  that	  was	  vehemently	  against	  a	  public	  contributory	  pension	  plan.	  The	  life	  
insurance	  industry	  saw	  the	  CPP	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  an	  expanding	  private	  pension	  system	  that	  
would	  provide	  decades	  of	  work	  for	  Bay	  Street.	  	  
When	  Pearson	  met	  with	  provincial	  leaders	  in	  1963	  and	  1964	  to	  discuss	  the	  




vision	  of	  a	  provincial	  plan	  that	  was	  fully	  funded	  and	  would	  use	  capital	  gains	  developed	  
by	  the	  fund	  for	  new	  social	  investment	  in	  schools,	  universities,	  colleges,	  housing	  
developments,	  and	  for	  investment	  in	  provincial	  infrastructure	  and	  other	  economic	  
projects.	  Quebec’s	  plan	  was	  attractive	  to	  other	  provincial	  governments,	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  Ontario,	  which	  was	  initially	  cold	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  CPP.	  Lesage	  was	  not	  
opposed	  to	  the	  federal	  government’s	  plan,	  but	  said	  Quebec	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  
participating	  and	  would	  only	  support	  the	  constitutional	  amendment	  required	  to	  
establish	  the	  federal	  government’s	  administration	  of	  CPP	  if	  Quebec	  was	  allowed	  to	  have	  
its	  own	  plan.	  Without	  Quebec’s	  support	  for	  constitutional	  reform,	  Pearson’s	  proposal	  
was	  dead	  on	  arrival.	  Quebec	  outlined	  its	  proposal	  at	  a	  First	  Ministers	  meeting	  in	  March	  
1964	  in	  Quebec	  City	  that	  was	  clearly	  stronger	  than	  the	  federal	  plan,	  making	  it	  obvious	  
that	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  have	  to	  seriously	  amend	  their	  own	  plan	  to	  meet	  the	  
demands	  of	  Quebec	  to	  establish	  a	  national	  public	  pension	  plan.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
Robarts	  hinted	  that	  Ontario	  might	  establish	  its	  own	  plan	  if	  Quebec	  was	  not	  part	  of	  CPP	  
(Little	  2008).	  Following	  the	  meeting,	  this	  expanse	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  Quebec	  
governments	  was	  significant	  and	  brought	  into	  question	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Canadian	  
federation,	  where	  fears	  of	  Quebec	  separating	  were	  palpable.	  Motivated	  by	  these	  fears,	  
through	  early	  April	  1964,	  Pearson	  organized	  a	  quick	  succession	  of	  private	  meetings	  
between	  Lesage	  and	  his	  political	  advisors	  to	  hash	  out	  a	  compromise	  between	  each	  
government’s	  proposals.	  The	  dramatic	  circumstances	  under	  which	  these	  meetings	  were	  
held	  established	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  Canadian	  Pension	  Plan	  and	  the	  Quebec	  Pension	  




rather	  than	  PAYGO,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  benefits	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  retirees.	  On	  April	  20,	  1964	  a	  
plan	  was	  finalized	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  Quebec	  governments,	  creating	  the	  
legislative	  framework	  for	  the	  C/QPP,	  which	  were	  essentially	  identical.	  	  
Ontario,	  for	  its	  part,	  was	  largely	  left	  out	  of	  this	  process.	  The	  fears	  of	  a	  faltering	  
federation	  justified	  Pearson’s	  decision	  to	  not	  include	  Ontario	  in	  its	  negotiations	  with	  
Quebec,	  where	  Ontario	  from	  the	  beginning,	  along	  with	  the	  insurance	  industry,	  had	  been	  
calling	  for	  a	  watered	  down	  CPP.	  The	  Quebec-­‐Ottawa	  deal	  in	  fact	  created	  a	  national	  plan	  
that	  offered	  much	  larger	  benefits.	  To	  appease	  Robarts	  and	  Ontario,	  Pearson	  agreed	  that	  
any	  future	  changes	  to	  CPP	  would	  require	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  provinces	  with	  two	  thirds	  of	  
the	  population	  –	  a	  rule	  that	  still	  lives	  today.	  Due	  to	  Ontario’s	  population	  size,	  this	  
virtually	  gave	  the	  province	  a	  veto	  on	  any	  future	  amendments	  (Little	  2008:	  33).	  	  
In	  hindsight,	  Quebec’s	  initiative	  in	  outlining	  its	  own	  provincial	  vision	  was	  a	  
decisive	  political	  tactic	  that	  pressured	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  amend	  their	  proposal	  
to	  align	  closer	  with	  Quebec’s	  agenda.	  This	  served	  to	  establish	  an	  institutional	  structure	  
that	  would	  appease	  federalists	  and	  presume	  a	  degree	  of	  economic	  independence	  
through	  the	  management	  of	  retirement	  savings	  on	  a	  provincial	  scale.	  Ironically,	  
Ontario’s	  legislative	  initiative	  and	  originality	  with	  passing	  Canada’s	  first	  pension	  
regulatory	  framework	  with	  the	  PBA	  served	  to	  propel	  Quebec’s	  interest	  in	  using	  pension	  
legislation	  for	  provincial	  interests	  in	  a	  context	  of	  growing	  separatist	  fervor.	  This	  example	  
illustrates	  how	  provincial	  legislation	  and	  politics	  informed	  the	  institutional	  shape	  of	  the	  




The	  CPP	  was	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  full	  retirement	  benefits	  for	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  
after	  1965	  since	  it	  needed	  to	  mature	  through	  the	  collection	  of	  contributions	  from	  
workers	  and	  employers	  before	  it	  was	  financially	  sound.	  To	  offer	  income	  support	  to	  
Canadians	  already	  at	  retirement	  age,	  governments	  established	  the	  Guaranteed	  Income	  
Supplement	  (GIS),	  an	  income-­‐tested	  supplement	  to	  pensioners	  receiving	  OAS	  without	  
other	  sources	  of	  income.	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  this	  program	  would	  be	  phased	  out	  once	  
C/QPP	  began	  paying	  full	  benefits.	  However,	  since	  many	  workers	  were	  ineligible	  for	  full	  
C/QPP	  benefits	  and	  since	  OAS	  alone	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  keep	  retirees	  out	  of	  poverty,	  GIS	  
was	  an	  important	  policy	  measure	  that	  kept	  many	  elderly	  Canadians	  from	  complete	  
impoverishment.	  Therefore,	  the	  program	  was	  maintained	  and	  has	  been	  indexed	  to	  the	  
cost	  of	  living.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  GIS	  and	  C/QPP	  cemented	  the	  first	  and	  second	  
pillar	  of	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system.	  The	  third	  pillar	  –	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  
and	  other	  private	  savings	  –	  formed	  separately	  from	  OAS,	  GIS,	  and	  C/QPP,	  and	  is	  the	  
product	  of	  Canada’s	  economic	  growth,	  postwar	  welfare	  politics,	  unionization,	  the	  
expansion	  of	  collective	  bargaining,	  and	  the	  development	  the	  global	  economy.	  
	  
The	  Birth	  of	  Workplace	  Pension	  Systems:	  1800s-­‐WWII	  
	  
The	  development	  of	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  took	  hold	  alongside	  the	  birth	  of	  publicly	  
funded	  government	  sponsored	  pension	  funds	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  that	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  public	  




developed	  historically	  in	  dialogue	  with	  one	  another,	  as	  two	  components	  of	  a	  broader	  
institution	  of	  retirement	  income	  security.	  	  
During	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  workplace	  pensions	  
developed	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  large	  employers,	  typically	  in	  government,	  
railroads,	  utilities,	  hospitals,	  universities	  and	  private	  manufacturing	  sectors	  (Bryden	  
2015;	  Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  203;	  Sass	  2006;	  Weitz	  1992).	  With	  the	  expansion	  of	  industrial	  
mass	  production	  and	  expanding	  state	  bureaucracies,	  these	  organizations	  became	  the	  
central	  institutions	  of	  industrial	  societies,	  and	  thus	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  large	  
corporate	  business	  and	  managerial	  models	  of	  employment.	  Increasingly,	  a	  handful	  of	  
these	  employers	  required	  a	  loyal	  and	  dedicated	  workforce.	  Pensions,	  beginning	  in	  
nineteenth	  century	  to	  WWII,	  served	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  attract	  and	  retain	  quality	  
workers	  and	  as	  a	  valuable	  instrument	  of	  personnel	  management.	  The	  size	  and	  longevity	  
of	  these	  employers	  enabled	  them	  to	  make	  a	  legitimate	  pension	  promise	  to	  their	  
workers,	  but	  could	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  weapon	  to	  interfere	  with	  labour	  organization	  and	  
labour	  disputes.	  
	   It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  employer	  and	  employee	  
began	  to	  transform	  into	  a	  standard	  employment	  relationship	  in	  the	  form	  of	  full	  time	  
continuous	  employment	  (Vosko	  2006).	  Labour	  movements	  across	  industrializing	  
countries	  took	  root	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  unionized	  work	  environments	  slowly	  evolved.	  
Employer	  pensions	  for	  ‘good	  service’	  came	  to	  represent	  an	  aspect	  of	  a	  social	  wage	  




	   Initial	  employer	  plans	  were	  provided	  to	  white-­‐collar	  workers,	  typically	  required	  
employee	  contributions,	  and	  was	  based	  on	  years	  of	  service,	  thus	  serving	  “as	  
compensation	  of	  the	  worker’s	  contribution	  of	  this	  long	  and	  diligent	  service	  (Sass	  2006).	  
The	  first	  employment-­‐based	  retirement	  scheme	  in	  Canada	  was	  introduced	  by	  in	  1821	  by	  
the	  Hudson’s	  Bay	  Company	  (HBC)	  (Kaplan	  and	  Fraser	  2013).	  The	  earliest	  publicly	  
sponsored	  retirement	  schemes	  came	  in	  1870	  offered	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  for	  civil	  
servants,	  and	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  Grand	  Trunk	  Rail	  created	  a	  pension	  plan	  for	  its	  
clerks	  in	  1874	  (Bryden	  1974;	  Weitz	  1992).	  In	  Britain,	  the	  first	  workplace	  plans	  were	  
offered	  to	  Customs	  and	  Excise	  officers,	  as	  their	  competence	  in	  tax	  collection	  was	  
fundamental	  to	  Britain’s	  emerging	  imperial	  power	  (Clark,	  Munnell,	  and	  Orszag	  2006:	  
18).	  Employer	  pensions	  would	  eventually	  be	  offered	  to	  blue-­‐collar	  occupations	  as	  both	  a	  
means	  to	  attract	  quality	  workers	  and	  as	  a	  form	  of	  industrial	  insurance,	  something	  that	  
was	  attractive	  to	  workers	  and	  families	  in	  the	  case	  of	  injury	  or	  death.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
1930s,	  employer	  plans	  covered	  up	  to	  fifteen	  percent	  of	  industrial	  workers	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  
and	  other	  industrialized	  countries	  including	  Canada	  (Sass	  2006).	  	  
Employer	  plans,	  however,	  only	  covered	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  work	  force	  
during	  this	  time,	  particularly	  for	  women	  who	  often	  had	  little	  to	  no	  labour	  market	  
participation,	  limiting	  their	  ability	  to	  adequately	  replace	  income	  during	  retirement	  for	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  labour	  force.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  often	  the	  case	  that	  employees	  did	  
not	  stay	  with	  an	  employer	  until	  retirement	  (or	  until	  the	  acquired	  vesting	  rights),	  or	  were	  
terminated	  before	  retirement	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  pension,	  even	  if	  the	  




the	  number	  of	  workers	  who	  actually	  received	  a	  pension	  (Bryden	  1974;	  Sass	  2006).	  There	  
was	  little	  government	  regulation	  over	  how	  employers	  managed	  employee	  pension	  
contributions	  and	  a	  worker’s	  pension	  was	  typically	  paid	  out	  as	  a	  company	  expense,	  
rather	  than	  from	  a	  dedicated	  pension	  fund	  held	  in	  good	  faith.	  As	  Carmichael	  describes,	  
in	  Canada	  and	  elsewhere,	  “Workplace	  pension	  plans	  were	  weak	  because	  of	  low	  
coverage	  rates,	  mismanagement	  of	  pension	  funds,	  employer	  contribution	  holidays,	  
discriminatory	  impacts	  on	  women,	  lack	  of	  inflation	  protection,	  and	  the	  paternalism	  of	  
employers”	  (2005:	  18).	  It	  was	  not	  unusual	  for	  employers	  to	  use	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  
company	  pension	  as	  a	  leveraging	  tool	  to	  control	  their	  workers,	  threatening	  to	  withhold	  
an	  employee’s	  pension	  if	  they	  were	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  labour	  organizational	  
activities.	  The	  employment	  pension	  system	  was	  in	  its	  infancy	  and	  was	  not	  viewed	  as	  an	  
enforceable	  legal	  right.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  that	  characterized	  this	  
period	  of	  employment	  left	  workers	  with	  little	  security	  against	  the	  whims	  of	  their	  
employers.	  	  
By	  1900	  there	  were	  approximately	  twelve	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  in	  Canada,	  
though	  this	  number	  would	  grow	  through	  the	  interwar	  years	  (Kaplan	  and	  Fraser	  2013).	  
“Corporate	  welfarism”	  replaced	  the	  doctrine	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  that	  was	  aided	  
by	  the	  introduction	  of	  favorable	  federal	  income	  tax	  legislation	  that	  the	  federal	  
government	  used	  to	  encourage	  employers	  to	  establish	  new	  pension	  funds	  by	  making	  
them	  financially	  attractive.	  New	  income	  tax	  legislation	  such	  as	  the	  Income	  War	  Tax	  Act,	  
1917	  and	  further	  amendments	  passed	  in	  1928	  and	  1938	  allowed	  employers	  to	  deduct	  




the	  employer	  agreed	  to	  place	  the	  fund	  in	  trust	  under	  separate	  management	  (Kaplan	  and	  
Fraser	  2013).	  Public	  sector	  employment	  pension	  plans	  also	  grew	  through	  the	  1920s	  in	  
British	  Columbia,	  Alberta,	  Ontario	  and	  Quebec.	  	  
However,	  while	  employers	  were	  encouraged	  to	  introduce	  pension	  plans	  for	  their	  
employees,	  there	  was	  no	  regulation	  of	  the	  legal	  relationship	  between	  employer	  and	  
employee	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  pension	  schemes.	  There	  was	  no	  common	  law	  principle	  that	  could	  
prohibit	  an	  employer	  from	  withholding	  pension	  entitlements	  from	  members.	  As	  Kaplan	  
and	  Fraser	  discuss,	  “The	  extent	  of	  an	  employee’s	  right	  to	  enforce	  retirement	  income	  
from	  his	  or	  her	  employer	  depended	  almost	  entirely	  on	  the	  bargain	  of	  the	  parties	  as	  
expressed	  in	  the	  employment	  contract”	  (2013:	  39).	  Employers	  during	  this	  time	  regarded	  
pension	  issues	  as	  belonging	  to	  their	  own	  purview	  with,	  “…unilateral	  powers	  of	  
amendment	  and	  termination”	  (Kaplan	  and	  Fraser	  2013:	  39).	  What’s	  more,	  if	  a	  company	  
entered	  bankruptcy	  there	  was	  no	  legal	  protection	  of	  employees’	  pension	  contributions.	  
This	  would	  change	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐	  nineteenth	  century,	  where	  pension	  arrangements	  
would	  shift	  from	  being	  viewed	  as	  purely	  a	  contractual	  right	  to	  an	  earned	  right,	  and	  an	  
integral	  aspect	  of	  the	  employment	  relationship	  that	  became	  legally	  enforceable.	  	  
	  
The	  Golden	  Era	  of	  Private	  Pensions:	  WWII-­‐1965	  
	  
The	  period	  following	  WWII	  to	  the	  mid	  1960s	  saw	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  employer	  
pension	  plans.	  The	  context	  of	  the	  postwar	  settlement	  was	  characterized	  by	  broad	  range	  




employment	  across	  industrial	  sectors,	  growing	  unionization,	  and	  rapid	  industrial	  
economic	  expansion.	  Across	  the	  industrial	  world	  of	  advanced	  capitalism,	  the	  workplace	  
pension	  system	  expanded	  to	  cover	  approximately	  fifty	  percent	  of	  industrial	  workers	  
(Sass	  2006).	  In	  Canada,	  a	  1947	  survey	  for	  the	  Dominion	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  found	  that	  
more	  than	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  workplace	  plans	  began	  after	  1939	  (Bryden	  1974:	  38).	  Buoyed	  by	  
post-­‐war	  peace,	  increased	  urbanization,	  rapid	  unionization,	  and	  collective	  bargaining	  
rights	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  political	  alliances	  of	  a	  new	  middle	  class,	  and	  a	  quickly	  
expanding	  global	  economy,	  employer	  pension	  coverage	  grew	  dramatically.	  The	  
ascendance	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  welfare	  state	  expanded,	  organized	  around	  new	  norms	  of	  
postwar	  labour	  law,	  legislation	  and	  policy	  (Vosco	  2006).	  Employer	  pensions	  served	  to	  
further	  standardize	  the	  employment	  relationship	  in	  the	  form	  of	  full	  time	  continuous	  
employment,	  one	  that	  was	  based	  on	  a	  ‘gender	  contract’	  of	  male	  breadwinner	  and	  
female	  homemaker	  and	  caregiver	  (McDonald	  1997;	  Cheal	  and	  Kampen	  1998;	  McDaniel	  
2001;	  Kodar	  2012).	  	  
Here,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  draw	  from	  Esping-­‐Andersen’s	  (1990)	  typology	  of	  welfare-­‐
state	  development	  to	  understand	  the	  broad	  structural	  forces	  that	  have	  shaped	  different	  
workplace	  pension	  systems	  across	  Western	  industrialized	  societies.	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  
claims	  that,	  “Any	  discussion	  of	  the	  history	  of	  pensions	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
radically	  different	  structural	  conditions	  that	  prevailed	  in	  early	  industrial	  capitalism”	  
(1990:	  89).	  Sass	  draws	  from	  the	  welfare-­‐state	  typology	  of	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  to	  compare	  
the	  economic	  and	  historical	  development	  of	  two	  distinct	  institutional	  trajectories	  of	  




what	  Esping-­‐Anderson	  terms	  ‘liberal	  welfare	  states’),	  that	  include	  (UK,	  US,	  and	  Canada);	  
the	  second	  occurring	  in	  continental	  Europe	  (including	  France,	  Sweden,	  Germany,	  
Netherlands).	  The	  destruction	  wrought	  by	  WWII	  was	  most	  damaging	  to	  the	  economies	  
in	  continental	  Europe,	  where,	  along	  with	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  the	  net	  worth	  of	  many	  
private	  employers	  and	  their	  pension	  schemes	  were	  destroyed.	  Consequently,	  there	  was	  
little	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  the	  aged.	  Given	  the	  comparatively	  strong	  tradition	  of	  publicly	  
provided	  welfare	  in	  continental	  Europe,	  national	  wage	  bargaining	  occurred	  after	  WWII,	  
institutionalizing	  labour-­‐market	  relations	  that	  “became	  the	  platform	  for	  establishing	  
quasi-­‐public	  mandatory	  social	  insurance	  arrangements	  that	  would	  cover	  all	  workers”	  
(Sass	  2006:	  82).	  Subsequently,	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  became	  administered	  
through	  public-­‐private	  systems.	  	  
In	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries	  such	  as	  Canada,	  the	  US,	  and	  UK,	  employee-­‐sponsored	  
plans	  became	  a	  separate	  private	  pillar	  in	  a	  broader	  public/private	  retirement	  income	  
system.	  A	  strong	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  corporate-­‐financial	  culture	  dominated	  conservative	  
business	  perspectives	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.	  These	  countries	  also	  exited	  WWII	  in	  a	  
stronger	  economic	  position	  where	  private	  pension	  plans	  could	  still	  be	  offered	  to	  
workers	  (Sass	  2006).	  Collective	  bargaining	  systems	  in	  these	  countries	  were	  conducted	  at	  
the	  company	  or	  industry	  level.	  For	  employers,	  company	  pension	  plans	  provided	  
attractive	  tax	  shelters,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  means	  to	  retain	  quality	  workers	  and	  contain	  labour	  
militancy.	  Many	  unions	  in	  these	  countries	  lobbied	  for	  universal	  security	  for	  the	  elderly	  in	  




reluctantly	  negotiating	  private	  pension	  schemes	  with	  single	  employers	  through	  
collective	  bargaining.	  	  
The	  need	  for	  reliable	  sources	  of	  labour	  in	  war	  industries	  led	  governments	  in	  
Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  establish	  an	  institutional	  framework	  that	  would	  
integrate	  unions	  into	  capitalist	  economic	  expansion	  through	  industrial	  relations	  
legislation	  and	  arbitration.	  While	  collective	  bargaining	  rights	  were	  established,	  the	  
desire	  of	  American	  and	  Canadian	  governments	  to	  use	  collective	  bargaining	  to	  mitigate	  
labour	  disputes	  created	  an	  opening	  for	  employers	  to	  establish	  corporate	  welfare	  models	  
of	  industrial	  relations.	  Thus,	  control	  over	  worker’s	  economic	  security	  became	  a	  key	  
battleground	  for	  control	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  
In	  1935	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Wagner	  Act	  became	  a	  foundational	  statue	  that	  
guaranteed	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  private	  sector	  employees	  to	  organize	  into	  unions,	  to	  
engage	  in	  collective	  bargaining	  and	  to	  strike.	  During	  WWII,	  the	  National	  War	  Labor	  
Board	  (NWLB)	  legislated	  that	  employers	  must	  negotiate	  sick	  leave,	  and	  that	  disability	  
wage	  plans	  and	  group	  insurance	  must	  be	  written	  into	  labour	  management	  contracts	  
(Klein	  2004).	  In	  1948,	  the	  National	  Labour	  Relations	  Board	  (NLRB)	  concluded	  in	  a	  
decision	  that,	  	  “employers	  were	  legally	  obligated	  to	  negotiate	  pension	  plans”	  (Weitz	  
1992:	  64),	  thus	  making	  pensions	  a	  formal	  bargainable	  issue.	  Although	  workers	  in	  Canada	  
had	  been	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  associate	  into	  trade	  unions	  in	  1872	  following	  the	  
Trade	  Union	  Act,	  in	  1944,	  the	  Privy	  Council	  Order	  1003	  adopted	  by	  Wartime	  Labour	  
Relations	  Regulations	  under	  the	  Liberal	  government	  of	  Mackenzie	  King	  forced	  




Even	  though	  the	  power	  of	  labour	  grew	  substantially	  during	  this	  period	  and	  was	  
able	  to	  establish	  new	  collective	  bargaining	  rights,	  labour	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  realizing	  a	  
larger	  role	  in	  economic	  security.	  For	  example,	  immediately	  following	  WWII	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  labour	  and	  health	  activists	  proposed	  community	  wide	  health	  programs	  where	  a	  
company	  would	  pay	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  employee	  payroll	  to	  an	  independent	  health,	  
welfare	  and	  retirement	  program	  that	  would	  be	  union-­‐run	  or	  union-­‐determined	  social	  
service	  programs.	  Labour	  leaders	  such	  as	  Walter	  Reuther	  also	  sought	  expanded	  
employment	  security	  through	  industry	  wide	  collective	  bargaining	  (Gladwell	  2006).	  
Employers,	  however,	  saw	  these	  proposals	  as	  European-­‐style	  corporatism	  and	  as	  a	  veiled	  
attempt	  to	  appropriate	  power	  that	  undercut	  managerial	  prerogatives.	  Instead,	  
employers	  sought	  to	  prevent	  control	  of	  social	  security	  through	  welfare	  capitalism.	  	  
To	  contain	  union	  power,	  employers	  used	  the	  unilateral	  purchase	  of	  commercial	  
group	  insurance	  and	  attempted	  to	  reform	  labour	  legislation	  “to	  defuse	  state-­‐backed	  
collective	  bargaining”	  (Klein	  2004:	  48).	  Another	  strategy	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  
collective	  bargaining	  negotiations	  at	  the	  local	  or	  plant	  level	  and	  not	  at	  the	  company	  or	  
industry	  level.	  This	  atomized	  the	  collective	  bargaining	  process	  that	  gave	  more	  power	  to	  
employers.	  For	  instance,	  union	  officials	  at	  the	  local	  level	  were	  often	  “woefully	  ignorant”	  
regarding	  pension	  issues,	  where	  their	  “…lack	  of	  sophistication	  in	  this	  very	  complex	  area	  
placed	  the	  unions	  at	  a	  distinct	  disadvantage	  in	  negotiations”	  (Weitz	  1992:	  67).	  
Furthermore,	  governments	  were	  unwilling	  to	  step	  in	  to	  labour	  disputes	  beyond	  setting	  
out	  basic	  parameters	  of	  collective	  bargaining.	  By	  offering	  new	  benefits	  and	  keeping	  




collective	  bargaining	  happen	  at	  the	  local	  or	  plant	  level,	  employers	  were	  able	  win	  
advantage	  over	  many	  unions	  at	  the	  bargaining	  table	  through	  defining	  security	  with	  the	  
adoption	  of	  welfare	  capitalism.	  	  
In	  hindsight,	  while	  the	  power	  of	  labour	  did	  substantially	  grow,	  along	  with	  
increasing	  wages	  and	  social	  benefits	  for	  workers,	  unions	  were	  not	  able	  to	  secure	  control	  
over	  economic	  security.	  In	  late	  1950s,	  the	  Canadian	  and	  American	  states	  began	  to	  
develop	  public	  policy	  that	  served	  to	  fill	  the	  holes	  left	  in	  private	  social	  policy,	  ultimately	  
siding	  the	  with	  the	  agenda	  of	  employer-­‐sponsored	  welfare	  capitalism.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  
withdrawal	  of	  the	  state	  from	  industrial	  relations,	  but	  the	  facilitation	  of	  employers’	  
control	  of	  private	  security	  through	  government	  intervention	  of	  supplemental	  public	  
policy.	  This	  solidified	  the	  private	  social	  security	  system	  in	  Canada	  and	  United	  States.	  As	  
Klein	  opined:	  “[Welfare	  capitalism]	  had	  created	  islands	  of	  security	  within	  the	  economy,	  
with	  high	  waters	  all	  around”	  (2004:	  58).	  
As	  such,	  unions	  ideologically	  accepted	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  through	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  In	  Canada,	  many	  unions	  reluctantly	  negotiated	  for	  beefed	  up	  
workplace	  pension	  plans	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  universal	  pension	  plan”	  (Carmichael	  2005:	  
16).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  labour	  movement’s	  intent	  of	  pooling	  risk	  across	  a	  broader	  group	  of	  
workers	  was	  squashed	  by	  the	  desire	  of	  large	  industrial	  employers	  to	  control	  the	  
retirement	  savings	  of	  their	  workers	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  tax	  exemptions.	  	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  these	  struggles	  and	  the	  broader	  international	  political	  
economy,	  private	  sector	  pension	  coverage	  rates	  shot	  up	  dramatically	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  




percent	  by	  the	  1960s	  (Sass	  2006:	  84).	  In	  Canada,	  the	  1970s	  was	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  pension	  
coverage	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  reaching	  over	  50	  percent	  for	  male	  workers,	  many	  of	  
whom	  worked	  for	  large	  industrial	  companies	  in	  manufacturing	  (Statistics	  Canada:	  2015).	  
This	  cemented	  the	  important	  function	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  as	  a	  central	  pillar	  in	  
retirement	  income	  systems,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  mandatory	  social	  insurance	  arrangements	  
in	  continental	  Europe.	  It	  is	  here,	  in	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  structure	  of	  employer	  
negotiated	  pension	  schemes	  that	  one	  can	  locate	  how	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  
has	  been	  historically	  institutionalized	  between	  workers	  and	  employers.	  This	  history	  is	  
critical	  in	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  today	  is	  being	  
individualized	  in	  within	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system.	  	  
	  
‘Minimum	  Standards’:	  Regulating	  Workplace	  Pensions,	  1960-­‐1980	  
	  
Beginning	  in	  the	  1960s,	  many	  governments	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries	  enacted	  ‘minimum	  
standards’	  legislation	  to	  protect	  the	  solvency	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  Governments	  
recognized	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  workplace	  plans	  as	  a	  central	  pillar	  of	  their	  
retirement	  income	  system	  with	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  pension	  coverage	  during	  the	  
post-­‐war	  era.	  Although	  coverage	  was	  expanding,	  many	  workers	  still	  did	  not	  gain	  a	  
pension	  when	  they	  retired.	  It	  was	  not	  unusual	  for	  a	  company	  to	  go	  bust	  along	  with	  their	  
plan.	  It	  was	  also	  quite	  possible	  for	  a	  worker	  to	  have	  no	  private	  pension	  income	  at	  
retirement	  after	  a	  forty-­‐year	  career	  if	  they	  had	  moved	  employers	  three	  or	  four	  times	  




During	  this	  time,	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  for	  women	  did	  expand,	  but	  their	  
benefits	  were	  not	  equal	  to	  men’s,	  reflecting	  the	  pay	  inequities	  and	  gender	  
discrimination	  embedded	  in	  Canada’s	  workforce.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  a	  period	  where	  until	  
1964,	  women	  still	  required	  the	  their	  husband’s	  signature	  to	  obtain	  a	  bank	  account	  
(Public	  Service	  Alliance	  of	  Canada	  2015).	  Women	  were	  also	  poorly	  covered	  by	  both	  
private	  and	  public	  pension	  schemes	  due	  to	  their	  limited	  time	  spent	  in	  the	  work	  force	  as	  
women’s	  workplace	  attachment	  was	  severely	  restricted,	  given	  women	  were	  the	  primary	  
care	  givers	  for	  child	  and	  domestic	  elderly	  care.	  Workplace	  pensions	  were	  most	  common	  
in	  remunerative	  industrial	  jobs	  that	  were	  usually	  held	  by	  men.	  Women	  of	  colour	  were	  
even	  more	  disadvantaged,	  working	  in	  low	  paying,	  domestic	  care-­‐taking	  positions.	  As	  
findings	  from	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Women	  published	  in	  1970	  revealed,	  only	  3.9	  
percent	  of	  managers	  were	  women,	  and	  although	  eight	  out	  of	  ten	  provinces	  had	  equal-­‐
pay	  laws,	  women	  were	  still	  paid	  less	  than	  their	  male	  counterparts.	  Moreover,	  two	  thirds	  
of	  people	  on	  welfare	  in	  1970	  were	  women	  (Public	  Service	  Alliance	  of	  Canada	  2015).	  
Thus,	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  continued	  to	  facilitate	  the	  single	  earner	  model,	  and	  
therefore	  gendered	  discrimination	  in	  the	  workforce.	  	  Due	  to	  these	  conditions,	  many	  
experienced	  a	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  living	  standards	  when	  entering	  retirement.	  As	  the	  
Women’s	  Liberation	  Movement	  gained	  momentum	  through	  the	  1970s,	  female	  labour	  
force	  participation	  expanded,	  in	  which	  demands	  for	  better	  access	  to	  pensions	  grew	  as	  
the	  impoverishment	  of	  women	  was	  acknowledged.	  
Government	  officials	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  growing	  size	  of	  pension	  tax-­‐




due	  to	  the	  special	  treatment	  given	  to	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  (Sass	  2006:	  87).	  To	  justify	  
the	  continuation	  of	  this	  special	  treatment	  of	  private	  pension	  funds,	  government	  officials	  
wanted	  a	  larger	  contribution	  from	  these	  plans	  to	  public	  welfare	  –	  i.e.	  expanded	  worker	  
coverage	  by	  this	  pillar	  (Sass	  2006:	  87).	  Governments	  sought	  to	  exchange	  tax	  benefits	  for	  
new	  regulatory	  rules	  on	  employer	  plans.	  These	  new	  statutes	  codified	  pension	  
governance	  to	  include	  new	  vesting,	  funding,	  and	  fiduciary	  standards	  to	  ensure	  
employers	  did	  not	  abuse	  plans	  financially	  and	  that	  the	  pension	  promise	  was	  indeed	  kept	  
for	  retiring	  workers.	  In	  1943	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  National	  War	  Labour	  Board	  ruled	  
that	  employers	  who	  already	  offered	  insurance	  benefits	  such	  as	  sick	  leave	  and	  pension	  
plans	  could	  not	  alter	  or	  abolish	  these	  existing	  benefits	  (Klein	  2004).	  Several	  years	  later,	  
the	  first	  minimum	  standards	  to	  occur	  in	  Canada	  came	  under	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  (ITA)	  in	  
1947	  that	  prohibited	  an	  employer	  from	  reducing	  or	  revoking	  a	  pension	  that	  was	  already	  
in	  pay.	  The	  Department	  of	  National	  Revenue	  published	  a	  “Blue	  Book”	  booklet	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  that	  set	  guidelines	  for	  ministries	  on	  how	  to	  register	  a	  pension	  plan	  through	  
an	  independent	  trust	  fund	  (Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  2013).	  This	  Blue	  Book	  provided	  an	  initial	  
regulatory	  framework,	  and	  while	  not	  mandatory,	  if	  employers	  wished	  to	  access	  tax	  
advantages	  offered	  through	  the	  ITA,	  employers	  had	  to	  adopt	  these	  new	  standards.	  
Furthermore,	  “The	  Blue	  Book’s	  requirement	  that	  employer	  contributions	  to	  a	  trusteed	  
pension	  plan	  had	  to	  be	  irrevocable	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  high-­‐profile	  pension	  surplus	  
litigation	  of	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s”	  (Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  2013:	  41).	  This	  will	  be	  




John	  Robarts’	  Liberal	  government	  in	  Ontario	  was	  the	  first	  Canadian	  government	  
to	  enact	  pension	  legislation	  with	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  in	  1965.	  The	  statute	  
established	  the	  principle	  of	  vesting,	  “whereby	  workers	  accrued	  a	  right	  to	  their	  pensions	  
during	  their	  period	  of	  employment”	  (Carmichael	  2005:	  17),	  thus	  legally	  guaranteeing	  an	  
employee’s	  access	  to	  their	  pension	  entitlement.	  This	  new	  legislation	  standardized	  the	  
“10/45”	  rule:	  an	  employee	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  a	  pension	  after	  ten	  years	  of	  service	  and	  
45	  years	  of	  age,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  move	  employers	  following	  period	  of	  service,	  
thereby	  securing	  pensionable	  income	  for	  those	  who	  met	  this	  criteria.	  This	  significantly	  
facilitated	  worker	  mobility.	  This	  legislation	  also	  introduced	  trust	  law	  to	  govern	  fiduciary	  
conduct	  that	  assumed	  a	  “community	  of	  interest	  between	  the	  grantor	  (the	  employer)	  
and	  the	  beneficiary	  (the	  worker)	  and	  imposed	  fiduciary	  requirements	  only	  on	  trustees”	  
(Sass	  2006:	  88).	  Until	  that	  point,	  misconduct	  of	  pension	  funds	  usually	  happened	  from	  
either	  employers	  or	  unions.	  This	  required	  one	  trustee	  to	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  sponsor	  
to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  workers	  (Sass	  2006).	  The	  PBA	  served	  as	  a	  model	  for	  the	  
federal	  government	  and	  other	  provinces	  in	  Canada,	  providing	  a	  minimum	  standard	  of	  
pension	  plan	  solvency	  and	  the	  legal	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  of	  employers	  to	  protect	  the	  
solvency	  of	  the	  company	  plan.	  	  
	  
Globalization,	  Neoliberalism,	  and	  the	  Employer	  Pension	  Plan:	  Post-­‐1980	  
	  
Transformations	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  substantially	  weakened	  employer	  




labour	  force,	  technological	  advances	  in	  manufacturing,	  the	  development	  of	  global	  
production	  systems,	  and	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  service	  industries	  all	  served	  to	  
challenge	  the	  mid-­‐century	  ‘social	  compromise’	  of	  standard	  employment	  between	  state,	  
capital	  and	  labour.	  Full-­‐time	  employment	  based	  on	  a	  gendered	  division	  of	  labour	  and	  
low	  labour	  mobility	  would	  change,	  and	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  began	  to	  diminish	  
in	  1984,	  particularly	  within	  the	  private	  sector	  (see	  Table	  4.1).	  These	  transformations	  
weakened	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  labour	  movements,	  leading	  to	  decreasing	  levels	  of	  
unionization,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  consolidating	  the	  structural	  power	  of	  capital	  (Gill	  
and	  Law	  2008).	  	  
	  
Table	  4.1:	  Pension	  plans	  and	  members	  for	  selected	  years,	  1960-­‐1988	  
	  







1960	   8,920*	   1,815	   6,530	   27.8	  
1965	   13,660	   2,346	   7,253	   32.3	  
1970	   16,137	   2,822	   8,466	   33.3	  
1974	   15,853	   3,424	   9,743	   35.1	  
1976	   15,625	   3,902	   10,491	   37.2	  
1978	   15,095	   4,193	   11,155	   37.6	  
1980	   14,586	   4,475	   11,879	   37.6	  
1982	   15,232	   4,658	   12,202	   38.2	  
1984	   17,711	   4,565	   12,748	   35.8	  
1986	   21,094	   4,668	   13,283	   35.1	  
1988	   21,239	   4,845	   13,779	   35.2	  
*Does	  not	  include	  651	  non-­‐responses	  where	  there	  were	  indications	  of	  an	  existing	  plan	  and	  
registration	  with	  National	  Revenue.	  
**1960-­‐1974	  population	  data,	  14	  years	  of	  age	  and	  older;	  1976-­‐1988	  population	  data,	  15	  years	  
of	  age	  and	  older.	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Survey	  of	  Pension	  Plan	  Coverage	  1965	  and	  Pension	  Plans	  in	  Canada,	  
cited	  from	  Weitz	  1992:	  122	  (for	  pension	  data);	  population	  1960-­‐1974,	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Series	  
D134-­‐143;	  population	  1976-­‐1988,	  Statistics	  Canada,	  CANSIM	  table	  282-­‐0002.	  Pension	  coverage	  




Global	  economic	  growth	  slowed	  down	  in	  the	  1970s,	  along	  with	  corporate	  profit	  
margins.	  This	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  including	  the	  oil	  “shocks”	  of	  1973	  and	  
1979	  that	  almost	  quadrupled	  the	  price	  of	  energy,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  economic	  
competition	  grew	  from	  newly	  industrializing	  ex-­‐colonies.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  
alike	  were	  confronted	  with	  growing	  government	  expenditures,	  decreasing	  productivity,	  
rising	  inflation	  and	  stagnating	  wages.	  ‘Stagflation’	  was	  quickly	  undermining	  Keynesian	  
models	  of	  economic	  policy	  where	  economies	  of	  scale	  premised	  on	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  
system	  of	  strict	  capital	  controls	  were	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  beneficial	  (Clarkson	  2002).	  
Business	  increasingly	  looked	  outwards	  to	  international	  markets	  to	  mitigate	  these	  
effects,	  where	  large	  employers	  began	  to	  offshore	  manufacturing	  operations	  to	  cheaper	  
labour	  markets	  (Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  2009;	  2014).	  Following	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Bretton	  
Woods	  agreement	  in	  1971	  and	  the	  subsequent	  deregulation	  of	  capital	  controls,	  
international	  capital	  mobility	  intensified,	  along	  with	  technological	  advances	  in	  
transportation	  and	  telecommunications,	  facilitating	  the	  expansion	  of	  global	  production	  
chains.	  As	  such,	  economic	  globalization	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism	  transformed	  the	  
standard	  employment	  relationship,	  and	  with	  it	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  in	  advanced	  
industrial	  countries.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  service	  industries	  grew	  as	  consumer	  tastes	  of	  highly	  urbanized	  
and	  industrialized	  societies	  changed,	  demanding	  new	  services	  such	  as	  tourism,	  
education,	  financial	  advice,	  and	  other	  social	  services	  (Engelen	  2006:	  102).	  This,	  along	  
with	  the	  off	  shoring	  of	  manufacturing	  industries,	  catalyzed	  sectoral	  shifts	  in	  the	  




societies	  (see	  Jessop	  2002).	  More	  sophisticated	  consumer	  demands	  led	  to	  the	  upgrading	  
of	  products	  and	  served	  to	  professionalize	  many	  managerial	  positions,	  thus	  creating	  new	  
needs	  for	  a	  more	  educated	  workforce.	  The	  Women’s	  Liberation	  Movement	  since	  the	  
1960s	  had	  demanded	  greater	  equality	  in	  wages	  and	  working	  conditions,	  while	  
establishing	  the	  right	  to	  economic	  independence,	  challenging	  traditional	  gender	  roles,	  
expanding	  female	  workforce	  participation	  from	  24	  percent	  in	  1954	  to	  76	  percent	  by	  
1990	  (Statistics	  Canada	  2015b).	  Women	  began	  filling	  many	  of	  the	  newly	  created	  service	  
industry	  jobs,	  positions	  that	  were	  typically	  low	  paying.	  These	  changes	  in	  the	  labour	  
force,	  along	  with	  new	  technological	  advances	  in	  manufacturing,	  served	  to	  decrease	  the	  
labour	  market	  value	  of	  less	  educated	  older	  men	  working	  in	  disappearing	  remunerative	  
industrial	  jobs	  (Sass	  2006)	  as	  the	  shift	  to	  post-­‐industrial	  society	  unfolded.	  	  
As	  Robin	  Blackburn	  describes,	  “Free	  market	  economics	  marginalized	  during	  the	  
postwar	  boom,	  was	  becoming	  respectable	  again,	  with	  first	  Friedrich	  von	  Hayek,	  and	  
then	  Milton	  Friedman,	  receiving	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  for	  economics”	  (2002:	  11).	  Keynesian	  
economics	  was	  losing	  legitimacy	  as	  economists,	  business	  executives,	  technocrats,	  and	  
politicians	  looked	  to	  laissez-­‐faire	  economic	  theory	  to	  mitigate	  crises	  of	  diminishing	  profit	  
rates.	  Reducing	  public	  expenditure	  and	  privatizing	  public	  provision	  and	  services	  was	  
becoming	  fashionable.	  As	  capital	  became	  more	  mobile	  and	  the	  corporate	  sector	  began	  
to	  internationalize	  their	  operations,	  nation	  states	  increasingly	  had	  to	  compete	  for	  
capital	  investment,	  compelling	  states	  to	  pursue	  neoliberal	  programs	  of	  tax	  reduction,	  
trade	  liberalization,	  deregulation	  and	  cuts	  to	  welfare	  spending	  (Brenner	  2004;	  Harvey	  




the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  United	  States,	  and	  then	  spreading	  outwards	  to	  places	  such	  as	  
Canada,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  (Harvey	  2005).	  Policymaking	  embodying	  neoliberal	  
ideas	  promoted	  the	  individualization	  of	  risk	  of	  labour	  force	  participation,	  stigmatized	  
welfare	  recipients,	  and	  fostered	  new	  institutional	  forms	  of	  governing	  (Rose	  1999;	  Peck	  
2001;	  Blyth	  2002;	  Wacquant	  2009).	  Labour	  movements	  were	  thus	  under	  sustained	  
pressure	  to	  accept	  cuts	  in	  wages	  and	  benefits	  for	  their	  workers.	  During	  time	  capital	  
flight	  to	  cheaper	  labour	  markets	  became	  common	  practice,	  leading	  decreasing	  levels	  of	  
unionization,	  tipping	  the	  balance	  of	  class	  forces	  further	  towards	  capital.	  In	  this	  context,	  
Marxist	  scholars	  such	  as	  Harvey	  (2005)	  and	  Pantich	  and	  Gindin	  (2012)	  portray	  
neoliberalism	  as	  a	  class	  project	  to	  reestablish	  domination	  of	  the	  economic	  elite	  over	  
working	  classes	  and	  other	  political	  movements	  that	  threatened	  capitalist	  enterprise.	  
These	  changing	  economic	  conditions	  diminished	  the	  market	  power	  of	  large	  
corporate	  and	  union	  pension	  sponsors	  to	  “underwrite	  and	  manage	  long-­‐term	  
retirement	  income	  programs”	  (Sass	  2006:	  93).	  This,	  along	  with	  the	  diminishing	  value	  of	  
an	  aging	  male	  workforce	  with	  low	  education	  levels,	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  large	  
employers	  “to	  keep	  such	  workers	  gainfully	  employed	  at	  a	  decent	  wage	  until	  the	  
specified	  ‘normal	  retirement	  age.’”	  (Sass	  2006:	  93).	  As	  the	  power	  of	  trade	  unions	  
weakened,	  the	  post-­‐war	  Fordist	  model	  of	  full-­‐time	  employment	  was	  transforming,	  
making	  way	  for	  post-­‐industrial	  knowledge	  economies	  based	  on	  precarious	  labour	  
practices	  and	  “flexible”	  workforces	  (e.g.	  Fordism	  to	  post-­‐Fordism)	  (See	  Jessop	  2002).	  




In	  Canada,	  during	  this	  period,	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  for	  men	  decreased	  
from	  a	  high	  of	  52%	  in	  1979	  to	  a	  low	  of	  37%	  in	  2011.	  The	  story	  for	  women	  is	  different,	  
where	  pension	  coverage	  grew	  from	  just	  over	  25%	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  to	  40%	  in	  2011	  
(Statistics	  Canada	  2015a:	  1).	  This	  increase	  was	  partly	  due	  because	  of	  women’s	  number	  
in	  the	  workforce	  also	  grew	  from	  the	  1960s	  onwards.	  Canada’s	  economy	  and	  labour	  
market	  was	  transforming	  along	  gendered	  lines,	  in	  which	  many	  large	  manufacturing	  
jobs—typically	  held	  by	  men—were	  disappearing	  along	  with	  lower	  union	  density.	  
Women	  entered	  public	  sector	  jobs,	  such	  as	  teachers,	  healthcare	  professionals,	  and	  
government	  staff,	  where	  employer	  pension	  coverage	  remained	  relatively	  stable,	  thus	  
also	  increasing	  women’s	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  (Statistics	  Canada	  2015a).	  	  
The	  extent	  of	  this	  decline	  of	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada	  is	  an	  
expression	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  economy,	  neoliberalism,	  the	  growth	  of	  corporate	  
power	  and	  declining	  union	  power,	  the	  casualization	  of	  work	  and	  the	  desire	  of	  many	  
employers	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  business	  of	  providing	  secure,	  company	  sponsored	  defined	  
benefit	  (DB)	  pensions	  to	  their	  employees.	  Increasingly,	  since	  the	  1980s,	  as	  unionization	  
density	  dropped,	  defined	  contribution	  (DC)	  plans	  have	  been	  offered	  in	  their	  place,	  along	  
with	  other	  private	  investment	  vehicles	  through	  private	  sector	  insurance	  companies	  and	  
banks.	  The	  expansion	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  promoted	  cutting	  back	  on	  public	  pensions	  
while	  encouraging	  citizens	  to	  save	  for	  their	  own	  retirement	  by	  investing	  in	  commercial	  
pension	  funds.	  Congruent	  with	  these	  ideas,	  in	  1994,	  the	  World	  Bank	  published	  an	  
influential	  paper	  titled,	  Averting	  the	  Old	  Age	  Crisis:	  Policies	  to	  Protect	  the	  Old	  and	  




Béland	  and	  Gran	  2008;	  Orenstein	  2008).	  It	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  first	  pillar	  of	  retirement	  
income	  systems	  across	  the	  advanced	  industrial	  world	  through	  championing	  the	  
commercialization	  of	  retirement	  provision	  (Blackburn	  2002).	  But	  there	  has	  been	  
significant	  push	  back	  to	  these	  attempts.	  The	  American	  government	  led	  by	  President	  
George	  W.	  Bush	  unsuccessfully	  attempted	  to	  privatize	  Social	  Security	  funds	  into	  
personal	  investment	  funds	  in	  2005.	  In	  Canada,	  attempts	  to	  reform	  CPP	  and	  OAS	  in	  the	  
1980s	  and	  1990s	  also	  faced	  stiff	  resistance	  (Battle	  1997;	  Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005;	  Myles	  
2013).	  
Growing	  worker	  mobility	  also	  placed	  new	  pressures	  on	  pension	  systems.	  Vesting	  
and	  portability	  policy	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1980s	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  unfair,	  where	  
typical	  vesting	  periods	  began	  after	  ten	  years	  of	  service	  and	  the	  employee	  had	  to	  be	  at	  
least	  45	  years	  old,	  and	  where	  the	  right	  to	  transfer	  commuted	  values	  of	  retirement	  
savings	  in	  the	  form	  of	  DB	  plans	  was	  often	  limited.	  Other	  factors	  were	  making	  pension	  
legislation	  outdated,	  including	  a	  wave	  of	  regulatory	  reform	  across	  Canadian	  jurisdictions	  
to	  address	  vesting	  and	  portability	  issues,	  along	  with	  other	  changing	  working	  conditions	  
that	  involved	  significant	  layoffs	  (Dekanic	  2001).	  This	  wave	  of	  reforms	  included	  changes	  
to	  Ontario’s	  PBA	  in	  1987	  (Baldwin	  2008;	  Gee	  and	  McDaniels	  1991;	  Van	  Reisen	  2008).	  
These	  reforms	  contained:	  “earlier	  vesting	  provisions;	  portability	  of	  the	  pension	  funds;	  
and	  the	  creation	  of	  defined	  contribution	  pension	  plans	  all	  hoping	  to	  improve	  retirement	  
prospects	  for	  workers	  who,	  in	  all	  likelihood,	  [would]	  not	  enjoy	  cradle	  to	  grave	  
relationship	  with	  their	  employer”	  (Dekanic	  2001:	  1).	  New	  investment	  vehicles	  were	  




retirement	  flexibility	  as	  a	  means	  to	  transfer	  the	  commuted	  value	  of	  pension	  savings	  to	  a	  
different	  investment	  vehicle.	  Other	  investment	  vehicles	  consisted	  of	  a	  shift	  from	  
purchasing	  annuities	  to	  “programs	  of	  self-­‐managed	  withdrawal	  of	  assets	  from	  DC	  plans	  
and	  RRSP	  accounts”	  (Baldwin	  2008:	  32).	  	  
The	  shift	  from	  DB	  to	  DC	  plans	  is	  not	  linear,	  nor	  should	  it	  be	  assumed	  that	  
employers	  were	  always	  pressuring	  their	  employees	  to	  replace	  their	  DB	  plans	  with	  DC	  
plans	  (this	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Seven).	  Dekanic	  (2001)	  describes	  
how	  during	  the	  1980s	  workers	  and	  employers	  alike	  were	  attracted	  to	  DC	  plans,	  albeit	  
for	  different	  reasons.	  This	  was	  during	  a	  time	  of	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  a	  global	  bull	  
market,	  and	  many	  employees	  thought	  they	  could	  find	  a	  better	  return	  with	  a	  DC	  plan	  
than	  their	  DB	  plans.	  Employers	  also	  liked	  them	  since	  they	  lowered	  administrative	  costs	  
and	  were	  deemed	  as	  less	  risky.	  	  
	   Baldwin	  (2008)	  highlights	  that	  DC	  plans	  are	  becoming	  an	  increasingly	  important	  
part	  of	  Canada’s	  RIS.	  DC	  plans	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  –	  are	  the	  plan	  of	  choice	  
now	  for	  many	  employers,	  as	  the	  cost	  associated	  with	  traditional	  DB	  plans	  are	  deemed	  
too	  expensive	  and	  risky22.	  Considering	  this	  transformation	  in	  the	  RIS,	  the	  impact	  of	  DC	  
plans	  is	  relatively	  unknown,	  particularly	  around	  issues	  of	  impact	  on	  retirement	  behavior,	  
labour	  mobility,	  the	  allocation	  of	  pension	  assets	  and	  financial	  markets.	  Baldwin	  claims	  
that	  since	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  plans	  provide	  “reasonably	  strong	  minimum	  income	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  the	  pension	  plan	  savings	  today	  are	  typically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  hybrid	  between	  
DB	  and	  DC	  benefits.	  There	  is	  a	  spectrum	  that	  exists	  between	  these	  two	  poles	  of	  pension	  plans	  
that	  has	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  increasing	  mobility	  of	  
workers.	  Many	  companies	  reviewed	  their	  pension	  systems	  beginning	  in	  the	  1980s	  through	  




protection,”	  changes	  will	  be	  felt	  strongest	  by	  middle	  to	  upper	  class	  workers	  (2008:	  31).	  
These	  changes,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  point	  to	  how	  the	  shift	  to	  DC	  have	  facilitated	  
worker	  mobility	  by	  freeing	  DB	  members	  not	  eligible	  for	  early	  retirement	  to	  have	  the	  
option	  of	  choosing	  to	  “transfer	  the	  commuted	  value	  of	  their	  benefit	  to	  an	  RRSP”	  (2008:	  
31).	  Consequently,	  for	  young	  job	  changers,	  “DB	  promises	  frequently	  become	  DC	  
accumulations”	  (2008:	  31).	  This	  means	  that	  due	  to	  regulatory	  changes,	  there	  is	  
increasing	  mobility	  in	  the	  RIS	  system	  that	  allows	  workers	  to	  transfer	  pension	  benefits	  
from	  a	  DB	  plan	  to	  a	  DC	  form	  of	  accumulation.	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  declining	  union	  power,	  collective	  bargaining	  is	  where	  many	  of	  
these	  changes	  have	  been	  negotiated,	  often	  creating	  new	  two-­‐tier	  employee	  systems	  
where	  older	  employees	  have	  kept	  their	  DB	  plans	  while	  new	  hires	  are	  offered	  less	  secure	  
DC	  plans.	  Recent	  negotiations	  between	  Unifor	  and	  General	  Motors	  Canada	  illustrate	  an	  
emerging	  trend	  of	  unions	  trading	  secure	  pension	  benefits	  for	  new	  jobs	  and	  future	  plant	  
investments	  (Gollom	  2016).	  This	  represents	  an	  institutional	  shift	  within	  the	  third	  pillar	  of	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  during	  this	  period	  as	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  
retirement	  has	  been	  shifted	  further	  onto	  individual	  workers.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  many	  
have	  called	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  CPP	  to	  address	  this	  issue,	  particularly	  from	  those	  
involved	  in	  the	  labour	  movement.	  But	  the	  federal	  government	  led	  by	  Stephen	  Harper	  
rejected	  this	  idea	  and	  responded	  instead	  with	  PRPPs	  (Pooled	  Registered	  Pension	  Plans),	  
a	  voluntary	  savings	  system	  that	  few	  see	  as	  a	  substantial	  remedy	  to	  this	  problem	  
(Townson	  2011)	  –	  a	  move	  similar	  to	  the	  Government	  Annuities	  Act	  of	  1908	  that	  provided	  




system.	  Myles	  describes	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  Canada	  as	  suffering	  from	  a	  “severe	  
case	  of	  ‘policy	  drift’”	  (2013:	  313)	  where	  the	  federal	  government	  has	  been	  slow	  to	  
provide	  alternatives	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  decreasing	  pension	  coverage.	  However,	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP)	  in	  2015	  and	  the	  
proposed	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  benefits	  in	  June	  2016	  point	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  
period	  of	  pension	  politics,	  as	  provincial	  governments	  play	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  
expanding	  pension	  coverage	  (Baldwin	  2010	  and	  FitzGerald	  2010)(more	  on	  this	  in	  
Chapter	  Five).	  The	  growing	  role	  of	  governments	  in	  expanding	  public	  pension	  benefits	  
point	  to	  a	  new	  period	  of	  transition,	  one	  in	  which	  governments	  agree	  to	  assume	  new	  




The	  intention	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  historical,	  institutional	  and	  material	  
conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  pension	  plans	  in	  Canada	  and	  other	  
industrializing	  countries.	  This	  was	  achieved	  by	  examining	  capitalist	  economic	  expansion,	  
the	  development	  of	  wage	  labour,	  and	  class	  tensions	  that	  galvanized	  political	  demands	  
for	  security	  in	  old	  age.	  Similarly,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  has	  been	  
discussed,	  illustrating	  its	  different	  path	  from	  public	  pension	  schemes	  and	  the	  major	  
political	  and	  economic	  transformations	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  have	  undergone	  in	  
Canada	  and	  elsewhere.	  As	  such,	  this	  history	  illuminates	  the	  contours	  of	  Canada’s	  




public	  pension	  system	  has	  been	  contextualized	  in	  the	  development	  of	  other	  social	  
policies	  and	  the	  welfare	  state	  during	  the	  postwar	  era.	  The	  origins	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  
are	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  large	  industrial	  employers	  and	  the	  expanding	  
bureaucratic	  offices	  of	  public	  institutions	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  The	  need	  for	  
employers	  to	  attract	  skilled,	  long	  term	  employees	  created	  the	  incentive	  for	  some	  
employers	  to	  offer	  workplace	  pensions.	  Although	  public	  and	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  
have	  a	  different	  institutional	  history,	  their	  development,	  particularly	  following	  WWII,	  
occurred	  in	  dialogue	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  institution	  of	  retirement	  income	  security.	  In	  
sum,	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  and	  workplace	  pensions	  should	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  the	  
product	  of	  goodwill	  and	  benevolence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  policymakers	  and	  employers,	  but	  
rather	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  shifting	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  growing	  demands	  being	  
made	  by	  labour	  movements.	  
In	  Ontario,	  the	  PBA	  legislation	  was	  reformed	  in	  1987	  and	  2013	  to	  meet	  some	  of	  
the	  challenges	  of	  an	  increasingly	  mobile	  labour	  market	  with	  a	  shrinking	  manufacturing	  
industry.	  This	  mix	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  transforming	  economic	  and	  labour	  market	  
conditions,	  and	  struggle	  between	  workers	  and	  employers	  to	  decide	  who	  should	  take	  on	  
more	  of	  the	  risk	  in	  Ontario	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  The	  
following	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  
and	  its	  connection	  with	  policymaking	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  investigating	  key	  events	  and	  
institutional	  dynamics	  that	  led	  to	  reforms	  of	  the	  PBA	  in	  1987	  and	  2013.	  This	  analysis	  will	  
shed	  light	  on	  the	  political	  and	  sociological	  processes	  of	  how	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	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“The	  private	  pension	  is	  one	  of	  the	  great	  curiosities	  of	  modern	  economic	  history”	  –	  Steven	  A.	  
Sass,	  The	  Promise	  of	  Private	  Pensions,	  1997.	  
	  
“It’s	  a	  40-­‐year	  experiment	  that	  didn’t	  really	  work”	  –	  Union	  Official	  1,	  May	  2015	  
	  
Chapter	  Four	  provided	  a	  broad,	  historical	  examination	  of	  the	  material	  and	  social	  
conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  systems	  across	  
industrializing	  countries	  with	  a	  specific	  focus	  on	  Canada,	  the	  United	  Kingdome	  and	  the	  
United	  States.	  This	  chapter	  builds	  on	  this	  history,	  focuses	  on	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  
Ontario	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  analyzing	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  and	  the	  major	  rounds	  of	  legislative	  reform	  that	  followed.	  The	  
intent	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  policymaking	  process	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  social,	  
political,	  and	  economic	  processes,	  and	  the	  institutional	  dynamics	  that	  have	  led	  to	  
legislative	  and	  regulatory	  reform.	  Following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PBA	  in	  1965,	  there	  
have	  been	  two	  major	  rounds	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  first	  in	  1987	  and	  second	  in	  2010.	  
What	  are	  the	  political-­‐economic	  conditions	  that	  led	  to	  these	  reforms	  and	  why	  did	  these	  
reforms	  occur	  in	  intervals	  of	  over	  20	  years?	  	  
By	  taking	  an	  historical	  perspective	  that	  adopts	  a	  political-­‐economic	  approach,	  




interest	  rates,	  economic	  cycles,	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  class	  forces.	  The	  tensions	  between	  
employer	  and	  employee	  class	  interests	  have	  remained	  a	  constant	  and	  central	  dynamic	  
throughout	  the	  history	  of	  pension	  policymaking,	  including	  Ontario.	  Favorable	  economic	  
conditions	  and	  specific	  tax	  benefits	  have	  compelled	  employers	  to	  sponsor	  and	  manage	  
workplace	  pension	  funds.	  Conversely,	  big	  ideas	  that	  seek	  to	  expand	  pension	  coverage	  
emerge	  during	  economic	  downturns	  as	  unions	  struggle	  to	  protect	  pension	  benefits	  for	  
workers.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  all	  has	  remained	  the	  same.	  Canadian	  economic	  integration	  
with	  the	  United	  States	  has	  deepened	  along	  with	  expanding	  service	  based	  industries	  
characterized	  by	  growing	  precarious	  employment	  within	  a	  context	  of	  expanding	  
economic	  globalization	  and	  decreasing	  levels	  of	  unionization	  (Arthurs	  2000;	  Vosko	  2006;	  
Pupo	  and	  Thomas	  2010).	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  the	  portfolios	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  have	  
significantly	  diversified	  into	  real	  estate	  and	  global	  equity	  markets.	  Pension	  fund	  
consultancy	  has	  expanded	  at	  the	  same	  time	  overall	  pension	  coverage	  has	  shrunk	  
(Marmer	  1997).	  And	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  employers	  primarily	  in	  private	  sector	  industries	  are	  
exiting	  the	  provision	  of	  secure	  pension	  benefits,	  successfully	  demanding	  unions	  
relinquish	  secure	  pension	  benefits	  in	  exchange	  for	  new	  hires,	  pay	  raises,	  and	  future	  
investments	  (Gollom	  2016).	  These	  changes	  have	  placed	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  
increasingly	  on	  individual	  workers.	  	  
To	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  processes,	  this	  chapter	  is	  organized	  into	  six	  historical	  
sections,	  beginning	  in	  the	  post	  war	  period,	  through	  to	  the	  2010s.	  Four	  points	  will	  be	  
addressed	  in	  each	  time	  period,	  including:	  a)	  what	  was	  occurring	  politically	  and	  




developments;	  c)	  class	  forces	  and	  other	  stakeholder	  groups	  shaping	  policy	  development	  
and	  their	  main	  positions	  on	  pensions;	  and	  d)	  how	  each	  period	  was	  different	  from	  
previous	  periods.	  By	  examining	  these	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  development,	  the	  relationship	  
between	  economic	  cycles	  and	  rounds	  of	  legislative	  design,	  and	  the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  
incremental	  policy	  changes	  on	  how	  risk	  has	  been	  distributed	  in	  Ontario	  society	  will	  also	  
be	  considered.	  This	  chapter	  also	  highlights	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  changing	  landscape	  
of	  class	  forces,	  ideation	  and	  the	  state,	  exploring	  how	  different	  policy	  ideas	  reflected	  a	  
particular	  set	  of	  class	  interests.	  Drawing	  from	  this	  analysis,	  an	  argument	  is	  presented	  
that	  claims	  the	  1990s	  represents	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  
retirement	  was	  individualized.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  how	  much	  risk	  workers	  are	  willing	  
to	  accept,	  resulting	  in	  new	  political	  coalitions	  that	  demand	  government	  play	  a	  larger	  
role	  in	  providing	  security	  to	  workers.	  
This	  chapter	  draws	  from	  historical	  information	  gathered	  through	  interviews	  with	  
pension	  experts.	  To	  substantiate	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  participants,	  secondary	  literature	  is	  
used,	  that	  includes	  academic	  literature,	  major	  government	  policy	  reports,	  newspaper	  
and	  pension	  industry	  publications,	  and	  Hansard	  parliamentary	  transcriptions.	  While	  
both	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  workplace	  pensions	  will	  be	  discussed,	  changes	  in	  the	  
private	  sector	  are	  given	  more	  attention.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  where	  





1940s	  to	  1960s	  –	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  PBA	  
	  
Canada’s	  economy	  rapidly	  expanded	  following	  WWII.	  After	  WWI,	  Canada’s	  status	  as	  a	  
dominion	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  began	  to	  shift	  from	  its	  colonial	  master	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  
Ocean	  towards	  continental	  integration	  with	  the	  rising	  hegemony	  of	  the	  United	  States	  
(Brodie	  and	  Jenson	  1980;	  Levitt	  2002).	  These	  changes	  became	  an	  important	  structural	  
force	  shaping	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario.	  The	  development	  of	  an	  industrial	  
“branch	  plant”	  economy	  of	  American	  subsidiaries	  operating	  in	  Ontario	  and	  the	  
expansion	  of	  trade	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  were	  the	  source	  of	  key	  economic	  events	  
that	  led	  to	  policy	  change	  in	  Ontario.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  period	  in	  which	  Canadian	  
governments	  fundamentally	  rethought	  economic	  management	  and	  social	  policymaking,	  
influenced	  by	  Keyensian	  policy	  ideas	  (Bradford	  2000;	  Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  Years	  of	  
social	  and	  economic	  hardship	  following	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  WWII	  sharpened	  
demands	  that	  individual	  risks	  be	  mitigated	  by	  government	  policy.	  Unionization	  rapidly	  
grew,	  cementing	  a	  new	  degree	  of	  working	  class	  power.	  Consensus	  emerged	  in	  which	  
workers	  and	  citizens	  wanted	  government	  to	  take	  on	  more	  responsibility	  in	  providing	  
social	  security	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  services,	  benefits	  and	  rights	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  
healthcare,	  housing,	  education,	  income	  support	  and	  social	  services	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  
2013:	  60).	  Antiquated	  economic	  theories	  that	  viewed	  unemployment	  as	  an	  individual	  
failure	  were	  being	  replaced	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  economic	  hardships	  were	  
caused	  by	  structural	  forces	  requiring	  government	  intervention.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  in	  




During	  the	  late	  1930s,	  it	  was	  calculated	  by	  several	  Canadian	  studies23	  that	  
“considerably	  less	  than	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  labour	  force…had	  pension	  protection”	  (Weitz	  
1992:	  36).	  When	  wage	  controls	  were	  introduced	  during	  the	  early	  1940s	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
war	  effort,	  new	  impetus	  was	  created	  for	  workplace	  pensions	  as	  a	  “fringe	  benefit”.	  
Before	  then,	  for	  the	  plans	  that	  did	  exist,	  these	  plans	  were	  not	  pre-­‐funded	  and	  were	  
instead	  paid	  from	  company	  payroll.	  This	  left	  many	  employees	  very	  vulnerable	  with	  little	  
protection	  if	  something	  was	  to	  happen	  to	  their	  relationship	  with	  their	  employer,	  such	  as	  
being	  terminated	  before	  retirement	  or	  company	  bankruptcy.	  As	  one	  government	  
pension	  regulator	  described:	  “So	  as	  far	  as	  saving	  for	  retirement,	  if	  you	  thought	  that	  you	  
would	  be	  there	  forever	  and	  until	  you	  retired,	  then	  you	  might	  get	  a	  pension,	  but	  you	  
couldn’t	  count	  on	  it”	  (Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
The	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act,	  first	  promulgated	  in	  1963	  and	  then	  enacted	  in	  1965,	  
was	  pioneering	  legislation	  for	  its	  time.	  Ontario	  was	  Canada’s	  largest	  and	  most	  
industrialized	  province	  and	  had	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  
Although	  the	  total	  number	  of	  pensions	  was	  growing	  at	  this	  time,	  there	  were	  simmering	  
problems	  that	  made	  pensions	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  within	  provincial	  politics	  in	  the	  late	  
1950s,	  becoming	  a	  key	  issue	  in	  the	  1959	  provincial	  election.	  With	  pressure	  from	  the	  
Liberal	  party	  that	  proposed	  a	  province-­‐wide	  scheme	  for	  portable	  pensions,	  and	  from	  the	  
CCF	  who	  demanded	  immediate	  vesting	  rights	  for	  all	  Ontario	  workers,	  Conservative	  
Premier	  Leslie	  M.	  Frost	  established	  the	  Ontario	  Committee	  on	  Portable	  Pensions	  to	  
examine	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  on	  April	  7,	  1960	  (Weitz	  1992).	  Many	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  National	  Employment	  Commission	  survey	  (1936);	  Industrial	  Retirement	  Plans	  in	  Canada	  




turning	  to	  government	  to	  resolve	  these	  problems,	  fearful	  of	  the	  effects	  that	  economic	  
cycles	  would	  have	  on	  the	  security	  of	  pension	  benefits.	  	  	  
	   The	  committee	  represented	  a	  spectrum	  of	  interests,	  jointly	  chaired	  by	  University	  
of	  Toronto	  (U	  of	  T)	  economic	  professor	  D.C.	  MacGregor	  and	  deputy	  minister	  of	  
economics	  for	  Ontario	  George	  E.	  Gathercole.	  Representatives	  from	  the	  University	  of	  
Toronto	  School	  of	  Social	  Work,	  the	  Canadian	  Life	  Insurance	  Officers	  Association	  and	  the	  
Canadian	  Welfare	  Council	  were	  also	  present	  on	  the	  committee.	  The	  committee	  
submitted	  its	  findings	  to	  government	  in	  two	  reports:	  first,	  with	  the	  Summary	  Report	  on	  
Portable	  Pensions,	  submitted	  10	  February	  1961;	  and	  then	  with	  the	  Second	  Report	  on	  the	  
Ontario	  Committee	  on	  Portable	  Pension,	  submitted	  1	  August	  1961.	  
	   The	  committee	  agreed	  that	  maintaining	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  played	  a	  
key	  and	  continuing	  role	  in	  the	  economy,	  while	  also	  recognizing	  major	  weaknesses	  with	  
the	  system.	  There	  were	  four	  major	  problems	  identified	  by	  the	  committee.	  The	  first	  was	  
limited	  coverage.	  Too	  many	  workers	  did	  not	  have	  a	  pension	  plan,	  with	  only	  two-­‐fifths	  of	  
workers	  in	  Ontario	  being	  members	  of	  a	  plan	  (Weitz	  1992).	  The	  second	  was	  the	  limited	  
number	  of	  pension	  plans	  –	  the	  majority	  of	  workers	  with	  a	  pension	  plan	  worked	  for	  large	  
employers,	  while	  those	  without	  pension	  coverage	  were	  typically	  employed	  by	  small	  
businesses	  (a	  situation	  that	  remains	  true	  today).	  This	  generated	  concern	  around	  issues	  
of	  equity	  between	  large	  and	  small	  employers	  when	  developing	  regulation	  to	  increase	  
pension	  coverage.	  To	  mitigate	  this	  issue,	  the	  committee	  recommended	  that	  all	  
employers	  with	  fifteen	  or	  more	  employees	  should	  have	  to	  provide	  pension	  plans	  for	  




out	  on	  accruing	  pension	  benefits	  for	  several	  reasons,	  such	  as	  by	  not	  working	  with	  an	  
employer	  long	  enough	  to	  gain	  a	  vested	  right;	  or	  conversely,	  for	  employees	  who	  had	  
achieved	  vesting	  rights,	  many	  were	  leaving	  before	  achieving	  full	  pension	  benefits	  and	  
were	  withdrawing	  their	  pension	  contributions	  as	  a	  cash	  payment	  (Weitz	  1992).	  This	  
meant	  that	  many	  workers	  who	  initially	  began	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  plan	  were	  entering	  
retirement	  with	  no	  pension	  income.	  This	  situation	  highlighted	  issues	  of	  vesting	  and	  
portability	  arising	  from	  worker	  mobility,	  calling	  for	  new	  vesting	  rules	  and	  policy	  for	  
“locking-­‐in”	  pension	  contributions	  that	  would	  be	  paid	  out	  to	  a	  worker	  during	  retirement	  
instead	  of	  when	  they	  left	  the	  company.	  And	  fourth,	  inconsistent	  government	  
supervision	  and	  inspection:	  the	  legislative	  framework	  that	  regulated	  workplace	  pension	  
plans	  in	  Ontario	  and	  across	  the	  country	  consisted	  of	  a	  patchwork	  of	  federal	  and	  
provincial	  regulation,	  primarily	  based	  on	  income	  tax	  rules.	  Consistent	  supervision	  and	  
inspection	  located	  a	  single	  regulatory	  body	  was	  required,	  it	  was	  argued	  by	  the	  
committee,	  to	  assure	  adequate	  design	  and	  funding	  of	  pension	  plans	  (Weitz	  1992:	  75-­‐
80).	  
	   Given	  these	  problems,	  the	  PBA	  was	  designed	  to	  establish	  “minimum	  standards”	  
of	  pension	  regulation	  that	  would	  encourage	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  pension	  system,	  
improve	  solvency	  to	  meet	  best	  practices,	  limit	  the	  waste	  of	  pension	  contributions	  while	  
facilitating	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  mobile	  workforce.	  Importantly,	  the	  legislation	  was	  also	  
intended	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  benefits	  by	  establishing	  funding	  that	  was	  separate	  from	  
the	  organization.	  As	  one	  participant	  described	  it:	  “So	  it	  was	  basically	  at	  that	  time	  you’re	  




set	  them	  up	  prefunded	  so	  people	  can	  rely	  on	  receiving	  the	  entitlement	  from	  the	  plans’”	  
(Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  Government	  was	  attempting	  to	  limit	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  
employees	  were	  exposed	  to	  by	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system,	  which	  until	  the	  early	  
1960s,	  had	  developed	  with	  minimal	  regulation.	  
The	  report	  went	  through	  three	  drafts	  from	  1961	  to	  1963	  and	  included	  multiple	  
rounds	  of	  public	  feedback.	  Several	  obstacles	  during	  this	  legislative	  process	  were	  
deciding	  vesting	  and	  cash	  withdrawal	  rules	  for	  employees	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  eligibility	  
and	  membership	  should	  be	  mandatory.	  Developing	  new	  standards	  that	  required	  plan	  
sponsors	  to	  communicate	  the	  status	  of	  plans	  to	  their	  members	  were	  determined	  to	  
ensure	  maximum	  protection.	  During	  this	  process,	  the	  Pension	  Commission	  of	  Ontario	  
(PCO)	  was	  also	  instituted	  to	  enforce	  standards	  set	  out	  in	  the	  PBA.	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PBA	  stoked	  Quebec’s	  
interest	  in	  pension	  policy	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  national	  economic	  sovereignty,	  leading	  Quebec	  to	  
play	  a	  foundational	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Q/CPP	  that	  was	  legislated	  in	  
1965.	  The	  events	  of	  1965,	  conversely,	  led	  the	  Ontario	  provincial	  government	  to	  amend	  
the	  PBA.	  The	  final	  draft	  of	  the	  PBA	  tabled	  in	  1963	  was	  impacted	  by	  the	  QPP/CPP	  in	  two	  
ways.	  First,	  to	  address	  the	  acute	  problem	  of	  low	  pension	  coverage,	  the	  original	  PBA	  
draft	  required	  a	  mandatory	  pension	  plan	  for	  employers	  with	  fifteen	  or	  more	  employees.	  
If	  the	  CPP	  had	  not	  been	  established	  in	  1965,	  the	  Ontario	  government	  led	  by	  the	  
Conservative	  party	  was	  planning	  to	  make	  workplace	  plans	  mandatory	  for	  almost	  every	  
worker	  in	  the	  province.	  But	  given	  that	  all	  Canadian	  workers	  would	  be	  partially	  covered	  




vesting	  rules	  that	  would	  begin	  at	  age	  thirty	  were	  replaced	  by	  the	  45/10	  rule,	  whereby	  
vesting	  would	  begin	  at	  age	  45	  after	  ten	  years	  of	  service	  to	  an	  employer.	  Once	  an	  
employee	  reached	  this	  threshold,	  pension	  contributions	  were	  locked-­‐in	  until	  retirement.	  
Hence,	  workplace	  plans	  would	  voluntarily	  exist	  beside	  the	  CPP	  rather	  than	  replace	  it.	  	  
	   The	  PBA	  and	  level	  of	  interest	  rates	  shaped	  how	  employers	  met	  new	  regulatory	  
rules	  to	  make	  retirement	  provision	  more	  secure.	  When	  interest	  rates	  are	  low,	  liabilities	  
of	  funds	  go	  up,	  and	  are	  therefore	  more	  likely	  to	  threaten	  the	  solvency	  of	  a	  fund.	  During	  
the	  late	  1960s,	  interest	  rates	  were	  low	  and	  so	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  fund	  was	  more	  expensive	  
and	  therefore	  less	  attractive	  to	  employers.	  To	  mitigate	  this,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
meeting	  new	  trust	  fund	  standards,	  many	  employers	  bought	  group	  annuities	  from	  
insurance	  companies	  to	  remove	  liabilities	  involved	  with	  a	  pension	  plan	  off	  company	  
books.	  Money	  was	  paid	  to	  the	  insurance	  company	  and	  the	  insurance	  company	  
guaranteed	  to	  pay	  the	  pension.	  There	  were	  approximately	  7300	  pension	  plans	  in	  
Ontario	  in	  1965	  shortly	  after	  the	  PBA	  came	  into	  force,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  plans	  
were	  with	  group	  annuity	  contracts	  (Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  Only	  the	  contribution	  to	  
the	  insurance	  company	  would	  remain	  on	  annual	  corporate	  statements.	  	  
This	  scenario	  began	  to	  change	  with	  rising	  interest	  rates	  in	  the	  1970s,	  which	  made	  
the	  administration	  of	  company	  pension	  more	  attractive.	  Rising	  interest	  rates	  meant	  a	  
company	  pension	  plan	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  investment	  opportunity:	  	  
And	  so	  as	  interest	  rates	  came	  up,	  a	  lot	  of	  employers	  said,	  ‘you	  know	  what,	  why	  would	  I	  
pay	  this	  money	  to	  the	  insurance	  company	  and	  let	  them	  make	  a	  profit?	  Why	  don’t	  I	  set	  
up	  a	  pension	  fund,	  invest	  it,	  and	  I	  can	  limit	  my	  costs	  because	  I	  can	  do	  as	  well	  as	  the	  




Consequently,	  many	  employers	  moved	  away	  from	  group	  annuities	  to	  establish	  separate	  
trust	  funds	  and	  hired	  their	  own	  consultants	  to	  invest	  on	  their	  behalf	  to	  profit	  from	  an	  
economic	  environment	  in	  which	  ten	  percent	  or	  greater	  on	  investment	  returns	  was	  not	  
unusual.	  	  
Although	  the	  PBA	  had	  been	  established	  during	  this	  period	  to	  protect	  workers’	  
vested	  rights	  to	  pension	  benefits,	  the	  structure	  of	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  
facilitated	  by	  the	  PBA	  meant	  workers’	  retirement	  incomes	  were	  still	  exposed	  to	  
significant	  levels	  of	  risk.	  Attempts	  to	  pool	  workers’	  risk	  had	  failed,	  in	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  
workplace	  pension	  plans	  was	  not	  pooled	  across	  industrial	  sectors,	  or	  even	  across	  local	  
bargaining	  units	  for	  a	  single	  firm,	  compartmentalizing	  risk	  into	  single	  employer	  pension	  
plans.	  Future	  corporate	  bankruptcies	  and	  insolvency	  would	  expose	  these	  shortcomings,	  
necessitating	  further	  rounds	  of	  policy	  reform,	  leading	  Commissioner	  Harry	  Arthurs	  in	  
2008	  to	  lament,	  “Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  came	  not	  to	  be	  a	  ‘system’	  at	  all,	  but	  rather	  a	  
number	  of	  independent	  plans	  sponsored	  by	  individual	  employers	  or	  groups	  of	  
employers…”	  (Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  2008:	  10).	  	  
	  
1970s	  –	  Early	  1980s	  	  
	  
The	  rapid	  economic	  expansion	  that	  defined	  the	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s	  began	  to	  slow	  by	  
the	  late	  1960s,	  creating	  new	  risks	  for	  Ontario	  pensioners	  and	  catalyzing	  new	  provincial	  
government	  regulation	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  downturn	  in	  the	  global	  




industrial	  operations,	  where	  plant	  re-­‐location	  or	  closure	  by	  domestic,	  American	  and	  
other	  foreign	  firms	  became	  common.	  As	  Canada’s	  most	  industrialized	  province,	  
Ontario’s	  workers	  and	  pensioners	  acutely	  felt	  these	  economic	  transformations,	  through	  
either	  job	  loss	  and/or	  considerable	  reductions	  to	  benefits	  built	  up	  over	  years	  of	  
contributions,	  bringing	  into	  focus	  the	  limitations	  of	  existing	  legislation.	  This	  led	  to	  new	  
pressure	  on	  the	  Ontario	  government	  to	  provide	  more	  security	  to	  workers	  through	  policy	  
reform.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Keynesian	  consensus	  over	  Canada’s	  welfare	  system	  was	  
unraveling.	  Ideological	  debates	  over	  the	  merits	  of	  various	  social	  policies	  were	  growing	  
stronger,	  in	  which	  a	  “rightward	  shift	  in	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  of	  politics	  and	  
policymaking”	  that	  promoted	  markets	  grew	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013:	  114).	  Shrinking	  faith	  
in	  the	  redistributive	  capacities	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐70s	  onwards	  
was	  redefining	  how	  social	  policy	  resources	  should	  be	  allocated.	  In	  Ontario,	  the	  
provincial	  government	  attempted	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  restrain	  public	  sector	  
expenditures,	  marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  fiscal	  policy	  that	  abandoned	  
the	  Keynesian	  “revolution”	  that	  had	  begun	  in	  the	  1940s	  (Evans	  and	  Shields	  2011).	  	  
In	  the	  economic	  sphere,	  Harry	  Arthurs	  identifies	  this	  period	  as	  the	  “hollowing-­‐
out	  of	  Canada”	  (Arthurs	  2000;	  2009)	  that	  had	  significant	  implications	  for	  private	  sector	  
pensions	  and	  policymaking.	  Driven	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  North	  American	  integration,	  Arthurs	  
describes	  the	  shrinking	  power	  and	  importance	  of	  Canada’s	  post-­‐war	  subsidiary	  
corporate	  structure	  in	  the	  face	  of	  expanding	  economic	  globalization.	  To	  take	  advantage	  
of	  the	  efficiencies	  offered	  by	  new	  information	  technologies	  and	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  




American	  head	  offices.	  This	  directly	  impacted	  the	  autonomy	  of	  Canadian	  firms	  by	  
moving	  management	  functions	  abroad.	  Arthurs	  argues	  that	  this	  shifted	  the	  locus	  of	  
corporate	  decision	  making	  away	  from	  Canada,	  resulting	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  Canadian	  
practices	  and	  knowledge	  in	  corporate	  governance.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  neoliberal	  practices	  of	  corporate	  governance	  expanded	  with	  
the	  growth	  of	  economic	  globalization,	  while	  the	  class	  power	  established	  in	  the	  postwar	  
era	  was	  diminishing	  (Brenner	  2004;	  Harvey	  2005).	  Deregulation	  was	  adopted	  to	  advance	  
corporate	  interests,	  where	  a	  new	  consensus	  developed	  amongst	  corporate	  managers	  
that	  accepted,	  “…that	  the	  power	  of	  unions	  should	  be	  curtailed,	  that	  labor	  standards	  
should	  be	  made	  more	  flexible,	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  pensions	  and	  other	  social	  entitlements	  
should	  be	  reduced,	  and	  that	  workforce	  discipline	  should	  be	  maintained”	  (Arthurs	  2009:	  
789).	  Pensions	  were	  now	  becoming	  the	  target	  of	  foreign	  executives	  seeking	  to	  squeeze	  
new	  profits	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  previously	  established	  pension	  obligations24.	  Arthurs	  
(2008)	  argued	  that	  Canadian	  executives,	  experts,	  and	  policymakers	  became	  more	  
committed	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  globalization	  and	  regional	  integration,	  terming	  it	  as	  the	  
“globalization	  of	  the	  mind”	  (Arthurs	  1998),	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  reengineering	  Canadian	  
labour	  law	  and	  industrial	  relations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Indeed,	  these	  changes	  concerned	  political	  leaders.	  1987	  NDP	  pension	  critic	  Ross	  McClellan	  
introduced	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  PBA	  that	  would	  require	  the	  majority	  of	  trustees	  of	  a	  multi-­‐
employer	  pension	  plan	  to	  be	  “Canadian	  citizens	  or	  landed	  immigrants”	  (Hansard	  transcriptions,	  
1987).	  This	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  assets	  from	  Canadian	  pension	  plans	  were	  protected	  by	  flowing	  to	  
Canadian	  workers,	  rather	  than	  parent	  unions	  and	  trustees	  on	  pension	  boards	  managing	  the	  
money	  of	  Canadian	  workers.	  There	  was	  cross-­‐party	  consensus	  on	  this	  amendment	  and	  it	  was	  




Within	  this	  context,	  as	  the	  PBA	  entered	  into	  its	  second	  decade,	  problems	  arose	  
around	  issues	  of	  liability.	  Liability	  of	  a	  terminated	  plan	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  assets	  of	  a	  
plan,	  not	  to	  the	  assets	  of	  a	  company	  as	  a	  whole.	  When	  a	  fund	  terminated,	  the	  employer	  
only	  had	  to	  pay	  contributions	  to	  a	  plan	  until	  its	  wind-­‐up	  date.	  Any	  loss	  in	  commitments	  
to	  members	  was	  reduced	  from	  their	  pension	  benefits:	  “Thus,	  plan	  members	  rather	  than	  
the	  sponsor	  bore	  the	  burden	  of	  any	  shortfall”	  (Weitz	  1992:	  98),	  placing	  ultimate	  risk	  of	  a	  
failed	  plan	  onto	  workers.	  	  
This	  pressure	  on	  the	  Ontario	  government	  culminated	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Pension	  Benefit	  Guarantee	  Fund	  (PBGF)	  passed	  into	  legislation	  on	  12	  December	  1980.	  
The	  PBGF	  was	  the	  first	  fund	  in	  Canada	  (and	  remains	  today	  the	  only	  fund	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  
Canada)	  to	  provide	  a	  government	  guarantee	  to	  pension	  beneficiaries	  against	  sponsor	  
insolvency,	  initiating	  the	  heighted	  role	  of	  government	  in	  providing	  insurance	  measures	  
to	  protect	  workers	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  According	  to	  Weitz	  
(1992),	  the	  PBGF	  was	  hastily	  drafted	  in	  a	  political	  context	  of	  intense	  media	  and	  union	  
pressure	  following	  a	  string	  of	  plant	  closures	  in	  early	  1980.	  The	  NDP	  demanded	  the	  
minority	  government	  provide	  workers	  with	  insurance	  if	  their	  employer	  became	  
insolvent	  and	  the	  plan	  was	  underfunded.	  Demands	  within	  government	  were	  coming	  
from	  the	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  rather	  than	  Pension	  Commission	  of	  Ontario	  (PCO).	  
The	  PCO	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  regulation	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  and	  was	  
the	  government	  office	  with	  the	  most	  expertise	  in	  this	  field.	  Modeled	  on	  the	  United	  
States	  Pension	  Benefit	  Guarantee	  Fund	  as	  a	  means	  to	  protect	  vested	  pension	  




the	  appearance	  of	  government	  concern	  and	  effective	  action”	  (Weitz	  1992:	  99).	  The	  PCO	  
at	  the	  time	  claimed	  a	  guaranteed	  fund	  was	  not	  required,	  given	  the	  regulatory	  tools	  that	  
already	  existed,	  and	  would	  create	  administrative	  costs	  to	  both	  the	  PCO	  and	  plan	  
administrators.	  Other	  provincial	  jurisdictions	  also	  did	  not	  support	  the	  PBGF,	  saying	  they	  
would	  not	  create	  similar	  guaranteed	  funds.	  Provinces	  at	  the	  time	  were	  already	  
struggling	  to	  establish	  harmonized	  regulatory	  practices	  and	  legislative	  uniformity	  of	  
workplace	  pension	  plans	  across	  Canada,	  which	  had	  been	  a	  major	  objective	  of	  the	  
Canadian	  Association	  of	  Pension	  Supervisory	  Authorities	  (CAPSA)	  since	  its	  inception	  in	  
1965	  (Weitz	  1992).	  Furthermore,	  shortly	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PBGF,	  the	  Royal	  
Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Pensions	  in	  Ontario	  that	  was	  mandated	  to	  study	  Ontario’s	  
pension	  system	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  Haley	  Report)	  had	  declared	  that	  government	  funding	  
was	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  durability	  of	  province’s	  pension	  system.	  	  
The	  reorganization	  of	  Canada’s	  industrial	  base	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  deep	  
economic	  recession	  in	  1981-­‐2	  slowed	  the	  expansion	  of	  workplace	  plans,	  decreasing	  plan	  
membership	  amongst	  workers	  in	  Canada	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  records	  had	  been	  kept.	  
Unemployment	  in	  Ontario	  between	  1976	  and	  1983	  grew	  from	  6.1	  to	  10.4	  percent	  
(Statistics	  Canada,	  CANSIM	  table	  282-­‐0086).	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  unemployment	  in	  
Ontario’s	  manufacturing	  sector	  more	  than	  doubled	  from	  5.3	  to	  10.8	  (Statistics	  Canada,	  
CANSIM	  table	  282-­‐0008).	  Men	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  education	  most	  acutely	  felt	  these	  
changes,	  where	  the	  total	  unemployment	  at	  its	  lowest	  level	  was	  10	  percent	  for	  men	  and	  




fulltime	  industrial	  positions	  began	  to	  disappear,	  along	  with	  DB	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  
for	  many	  of	  Ontario’s	  private	  sector	  workers.	  	  
Conversely,	  pension	  coverage	  for	  women	  continued	  to	  rise	  through	  the	  early	  
1980s,	  albeit	  at	  a	  slower	  pace,	  characterized	  by	  the	  growing	  percentage	  of	  women	  
working	  in	  public	  sector	  occupations	  that	  offered	  secure	  defined	  benefit	  pension	  plans.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Percentage	  of	  male	  and	  female	  employees	  with	  a	  registered	  pension	  plan,	  
Canada,	  1947	  -­‐	  2011	  
	  
	  
Note:	  The	  1947	  numbers	  show	  pension	  coverage	  for	  both	  sexes.	  
Source:	  Pension	  Plans	  in	  Canada,	  1977	  to	  2011,	  and	  previous	  Statistics	  Canada	  publications	  on	  
pension	  plans.	  Cited	  from	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Megatrends	  (2015),	  Pensions:	  The	  ups	  and	  downs	  of	  
pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada.	  	  
	  
This	  put	  new	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  to	  ease	  some	  of	  the	  funding	  requirements	  by	  














































wound-­‐up.	  Thus,	  through	  the	  1980s	  different	  funding	  rules	  were	  developed	  that	  could	  
exclude	  certain	  benefits	  from	  solvency	  funding.	  
	  
1980s	  –	  Surplus,	  Economic	  Globalization	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  the	  Pension	  Professional	  
	  
This	  was	  the	  decade	  in	  which	  workplace	  pensions	  entered	  into	  the	  fray	  of	  economic	  
globalization,	  linking	  worker	  retirement	  income	  security	  to	  transnational	  corporate	  
governance	  practices	  and	  global	  financial	  markets.	  Conservative	  blue-­‐chip	  investment	  
portfolios	  were	  replaced	  with	  modern	  portfolio	  theory,	  while	  professional	  pension	  
consultancy	  emerged	  as	  a	  voice	  of	  authority	  over	  pension	  governance	  and	  decision	  
making	  (Marmer	  1997;	  Carmichael	  2005).	  While	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  covered	  by	  a	  
pension	  plan	  increased	  through	  the	  1980s,	  pension	  coverage	  for	  men	  and	  Ontario’s	  total	  
workforce	  decreased	  (see	  Figure	  5.1).	  The	  traditional	  employment	  relationship	  
characterized	  by	  long-­‐term	  work	  tenure	  in	  industries	  premised	  on	  male	  breadwinner	  
model	  was	  eroding.	  Economic	  globalization	  and	  the	  corporate	  restructuring	  of	  Ontario’s	  
industrial	  base	  made	  way	  for	  new	  service	  based	  industries	  and	  an	  expanding	  educated	  
professional	  class	  of	  workers	  who	  were	  more	  mobile.	  Defined	  contribution	  (DC)	  plans	  
grew	  as	  a	  popular	  alternative	  to	  what	  many	  deemed	  as	  unfair	  vesting	  rules	  in	  Ontario	  
that	  allowed	  workers	  to	  profit	  from	  high	  interest	  rates.	  Job	  tenures	  were	  shrinking,	  
catalyzing	  demands	  for	  mobile	  retirement	  saving	  vehicles.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  




Within	  the	  pension	  world,	  this	  was	  a	  period	  that	  touched	  upon	  issues	  of	  
increasing	  pension	  coverage	  for	  women,	  decreasing	  mortality	  rates,	  vitriolic	  debates	  
over	  sharing	  vast	  surpluses	  produced	  by	  pension	  funds	  in	  a	  context	  of	  high	  interest	  
rates,	  inflation	  protection,	  new	  continental	  accounting	  standards,	  and	  an	  overall	  shift	  in	  
philosophy	  in	  how	  pensions	  and	  the	  role	  they	  play	  within	  the	  economy	  was	  understood.	  
Also,	  in	  1987,	  at	  the	  age	  of	  24,	  the	  PBA	  underwent	  its	  first	  round	  of	  major	  legislative	  
reform.	  This	  occurred	  shortly	  after	  the	  Liberal	  government	  led	  by	  David	  Peterson	  won	  a	  
minority	  government	  in	  1985	  (with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  NDP),	  dethroning	  the	  Progressive	  
Conservative	  dynasty	  after	  42	  years	  in	  power	  and	  moving	  Ontario	  policymaking	  
“significantly	  to	  the	  left”	  (Haddow	  and	  Klassen	  2006:	  55).	  	  
While	  Ontario	  politics	  were	  moving	  left,	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  the	  Keynesian	  
consensus	  supporting	  the	  Canadian	  welfare	  states	  was	  faltering	  (Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013;	  
Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005).	  Canada’s	  struggling	  economy	  and	  growing	  government	  deficits	  
sparked	  new	  debate	  over	  social	  policy	  as	  the	  welfare	  state	  transitioned	  from	  an	  
expansionist	  phase	  to	  a	  crisis	  phase	  (Rice	  and	  Prince:	  2013).	  New	  organizations	  and	  
alliances	  were	  forming,	  with,	  for	  example,	  the	  rise	  of	  business	  activist	  lobby	  
organizations,	  women’s	  groups,	  community	  groups	  and	  retiree	  groups,	  generating	  
increasing	  ideological	  divides	  in	  Canadian	  civil	  society	  over	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  





Figure	  5.2:	  Unionization	  rates	  of	  employed	  individuals	  aged	  17	  -­‐	  64,	  Canada,	  1982	  -­‐	  2014	  
	  
Sources:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Labour	  Force	  Survey,	  1997	  to	  2014;	  Labour	  Market	  Activity	  Survey,	  
1986	  to	  1990;	  Survey	  of	  Union	  Membership,	  1984;	  Survey	  of	  Work	  History,	  1981.	  Cited	  from	  
Galarneau	  and	  Sohn	  (2013).	  
	  
Unionization	  levels	  in	  Canada	  in	  the	  1980s	  began	  to	  drop	  dramatically,	  
particularly	  for	  men	  working	  in	  private	  sector	  industrial	  jobs.	  As	  Figures	  5.1	  and	  5.2	  
illustrate,	  the	  drop	  in	  pension	  coverage	  for	  men	  coincided	  with	  in	  dropping	  unionization	  
rates	  beginning	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  As	  economic	  integration	  with	  the	  United	  States	  
deepened,	  the	  balance	  of	  class	  forces	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  tipping	  further	  in	  favor	  
of	  capital,	  resulting	  with	  diminishing	  pension	  coverage	  of	  remunerative	  industrial	  jobs.	  
These	  changing	  economic	  conditions	  fueled	  new	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  remedy	  
growing	  levels	  of	  risk.	  The	  pension	  policy	  transformations	  occurring	  in	  Ontario	  were	  part	  
of	  a	  broader	  national	  discussion	  in	  Canada	  on	  retirement	  income	  security	  that	  involved	  
























































high	  level	  of	  publicity	  pension	  policy	  was	  receiving	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  period	  from	  the	  late	  
1970s	  to	  the	  early	  1980s	  was	  termed	  the	  “Great	  Pension	  Debate”	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  
2005;	  Little	  2008;	  Rice	  and	  Prince	  2013).	  Given	  the	  economic	  transformation	  underway	  
in	  Canada’s	  economy,	  and	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  Canadian	  workers	  had	  no	  
workplace	  pensions,	  stakeholder	  groups	  across	  civil	  society,	  the	  business	  community	  
and	  government	  produced	  a	  corpus	  of	  policy	  reports	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  income	  
security	  for	  Canadian	  workers.	  The	  C/QPP	  was	  just	  over	  ten	  years	  old	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  
and	  according	  to	  Little	  (2008),	  “…the	  tenor	  of	  the	  times	  was	  such	  that	  grand	  proposals	  
for	  new	  social	  programs	  were	  still	  very	  much	  on	  the	  agenda”	  (p.	  51).	  From	  the	  labour	  
side,	  the	  CLC	  proposed	  expanding	  CPP	  from	  a	  maximum	  benefit	  of	  25	  percent	  of	  
earnings	  to	  50	  percent,	  which	  was	  commensurate	  to	  other	  industrial	  countries.	  This	  
proposal	  gained	  support	  from	  labour,	  seniors	  and	  women’s	  groups.	  Even	  government	  
officials	  were	  calling	  for	  expanded	  CPP	  benefits	  through	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Welfare	  
(NCW),	  a	  federal	  government	  advisory	  group	  led	  by	  Ken	  Battle	  that	  had	  called	  for	  a	  
more	  modest	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  benefits	  to	  37.5	  percent.	  The	  Business	  Committee	  on	  
Pension	  Policy,	  representing	  major	  private	  sector	  lobby	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  
Business	  Council	  on	  National	  Issues	  (BCNI),	  Canadian	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  
Business	  (CFIB),	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Health	  Life	  and	  Insurance	  Association	  (CHLIA),	  
produced	  a	  policy	  statement	  in	  1982	  stating	  that	  solutions	  could	  be	  found	  without	  
government	  intervention.	  Ontario’s	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Pensions	  was	  
conducted	  during	  this	  time,	  along	  with	  four	  other	  major	  government	  reports	  produced	  




which	  national	  debate	  on	  pensions	  and	  security	  had	  galvanized	  many	  groups	  across	  
Canadian	  society.	  	  
	   The	  litany	  of	  proposals	  set	  forth	  during	  this	  time	  can	  be	  organized	  into	  three	  
broad	  categories:	  those	  that	  called	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  CPP;	  those	  that	  called	  for	  the	  
mandatory	  expansion	  of	  workplace	  pension	  plans;	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not	  see	  the	  need	  
for	  government	  intervention	  (Little	  2008).	  The	  breadth	  and	  intensity	  of	  this	  debate	  led	  
the	  federal	  government	  to	  convene	  the	  National	  Pensions	  Conference	  in	  March	  1981	  
with	  Prime	  Minister	  Pierre	  Trudeau	  providing	  the	  opening	  remarks	  with	  a	  “promise	  of	  
major	  reform	  during	  his	  government’s	  mandate”	  (cited	  from	  Little	  2008).	  Trudeau’s	  
remarks	  highlighted	  the	  tenor	  of	  other	  pension	  reformers	  of	  the	  period:	  reform	  should	  
occur	  in	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system,	  while	  mandatory	  pensions	  as	  a	  policy	  
alternative	  were	  viewed	  as	  inferior	  and	  second-­‐best,	  and	  thus	  this	  option	  was	  not	  
aggressively	  pursued	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  other	  countries	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005).	  
Excitement	  was	  high	  and	  women’s	  groups	  for	  the	  first	  time	  were	  heavily	  
involved	  in	  national	  pension	  debate.	  In	  1970,	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  
Women	  outlined	  the	  disproportionate	  level	  of	  women	  living	  in	  poverty	  during	  
retirement,	  revealing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  pension	  systems,	  both	  public	  and	  private,	  
along	  with	  other	  social	  policies,	  were	  structured	  on	  a	  male-­‐breadwinner	  model	  of	  social	  
reproduction	  (Wilson	  1977).	  Many	  women	  claimed	  that	  the	  language	  and	  structure	  of	  
existing	  social	  policy	  marginalized	  women	  into	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  while	  reifying	  
structures	  of	  patriarchy.	  The	  commission	  served	  to	  activate	  a	  national	  debate	  that	  




to	  better	  help	  women	  by	  doubling	  CPP	  benefits	  and	  expanding	  workplace	  pension	  
coverage.	  With	  the	  rapid	  entrance	  of	  women	  into	  the	  workforce	  and	  the	  
acknowledgement	  of	  poverty	  levels	  amongst	  elderly	  women	  in	  Canada,	  the	  scope	  and	  
character	  of	  the	  national	  debate	  on	  pension	  coverage	  had	  been	  transformed	  with	  the	  
involvement	  of	  women	  activist	  organizations.	  	  
However,	  the	  eighteen-­‐month	  recession	  of	  1981-­‐2	  that	  began	  later	  in	  the	  year	  
thwarted	  the	  momentum	  and	  hopes	  that	  had	  been	  present	  during	  the	  National	  
Pensions	  Conference.	  After	  the	  recession,	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  were	  
reluctant	  to	  introduce	  sweeping	  changes,	  resulting	  in	  what	  Rice	  and	  Prince	  (2013)	  
termed	  a	  “social	  policy	  failure	  [with]	  marginal	  results”	  (p.	  113),	  ultimately	  leading	  to	  a	  
period	  of	  crisis	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  
Through	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  decade	  in	  Ontario,	  following	  the	  implementation	  
of	  the	  PBGF	  in	  1980	  and	  the	  economic	  recession,	  incremental	  change	  to	  the	  PBA	  
continued.	  During	  this	  period,	  several	  participants	  describe	  a	  shift	  in	  philosophy	  from	  
understanding	  workplace	  pensions	  as	  reward	  for	  long	  service	  to	  being	  viewed	  as	  
deferred	  wages.	  This	  shift	  had	  broad	  implications	  for	  how	  employers	  and	  members	  
viewed	  negotiated	  pension	  benefits	  leading	  to	  new	  regulations	  that	  shortened	  vesting	  
rules	  (Regulator1,	  April	  2015).	  The	  enactment	  of	  the	  PBA	  in	  1965	  implemented	  the	  
45/10	  rule,	  introducing	  accrual	  rights	  for	  workers	  over	  45	  years	  old	  with	  ten	  years	  of	  
service	  or	  more,	  protecting	  workers	  with	  long	  service	  from	  losing	  their	  pensions	  if	  they	  
were	  laid	  off	  or	  changed	  jobs	  later	  in	  their	  career.	  During	  this	  time,	  pensions	  were	  thus	  




funds	  were	  relatively	  affordable	  to	  administer	  and	  provided	  strong	  investment	  returns	  
and	  could	  be	  used	  to	  secure	  a	  long-­‐term	  loyal	  workforce.	  Moreover,	  high	  interest	  rates,	  
strong	  markets,	  and	  loose	  accounting	  standards	  made	  pensions	  attractive	  to	  employers	  
(Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  This	  continued	  in	  Ontario	  and	  elsewhere	  through	  the	  1960s	  
and	  early	  1970s.	  	  
But	  this	  understanding	  was	  challenged	  in	  the	  1980s	  by	  emerging	  economic	  and	  
labour	  conditions,	  including	  increasing	  worker	  mobility	  and	  the	  recognition	  that	  
workers,	  unlike	  their	  parents’	  generation,	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  work	  with	  a	  single	  employer	  
for	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  career	  (Ambachtsheer	  and	  Ezra	  1998;	  Dekanic	  2001).	  Many	  
began	  to	  view	  the	  45/10	  as	  unfair.	  Ontario’s	  workforce	  was	  rapidly	  changing.	  The	  
service	  sector	  was	  growing	  and	  Ontario’s	  industrial	  base,	  characterized	  by	  regular	  plant	  
closures	  and	  relocations,	  was	  proof	  for	  workers	  and	  their	  unions	  that	  pension	  
regulations	  had	  to	  change.	  More	  women	  were	  entering	  the	  workforce.	  The	  battle	  over	  
who	  was	  entitled	  to	  large	  pension	  fund	  surpluses	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  (discussed	  
below)	  sparked	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  ownership	  of	  investment	  returns	  produced	  by	  worker	  
contributions	  (Finlayson	  1988).	  And	  perspectives	  on	  jointly	  sponsored	  pension	  plans	  
changed	  as	  pension	  funds	  increased	  in	  cost	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Within	  this	  context,	  
workplace	  pensions	  increasingly	  were	  viewed	  as	  deferred	  wages	  as	  opposed	  to	  reward	  
for	  years	  of	  service.	  	  
Following	  the	  1981-­‐2	  recession,	  pension	  coverage	  began	  to	  grow	  again	  through	  
the	  mid-­‐1980s	  along	  with	  rising	  interest	  rates.	  The	  continuing	  rise	  of	  interest	  rates	  led	  to	  




became	  a	  definitive	  issue	  (Finlayson	  1988).	  Funds	  were	  earning	  large	  sums	  of	  profit,	  
leading	  to	  class	  struggle	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  over	  who	  was	  entitled	  to	  
pension	  fund	  surpluses.	  Private	  sector	  employers	  who	  funded,	  administered	  and	  
assumed	  the	  risk	  of	  providing	  pension	  income	  for	  members	  saw	  the	  surplus	  as	  their	  
entitlement	  and	  began	  applying	  to	  the	  PCO	  to	  withdraw	  surplus	  that	  was	  typically	  worth	  
millions.	  Workers	  and	  retirees,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  saw	  surplus	  as	  belonging	  to	  members	  
given	  that	  the	  pension	  fund	  had	  been	  set	  up	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  retirement	  income.	  At	  
the	  time,	  high	  inflation	  was	  seriously	  eating	  into	  the	  value	  of	  pensions	  that	  had	  little	  or	  
no	  inflation	  indexation	  and	  many	  argued	  that	  pension	  fund	  surpluses	  should	  be	  used	  for	  
inflation	  protection	  (Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
These	  issues	  spilled	  into	  parliamentary	  debate.	  When	  debating	  reforms	  to	  the	  
PBA	  in	  1987	  in	  parliament,	  the	  NDP	  vocally	  opposed	  surplus	  sharing,	  arguing	  that	  
pension	  funds	  represented	  “deferred	  wages”	  and	  were	  the	  “sole”	  property	  of	  workers,	  
not	  sponsors	  (McClelland,	  Hansard	  transcription,	  June	  1987).	  NDP	  pension	  critic	  Ross	  
McClellan	  called	  for	  the	  PBA	  to	  be	  amended	  to	  define	  pension	  plans	  as	  the	  property	  of	  
workers.	  McClellan	  also	  wanted	  an	  amendment	  that	  would	  stop	  the	  Pension	  
Commission	  of	  Ontario	  (PCO)	  from	  giving	  surplus	  money	  to	  an	  employer,	  which	  it	  had	  
previously	  done	  in	  the	  Dominion	  Stores	  case,	  allowing	  Conrad	  Black	  access	  to	  $39	  
million	  in	  pension	  surplus	  funds,	  which	  to	  many	  symbolized	  the	  “legalized	  theft	  of	  
surplus	  pension	  funds”	  by	  corporations,	  “sticking	  the	  money	  in	  their	  own	  pockets”	  




disagreed,	  claiming	  that	  employers	  take	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  DB	  plans	  and	  therefore	  are	  
entitled	  to	  any	  surplus	  during	  health	  economic	  periods.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  Dominion	  Stores	  case	  became	  highly	  publicized,	  and	  the	  class	  
struggle	  over	  ownership	  of	  pension	  surpluses	  in	  Ontario	  became	  so	  heated	  that	  the	  
provincial	  government	  implemented	  a	  moratorium	  on	  surplus	  withdrawal,	  convening	  a	  
task	  force	  on	  inflation	  and	  surplus	  sharing.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  PCO	  became	  more	  
conservative	  in	  its	  regulatory	  practices	  (Finlayson	  1988;	  Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014).	  These	  
events	  helped	  lead	  to	  a	  series	  court	  cases	  on	  how	  to	  divide	  fund	  surpluses.	  	  
In	  December	  1986,	  the	  minority	  Liberal	  government	  led	  by	  David	  Peterson	  
introduced	  Bill	  170	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Legislature	  for	  first	  reading,	  which	  later	  became	  the	  
first	  major	  legislative	  reform	  to	  the	  PBA	  in	  late	  1987.	  “Grow-­‐in”	  rights	  that	  made	  
workers	  eligible	  for	  retirement	  arrangements,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PBGF	  in	  1980	  
and	  increased	  powers	  for	  the	  pension	  regulator	  were	  all	  issues	  consolidated	  in	  the	  
revised	  PBA.	  Also,	  the	  funding	  controversies	  that	  dominated	  the	  policy	  agenda	  through	  
the	  1980s,	  including	  ownership	  of	  surplus	  funds,	  contribution	  holidays	  (i.e.	  how	  long	  an	  
employer	  could	  take	  a	  break	  from	  contributing	  to	  a	  plan	  if	  there	  was	  a	  surplus),	  and	  
acceptable	  funding	  deficits	  levels	  were	  partially	  resolved	  with	  ad	  hoc	  amendments	  to	  
the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act,	  1987	  (Arthurs	  2008).	  Many	  of	  these	  funding	  issues,	  however,	  
would	  persist	  through	  to	  the	  2000s	  
Inflation	  protection,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  left	  out	  of	  the	  1987	  PBA	  reforms.	  
Instead,	  on	  December	  9,	  1986,	  the	  conditions	  of	  high	  inflation	  and	  surplus	  sharing	  issues	  




Inflation	  Protection	  for	  Employment	  Pension	  Plans.	  This	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  
Bill	  170	  (which	  became	  the	  PBA,	  1987)	  was	  introduced	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Legislature	  for	  
first	  reading.	  Given	  the	  political	  contentiousness	  of	  pension	  inflation	  protection	  and	  the	  
regulatory	  difficulties	  of	  implementing	  new	  indexing	  rules,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  used	  
the	  Task	  Force	  delay	  decision	  on	  indexing	  rules.	  Published	  January	  1988,	  what	  became	  
commonly	  known	  as	  the	  “Friedland	  Report”	  named	  after	  the	  Task	  Force’s	  chair,	  Martin	  
Friedland,	  professor	  of	  Law	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Toronto,	  concluded	  that	  the	  provincial	  
government	  should	  legislate	  a	  minimum	  standard	  inflation	  protection	  that	  adopted	  the	  
formula	  of	  75%	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Price	  Index	  (CPI).	  These	  indexing	  rules	  never	  
materialized.	  
Another	  defining	  event	  of	  the	  1980s	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  accounting	  
standards	  that	  placed	  pension	  liabilities	  onto	  company	  balance	  sheets.	  Many	  
participants	  claimed	  the	  adoption	  of	  these	  new	  accounting	  standards	  made	  
administering	  DB	  plans	  much	  more	  undesirable	  for	  many	  employers.	  Canada	  began	  to	  
adopt	  American	  accounting	  standards	  as	  the	  two	  economies	  became	  more	  integrated.	  
According	  to	  Gaa	  (2007),	  this	  occurred	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Canada’s	  proximity	  the	  
United	  States	  facilitated	  capital	  investment	  in	  Canada’s	  economy,	  whereby	  the	  1960s	  
over	  80	  percent	  of	  foreign	  capital	  was	  American.	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  “branch	  plant”	  
economy	  characterized	  by	  American	  firms	  operating	  subsidiaries	  in	  Canada	  deepened	  
economic	  integration	  and	  corporate	  practices.	  The	  need	  of	  Canadian	  firms	  to	  access	  
American	  financial	  markets	  and	  intensified	  trade	  between	  both	  countries	  led	  many	  




funds	  and	  respective	  commitments	  in	  recent	  years	  had	  many	  accountants	  concerned	  
about	  how	  pension	  fund	  liabilities	  and	  assets	  were	  measured	  and	  reported	  in	  financial	  
statements	  (Friedland	  et	  al.	  1988).	  In	  December	  1986,	  new	  standards	  required	  Canadian	  
companies	  to	  systematize	  recognition	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  pension	  plans	  when	  reporting	  
corporate	  expenses	  and	  liabilities.	  These	  new	  practices	  aimed	  to	  enhance	  comparability	  
between	  companies	  and	  to	  improve	  consistency	  between	  different	  reporting	  periods.	  
Prior	  to	  this	  time,	  when	  reporting	  pension	  fund	  costs,	  companies	  only	  had	  to	  report	  
annual	  contributions	  to	  the	  plan,	  not	  the	  unfunded	  future	  liabilities	  that	  were	  defined	  
by	  demographic	  factors	  of	  plan	  members	  and	  future	  economic	  conditions	  premised	  on	  
changing	  interest	  rates	  that	  were	  unknown.	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  these	  new	  
accounting	  standards,	  the	  level	  of	  liabilities	  grew	  dramatically	  since	  they	  were	  now	  on	  
company	  books,	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  diminishing	  the	  apparent	  financial	  standing	  of	  the	  
organization.	  Suddenly,	  the	  perceived	  cost	  of	  administering	  a	  pension	  fund	  substantially	  
increased.	  	  	  
	  
Entering	  capital	  markets	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  pension	  consultant	  
In	  the	  twenty	  years	  between	  the	  early	  1960s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  pension	  funds	  in	  Canada	  
and	  the	  United	  States	  had	  remodeled	  their	  investment	  strategies,	  linking	  pension	  fund	  
capital	  to	  global	  markets.	  This	  transformed	  the	  managerial	  practices	  of	  fund	  
administration	  and	  the	  desire	  and	  level	  of	  involvement	  of	  corporate	  management	  in	  
providing	  plans.	  Pension	  fund	  investment	  portfolios	  before	  the	  1970s	  were	  




stocks.	  By	  the	  1980s,	  funds	  were	  being	  invested	  in	  new	  asset	  classes	  such	  as	  
international	  stocks	  and	  private	  equity.	  This	  had	  been	  facilitated	  by	  the	  size	  of	  pension	  
assets	  during	  the	  time	  that	  had	  substantially	  grown.	  In	  Canada,	  between	  1960	  and	  1980,	  
pension	  fund	  assets	  grew	  from	  $4.8	  billion	  to	  $65.5	  billion,	  thus	  becoming	  the	  fastest	  
growing	  financial	  institution	  in	  the	  country	  (Deaton	  1989;	  Carmichael	  2005).	  
Furthermore,	  new	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  modern	  portfolio	  theory	  (MPT)	  and	  
technology	  were	  driving	  factors	  in	  the	  financial	  behavior	  of	  workplace	  pension	  funds	  
(Marmer	  1997).	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Employee	  Retirement	  
Income	  Security	  Act	  (ERISA)	  outlined	  new	  prudent	  practices	  and	  fiduciary	  
responsibilities	  that	  required	  investment	  diversification.	  The	  consultancy	  industry	  
rapidly	  grew	  as	  fund	  managers	  hired	  consultants	  to	  set	  investment	  policies	  and	  goals	  
and	  to	  allocate	  long-­‐term	  assets	  (Marmer	  1997).	  These	  consultants	  brought	  with	  them	  a	  
new	  economic	  rationale	  of	  modern	  portfolio	  theory	  to	  educate	  pension	  funds	  on	  how	  to	  
improve	  the	  fund’s	  portfolio	  efficiency	  without	  being	  exposed	  to	  more	  risk	  by	  investing	  
in	  new	  asset	  classes.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  1971,	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Bretton-­‐Woods	  
system	  opened	  global	  financial	  markets	  up	  to	  institutional	  investors.	  The	  contributions	  
of	  working	  class	  citizens	  were	  now	  entering	  global	  stock	  markets	  and	  by	  the	  mid-­‐80s,	  
and	  plans	  began	  to	  make	  more	  money	  off	  investments	  compared	  to	  contributions.	  	  
Beyond	  portfolio	  holdings,	  these	  changes	  impacted	  the	  management	  culture	  of	  
pension	  funds.	  First,	  the	  business	  of	  administering	  a	  plan	  became	  more	  volatile	  due	  to	  
increased	  exposure	  to	  global	  financial	  market	  fluctuations.	  Before,	  when	  plans	  were	  




experienced	  less	  volatility.	  Second,	  the	  stature	  of	  investment	  professionals	  and	  related	  
knowledge	  became	  more	  paramount	  compared	  to	  local	  managerial	  practices	  that	  had	  
previously	  been	  developed	  through	  human	  resources	  expertise.	  The	  “hollowing	  out”	  of	  
corporate	  Canada	  had	  begun	  by	  the	  1980s	  with	  American	  and	  other	  foreign	  subsidiaries	  
in	  Ontario	  merging	  or	  shutting	  operation	  was	  commonplace.	  Globalization,	  trade	  
liberalization	  and	  emerging	  communications	  technology	  were	  making	  redundant	  
foreign-­‐owned	  subsidiaries,	  centralizing	  managerial	  control	  within	  transnational	  parent	  
corporate	  headquarters,	  with	  many	  national	  corporate	  head	  offices	  moving	  abroad	  
(Arthurs	  2000).	  Portfolios	  with	  blue-­‐chip	  stocks	  and	  government	  bonds	  that	  could	  be	  
handled	  by	  in-­‐house	  management	  were	  in	  decline.	  As	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  grew,	  along	  
with	  new	  accounting	  standards	  and	  exposure	  to	  global	  financial	  markets,	  pensions	  were	  
becoming	  an	  object	  of	  financial	  management	  expertise,	  a	  concern	  for	  chief	  financial	  
officers	  and	  VPs	  of	  finance	  (Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014).	  As	  such,	  international	  professional	  
bodies	  and	  standards,	  as	  opposed	  to	  localized	  management	  practices,	  more	  and	  more	  
influenced	  the	  knowledge	  used	  to	  manage	  these	  funds.	  	  
	  
1990s	  –	  The	  Exit	  of	  Provision	  
	  
While	  economic	  globalization	  and	  corporate	  restructuring	  during	  the	  1980s	  began	  to	  
unhinge	  the	  post-­‐war	  industrial	  employment	  relationship,	  employers	  seeking	  to	  exit	  the	  
provision	  of	  retirement	  income	  en	  masse	  characterized	  the	  1990s.	  Growing	  regulatory	  




conditions	  highlighted	  the	  “asymmetry	  of	  risk”	  involved	  with	  plan	  administration	  from	  
an	  employer	  and	  plan	  sponsor	  perspective	  (Actuary,	  April	  2015).	  Also,	  decreasing	  
unionization	  levels	  that	  had	  begun	  in	  the	  1980s	  continued	  to	  decline	  during	  1990s,	  
particularly	  for	  men,	  allowing	  more	  employers	  to	  diminish	  pension	  benefits	  with	  less	  
resistance	  from	  workers	  (see	  Figure	  5.2)(Garlarneau	  and	  Sohn	  2013).	  An	  economic	  
recession	  began	  in	  1990,	  resulting	  with	  more	  plant	  closures,	  displacing	  thousands	  of	  
industrial	  workers.	  Unemployment	  levels	  in	  Ontario	  rose	  to	  10.2	  percent	  by	  1992,	  
representing	  the	  loss	  of	  250,000	  jobs	  (Evans	  and	  Smith	  2015).	  Given	  these	  conditions,	  
the	  1990s	  represent	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  which	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  become	  
increasingly	  individualized	  amongst	  the	  provincial	  workforce,	  reflected	  through	  
transforming	  economic	  conditions	  and	  the	  expanding	  use	  of	  DC	  plans	  and	  overall	  
decreasing	  pension	  coverage.	  	  
At	  the	  political	  level,	  the	  brokerage	  politics	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  with	  the	  
Progressive	  Conservatives	  at	  the	  helm	  had	  ended.	  Haddow	  and	  Klassen	  (2006)	  describe	  
Ontario’s	  party	  system	  as	  becoming	  more	  “polarized”	  during	  this	  time,	  following	  the	  
election	  of	  a	  minority	  Liberal	  party	  in	  mid	  1980s	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  NDP.	  This	  trend	  
continued	  when	  the	  NDP	  won	  in	  1990,	  led	  by	  Bob	  Rae,	  who	  attempted	  to	  formalize	  
dialogue	  between	  labour	  and	  business	  during	  his	  tenure.	  The	  NDP’s	  desire	  to	  establish	  a	  
labour-­‐business	  dialogue,	  and	  their	  attempt	  codify	  new	  labour	  rights	  into	  labour	  market	  
policy	  had	  failed,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  their	  adoption	  of	  austerity	  measures	  that	  alienated	  their	  
own	  supporters	  (Evans	  and	  Smith	  2015).	  Conversely,	  The	  Conservative	  Harris	  




(Haddow	  and	  Kalssen	  2006),	  reversing	  most	  of	  the	  NDP’s	  labour	  laws,	  while	  introducing	  
an	  extensive	  series	  of	  business-­‐friendly	  legislation	  during	  the	  “Common	  Sense	  
Revolution”	  (Peck	  2001;	  Evans	  and	  Smith	  2015).	  This	  legislation	  diminished	  collective	  
bargaining	  rights,	  limiting	  labour’s	  ability	  to	  organize	  and	  strike	  and	  introduced	  market-­‐
oriented	  “workfare”	  (Peck	  2001;	  Panitch	  and	  Schwartz	  2003;	  Haddow	  and	  Klassen	  2006;	  
Evans	  and	  Smith	  2015).	  Indeed,	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  during	  this	  time	  
heightened	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  capital,	  changing	  the	  
landscape	  of	  class	  relations	  (Harvey	  2005).	  Consequently,	  while	  economic	  restructuring	  
and	  neoliberal	  policy	  initiatives	  were	  introduced,	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  remained	  a	  
contentious	  policy	  field,	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  toxic	  by	  government	  officials.	  
When	  David	  Peterson’s	  Liberal	  minority	  government	  was	  defeated	  at	  the	  hands	  
of	  the	  NDP,	  the	  NDP	  had	  promised	  to	  introduce	  new	  legislation	  that	  would	  make	  
surpluses	  the	  property	  of	  plan	  members,	  or	  at	  least	  develop	  a	  clear	  policy	  on	  the	  issue	  
(Brett	  1991).	  As	  the	  official	  opposition	  during	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  NDP	  had	  been	  vocal	  
supporters	  of	  labour	  and	  retiree	  groups	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  block	  employers	  from	  
withdrawing	  pension	  surpluses.	  But	  as	  the	  1990s	  carried	  on,	  surplus	  sharing	  continued	  
to	  simmer	  away	  with	  no	  new	  rules	  following	  the	  moratorium	  on	  surplus	  withdrawal	  
introduced	  by	  the	  Liberals	  in	  1987	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  December	  2014).	  Furthermore,	  
recommendations	  on	  inflation	  protection	  presented	  by	  the	  Friedland	  Task	  Force	  in	  1988	  
were	  unsuccessful,	  with	  no	  new	  rules	  on	  mandatory	  indexing	  of	  DB	  plans.	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  new	  pension	  legislation	  around	  surplus	  sharing	  and	  pension	  




the	  legal	  landscape	  for	  pension	  law	  in	  Ontario	  (Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  2013).	  Many	  of	  the	  
rulings	  during	  this	  period	  were	  viewed	  to	  be	  labour	  friendly25,	  frustrating	  many	  
employers	  and	  their	  professional	  consultants.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  labour	  lawyers	  
realized	  they	  could	  be	  paid	  from	  pension	  funds	  rather	  than	  the	  union,	  revealing	  an	  
extensive	  source	  of	  business.	  Pension	  law	  thus	  emerged	  as	  an	  expanding	  legal	  field,	  
where	  a	  growing	  cadre	  of	  labour	  lawyers	  were	  setting	  forth	  arguments	  in	  labour’s	  
favour	  over	  surplus	  entitlement	  (Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Eillen	  Gillese,	  
Pension	  Commissioner	  of	  Ontario	  from	  1988	  to	  1998,	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  friendly	  to	  
arguments	  set	  forth	  by	  labour	  lawyers	  (Lawyer4,	  July	  2014).	  Employers’	  rights	  to	  
pension	  surplus	  were	  diminished	  with	  rulings	  such	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada’s	  
decision	  on	  Schmidt	  v.	  Air	  Products	  Canada	  Ltd.	  (1994)	  that	  put	  stringent	  restrictions	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Under	  the	  new	  1987	  PBA	  legislation,	  the	  Pension	  Commission	  of	  Ontario’s	  (PCO)	  
Superintendent’s	  jurisdiction	  (i.e.	  regulator,	  adjudicator	  and	  administrator	  of	  the	  PBA)	  was	  
significantly	  expanded	  from	  an	  advisory	  and	  record-­‐keeping	  role	  to	  principal	  “first-­‐instance”	  
decision	  maker	  role	  from	  1987-­‐1998.	  Consequently	  “virtually	  all	  initial	  decisions	  under	  the	  PBA	  
were	  made	  by	  the	  Superintendent”	  (Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  2013:	  62).	  In	  this	  post-­‐1987	  regulatory	  
regime,	  an	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  in	  terms	  of	  “access	  to	  justice”	  and	  
“procedural	  reciprocity”	  between	  employees,	  members,	  and	  employers	  and	  plan	  sponsors.	  This	  
shift	  drew	  from	  recommendations	  presented	  in	  the	  Haley	  Report	  published	  in	  1980	  that	  called	  
for	  the	  overhaul	  of	  Ontario’s	  pension	  regulatory	  framework.	  Under	  the	  new	  legislation	  
employees	  were	  offered	  new	  hearing	  and	  participation	  rights	  to	  arbitrate	  and	  protect	  benefits,	  
rather	  than	  only	  being	  available	  to	  employers	  or	  administrators	  (that	  had	  been	  the	  case	  before	  
1987).	  Given	  individual	  members	  and	  employees	  often	  did	  not	  have	  independent	  legal	  counsel,	  
the	  PCO	  represented	  their	  interests	  during	  appeals	  made	  by	  employers.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  
changes	  amounted	  to	  a	  series	  of	  rulings	  that	  limited	  employers’	  and	  sponsors’	  ability	  to	  
independently	  undertake	  partial	  wind	  up	  of	  a	  plan,	  withdraw	  surplus	  on	  a	  plan	  wind	  up,	  and	  
transfer	  assets	  between	  plans	  without	  employee	  and	  member	  consultation.	  According	  to	  Kaplan	  
and	  Frazer	  (2013)	  this	  represented	  an	  “evolution	  of	  Ontario	  pension	  regulation	  and	  
adjudication”	  (p.	  66),	  in	  which	  regulators	  adopted	  the	  “normative	  sense	  that	  employee	  litigants	  
were	  owed	  elevated	  protections”	  (p.	  70).	  One	  participant	  described	  these	  ruling	  favorable	  to	  
employees	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  general	  sense	  amongst	  employers	  during	  the	  1990s	  of	  the	  
expanding	  regulatory	  burden	  involved	  with	  administering	  workplace	  DB	  pension	  plans.	  For	  
examples,	  see	  rulings	  CUPE	  v	  Ontario	  Hospital	  Assn	  (1992);	  CUPE,	  Locals	  1144	  &	  1590	  v	  Ontario	  





employer	  entitlement	  to	  surplus,	  becoming	  the	  leading	  statement	  of	  the	  law	  on	  pension	  
plan	  surpluses	  (Litner	  2011).	  This	  insertion	  of	  workers’	  rights	  in	  pension	  law	  broadened	  
tension	  between	  employers	  and	  members,	  who	  until	  then	  had	  more	  control	  over	  
surpluses.	  	  
Although	  employers	  in	  Ontario	  were	  losing	  some	  legal	  battles	  over	  surpluses,	  by	  
the	  late	  1990s	  a	  bull	  market	  was	  underway,	  interest	  rates	  remained	  high,	  and	  money	  
was	  still	  awash	  in	  the	  pension	  system,	  keeping	  pension	  costs	  low,	  while	  contributing	  to	  
expanding	  surpluses.	  These	  conditions	  ended	  abruptly	  with	  the	  bursting	  of	  the	  dot-­‐com	  
bubble	  in	  1999.	  By	  the	  early	  2000s,	  funds	  invested	  in	  tech	  stocks	  were	  hit	  hard,	  leading	  
to	  what	  one	  participant	  called	  a	  “complaint	  discourse”	  amongst	  plan	  administrators	  
(Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014)	  (to	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  following	  section).	  	  	  
During	  this	  time,	  Ontario’s	  pension	  regulator	  underwent	  institutional	  reform.	  In	  
1998,	  the	  PCO	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Commission	  of	  Ontario	  (FSCO).	  
The	  Conservative	  Harris	  government—which	  took	  power	  from	  the	  NDP	  in	  1995—
consolidated	  financial	  service	  regulation,	  moving	  the	  regulatory	  powers	  from	  the	  PCO	  to	  
FSCO	  which	  was	  also	  mandated	  to	  regulate	  other	  financial	  institutions,	  including	  credit	  
unions,	  cooperatives,	  and	  insurance,	  loan	  and	  mortgage	  companies	  under	  one	  
superintendent26.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Following	  this	  institutional	  change,	  FSCO	  became	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  regulation—
ensuring	  pension	  plan	  administrators	  prudently	  followed	  rules	  contained	  with	  the	  Pension	  
Benefits	  Act.	  Policy	  advisory	  moved	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance.	  Following	  reforms	  to	  the	  PBA	  in	  
1987,	  the	  PCO	  had	  played	  an	  important	  policy	  function	  in	  the	  development	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  
Ontario.	  However,	  the	  PCO	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  overlapping	  in	  pension	  
policy	  work	  during	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  resulting	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  taking	  




New	  accounting	  standards	  and	  decreasing	  interest	  rates	  meant	  more	  
organizations	  were	  exposed	  to	  more	  liabilities	  while	  pension	  fund	  surpluses	  were	  
disappearing,	  inducing	  rising	  costs.	  This	  combination	  of	  factors	  escalated	  through	  the	  
1990s	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  leading	  to	  what	  one	  participant	  called	  a	  “perfect	  
storm”:	  “…interest	  rates	  had	  declined	  to	  what	  was	  very	  painful.	  Their	  investments	  
tanked.	  Mortality	  started	  to	  show	  up	  on	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  pension	  funds.	  All	  of	  
these	  things	  happened”	  (Regulator	  1,	  April	  2015).	  This	  combination	  of	  factors	  resulted	  
with	  a	  range	  of	  governmental	  policy	  responses,	  including	  temporary	  solvency	  relief	  
measures	  and	  initiatives	  to	  facilitate	  joint	  sharing	  of	  risks	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  
pension	  funds	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  jointly	  sponsored	  pension	  plans.	  	  
This	  issue	  of	  rising	  costs	  became	  a	  new	  battleground	  between	  employers	  and	  
employees	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  risk	  involved	  with	  structuring	  pension	  benefits	  (Actuary	  
1,	  April	  2015).	  While	  many	  employers	  during	  the	  postwar	  period	  sought	  to	  offer	  
company	  plans	  to	  benefit	  from	  favorable	  economic	  conditions	  and	  tax	  regulations,	  
employers	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  sought	  to	  exit	  the	  provision	  of	  retirement	  
income,	  exposing	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  voluntary	  workplace	  pension	  system.	  The	  desire	  
of	  many	  employers,	  mostly	  in	  the	  private	  sector27,	  to	  exit	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regulatory	  duties.	  When	  the	  PCO	  was	  replaced	  with	  FSCO	  in	  1998,	  adjudicative	  functions	  were	  
transferred	  to	  Financial	  Services	  Tribunal	  (FST),	  whose	  mandate	  is	  to	  track	  the	  work	  of	  FSCO.	  
According	  to	  some	  in	  the	  pension	  community,	  the	  result	  of	  these	  changes	  was	  that,	  “…pension	  
law,	  policy	  and	  adjudication	  now	  reside	  within	  a	  regime	  whose	  primary	  focus	  is	  the	  regulation	  of	  
financial	  markets”	  (Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  2008:	  11),	  rather	  than	  pension	  
funds.	  
27	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  governance	  structures	  amongst	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  that	  shape	  the	  
type	  of	  risk	  a	  plan	  is	  exposed	  to.	  The	  majority	  of	  private	  sector	  pension	  plans	  are	  single-­‐




retirement	  income	  during	  this	  time,	  suggests	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  was	  
being	  increasingly	  pushed	  onto	  individual	  workers.	  	  
With	  the	  increase	  in	  cost,	  many	  employers	  claimed	  they	  were	  bearing	  too	  much	  
of	  the	  risk	  without	  immediate	  reward.	  Many	  interview	  participants	  drew	  a	  direct	  link	  
between	  accounting	  standards	  and	  rising	  costs	  of	  pension	  funds	  to	  the	  desire	  of	  
employers	  to	  move	  away	  from	  DB	  plans	  and	  pension	  funds	  in	  general.	  As	  one	  interview	  
participant	  states:	  	  
I	  think	  the	  most	  significant	  change	  that	  impacted	  the	  thinking	  on	  pensions	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  the	  accounting	  changes,	  because	  before	  that,	  it	  might	  not	  have	  been	  
appended	  as	  an	  index	  to	  your	  financial	  corporate	  financial	  statements	  that	  you	  have	  
this	  huge	  pension	  liability.	  And	  after	  that	  they	  had	  to	  report	  it	  and	  it	  started	  showing	  
up	  on	  the	  financial	  statements	  and	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  bottom	  line	  of	  the	  
company.	  Then	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  opportunities	  to	  look	  for	  –	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  –	  to	  
look	  for	  ways	  to	  change	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  company	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  pension	  
plan.	  Looking	  for	  opportunities	  to	  limit	  the	  risk,	  which	  is	  why	  you	  have	  all	  these	  de-­‐
risking	  initiatives	  today	  (Regulator	  1,	  2015).	  
	  
	  Employers	  began	  to	  demand	  that	  members	  should	  assume	  more	  of	  the	  cost	  if	  
they	  were	  to	  continue	  to	  offer	  the	  benefit28.	  Or	  conversely,	  move	  to	  a	  DC	  plan	  where	  
members	  bore	  more	  or	  all	  of	  the	  investment	  risk.	  Where	  once	  the	  economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ensuring	  the	  fund	  meets	  solvency	  requirements.	  Most	  public	  sector	  plans	  are	  multi-­‐employer	  
pension	  plans	  (MEPPs)	  or	  jointly	  sponsored	  pension	  plans	  (JSPPs)	  that	  have	  a	  board	  of	  trustees	  
that	  include	  employee	  and	  sponsor	  representatives.	  Given	  SEPPs	  have	  only	  one	  sponsor	  and	  are	  
usually	  much	  smaller	  in	  scale	  compared	  to	  MEPPs	  and	  JSPPs,	  SEPPs	  involve	  higher	  levels	  of	  risk	  
for	  the	  sponsor	  (and	  for	  members).	  In	  this	  context,	  many	  employers	  with	  a	  SEPP	  were	  seeking	  to	  
exit	  their	  involvement	  in	  retirement	  provision.	  See	  Chapter	  Seven	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  
of	  risk	  and	  pension	  plan	  governance	  structure.	  	  
28	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  plans	  are	  structured	  in	  different	  way	  with	  respect	  to	  contribution	  
rates.	  Some	  plans	  are	  fully	  funded	  by	  the	  employer	  (typically	  SEPPs),	  whereas	  others	  are	  funded	  
equally	  by	  both	  employer	  and	  employee	  (typically	  MEPPs	  and	  JSPPs),	  or	  some	  other	  
combination.	  During	  the	  1950s,	  the	  hostility	  of	  unions	  towards	  employer-­‐sponsored	  plans	  
diminished	  when	  offered	  non-­‐contributory	  plans	  where	  all	  costs	  were	  borne	  by	  the	  employer	  (in	  
a	  form	  of	  a	  SEPP)	  (Weitz	  1992:	  63).	  Since	  the	  1950s,	  pensions	  and	  contributions	  rates	  have	  been	  




environment	  of	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  high	  rates	  of	  returns	  were	  coupled	  with	  lax	  
accounting	  and	  surplus	  sharing	  rules,	  now	  pension	  funds	  were	  coming	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  
more	  work	  with	  little	  reward.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  pensions	  were	  no	  longer	  being	  used	  as	  
reward	  for	  long	  service.	  Another	  interview	  participant	  describes	  the	  change	  in	  tone	  of	  
how	  employers	  viewed	  pensions,	  and	  how	  this	  would	  come	  to	  alter	  actuarial	  practice	  
and	  investment	  strategies:	  	  
When	  I	  was	  on	  the	  pension	  consulting	  side,	  pension	  plans	  were	  actually	  income	  
generating	  to	  the	  plans.	  So	  from	  a	  balance	  sheet	  perspective,	  they	  were	  positive,	  
they	  were	  like	  the	  wine	  of	  business	  adding	  value	  to	  shareholders.	  But	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  
tides	  turned	  and	  interest	  rates	  went	  down	  to	  become	  a	  cost	  item,	  rather	  than	  a	  
revenue	  item.	  So	  I	  think	  that	  really	  zoned	  in	  the	  focus	  on	  stock	  price.	  Accounting	  
rules	  changed	  to	  make	  it	  more	  visible	  on	  the	  statements	  and	  everything	  else.	  So	  we	  
put	  a	  microscope	  on	  it	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
These	  trends	  elevated	  the	  role	  of	  pension	  actuaries	  within	  the	  management	  of	  
funds.	  Emphasis	  on	  investment	  grew	  as	  attempts	  to	  maximize	  investment	  returns	  in	  a	  
tougher	  economic	  environment	  became	  commonplace.	  Rising	  costs	  of	  funds	  would	  fuel	  
anti-­‐pension	  discourse,	  feeding	  into	  a	  new	  debate	  over	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  income	  
security	  during	  retirement.	  	  
	   The	  division	  between	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  pension	  plans	  in	  Ontario	  also	  
figured	  centrally	  as	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  interviews.	  Public	  sector	  plans	  began	  to	  grow	  with	  
the	  establishment	  of	  new	  joint-­‐sharing	  governance	  structures.	  In	  1987,	  Ontario	  Premier	  
David	  Peterson	  organized	  a	  task	  force	  chaired	  by	  Malcolm	  Rowan	  to	  address	  the	  low	  
funding	  status	  facing	  the	  government	  agencies	  administering	  public	  sector	  pension	  
funds	  in	  Ontario.	  Later	  that	  year,	  the	  task	  force	  published	  In	  Whose	  Interest?	  Report	  of	  




known	  as	  the	  “Rowan	  Report”,	  argued	  that	  public	  pension	  plans	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  
the	  same	  financial	  and	  disclosure	  standards	  as	  corporate	  plans.	  These	  plans	  should	  
become	  independent	  legal	  entities	  that	  reflect	  industry	  best	  practices	  and	  should	  not	  be	  
used	  to	  further	  government	  public	  policy	  aims,	  as	  only	  stakeholder	  interests	  should	  be	  
considered.	  The	  Rowan	  Report	  laid	  groundwork	  for	  joint-­‐sponsorship	  model	  in	  public	  
sector	  plans,	  which	  famously	  helped	  establish	  the	  Ontario	  Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  
(OTPP),	  turning	  it	  from	  an	  underfunded	  “arcane”	  government	  agency	  to	  one	  of	  the	  
largest	  and	  most	  successful	  public	  sector	  workplace	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  world	  
(Ambachtsheer	  2007).	  Other	  plans,	  such	  as	  OPTrust,	  OMERS,	  and	  HOOPP	  have	  followed	  
a	  similar	  trajectory,	  where	  today	  Ontario’s	  public	  sector	  pension	  funds	  are	  major	  
institutional	  investors	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  have	  grown	  to	  become	  a	  leading	  
model	  of	  fund	  governance	  internationally.	  
	  
2000s	  –	  Workplace	  Pensions	  Limp	  into	  the	  21st	  Century	  
	  
Pension	  policy	  became	  increasingly	  contentious	  at	  both	  the	  provincial	  and	  national	  
levels	  during	  this	  time.	  	  An	  anti-­‐pension	  discourse	  had	  taken	  root	  amongst	  different	  
groups	  across	  Canada	  attempting	  to	  privatize	  Canada’s	  public	  pension	  system,	  led	  by	  
groups	  such	  as	  the	  C.D.	  Howe	  Institute,	  Fraser	  Institute,	  the	  ACMP	  and	  Reform	  and	  
Alliance	  political	  parties	  (Townson	  2000).	  This	  discourse	  was	  linked	  to	  a	  transnational	  
neoliberal	  project	  that	  sought	  to	  privatize	  public	  pension	  systems	  around	  the	  world	  




their	  ideas	  through	  claims	  of	  an	  impending	  “demographic	  time	  bomb”	  that	  would	  be	  
disastrous	  for	  national	  economies	  (Townson	  2000;	  Blackburn	  2002;	  Béland	  and	  Gran	  
2008).	  The	  Reform	  Party	  (in	  which	  Stephen	  Harper	  was	  a	  MP	  at	  the	  time)	  had	  been	  
advocating	  for	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  CPP	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  “Super-­‐RRSPs”,	  while	  the	  
Alliance	  Party	  led	  by	  Stockwell	  Day	  threatened	  to	  take	  Alberta	  out	  of	  the	  CPP	  unless	  
other	  finance	  ministers	  agreed	  to	  allow	  people	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  a	  CPP	  and	  set	  up	  individual	  
savings	  accounts	  (Townson	  2000).	  	  
In	  Ontario,	  during	  the	  five	  years	  of	  Harris’	  Conservative	  neoliberal	  policy	  agenda,	  
unionization	  rates	  had	  sunk	  to	  27	  percent	  in	  2002,	  making	  Ontario	  ninth	  in	  union	  
density	  amongst	  Canada’s	  ten	  provinces	  (Haddow	  and	  Klassen	  2006).	  The	  “new	  
economy”	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  restructuring	  of	  Ontario’s	  economy	  fueled	  by	  
economic	  globalization	  fostered	  a	  labour	  market	  characterized	  by	  “heightened	  
insecurity”	  (Pupo	  and	  Thomas	  2010).	  Workfare	  policies	  had	  been	  introduced,	  
attempting	  to	  push	  more	  workers	  into	  low-­‐paying	  jobs	  following	  changes	  to	  the	  
Unemployment	  Insurance	  program	  (Peck	  2001).	  Many	  full-­‐time,	  industrialized	  workers	  
that	  had	  lost	  their	  jobs	  in	  the	  1990s	  struggled	  to	  find	  permanent	  employment	  (Evans	  
and	  Smith	  2015).	  Accordingly,	  the	  number	  of	  part-­‐time	  jobs	  grew,	  while	  replacing	  the	  
number	  of	  full-­‐time	  jobs,	  leading	  to	  an	  expanding	  service	  sector	  and	  growth	  in	  
“precarious”	  employment,	  thus	  transforming	  labour-­‐market	  policies,	  employment	  
relations	  and	  collective	  organizing	  and	  bargaining,	  particularly	  following	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  in	  2008	  (Vosko	  2005;	  Thomas	  2009;	  Pupo	  and	  Thomas	  2010).	  Significant	  




was	  during	  this	  time	  when	  long-­‐service	  workers	  in	  Ontario’s	  traditional	  industries	  were	  
leaving	  the	  workforce,	  while	  younger	  workers	  were	  not	  being	  offered	  the	  same	  level	  of	  
employment	  protection.	  DB	  coverage	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  dropping	  significantly	  in	  
Ontario	  and	  across	  the	  country.	  	  
As	  such,	  in	  the	  2000s,	  adequate	  pension	  coverage	  was	  a	  “crucial	  public	  policy	  
objective”	  (Kaplan	  and	  Frazer	  2013:	  74).	  The	  Ontario	  government	  became	  embroiled	  in	  
a	  series	  of	  high	  profile	  corporate	  restructurings	  in	  the	  steel,	  automotive	  and	  tech	  
industries29,	  negotiating	  with	  unions	  and	  corporate	  employers	  who	  had	  become	  
insolvent	  and	  faced	  bankruptcy,	  threatening	  the	  security	  of	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  for	  
tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  workers	  and	  retirees	  across	  the	  province.	  Pension	  jurisprudence	  
continued	  to	  play	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  defining	  pension	  policy	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  new	  
legislation.	  Funding	  concerns	  replaced	  discord	  over	  surplus	  entitlements.	  And	  plan	  
management	  and	  professional	  practices	  modified	  as	  pension	  fund	  administrators	  sought	  
new	  ways	  to	  optimize	  investment	  returns	  to	  maintain	  healthy	  funding	  levels.	  The	  
decade	  ended	  with	  the	  largest	  global	  recession	  in	  economic	  history.	  Long	  awaited	  
government	  action	  on	  Ontario’s	  pension	  file	  was	  initiated	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP).	  How	  to	  save	  DB	  plans	  and	  expand	  
pension	  coverage	  was	  the	  major	  concern	  that	  defined	  the	  2000s.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The	  intersection	  between	  economic	  conditions,	  plan	  management,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  
risk	  sharing	  between	  members	  and	  managers	  facilitated	  actuaries	  playing	  a	  more	  
prominent	  role	  in	  pension	  management.	  The	  tone	  of	  actuarial	  consultation	  changed	  
during	  this	  period	  from	  how	  to	  spend	  surpluses	  to	  sustainability,	  as	  surpluses	  
disappeared	  and	  were	  replaced	  with	  funding	  shortfalls	  in	  the	  2000s.	  This	  was	  primarily	  
in	  the	  private	  sector,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  Investment	  
strategies	  had	  become	  more	  elaborate	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on,	  for	  example,	  portfolio	  
diversification	  and	  further	  entry	  into	  private	  equity	  markets.	  	  
During	  the	  era	  of	  surpluses,	  "trapped	  capital"	  was	  the	  big	  issue,	  specifically	  how	  
employers	  could	  avoid	  this	  since	  surplus	  sharing	  rules	  were	  put	  in	  place	  during	  the	  
1980s	  led	  to	  what	  actuaries	  were	  calling	  "asymmetry	  of	  risk".	  The	  moratorium	  on	  
surplus	  withdrawal	  implemented	  in	  1987,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  employers	  faced	  in	  
accessing	  pension	  surplus,	  led	  many	  employers	  to	  feel	  they	  were	  shouldering	  too	  much	  
risk.	  For	  example,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  funding	  deficit	  in	  a	  DB	  plan,	  employers	  were	  solely	  
liable	  for	  funding	  the	  deficit,	  while	  having	  to	  share	  surplus	  with	  employees.	  To	  limit	  this	  
risk,	  employers	  underfunded	  their	  plans	  during	  years	  of	  surplus:	  	  
Because	  you	  can	  fund	  a	  deficit	  over	  fifteen	  years,	  they	  would	  just	  do	  the	  bare	  minimum	  
required.	  So	  it	  went	  from	  trying	  to	  define	  a	  target	  of	  how	  to	  keep	  a	  plan	  healthy	  and	  
sustainable	  over	  the	  long	  term	  to	  how	  do	  we	  minimally	  fund	  the	  plan	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  
of	  trapped	  capital	  	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
As	  surpluses	  disappeared,	  the	  issue	  moved	  to	  sustainability	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  
Questions	  began	  to	  include,	  "What	  do	  we	  have	  to	  do	  for	  plan	  design?	  What	  about	  




we	  have	  to	  improve	  the	  plan?"	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  Consequently,	  this	  led	  to	  an	  
increased	  focus	  on	  "liability-­‐driven	  investing"	  (LDI)	  amongst	  plan	  administrators	  seeking	  
to	  keep	  the	  plan	  sustainable	  in	  a	  context	  of	  deteriorating	  economic	  conditions.	  
Actuaries	  were	  thus	  spending	  more	  time	  developing	  investment	  strategies	  designed	  to	  
fund	  future	  liabilities	  of	  plans,	  rather	  than	  simply	  focusing	  on	  achieving	  better	  
investment	  returns	  (also	  known	  as	  “benchmark-­‐driven”	  investing).	  LDI	  became	  a	  new	  
moniker	  in	  the	  pension	  management	  community,	  elevating	  the	  role	  of	  actuaries.	  	  
	  
Bankruptcies	  
In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  several	  large	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  in	  Ontario	  were	  in	  serious	  
trouble	  and	  required	  government	  intervention	  for	  protection	  from	  insolvent	  employers.	  	  
Several	  large	  corporate	  operations	  located	  in	  Ontario	  were	  facing	  insolvency	  and	  
seeking	  bankruptcy	  protection.	  These	  companies	  employed	  thousands	  of	  workers	  with	  
high	  industrial	  wages	  and	  administered	  massive	  single	  employer	  pension	  plans	  (SEPPs)	  
that	  had	  thousands	  of	  members	  and	  pensioners	  who	  were	  facing	  the	  prospect	  that	  their	  
company	  pension	  plan	  may	  be	  severely	  cut.	  The	  PBGF,	  which	  had	  been	  set	  up	  to	  insure	  
workers’	  pensions	  up	  to	  the	  first	  $1000	  of	  their	  monthly	  pension,	  was	  being	  depleted	  by	  
companies	  such	  as	  Algoma	  Steel,	  Stelco	  and	  GM.	  Winding	  up	  pension	  funds	  with	  
insufficient	  assets	  became	  a	  key	  political	  issue.	  	  
These	  problems	  were	  linked	  to	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  Rae	  government	  during	  an	  
economic	  recession	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Policy	  Analyst	  1,	  December	  2014).	  At	  the	  time,	  




and	  manufacturing	  industries	  were	  struggling.	  To	  mitigate	  these	  financial	  conditions,	  six	  
companies—Canadian	  divisions	  of	  Ford,	  Chrysler,	  and	  IBM,	  Sears	  Canada	  and	  Stelco—
wanted	  permission	  to	  cut	  contributions	  to	  their	  pensions	  until	  economic	  conditions	  
improved	  (Reguly	  2004).	  This	  would	  allow	  these	  companies	  to	  be	  exempt	  from	  solvency	  
tests	  for	  their	  pension	  plans,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  take	  a	  “contribution	  holiday”	  from	  
funding	  their	  respective	  plans.	  These	  companies	  argued	  that	  they	  were	  “too	  big	  to	  fail”:	  
the	  scale	  of	  their	  operations	  was	  insurance	  against	  bankruptcy,	  extinguishing	  any	  
pension	  fund	  insolvency	  risks.	  Believing	  this	  would	  help	  large	  employers	  weather	  the	  
recession,	  Bob	  Rae	  introduced	  so-­‐called	  “too	  big	  to	  fail”	  legislation.	  In	  return,	  these	  
companies	  were	  required	  to	  make	  higher	  annual	  contributions	  to	  the	  PBGF.	  	  
Ironically,	  most	  of	  these	  companies	  did	  “fail”,	  in	  that	  they	  sought	  bankruptcy	  
protection	  by	  the	  2000s.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  PBGF	  was	  grossly	  inadequate	  to	  mitigate	  
pension	  shortfalls,	  which	  for	  GM	  alone	  was	  estimated	  in	  2007	  to	  be	  $4.9	  billion	  (Talaga	  
2008).	  The	  provincial	  government,	  for	  its	  part,	  was	  dragged	  into	  the	  centre	  of	  these	  
bankruptcies	  and	  corporate	  restructurings.	  Although	  the	  government	  was	  not	  legally	  
required	  to	  top-­‐up	  the	  PBGF,	  or	  to	  protect	  companies	  from	  bankruptcy,	  the	  social,	  
political	  and	  economic	  fallout	  if	  these	  employers	  did	  go	  bankrupt	  along	  with	  their	  
pensions	  was	  deemed	  by	  many	  to	  be	  disastrous.	  Subsequently,	  bureaucrats	  in	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  political	  leaders	  in	  the	  provincial	  government	  were	  consumed	  in	  
restructuring	  negotiations	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  2000s.	  One	  participant	  familiar	  with	  
these	  negotiations	  said	  the	  Liberal	  government	  saw	  itself	  as	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  




public	  (Lawyer	  2,	  November	  2014).	  This	  participant	  and	  several	  others	  claimed	  this	  was	  
less	  about	  protecting	  pensions	  per	  se,	  but	  rather	  about	  protecting	  jobs	  in	  geographically	  
concentrated	  areas	  that	  were	  highly	  unionized.	  One	  government	  official	  involved	  in	  
these	  negotiations	  claimed	  it	  was	  in	  the	  provincial	  government’s	  interest	  to	  prop	  up	  an	  
insolvent	  pension	  fund	  rather	  than	  have	  thousands	  of	  workers	  lose	  their	  jobs	  and	  
pensions,	  and	  therefore	  be	  on	  the	  hook	  in	  other	  ways	  (Policy	  Analyst	  1,	  December	  
2014).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  government	  assumed	  a	  role	  in	  shouldering	  the	  risk	  of	  
ensuring	  workers	  received	  part	  of	  their	  pension	  through	  negotiation,	  and	  when	  
necessary,	  purchasing	  shares	  in	  the	  company	  to	  steer	  the	  plan	  and	  company	  towards	  
solvency.	  	  
The	  government’s	  role	  in	  these	  corporate	  restructurings	  also	  fueled	  anti-­‐pension	  
discourse,	  particularly	  regarding	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans.	  Newspaper	  headlines	  at	  the	  
time	  claimed	  the	  Ontario	  government’s	  role	  in	  these	  negotiations	  could	  put	  taxpayers	  
on	  the	  hook	  for	  “billions”	  of	  dollars.	  Many	  blamed	  Bob	  Rae’s	  NDP	  government	  for	  
allowing	  these	  employers	  to	  ignore	  their	  pension	  plans.	  And	  others	  saw	  government	  
bailouts	  as	  taxpayer	  dollars	  being	  spent	  on	  private	  pensions	  that	  the	  majority	  workers	  in	  
Ontario	  did	  not	  have.	  Furthermore,	  the	  PBGF	  only	  covered	  DB	  plans	  that	  were	  five	  years	  
or	  older,	  with	  no	  protection	  for	  those	  with	  DC	  plans.	  Conservative	  MPP	  Rob	  Runciman	  
claimed	  that	  the	  government	  was	  not	  bailing	  out	  the	  sinking	  value	  of	  RRSPs	  at	  the	  time,	  
so	  why	  should	  DB	  plans	  be	  protected	  (Talaga	  2008).	  Consequently,	  these	  corporate	  
restructurings	  during	  the	  2000s	  became	  another	  factor	  in	  the	  “stew”	  of	  variables	  that	  




Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  –	  time	  for	  change.	  	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  was	  in	  disarray.	  The	  events	  of	  the	  early	  
1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  made	  political	  leaders	  apprehensive	  to	  touch	  the	  “third	  rail”	  of	  
pension	  policy	  (Leech	  and	  McNish	  2013).	  Furthermore,	  the	  PBA	  was	  becoming	  an	  
impediment	  for	  doing	  business,	  making	  corporate	  restructurings	  more	  difficult	  around	  
items	  such	  as	  asset	  transfers.	  Given	  these	  issues,	  pensions	  were	  viewed	  as	  toxic—
politically	  contentious	  with	  little	  public	  interest.	  And	  letting	  the	  courts	  decide	  pension	  
policy	  was	  problematic	  for	  many	  members	  of	  the	  pension	  community.	  As	  one	  
participant	  pointed	  out,	  Ontario	  had	  been	  a	  leader	  during	  the	  1980s,	  the	  first	  of	  the	  
provinces	  to	  reform	  pension	  legislation	  and	  regulation.	  But	  then	  it	  did	  nothing,	  and	  by	  
the	  mid-­‐2000s	  other	  provinces30	  were	  already	  underway	  with	  their	  own	  reviews	  once	  
Ontario	  got	  around	  to	  it	  with	  the	  OECP	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  December	  2014).	  Given	  that	  
almost	  half	  the	  country's	  pension	  plans	  are	  registered	  in	  Ontario,	  this	  was	  a	  problem	  
requiring	  legislative	  reform.	  	  
Bureaucrats	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  who	  were	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  state	  
of	  pension	  policy	  were	  actively	  pushing	  for	  policy	  change.	  There	  was	  the	  general	  sense	  
that	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  not	  working	  as	  well,	  that	  legislation	  was	  vague	  on	  a	  series	  
of	  issues	  that	  resulted	  with	  unintended	  consequences	  via	  court	  rulings.	  As	  one	  
government	  official	  recalled:	  “You	  know,	  20	  years	  of	  no	  pension	  legislation,	  letting	  
courts	  decide	  was	  from	  the	  bureaucrat’s	  point	  of	  view	  not	  a	  good	  thing.	  So	  we	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Joint	  Expert	  Panel	  on	  Pension	  Standards	  (2008).	  Report	  of	  the	  Joint	  Expert	  Panel	  on	  Pension	  
Standards:	  Getting	  Our	  Act	  Together:	  Pension	  Reform	  in	  Alberta	  and	  British	  Columbia.;	  Régie	  des	  




keen	  to	  get	  a	  commission”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  December	  2014).	  Calls	  for	  a	  commission	  
began	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  during	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  Eves	  government.	  Under	  pressure	  
from	  government	  officials	  and	  others	  in	  the	  pension	  community,	  Finance	  Minister	  Janet	  
Ecker	  agreed	  that	  a	  review	  was	  in	  order,	  but	  claimed	  due	  to	  current	  political	  conditions,	  
the	  time	  was	  not	  opportune	  to	  organize	  a	  commission.	  In	  late	  2002,	  the	  Eves	  
government	  suffered	  severe	  political	  backlash	  on	  Bill	  198,	  Keeping	  the	  Promise	  for	  a	  
Strong	  Economy	  Act.	  Embedded	  in	  what	  was	  a	  budget	  bill,	  the	  bill’s	  pension	  provisions	  
were	  interpreted	  by	  workers	  and	  unions	  as	  removing	  surplus	  rights	  of	  pensioners	  and	  
members	  retroactive	  to	  1988,	  igniting	  the	  collective	  ire	  of	  workers,	  unions	  and	  
pensioners	  across	  the	  province.	  A	  recent	  court	  ruling31	  had	  just	  asserted	  employee	  
rights	  to	  surpluses	  during	  a	  partial	  wind-­‐up.	  Ecker’s	  legislation	  was	  seen	  as	  supplanting	  
this	  decision,	  leading	  to	  a	  mass	  rally	  at	  Queen’s	  Park	  of	  angry	  pensioners.	  Within	  a	  
month	  of	  tabling	  Bill	  198,	  Ecker,	  who	  had	  been	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  bill,	  and	  Premier	  Eves	  
promised	  to	  excise	  the	  pension	  provisions	  from	  the	  bill,	  embarrassing	  the	  provincial	  
government.	  Smelling	  defeat	  leading	  up	  to	  a	  provincial	  election,	  oppositional	  parties	  
heightened	  political	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  government’s	  approach	  to	  pension	  policy.	  
The	  victory	  of	  the	  Liberal	  party	  in	  2003	  led	  by	  Dalton	  McGuinty	  provided	  a	  new	  
opportunity	  for	  officials	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  to	  establish	  an	  independent	  review	  of	  
pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario.	  The	  extended	  duration	  of	  no	  legislative	  reform,	  the	  perceived	  
toxicity	  of	  the	  pension	  file,	  and	  the	  new	  Liberal	  government	  in	  2003	  were	  ingredients	  
that	  made	  the	  wheels	  of	  a	  new	  round	  of	  pension	  reform	  begin	  to	  turn.	  During	  the	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




years	  of	  the	  Liberal	  government,	  the	  pension	  file	  was	  not	  “at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  pile”,	  and	  
the	  government	  was	  consumed	  with	  other	  issues	  (Lawyer	  2,	  November	  2014).	  
Moreover,	  the	  major	  corporate	  restructurings	  meant	  public	  opinion	  on	  pensions	  was	  
tense.	  One	  participant	  familiar	  with	  the	  political	  atmosphere	  claimed	  they	  had	  to	  “tread	  
carefully	  around	  public	  opinion”	  on	  pension	  issues	  (Lawyer	  2,	  November	  2014).	  Given	  
the	  complex	  nature	  of	  pension	  policy	  and	  all	  the	  different	  variables	  involved,	  the	  media	  
and	  public	  opinion	  was	  easily	  stoked	  into	  vitriolic	  debate.	  Indeed,	  “pension	  envy”	  was	  
high,	  pitting	  workers	  with	  DB	  plans	  against	  those	  without	  pension	  coverage.	  This	  tension	  
also	  pitted	  private	  sector	  pensions	  that	  were	  waning	  against	  so-­‐called	  “gold	  plated”	  
public	  sector	  pensions	  of	  workers	  who	  were	  seen	  to	  have	  more	  job	  security	  sustained	  by	  
taxpayer	  dollars.	  	  
In	  2006,	  nearing	  the	  end	  of	  McGuinty’s	  first	  term	  in	  office,	  Finance	  Minister	  Greg	  
Sorbara	  agreed	  to	  move	  forward	  on	  what	  would	  become	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  
Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP).	  Solvency,	  contributions,	  appetite	  to	  move	  from	  DB	  to	  
DC,	  and	  availability	  of	  pensions	  were	  issues	  that	  were	  not	  seen	  to	  be	  resolvable	  
independently,	  but	  instead	  required	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  the	  pension	  file	  as	  a	  whole.	  
The	  McGuinty	  government	  saw	  this	  an	  opportune	  time	  to	  commence	  an	  independent	  
review,	  since	  it	  indicated	  to	  the	  public	  the	  government	  was	  taking	  action	  on	  pending	  
pension	  issues.	  But	  given	  that	  this	  was	  close	  to	  a	  provincial	  election	  period,	  a	  
commission	  could	  be	  used	  to	  “bunt”	  this	  issue	  forward	  into	  the	  next	  election	  cycle.	  One	  
participant	  maintained,	  “I	  didn’t	  want	  pension	  issues	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  2007	  




cycles,	  another	  participant	  described	  how	  governments	  “want	  to	  do	  big	  changes	  early	  in	  
their	  mandate”,	  while	  the	  year	  before	  an	  election,	  “nothing	  happens	  that	  isn’t	  going	  to	  
be	  good	  news”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  December	  2014).	  To	  remove	  pensions	  from	  the	  
immediate	  agenda,	  the	  OECP	  was	  organized	  so	  someone	  outside	  of	  government	  could	  
look	  at	  the	  mix	  of	  simmering	  issues.	  Sorbara	  appointed	  law	  professor	  Dr.	  Harry	  Arthurs.	  
Sorbara	  had	  been	  a	  student	  of	  Arthurs	  at	  Osgoode	  Law	  School	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  had	  
worked	  with	  Arthurs	  as	  Minister	  of	  Colleges	  and	  Universities	  and	  Minister	  of	  Skills	  
Development	  from	  1985	  to	  1987	  when	  Arthurs	  was	  President	  of	  York	  University.	  
Although	  well	  respected	  in	  the	  pension	  community,	  many	  saw	  Arthurs	  as	  labour	  friendly	  
(Policy	  Analyst	  4,	  October	  2014).	  	  
Several	  participants	  described	  how	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  was	  intent	  on	  limiting	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  commission’s	  mandate	  from	  asking	  bigger	  questions	  about	  Ontario’s	  
pension	  system	  that	  included	  exploring	  an	  expanded	  CPP	  and/or	  developing	  a	  
mandatory	  provincial	  pension	  system.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  OECP	  was	  mandated	  to	  examine	  
only	  voluntary	  workplace	  pensions	  in	  Ontario	  to	  develop	  new	  strategies	  to	  protect	  and	  
expand	  DB	  plans.	  	  
	   The	  OECP	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Ontario	  government	  October	  31,	  2008,	  shortly	  
after	  the	  most	  dramatic	  events	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007/08.	  The	  new	  
Minister	  of	  Finance,	  Dwight	  Duncan,	  became	  entrenched	  in	  managing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
global	  recession	  on	  Ontario’s	  economy.	  Consequently,	  the	  government	  had	  to	  look	  at	  
both	  the	  long	  terms	  proposals	  of	  the	  OECP	  and	  provide	  short-­‐term	  responses	  to	  




going	  to	  frame	  their	  response	  to	  the	  report	  given	  the	  short-­‐term	  implications	  of	  the	  
recession.	  	  
	   There	  are	  competing	  perspectives	  regarding	  how	  government	  officials	  received	  
the	  final	  report32.	  One	  participant	  described	  Conservative	  opposition	  pension	  critic,	  MPP	  
Tim	  Hudak,	  as	  not	  taking	  an	  “active	  interest	  in	  this	  subject”	  (Lawyer	  3,	  November	  2014).	  
Another	  participant	  alleged	  that	  the	  OECP	  was	  "...a	  challenging	  report	  for	  the	  
government	  to	  get	  its	  head	  around	  because	  we	  basically	  had	  20	  years	  of	  very	  little	  
reform.	  A	  complex	  topic"	  (Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  When	  the	  250	  paged	  technical	  report	  
on	  a	  complex	  policy	  file	  landed	  on	  their	  table,	  the	  government	  took	  some	  time	  to	  
process	  the	  OECP's	  findings.	  This,	  coupled	  with	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  collapsing	  auto	  
and	  steel	  sectors,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Finance	  having	  to	  organize	  an	  economic	  
stimulus,	  siphoned	  much	  of	  the	  government’s	  attention	  from	  responding	  to	  the	  report.	  	  
I	  just	  think	  people	  really	  didn't	  know	  what	  to	  do.	  I	  think	  it	  was	  received	  as	  pensions	  is	  
often	  received,	  which	  is,	  you	  know,	  this	  is	  complicated	  and	  I'm	  worried	  it	  might	  be	  
contentious	  and	  I	  don't	  really	  know	  whether	  the	  public	  cares	  all	  that	  much	  about	  it	  	  
(Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  	  
	  
Another	  participant	  claimed	  that	  government	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  much	  of	  the	  
report.	  There	  had	  been	  tensions	  between	  the	  commissioner	  and	  some	  government	  
officials	  over	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  mandate,	  where	  Arthurs	  decided	  independently	  to	  
include	  an	  extra	  chapter	  in	  the	  OECP	  on	  issues	  that	  were	  outside	  of	  the	  mandate,	  but	  
that	  were	  central	  issues	  with	  stakeholders	  during	  consultations	  for	  the	  report.	  There	  
was	  fear	  by	  some	  within	  government	  that	  the	  OECP	  would	  produce	  recommendations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  accounts	  received	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  whether	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  was	  a	  division	  
between	  policy	  and	  political	  staff	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  in	  how	  they	  viewed	  the	  




that	  would	  be	  too	  large	  in	  scope	  for	  the	  government	  to	  respond	  to.	  This	  tension	  was	  
viewed	  by	  one	  participant	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  attempting	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  
by	  sidestepping	  initiatives	  that	  would	  dramatically	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  policy	  
work	  (Lawyer	  3,	  November	  2014).	  	  	  
	   When	  the	  government	  did	  begin	  to	  mull	  through	  the	  report,	  they	  heard	  from	  
constituents	  and	  stakeholders	  who	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  recent	  crisis	  
on	  their	  retirement	  savings.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  the	  case	  that	  the	  crisis	  increased	  the	  profile	  of	  
the	  pension	  file,	  where	  public	  fears	  regarding	  their	  financial	  security	  was	  being	  stoked.	  
Given	  low	  interest	  rate	  levels	  and	  the	  proximity	  of	  baby	  boomers	  to	  retirement,	  DB	  
plans	  were	  viewed	  as	  important	  by	  more	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  	  
As	  for	  stakeholders,	  the	  pension	  community	  saw	  the	  OECP	  as	  labour	  friendly,	  
"and	  coming	  up	  with	  some	  ideas	  that	  wouldn't	  necessarily	  fly.	  But	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  stir	  
the	  pot	  and	  get	  things	  done"	  (Policy	  Analyst	  4,	  October	  2014).	  As	  a	  result,	  stakeholders	  
were	  pleased	  that	  there	  was	  movement	  finally	  on	  some	  of	  these	  issues,	  particularly	  
around	  issues	  of	  asset	  transfers,	  which	  had	  generated	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  in	  the	  early	  
2000s	  with	  large	  corporate	  and	  public	  sector	  restructurings.	  Some	  of	  the	  OECP’s	  
recommendations	  informed	  Bill	  23633	  and	  Bill	  12034,	  which	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  2010,	  
reforming	  aspects	  of	  the	  PBA	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  over	  twenty	  years.	  These	  bills	  updated	  
the	  PBA	  on	  issues	  including:	  partial	  windups	  of	  pension	  plans;	  grow-­‐in	  rights	  for	  all	  
members	  involuntarily	  terminated	  (under	  old	  rules	  members	  had	  to	  have	  a	  combined	  
age	  and	  service	  of	  at	  least	  55);	  immediate	  vesting	  (under	  old	  rules	  members	  who	  were	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  Bill	  236,	  Pension	  Benefits	  Amendment	  Act,	  2010.	  




terminated	  with	  less	  than	  two	  years	  of	  service	  received	  only	  a	  refund	  on	  contributions);	  
simplified	  asset	  transfers	  rules;	  improved	  member	  communications	  for	  plan	  
amendments;	  and	  clearer	  surplus	  entitlement	  rules	  (Faba	  2011).	  Although	  the	  pension	  
community	  welcomed	  these	  changes,	  many	  became	  frustrated	  with	  the	  pace	  at	  which	  
reforms	  were	  occurring,	  since	  the	  drafting	  of	  regulations	  for	  these	  bills	  was	  not	  
completed	  until	  2012,	  almost	  five	  years	  after	  the	  OECP	  was	  published.	  What’s	  more,	  
many	  of	  the	  OECP’s	  recommendations	  were	  shelved.	  For	  example,	  Arthur’s	  called	  for	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  “Pension	  Community	  Advisory	  Council”,	  providing	  an	  inclusive	  
forum	  for	  stakeholder	  groups	  across	  the	  spectrum	  to	  communicate	  and	  advise	  on	  policy	  
initiatives	  (Recommendation	  10-­‐2).	  He	  also	  called	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “Pension	  
Champion”,	  streamlining	  policy	  development,	  consultation,	  promotion	  and	  facilitation	  
of	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  into	  a	  single	  agency	  or	  unit	  of	  government,	  increasing	  the	  
government’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  efficiently	  to	  policy	  issues	  (Recommendation	  10-­‐5).	  
Neither	  of	  these	  recommendations	  became	  policy.	  
	  
2010s	  –	  The	  Return	  of	  Big	  Ideas	  
	  
With	  the	  slow	  recovery	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  along	  with	  the	  downward	  trend	  
in	  pension	  coverage	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  many	  workers	  would	  not	  
have	  access	  to	  workplace	  pensions,	  big	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  expand	  coverage	  began	  to	  take	  
precedence	  in	  Canada	  once	  again,	  with	  Ontario	  playing	  a	  leading	  role.	  The	  national	  




Dwight	  Duncan,	  who	  replaced	  Greg	  Sorbara	  as	  Finance	  Minister	  in	  2007,	  wanted	  to	  
expand	  CPP	  to	  address	  Ontario’s	  beleaguered	  private	  sector	  workplace	  pension	  system.	  
Manufacturing	  jobs	  had	  been	  severely	  hit	  by	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  some	  plans	  
had	  become	  insolvent.	  The	  value	  of	  RRSPs	  had	  decreased,	  and	  many	  workers	  were	  
suddenly	  contemplating	  delaying	  retirement.	  Workplace	  pension	  coverage	  had	  dropped	  
from	  45	  percent	  in	  1992	  to	  39	  percent	  in	  2009	  (Townson	  2011)	  and	  unionization	  levels	  
had	  dropped	  to	  historic	  lows	  below	  30	  percent	  (Galarneau	  and	  Sohn	  2013).	  
Policymakers	  around	  the	  country	  believed	  a	  pension	  crisis	  was	  unfolding	  in	  Canada,	  
questioning	  the	  capacity	  of	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  to	  adequately	  provide	  security	  
for	  the	  majority	  of	  Canadian	  workers.	  Consequently,	  the	  simmering	  problems	  located	  in	  
the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  were	  spilling	  over	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  public	  pension	  
policymaking.	  	  
In	  May	  2009,	  Federal-­‐Provincial-­‐Territorial	  Ministers	  of	  Finance	  created	  the	  
Researching	  Working	  Group	  on	  Retirement	  Income	  Adequacy.	  Although	  governments	  
across	  the	  country	  had	  been	  concerned	  with	  decreasing	  pension	  coverage	  before	  2008,	  
the	  dramatic	  events	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  made	  clear	  the	  importance	  of	  
addressing	  Canada’s	  second	  pillar	  of	  retirement	  income	  savings.	  A	  Ministerial	  Steering	  
Committee,	  chaired	  by	  Alberta	  MP	  Ted	  Menzies	  on	  behalf	  of	  federal	  Finance	  Minister	  
Jim	  Flaherty,	  hired	  Jack	  Mintz,	  a	  University	  of	  Calgary	  economist,	  as	  research	  director	  
overseeing	  a	  commission	  that	  produced	  several	  reports	  on	  income	  adequacy	  in	  Canada.	  
On	  December	  18,	  2009,	  Mintz	  submitted	  the	  Summary	  Report	  on	  Retirement	  Income	  




	   Just	  a	  month	  earlier,	  Bob	  Baldwin,	  former	  policy	  director	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Labour	  
Congress,	  had	  submitted	  a	  report	  to	  the	  Ontario	  government	  also	  on	  the	  adequacy	  of	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system.	  Although	  Ontario	  was	  involved	  with	  the	  Federal-­‐
Provincial-­‐Territorial	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  Research	  Working	  Group	  on	  Retirement	  
Income	  Adequacy,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  had	  decided	  to	  hire	  Bob	  Baldwin	  to	  conduct	  a	  
separate	  report	  that	  would	  not	  be	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  Jack	  Mintz.	  Mintz	  was	  viewed	  
by	  some	  pension	  officials	  in	  Ontario	  as	  business	  friendly	  and	  wanted	  to	  conduct	  an	  
independent	  report	  produced	  by	  a	  specialist	  with	  a	  labour	  background.	  Both	  Mintz’s	  
and	  Baldwin’s	  reports	  were	  presented	  at	  an	  “Experts	  Day”	  conference	  on	  pension	  policy	  
in	  October	  2009,	  attended	  by	  professionals	  and	  experts	  involved	  with	  Canadian	  pension	  
policy.	  Both	  reports	  received	  feedback	  from	  leading	  researchers	  such	  as	  U	  of	  T	  
sociologist	  John	  Myles	  and	  McMaster	  economist	  Byron	  Spencer	  (Baldwin	  2009;	  Mintz	  
2009).	  	  	  
	   The	  reports	  submitted	  by	  Mintz	  and	  Baldwin	  provided	  different	  conclusions	  on	  
the	  adequacy	  of	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system.	  Baldwin	  estimated	  that	  
approximately	  one-­‐third	  of	  Canadians	  in	  the	  latter	  stage	  of	  their	  careers	  would	  likely	  
have	  inadequate	  income	  to	  maintain	  their	  current	  standard	  of	  living	  in	  retirement.	  The	  
Mintz	  report,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  denied	  that	  there	  was	  a	  crisis,	  requiring	  only	  minor	  
changes	  to	  improve	  the	  system.	  Different	  groups	  on	  the	  political	  spectrum	  cited	  these	  
reports	  over	  the	  coming	  year.	  	  
Ontario	  finance	  minister	  Dwight	  Duncan	  had	  communicated	  to	  his	  federal	  and	  




decreasing	  pension	  coverage.	  Although	  CPP	  is	  federally	  administered,	  to	  make	  changes	  
requires	  the	  support	  of	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  provinces	  with	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  population	  (a	  
compromise	  made	  in	  1963	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Lester	  Pearson	  with	  Ontario	  premier	  John	  
Robarts	  during	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  CPP	  that	  gave	  Ontario	  a	  veto	  on	  any	  future	  CPP	  
reforms	  as	  Canada’s	  most	  populous	  province).	  Because	  of	  this,	  Duncan	  had	  to	  lobby	  
federal	  and	  provincial	  leaders	  on	  this	  issue.	  The	  CLC	  was	  also	  actively	  lobbying	  the	  
Harper	  government	  and	  provinces	  to	  double	  CPP	  from	  25	  percent	  to	  50	  percent	  of	  
average	  adjusted	  pensionable	  earnings	  that	  would	  be	  phased	  in	  over	  a	  period	  of	  several	  
years	  (Townson	  2011).	  Initially,	  federal	  Finance	  Minister	  Jim	  Flaherty	  had	  been	  receptive	  
to	  the	  idea,	  agreeing	  to	  discuss	  incremental	  expansion	  of	  the	  CPP.	  Hassan	  Yussuff	  (now	  
current	  CLC	  president)	  was	  organizing	  meetings	  with	  various	  finance	  ministers	  and	  
others,	  where	  the	  CLC’s	  campaign	  had	  begun	  to	  develop	  some	  traction,	  garnering	  
widespread	  support	  from	  various	  organizations,	  including	  the	  Canadian	  Federation	  of	  
Municipalities.	  	  
Other	  experts	  came	  out	  in	  support	  of	  expanding	  CPP,	  including	  SFU	  economist	  J.	  
Rhys	  Kesselman,	  (who	  was	  also	  former	  assistant	  to	  chief	  statistician	  Michael	  Wolfson)	  
and	  Jack	  Horner,	  former	  finance	  department	  official,	  both	  producing	  reports	  that	  
identified	  a	  problem	  and	  indicated	  that	  fundamental	  reform	  was	  required.	  Baldwin’s	  
report	  was	  also	  cited	  in	  support	  of	  expanding	  CPP.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  business	  lobby	  
organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Canadian	  Life	  and	  Health	  Insurance	  Association	  (CLHIA),	  the	  
Canadian	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  Business	  (CFIB)	  and	  think	  tank	  C.D.	  Howe	  came	  out	  




investment	  vehicle	  (similar	  to	  DC	  plan)	  that	  would	  allow	  workers	  without	  an	  employer	  
pension	  plan	  to	  pool	  their	  retirement	  savings	  with	  other	  workers.	  Also,	  Alberta	  Finance	  
Minister	  Ted	  Morton	  had	  made	  clear	  he	  did	  not	  support	  any	  expansion	  of	  CPP.	  
According	  to	  one	  participant,	  some	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  were	  citing	  the	  Mintz	  
report,	  saying	  government	  action	  was	  not	  required	  (Union	  Official	  1,	  August	  2014).	  A	  
new	  national	  pension	  debate	  was	  emerging,	  one	  that	  fell	  along	  similar	  ideological	  lines	  
as	  previous	  national	  pension	  debates35.	  Different	  governments	  were	  hiring	  different	  
experts	  to	  analyze	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system,	  drawing	  different	  conclusions	  
that	  supported	  their	  ideological	  positions	  on	  how	  government	  should	  respond.	  	  
Several	  participants	  said	  Flaherty	  was	  initially	  open	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  expanding	  CPP	  
and	  that	  there	  was	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  commitment	  by	  governments	  across	  Canada.	  But	  
at	  a	  finance	  ministers	  meeting	  in	  December	  2010,	  the	  federal	  government	  changed	  its	  
tone,	  refusing	  to	  expand	  CPP,	  instead	  indicating	  it	  would	  move	  ahead	  with	  PRPP	  
legislation	  (Townson	  2011;	  Union	  Official	  1,	  August	  2014;	  Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  The	  
federal	  government	  had	  chosen	  a	  private	  sector	  solution	  to	  address	  Canada’s	  “pension	  
crisis”.	  	  
The	  federal	  government	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  requiring	  workers	  and	  employers	  
to	  increase	  their	  contributions	  to	  CPP,	  concerned	  this	  would	  alienate	  the	  government’s	  
business	  constituency.	  Moreover,	  given	  Harper’s	  track	  record	  of	  criticizing	  CPP	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  This	  downplaying	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  was	  a	  retirement	  savings	  crisis	  and	  using	  PRPPs	  
as	  a	  market-­‐based	  solution	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  1908	  Government	  Annuities	  Act	  (see	  chapter	  3),	  
which	  was	  used	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  to	  address	  growing	  calls	  for	  government	  action	  for	  
impoverished	  seniors.	  Rather	  than	  requiring	  employees	  and	  employers	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  
national	  plan	  and	  pool	  risk	  across	  Canada’s	  workforce,	  the	  Liberal	  in	  1907	  chose	  a	  voluntary	  




Reform	  Party	  MP	  and	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Citizens	  Coalition	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  
Harper	  had	  staked	  an	  ideological	  claim	  against	  CPP,	  a	  position	  he	  did	  not	  equivocate	  
from	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  (Townson	  2001).	  Harper’s	  position	  indicated	  that	  saving	  for	  
retirement	  was	  an	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  it	  was	  government’s	  role	  to	  provide	  new	  
saving	  mechanisms—such	  as	  PRPPs	  and	  Tax	  Free	  Savings	  Accounts—that	  would	  
facilitate	  workers	  to	  pool	  their	  money	  if	  they	  were	  so	  inclined.	  	  
Several	  participants	  said	  this	  announcement	  on	  PRPPs	  had	  come	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  
the	  CLC	  and	  others	  who	  perceived	  some	  form	  of	  CPP	  expansion	  would	  occur	  (Union	  
Official	  1,	  August	  2014;	  Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  According	  to	  Monica	  Townson,	  veteran	  
policy	  critic	  for	  the	  CCPA,	  the	  CLC	  were	  so	  taken	  aback	  that	  they,	  “…launched	  an	  Access	  
to	  Information	  request	  to	  try	  to	  find	  out	  who	  had	  torpedoed	  the	  attempt	  to	  expand	  the	  
public	  system”	  (2011:	  12).	  The	  official	  response	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  that	  
the	  economy	  was	  too	  fragile	  and	  expanding	  CPP	  would	  hinder	  Canada’s	  economic	  
recovery	  following	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  Several	  participants	  interviewed,	  along	  with	  
public	  critics	  of	  Harper,	  speculated	  that	  business	  interest	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  CHLIA	  and	  
CFIB	  had	  extensively	  lobbied	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  won	  the	  ear	  of	  Harper	  
(Townson	  2011;	  Policy	  Analyst	  4,	  May	  2014).	  Another	  participant	  claimed	  the	  PRPP	  
federal	  legislation	  was	  drafted	  with	  close	  consultation	  of	  the	  CHLIA,	  who	  stood	  to	  gain	  
new	  business	  from	  PRPP	  legislation	  (Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014).	  	  
The	  federal	  government’s	  position	  on	  CPP	  deeply	  frustrated	  the	  Ontario	  
government	  (and	  some	  other	  provincial	  governments)	  (Artuso	  2012).	  Although	  most	  




move	  forward	  with	  CPP	  expansion	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  compromise.	  
As	  it	  came	  clear	  that	  this	  would	  not	  happen,	  in	  protest,	  Dwight	  Duncan	  was	  the	  only	  
provincial	  finance	  minister	  who	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  Ted	  Menzies	  to	  discuss	  the	  PRPP	  
the	  following	  summer.	  Duncan	  said	  his	  government	  would	  only	  introduce	  
complementary	  provincial	  PRPP	  legislation	  if	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  agree	  to	  
incremental	  increases	  to	  the	  CPP.	  Critics	  of	  the	  PRPP	  proposal,	  including	  Duncan,	  argued	  
that	  providing	  another	  voluntary	  system	  would	  not	  mitigate	  the	  largest	  problems	  facing	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system.	  Canada’s	  $900-­‐billion	  in	  unused	  RRSP	  contribution	  
space	  suggested	  workers	  do	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  voluntary	  savings	  options	  
(MacFarland	  2011).	  These	  events	  deepened	  federal-­‐provincial	  tensions	  between	  Ontario	  
and	  Ottawa,	  providing	  justification	  for	  Ontario’s	  ambition	  to	  develop	  its	  own	  provincial	  
public	  pension	  system	  –	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP).	  	  
The	  ORPP	  can	  be	  viewed	  partially	  as	  the	  product	  of	  poor	  federal	  provincial	  
relations	  between	  Ontario	  and	  the	  federal	  government,	  largely	  premised	  on	  ideological	  
differences	  regarding	  fiscal	  management	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  government	  should	  
provide	  income	  security	  for	  workers.	  Ontario	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  expand	  CPP	  as	  
economic	  conditions	  pushed	  pension	  coverage	  lower	  in	  the	  province.	  But	  they	  could	  not	  
do	  so	  unilaterally.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  provinces	  supported	  expanding	  CPP	  to	  some	  
extent,	  there	  was	  not	  consensus	  among	  the	  provinces,	  allowing	  Harper	  to	  refuse	  to	  take	  
action,	  thus	  eliminating	  a	  major	  policy	  mechanism	  from	  Ontario’s	  toolkit.	  When	  
Kathleen	  Wynne	  replaced	  McGuinty	  as	  premier	  in	  2013,	  she	  continued	  to	  support	  




government:	  if	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  not	  going	  to	  budge	  on	  CPP,	  the	  Ontario	  
government	  would	  go	  it	  alone.	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  federal	  commitment,	  Wynne	  established	  the	  ORPP	  as	  a	  
central	  policy	  of	  her	  party’s	  platform	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2014	  provincial	  election.	  With	  a	  
surprising	  majority	  victory,	  Wynne	  had	  been	  handed	  a	  mandate	  to	  move	  forward	  on	  the	  
pension	  file.	  Initially,	  shortly	  following	  the	  election,	  Wynne	  had	  let	  it	  be	  known	  that	  door	  
was	  open	  if	  the	  federal	  government	  changed	  its	  mind,	  hoping	  the	  ORPP	  would	  pressure	  
the	  federal	  government	  to	  reconsider.	  But	  at	  a	  meeting	  in	  December	  2014,	  junior	  
Minister	  of	  State	  Kevin	  Sorenson	  shut	  down	  any	  conversation	  on	  CPP.	  Sorenson	  went	  on	  
the	  offensive	  with	  an	  op-­‐ed	  in	  the	  Financial	  Post,	  calling	  plans	  to	  expand	  CPP	  as	  a	  “job-­‐
killer”	  that	  would	  cost	  Canada’s	  economy	  between	  17,000	  to	  50,000	  jobs.	  Sorenson	  
defined	  raising	  CPP	  contributions	  as	  a	  “tax”	  on	  employers	  and	  cited	  a	  CFIB	  report	  that	  
claimed	  small	  businesses	  would	  reduce	  investments	  in	  their	  businesses	  and	  decrease	  
the	  number	  of	  employees	  if	  CPP	  was	  expanded	  (Sorenson	  2014).	  In	  the	  same	  piece,	  he	  
also	  described	  the	  Ontario	  government’s	  proposed	  ORPP	  as	  a	  job-­‐killer	  and	  criticized	  
their	  unwillingness	  to	  set	  up	  PRPP	  legislation.	  Not	  only	  was	  expanding	  the	  CPP	  
completely	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  the	  Conservative	  federal	  government	  had	  publically	  
castigated	  the	  Ontario	  government’s	  pension	  policy	  objective	  as	  imprudent.	  
Ontario/Ottawa	  relations	  were	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  low.	  	  
One	  participant	  describes	  these	  events	  in	  December	  2014	  as	  “tipping	  point”	  for	  
the	  Wynne	  government	  (Policy	  Analyst	  5,	  May	  2014).	  Through	  2015,	  the	  Wynne	  




that	  included	  ex-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Paul	  Martin	  and	  Bill	  Morneau,	  a	  Bay	  Street	  executive	  
who	  would	  become	  federal	  Finance	  Minister	  under	  the	  new	  Liberal	  government	  led	  by	  
Justin	  Trudeau.	  Similar	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  CPP	  in	  early	  1960s,	  political/federal	  
relations	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  structuring	  the	  level	  of	  government	  provision	  
of	  retirement	  income.	  And	  also	  similar	  to	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  the	  big	  policy	  ideas	  
presented	  by	  the	  Ontario	  government	  led	  to	  the	  proposed	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  in	  June	  




The	  intent	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  to	  explore	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  pension	  
policy	  in	  Ontario	  as	  one	  means	  to	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  saving	  for	  retirement	  has	  
been	  individualized	  from	  employers	  onto	  workers.	  The	  shifting	  contours	  between	  
private	  and	  public	  pension	  policy	  was	  highlighted,	  illustrating	  how	  provincial	  pension	  
politics	  are	  connected	  to	  changes	  at	  the	  federal	  level.	  The	  approach	  to	  pension	  
policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  has	  changed	  between	  successive	  periods,	  linked	  to	  key	  items	  
that	  include	  the	  economy,	  federal	  social	  policy,	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  different	  policy	  
actors.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  struggle	  over	  risk	  primarily	  
between	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  plan	  and	  employers.	  The	  story	  has	  been	  
different	  for	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  workers,	  where	  it	  has	  been	  private	  sector	  workers	  




the	  majority	  of	  workers	  in	  Ontario	  during	  this	  period	  have	  not	  had	  any	  workplace	  
pension	  plan.	  	  
Throughout	  the	  postwar	  period	  and	  into	  the	  twenty	  first	  century,	  workers	  and	  
governments	  have	  shouldered	  the	  ultimate	  risk	  of	  workplace	  pensions,	  while	  employers	  
have	  used	  workplace	  pensions	  for	  financial	  gain	  and	  to	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  Ontario’s	  
working	  class.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  PBA	  and	  other	  insurance	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  the	  
PBGF	  and	  the	  Ontario	  Government’s	  willingness	  to	  negotiate	  corporate	  bailouts	  have	  
partially	  protected	  workplace	  pensions	  institutionally,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  these	  
mechanisms.	  The	  PBGF	  was	  hastily	  organized	  in	  1980	  in	  response	  to	  intense	  political	  
pressure	  to	  insure	  against	  corporate	  restructuring	  and	  lost	  pension	  benefits.	  But	  the	  
PBGF	  is	  not	  large	  enough	  to	  insure	  against	  large-­‐scale	  corporate	  bankruptcies.	  
Conversely,	  the	  PBA	  has	  been	  reformed	  because	  protection	  of	  pension	  benefits	  was	  not	  
satisfactory.	  Corporate	  liability	  in	  plan	  wind-­‐ups	  in	  the	  1970s	  left	  many	  pensioners	  out	  
of	  pocket,	  while	  pension	  indexing	  and	  long-­‐term	  vesting	  periods	  undercut	  the	  security	  
of	  many	  pension	  plans.	  And	  while	  successive	  rounds	  of	  reform	  have	  been	  made	  to	  the	  
PBA	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  issues,	  overall	  pension	  coverage	  has	  continued	  to	  drop.	  
At	  the	  structural	  level,	  the	  PBA	  has	  legitimized	  a	  system	  that	  gave	  more	  leverage	  
to	  employers	  over	  workers	  (Shilton	  2016).	  This	  is	  because	  the	  PBA	  regulates	  a	  system	  
that	  is	  voluntary.	  It	  is	  the	  employer’s	  prerogative	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  provide	  a	  
workplace	  pension	  to	  their	  employees	  or	  not.	  For	  many	  years,	  particularly	  during	  the	  
postwar	  economic	  boom	  of	  the	  late	  1940s,	  1950s	  early	  1960s,	  workplace	  pensions	  were	  




conditions	  changed—as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  early	  the	  1970s	  through	  to	  the	  twenty	  first	  
century—many	  employers	  sought	  ways	  to	  exit	  the	  provision	  of	  DB	  pensions,	  or	  at	  a	  
minimum,	  limit	  their	  pension	  liabilities.	  Also,	  the	  PBA	  sustained	  a	  system	  that	  enabled	  
employers	  to	  control	  labour	  interests	  through	  the	  single	  employer	  pension	  plan.	  Rather	  
than	  develop	  a	  mandatory	  pension	  system	  that	  would	  pool	  retirement	  savings	  across	  
the	  province	  (that	  had	  been	  originally	  proposed	  in	  early	  drafts	  of	  the	  PBA),	  the	  PBA	  
facilitated	  the	  agenda	  of	  large	  employers	  to	  limit	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  to	  small	  
bargaining	  units.	  This	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  capital	  over	  labour,	  pressuring	  unions	  to	  
negotiate	  pension	  benefits	  often	  at	  the	  branch	  level.	  	  
In	  the	  current	  period,	  following	  the	  economic	  restructuring	  of	  Ontario’s	  
economy	  through	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  economic	  globalization,	  
the	  1990s	  became	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  which	  many	  employers	  sought	  to	  end	  their	  
voluntary	  participation	  in	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  system.	  The	  historical	  structure	  of	  
Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  generated	  problems	  that	  compelled	  many	  employers	  to	  exit	  
provision	  as	  administering	  pension	  plans	  became	  more	  expensive.	  Labour	  was	  winning	  
court	  battles	  over	  surplus	  sharing.	  Accounting	  standards	  ended	  the	  days	  in	  which	  
businesses	  did	  not	  have	  to	  account	  for	  pension	  liabilities	  on	  their	  annual	  balance	  sheets.	  
Pension	  plans	  were	  maturing	  while	  interest	  rates	  began	  to	  decrease,	  leading	  to	  growing	  
funding	  problems	  and	  liability	  issues.	  The	  “asymmetry	  of	  risk”	  involved	  with	  
administering	  a	  company	  pension	  plan	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  too	  much	  by	  many	  employers.	  
As	  corporate	  governance	  was	  moved	  away	  from	  Canada	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  union	  density	  




DB	  pension	  benefits.	  Secure	  DB	  plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  continue	  to	  diminish	  today,	  
leaving	  policymakers	  and	  individual	  workers	  responsible	  for	  the	  collective	  security	  of	  
Ontario’s	  labour	  force.	  	  
Public	  sector	  workers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  the	  “success	  stories”,	  in	  that	  their	  
DB	  pensions	  have	  remained	  relatively	  stable,	  successfully	  pooling	  risk	  across	  
occupational	  and	  government	  sectors.	  Public	  sector	  DB	  plans	  in	  Ontario	  that	  emerged	  in	  
the	  1990s	  built	  on	  joint-­‐sponsorship	  models	  of	  risk	  sharing	  (such	  as	  the	  Ontario	  
Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  and	  Healthcare	  of	  Ontario	  Pension	  Plan)	  have	  not	  only	  
weathered	  economic	  cycles,	  but	  have	  become	  global	  leaders	  on	  how	  to	  manage	  a	  
successful	  public	  sector	  DB	  plan.	  	  
Through	  this	  analysis,	  this	  chapter	  has	  also	  described	  the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  
pension	  debates	  and	  their	  close	  connection	  to	  economic	  cycles.	  These	  debates	  centre	  
around	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  security	  of	  workers:	  government,	  employers,	  unions,	  
or	  individual	  workers.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  each	  respective	  group	  shoulders	  
responsibility	  for	  retirement	  provision	  continuously	  shifts	  and	  is	  contingent	  on	  
economic,	  political	  and	  institutional	  factors.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  
to	  respond	  to	  demands	  for	  a	  national	  pension	  system,	  the	  federal	  government	  provided	  
government	  annuities	  that	  workers	  could	  purchase	  if	  they	  wished	  to	  prepare	  for	  
retirement.	  Amongst	  other	  reasons,	  this	  legislation	  was	  a	  political	  mechanism	  to	  avoid	  
establishing	  a	  contributory	  national	  public	  pension	  plan.	  Over	  60	  years	  later,	  in	  a	  context	  
of	  sustained	  economic	  restructuring	  and	  decreasing	  pension	  coverage,	  the	  “Great	  




expansion	  to	  provide	  more	  security	  for	  workers,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  living	  in	  poverty	  in	  
their	  final	  years.	  The	  level	  of	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Ontario	  has	  informed	  the	  
current	  national	  pension	  policy	  debate,	  where	  today,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  decreasing	  pension	  
coverage,	  CPP	  benefits	  have	  been	  expanded.	  Throughout	  these	  debates,	  group	  interests	  
have	  remained	  the	  same:	  on	  one	  side,	  business	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  CHLIA	  and	  CFIB	  
calling	  for	  voluntary	  market-­‐based	  solutions,	  and	  at	  the	  other,	  labour	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  
CLC	  calling	  for	  government	  policy	  that	  mandates	  retirement	  savings.	  	  
While	  ideological	  positions	  have	  remained	  entrenched,	  Canada’s	  labour	  market	  
and	  economy	  have	  changed,	  tipping	  the	  balance	  of	  class	  forces	  as	  unionization	  levels	  
declined.	  The	  hollowing-­‐out	  of	  Canada’s	  traditional	  industries	  diminished	  Ontario’s	  
largest	  employers,	  who	  typically	  provided	  secure	  DB	  plans	  to	  a	  lesser-­‐educated	  male	  
dominated	  workforce.	  In	  this	  changing	  landscape	  of	  class	  relations,	  neoliberal	  ideas	  
tightened	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  capital	  most	  acutely	  in	  
1990s.	  Employers,	  therefore,	  faced	  less	  resistance	  from	  unions	  as	  they	  exited	  the	  
provision	  of	  secure	  pension	  benefits.	  	  
Increased	  education	  levels	  and	  entry	  of	  women	  into	  the	  workplace	  along	  with	  
more	  worker	  mobility	  has	  occurred	  with	  expanding	  service-­‐based	  professional	  
occupations.	  DC	  plans	  have	  grown	  to	  facilitate	  these	  changes,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
shifted	  risk	  of	  retirement	  onto	  the	  individual.	  Canada’s	  economic	  integration	  with	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  global	  economy	  established	  new	  accounting	  standards	  while	  turning	  
pension	  fund	  capital	  into	  a	  major	  institutional	  investor	  in	  global	  stock	  markets.	  The	  




purview	  of	  an	  expanding	  cadre	  of	  pension	  professionals	  that	  includes	  investment,	  legal	  
and	  actuarial	  consultation.	  	  
While	  this	  chapter	  has	  explored	  the	  political-­‐economic	  conditions	  at	  the	  
structural	  level	  that	  have	  informed	  legislative	  reform	  in	  Ontario	  since	  the	  1940s,	  the	  
following	  chapter	  will	  explore	  in	  closer	  detail	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policymaking	  and	  drivers	  






CHAPTER	  6	  –	  DRIVING	  POLICY	  CHANGE:	  IDEAS,	  INTERESTS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  
	  
	  
“It	  rapidly	  became	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  while	  lots	  of	  pension	  professionals	  knew	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  
pension	  plans	  in	  a	  technical	  sense,	  very	  few	  of	  them	  knew	  much	  about	  the	  pension	  system.	  In	  
fact,	  no	  one	  knew	  very	  much	  about	  it,	  not	  even	  the	  government.	  Most	  of	  the	  data	  that	  were	  
floating	  around	  were	  inaccurate”	  (Commissioner,	  Harry	  Arthurs	  2009).	  	  
	  
	  
The	  intent	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  major	  drivers	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  as	  
described	  by	  pension	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  project.	  As	  the	  interview	  data	  
gathered	  for	  this	  dissertation	  illustrates,	  pension	  policymaking	  is	  a	  multifaceted	  process	  
characterized	  by	  the	  interaction	  between	  ideas,	  institutions	  and	  group	  interests.	  It	  is	  a	  
process	  that	  is	  influenced	  by	  socioeconomic	  relations,	  cultural	  patterns,	  state	  and	  party	  
structures,	  ideological	  apparatuses	  and	  politicized	  social	  identities	  (Skocpol	  1992).	  As	  
such,	  how	  ideas	  mobilize	  and	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process	  from	  different	  locations	  
within	  and	  outside	  of	  government	  is	  explored,	  and	  how	  group	  interests	  shape	  the	  
demands	  of	  stakeholders	  over	  particular	  policy	  issues,	  understood	  within	  a	  broader	  
institutional	  context.	  	  
	   The	  chapter	  is	  broken	  into	  three	  substantive	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  begins	  
with	  a	  theoretical	  sketch	  of	  different	  variables	  that	  drive	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  A	  
diagram	  is	  introduced	  that	  conceptually	  depicts	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  variables	  and	  the	  




policy	  process.	  This	  section	  also	  discusses	  the	  technical	  process	  of	  drafting	  legislation	  
and	  regulations,	  highlighting	  why	  and	  when	  government	  decides	  to	  develop	  new	  
legislation	  and	  regulations	  and	  who	  in	  government	  participates	  in	  specific	  stages	  of	  
research,	  drafting	  and	  implementing	  workplace	  pension	  law	  in	  Ontario.	  Throughout	  this	  
section,	  ideation	  (see	  Chapter	  Three)	  will	  also	  be	  considered	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  
between	  ideas,	  ideological	  apparatuses,	  and	  governing	  institutions	  of	  policymaking,	  
describing	  different	  entry	  points	  for	  ideas	  into	  government	  policymaking.	  Other	  items	  of	  
discussion	  will	  include	  the	  impact	  of	  election	  cycles	  and	  brokerage	  politics.	  
	   In	  the	  second	  section,	  group	  interests	  are	  examined	  as	  a	  key	  dynamic	  to	  
understanding	  workplace	  pension	  policymaking.	  The	  rising	  role	  of	  pension	  professionals	  
through	  their	  appropriation	  and	  control	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  required	  for	  pension	  
management	  is	  considered,	  arguing	  that	  these	  professional	  groups	  have	  become	  
powerful	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  pension	  community.	  Indeed,	  pension	  experts	  represent	  
both	  management	  and	  employer	  interests,	  often	  adopting	  a	  set	  of	  ideological	  
assumptions	  and	  anecdotal	  critiques	  of	  the	  pension	  system	  that	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  
their	  clients,	  which	  at	  times	  has	  led	  to	  vitriolic	  debate.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  contending	  
perspectives	  within	  the	  expert	  community	  are	  contained	  within	  professional	  
associations	  that	  establish	  professional	  standards	  of	  conduct	  and	  produce	  policy	  
recommendations	  for	  government	  officials.	  	  
	   The	  third	  section	  empirically	  grounds	  discussion	  in	  sections	  one	  and	  two	  using	  
the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP)	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  Here,	  the	  




socioeconomic,	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
OECP.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  policymaking	  is	  neither	  linear	  nor	  deterministic	  is	  underlined,	  
showing	  how	  this	  policymaking	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  political,	  
economic	  and	  institutional	  factors	  that	  facilitate	  particular	  ideational	  processes,	  
resulting	  with	  particular	  policy	  outcomes.	  
This	  chapter	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  exhaustive,	  attempting	  to	  describe	  every	  
possible	  variable	  that	  impacts	  policymaking.	  This	  is	  because	  pension	  policymaking	  is	  
determined	  by	  a	  myriad	  of	  intersecting	  factors	  that	  include	  historical,	  institutional,	  
social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  variables.	  Documenting	  every	  facet	  and	  dynamic	  
of	  the	  process	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Rather,	  attention	  is	  drawn	  to	  the	  
variables	  that	  were	  discussed	  by	  pension	  experts	  who	  were	  interviewed	  to	  provide	  a	  
clearer	  understanding	  of	  key	  drivers	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pensions.	  
These	  perspectives	  are	  used	  to	  develop	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  broad	  factors	  such	  as	  class	  interests,	  ideology,	  ideation	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  
pension	  policymaking.	  This	  model	  of	  investigation	  rejects	  evolutionary	  or	  linear	  models	  
of	  policy	  change	  that	  depict	  government	  activities	  as	  straightforwardly	  addressing	  social	  
demands,	  instead	  viewing	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  policies	  as	  mutually	  
constitutive.	  For	  this	  reason,	  “We	  must	  make	  social	  policies	  the	  starting	  points	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  end	  points	  of	  analysis:	  As	  politics	  creates	  policies,	  policies	  also	  remake	  politics”	  
(Skocpol	  1992:	  58).	  Accordingly,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  ideas,	  institutions	  





Institutions	  and	  Ideation	   	  
	  
Drivers	  of	  policy	  change	  and	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
To	  provide	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  drive	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process,	  
and	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  variables,	  Table	  and	  Figure	  6.1	  are	  each	  used	  for	  
hermeneutic	  purposes	  to	  further	  understand	  policy	  change.	  First,	  Table	  6.1	  separates	  
the	  policymaking	  process	  into	  three	  distinct	  levels,	  each	  level	  containing	  a	  series	  of	  
variables	  that	  drive	  policy	  change36.	  	  
	  





• Global	  economy	  
• Socioeconomic	  relations	  of	  production	  
• Class	  interests	  
• Economic	  cycles	  





• Institutional	  structures	  of	  governance	  (i.e.	  interplay	  
between	  federal	  and	  provincial	  jurisdictions	  of	  
policymaking;	  parliamentary	  party	  system);	  








• Public	  opinion	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  While	  these	  variables	  are	  separated	  into	  different	  levels,	  these	  levels	  are	  interrelated,	  in	  





This	  table	  depicts	  variables	  at	  the	  structural	  level	  of	  economic	  production	  and	  
class	  relations,	  to	  the	  institutional	  level	  within	  the	  state,	  to	  political	  level	  outside	  of	  
government	  at	  the	  level	  of	  civil	  society.	  	  
To	  further	  explain	  this	  table,	  Figure	  6.1	  illustrates	  the	  abstract	  relationship	  
among	  these	  variables,	  to	  more	  clearly	  explicate	  the	  ideational	  process	  and	  the	  inter-­‐
relationships	  between	  different	  variables	  at	  different	  levels.	  This	  figure	  highlights	  how	  
institutions	  at	  the	  meso	  level	  lie	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Governing	  
institutions	  are	  mandated	  to	  develop,	  reform	  and	  regulate	  pension	  policy,	  to	  ensure	  
legislation	  and	  regulation	  is	  responding	  appropriately	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  pension	  
community.	  The	  state	  therefore	  must	  respond	  to	  both	  socioeconomic	  structures	  of	  
material	  reproduction	  from	  “above”,	  and	  to	  discursive	  forces	  and	  ideation	  from	  non-­‐
governmental	  actors	  in	  civil	  society	  from	  “below”.	  	  
	   At	  the	  macro	  level,	  transformations	  within	  the	  global	  economy,	  and	  Ontario’s	  
increasing	  participation	  in	  processes	  of	  economic	  globalization	  generate	  new	  economic	  
and	  social	  conditions	  that	  require	  policy	  responses.	  New	  technological	  advances	  in	  
production,	  the	  openings	  of	  new	  labour	  markets,	  changing	  employment	  patterns	  and	  
relationships,	  and	  expanding	  financial	  markets	  are	  factors	  that	  transform	  the	  
employment	  relationship	  in	  Ontario	  and	  how	  workplace	  pensions	  are	  negotiated	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  employment	  contract.	  These	  changes	  alter	  the	  social	  relations	  of	  production,	  
stoking	  class	  struggles	  between	  workers	  attempting	  to	  protect	  their	  employment	  
security	  and	  benefits,	  while	  employers	  seek	  to	  cut	  costs	  to	  increase	  productivity	  and	  




structural	  variables	  that	  drive	  policymaking	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  social	  
formations,	  class	  relations	  and	  the	  material	  conditions	  of	  economic	  production.	  
	   The	  group	  interests	  that	  form	  from	  the	  macro	  level	  apply	  pressure	  on	  governing	  
institutions	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  class	  struggles	  over	  pension	  rights	  and	  the	  
protection	  of	  pension	  plan	  solvency.	  It	  is	  at	  the	  meso	  level	  that	  policymaking	  occurs	  
within	  the	  state	  apparatus	  to	  produce	  statutory	  law.	  This	  level	  is	  comprised	  of	  political	  
parties,	  a	  regulator,	  policy	  advisory	  staff	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  
and	  her/his	  political	  staff,	  Legislative	  Counsel,	  the	  court	  system,	  the	  Premier	  and	  
Cabinet.	  These	  different	  groups	  within	  the	  state	  are	  heterogeneous,	  having	  their	  own	  
particular	  set	  of	  institutional	  interests,	  sometimes	  working	  together,	  sometimes	  
competing	  to	  establish	  or	  limit	  ideational	  processes	  that	  inform	  the	  policymaking	  
process	  (Abrams	  1977).	  Other	  items	  at	  this	  level	  include	  temporal	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  
duration	  of	  time	  between	  rounds	  of	  legislative	  reform	  and	  the	  institutional	  governing	  





















Figure	  6.1:	  Flow	  chart	  of	  the	  inter-­‐relationship	  between	  macro,	  meso	  and	  micro	  level	  
factors	  that	  drive	  pension	  policy	  change	  
	  
	  
The	  micro	  level	  is	  understood	  here	  primarily	  as	  a	  source	  of	  discourse	  “below”	  or	  
outside	  of	  government,	  located	  in	  civil	  society	  that	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  class	  divisions	  and	  
group	  interests	  produced	  by	  political-­‐economic	  conditions.	  This	  is	  the	  level	  in	  which	  civil	  
society	  debates	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  pension	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  certain	  sections.	  
Pension	  professionals,	  unions,	  business	  and	  retiree	  associations,	  think	  tanks,	  activists	  




policy	  papers,	  government	  consultations,	  and	  in	  the	  media	  over	  different	  issues	  relating	  
pension	  policy.	  These	  debates	  and	  political	  engagements	  feed	  into	  the	  policymaking	  
process	  at	  the	  ground	  level,	  shaping	  the	  direction	  of	  policy	  reform	  proposals	  and	  policy	  
change.	  Ideology	  reflecting	  particular	  class	  interests	  is	  embedded	  within	  the	  micro	  level	  
as	  individuals,	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  media	  interpret	  economic,	  social	  policy	  and	  political	  
events	  through	  different	  ideological	  lenses,	  thus	  shaping	  their	  understanding	  and	  
critiques	  of	  pension	  policy.	  	  	  
	   Importantly,	  ideation	  occurs	  at	  both	  the	  meso	  and	  micro	  levels.	  Bureaucrats,	  
regulators	  and	  political	  leaders	  can	  be	  sources	  of	  new	  ideas	  as	  officials	  observe	  changes	  
within	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  and	  economy	  in	  Ontario	  and	  elsewhere.	  In	  this	  
context,	  ideas	  will	  find	  either	  success	  or	  perish,	  contingent	  on	  political	  dynamics	  
between	  different	  institutional	  groups.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  bureaucrats	  have	  their	  own	  
group	  interest	  dynamics,	  ideological	  perspective	  and	  interpretation	  of	  economic	  and	  
political	  conditions.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  existing	  pension	  policy	  can	  facilitate	  class	  tension	  
through	  policy	  drift,	  in	  which	  the	  failure	  of	  pension	  reform	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  
workers,	  or	  conversely,	  the	  interests	  of	  employers,	  generates	  political	  responses	  from	  
stakeholder	  groups,	  exhibiting	  another	  source	  of	  ideation.	  	  
Indeed,	  Figure	  6.1	  illustrates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  policymaking	  is	  not	  
unidirectional.	  While	  the	  state	  does	  sit	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  model,	  the	  state	  is	  impacted	  
by	  variables	  at	  the	  macro	  and	  micro	  levels,	  while	  also	  a	  source	  itself	  of	  ideation	  and	  






While	  there	  are	  many	  variables	  that	  drive	  the	  policymaking	  process	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  
governmental	  process	  of	  drafting	  legislation	  and	  regulations	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  specific	  
institutional	  protocol.	  The	  variables	  outlined	  in	  Table	  6.1	  and	  Figure	  6.1,	  and	  the	  
dynamics	  between	  these	  variables,	  feed	  into	  the	  institutional	  process	  of	  policymaking.	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  provides	  a	  description	  of	  this	  process,	  illustrating	  how	  
institutional	  protocol	  is	  open	  or	  limited	  to	  responding	  to	  particular	  issues.	  	  
When	  a	  “problem”	  arises37	  that	  government	  feels	  it	  should	  respond	  to,	  the	  
public	  service	  will	  sometimes	  put	  out	  a	  consultation	  paper,	  or	  green	  paper,	  to	  address	  a	  
perceived	  problem.	  The	  government	  receives	  feedback	  from	  stakeholders	  from	  all	  sides	  
of	  the	  spectrum.	  From	  here,	  policy	  staff	  in	  the	  public	  service	  develops	  policy.	  
For	  large	  changes	  that	  require	  legislative	  reform,	  stakeholder	  groups	  must	  be	  
consulted.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  smaller	  issues,	  changes	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  regulative	  
reform	  often	  without	  consultation	  with	  all	  stakeholder	  groups.	  From	  here,	  legislation	  
and/or	  regulations	  are	  drafted.	  Once	  drafted,	  the	  bill	  is	  published	  and	  another	  round	  of	  
consultations	  takes	  place	  for	  more	  feedback.	  	  
Because	  that's	  the	  feedback	  that	  is	  most	  critical	  for	  the	  regulation	  and	  legislation.	  Because	  
then,	  all	  the	  expert	  stakeholders,	  the	  lawyers,	  the	  actuaries,	  the	  pension	  fund,	  you	  know	  
the	  people,	  the	  pension	  plan	  administrators,	  they	  comment	  on	  the	  technical	  details	  
because	  that's	  what's	  of	  interest	  to	  them	  because	  they	  have	  to	  apply	  it	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  
2015).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	  a	  government	  to	  recognize	  something	  as	  a	  ‘problem’	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  series	  of	  factors,	  
including	  changing	  political-­‐economic	  context,	  pressure	  from	  specific	  interest	  groups,	  and	  




After	  this	  round	  of	  consultation,	  Legislative	  Counsel	  (i.e.	  government	  lawyers)	  
turn	  instructions	  from	  the	  policy	  staff	  into	  legal	  language.	  Typically,	  the	  bill	  draft	  is	  sent	  
between	  Legislative	  Council	  and	  policy	  staff,	  with	  each	  party	  commenting	  on	  the	  
document.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  process,	  the	  bill	  is	  passed	  to	  Legislative	  Council	  who	  is	  last	  
to	  edit	  the	  document	  before	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  House	  or	  Cabinet.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  the	  bill	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  legislature	  for	  debate.	  
According	  to	  one	  participant,	  “sometimes	  it	  gets	  debated	  well,	  other	  times	  not”	  (Policy	  
Analyst	  1,	  April	  2015).	  Regulations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  do	  not	  go	  through	  the	  
Legislature,	  but	  are	  passed	  by	  the	  Minister	  after	  she/he	  consults	  other	  Cabinet	  
Ministers.	  Then	  regulation	  takes	  effect.	  Generally	  speaking,	  the	  media	  pays	  less	  
attention	  to	  changes	  to	  regulations	  compared	  to	  legislative	  changes	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  
2015).	  	  
There	  are	  different	  “levers”	  available	  to	  policymakers	  when	  responding	  to	  a	  
“problem”	  that	  government	  thinks	  it	  must	  respond	  to.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  pension	  
issue	  arises,	  a	  team	  within	  government	  will	  expand	  to	  include	  policy	  advisors	  and	  a	  
lawyer	  with	  substantive	  expertise	  in	  pension	  law.	  This	  team	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  
this	  problem	  requires	  new	  legislation	  or	  can	  be	  addressed	  with	  some	  other	  mechanism,	  
such	  as	  launching	  a	  public	  education	  program	  or	  influencing	  public	  behavior	  through	  a	  
government	  procurement	  process.	  According	  to	  one	  government	  official,	  "The	  time	  that	  
you	  need	  legislation	  is	  when	  there's	  a	  gap	  in	  law,	  or	  an	  impediment	  in	  law	  to	  doing	  what	  
you	  want	  to	  do.	  The	  legislation	  doesn't	  tell	  the	  whole	  story,	  it	  just	  fills	  the	  gap,	  or	  gets	  




This	  participant	  identified	  two	  types	  of	  legislative	  drafting:	  1)	  "big	  tent"	  drafting	  
"which	  encompasses	  the	  entire	  process	  from	  identifying	  that	  there's	  an	  issue	  or	  
problem	  that	  you	  want	  to	  deal	  with,	  concluding	  that	  legislation	  might	  be	  part	  of	  the	  
mix";	  and	  2)	  the	  technical	  process	  of	  writing	  legislation,	  which	  is	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  
larger	  process	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  2015).	  The	  same	  participant	  described	  drafting	  legislation	  
as	  analogous	  to	  architecture	  –	  i.e.	  there	  is	  “big	  picture	  stuff,	  and	  nuts	  and	  bolts	  stuff”.	  If	  
it	  is	  decided	  that	  legislation	  is	  required,	  only	  elected	  officials	  can	  carry	  out	  “lawmaking”.	  
Any	  new	  piece	  of	  legislation	  or	  “rulebook”	  will	  consist	  of	  the	  statute,	  regulations	  and	  
some	  policy	  documents	  that	  are	  typically	  released	  by	  the	  regulator.	  This	  will	  be	  
discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  below.	  
	   There	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  legislation	  and	  the	  regulations	  
contained	  within	  a	  statute.	  Regulations	  are	  the	  details	  of	  the	  legislation.	  For	  example,	  	  
...the	  Act	  [i.e.	  the	  PBA]	  tells	  plan	  administrators	  and	  plan	  sponsors	  that	  a	  pension	  plan	  
has	  to	  provide	  sufficient	  funding.	  The	  regulations	  will	  tell	  you	  what	  the	  sufficient	  funding	  
looks	  like.	  So	  you'll	  find	  many	  pages	  dealing	  with	  how	  much	  money	  and	  what	  form	  of	  
investments	  and	  things	  like	  that.	  The	  regulations	  is	  where	  the	  action	  is	  usually	  (Lawyer	  
5,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  legislation	  establishes	  a	  standard,	  or	  the	  "what".	  But	  as	  the	  broader	  
environment	  changes,	  and,	  for	  example,	  new	  investment	  vehicles	  are	  developed	  in	  the	  
financial	  sector,	  new	  regulations	  will	  have	  to	  be	  established	  to	  ensure	  that	  certain	  
standards	  set	  out	  by	  the	  PBA	  are	  satisfied.	  	  
Regulations	  serve	  an	  important	  function	  in	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  have	  
to	  debate	  changes	  to	  regulations	  in	  the	  legislature.	  Rather,	  reforms	  to	  regulations	  are	  




public	  do	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  process.	  Drafting	  of	  regulations	  is	  similar	  to	  drafting	  
legislation	  in	  that	  the	  public	  service	  develops	  that	  text	  of	  proposed	  regulations.	  	  	  In	  
Ontario,	  all	  new	  regulations	  are	  published	  in	  the	  Ontario	  Gazette	  and	  Ontario's	  e-­‐Laws	  
website.	  
	  
Regulations	  and	  legislative	  reform	  
If	  Ontario	  is	  going	  through	  a	  period	  of	  considerable	  change	  dictated	  by	  transforming	  
economic	  conditions,	  for	  example,	  many	  new	  regulations	  will	  have	  to	  be	  written.	  This	  is	  
where	  one	  can	  find	  the	  major	  driver	  of	  policy	  change	  in	  the	  PBA.	  The	  PBA	  can	  remain	  
the	  same	  through	  this	  period	  of	  economic	  change,	  but	  new	  regulations	  will	  have	  to	  be	  
added,	  or	  “duct	  taped”	  onto	  the	  Act.	  One	  pension	  lawyer	  describes	  this	  process	  as	  
follows:	  	  
Then	  there	  will	  be	  times	  when	  the	  world	  changes	  in	  a	  way	  that	  requires	  changes	  to	  the	  
rules.	  During	  the	  period	  where	  the	  stock	  markets	  doing	  really	  badly,	  pension	  funds	  will	  
all	  of	  a	  sudden	  find	  themselves	  underfunded	  because	  the	  value	  of	  their	  investments	  
shrinks.	  And	  when	  a	  pension	  plan	  is	  underfunded,	  the	  law	  requires	  certain	  steps	  to	  be	  
taken,	  increased	  contributions	  like	  having	  a	  second	  mortgage	  on	  your	  home	  where	  you	  
have	  to	  make	  payments	  over	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  years.	  And	  employers	  may	  at	  that	  
point	  get	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  government	  and	  say,	  ‘if	  you	  make	  us	  do	  this,	  we	  will	  go	  out	  
of	  business.’	  So	  the	  government	  may	  make	  a	  choice	  to	  change	  the	  payment	  period	  for	  
fully	  funding	  your	  pension	  plan	  once	  again.	  And	  in	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  the	  regs	  will	  have	  to	  
be	  changed	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
Put	  differently,	  while	  the	  legislation	  lays	  out	  the	  overall	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  and	  can	  only	  
be	  changed	  through	  parliamentary	  debate,	  the	  regulations	  allow	  for	  smaller	  incremental	  




absence	  of	  parliamentary	  debate.	  Legislative	  reform	  will	  typically	  attract	  some	  degree	  of	  
media	  and	  public	  attention,	  whereas	  many	  regulatory	  changes	  will	  not.	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  regulations	  where	  exemptions	  will	  be	  conferred	  for	  different	  pension	  
funds.	  If	  a	  company	  faces	  bankruptcy,	  government	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  make	  
an	  exception.	  This	  is	  not	  unusual	  and	  within	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  PBA	  there	  is	  a	  list	  of	  
different	  funds	  and	  companies	  that	  are	  exempt	  from	  different	  rules	  contained	  within	  
the	  PBA.	  One	  example	  is	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Employees	  Retirement	  System	  
(OMERS)—one	  of	  Canada’s	  largest	  public	  sector	  occupational	  pension	  plans	  and	  
institutional	  investors.	  OMERS	  was	  reconfigured	  in	  2006	  that	  led	  to	  a	  new	  regulation	  
specifically	  for	  that	  plan	  to	  exempt	  it	  from	  certain	  clauses	  in	  the	  PBA.	  Also	  during	  the	  
2000s,	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  restructuring	  of	  Algoma	  and	  Stelco	  in	  the	  steel	  industry,	  
Ford	  and	  General	  Motors	  (GM)	  in	  the	  auto	  manufacturing	  industry,	  and	  Abitibi	  in	  the	  
pulp	  and	  paper	  industry,	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  specific	  regulations	  to	  enable	  these	  
companies	  to	  remain	  solvent.	  There	  are	  public	  policy	  considerations	  when	  these	  
regulations	  are	  made,	  such	  as	  "how	  can	  we	  best	  protect	  workers’	  pension	  entitlements	  
while	  keeping	  them	  employed"?	  	  
	   Over	  time,	  many	  regulations	  will	  be	  amended	  and	  new	  regulations	  introduced.	  
And	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  PBA	  unique	  compared	  to	  other	  provincial	  statutes,	  in	  that	  
there	  are	  more	  pages	  of	  regulations	  than	  actual	  legislation,	  given	  the	  varying	  conditions	  
that	  different	  funds	  face.	  But	  as	  a	  different	  participant	  points	  out,	  it	  can	  become	  





…too	  many	  one-­‐off	  laws	  for	  special	  circumstances.	  And	  so	  there's	  a	  powerful	  
countervailing	  force.	  And	  it's	  also	  the	  case	  that	  if	  you	  create	  a	  special	  rule	  for	  someone,	  
we'll	  call	  them	  GM	  because	  that's	  just	  a	  name,	  and	  another	  corporation	  can	  look	  at	  that	  
situation	  and	  say,	  'hold	  on	  a	  minute,	  I'm	  in	  the	  same	  position'.	  Then	  rule	  of	  law	  would	  
suggest	  that	  that	  other	  corporation	  should	  get	  the	  same	  treatment.	  And	  so	  there	  will	  
come	  a	  time	  at	  which	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  just	  to	  reform	  the	  law	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  
everybody	  (Lawyer	  3,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
In	  this	  type	  of	  environment,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  new	  regulations	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  
that	  have	  been	  “duct	  taped”	  onto	  the	  PBA	  can	  generate	  demand	  for	  legislative	  reform.	  
There	  comes	  a	  point	  in	  time	  in	  which	  legislation	  is	  deemed	  by	  the	  pension	  community	  as	  
incapable	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  address	  changes	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  labour	  market,	  where	  
more	  regulations	  cannot	  mitigate	  these	  challenges.	  This	  is	  what	  happened	  leading	  up	  
the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP)	  led	  by	  Harry	  Arthurs	  that	  
commenced	  in	  2006,	  where	  no	  legislative	  reform	  had	  occurred	  since	  1987.	  Many	  
participants	  interviewed	  for	  this	  project	  discussed	  this	  long	  period	  of	  little	  change	  to	  the	  
PBA	  as	  an	  important	  driver	  of	  policy	  change	  in	  2012.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  participants	  described	  the	  end	  of	  this	  period	  as	  a	  "stew"	  of	  
different	  issues	  simmering	  away,	  where	  the	  number	  of	  new	  regulations	  was	  posing	  
other	  problems	  that	  were	  best	  addressed	  by	  legislative	  reform.	  This	  dynamic	  illustrates	  
how	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  a	  statute	  (i.e.	  legislation	  and	  
regulations),	  transforming	  material	  conditions	  (of	  an	  economy	  and	  labour	  market)	  and	  







Between	  periods	  of	  major	  reform,	  legislative	  change	  can	  occur	  incrementally	  through	  
case	  law.	  For	  instance,	  a	  legal	  ruling	  on	  a	  particular	  issue	  outside	  of	  the	  PBA	  can	  create	  
gaps	  in	  legislation	  that	  the	  government	  has	  to	  respond	  to.	  One	  example	  is	  when	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  amended	  the	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  in	  May	  1999	  that	  redefined	  
“spouse”	  from	  a	  married	  couple	  or	  a	  “man	  and	  a	  woman”	  to	  “two	  persons”.	  The	  
Supreme	  Court	  gave	  the	  Ontario	  government	  one	  year	  to	  amend	  its	  Family	  Law	  Act.	  In	  
October	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  Attorney	  General	  Jim	  Flaherty	  introduced	  Bill	  5	  that	  amended	  
more	  than	  60	  other	  provincial	  laws,	  including	  the	  PBA	  to	  replace	  “spouse”	  with	  “spouse	  
and	  same-­‐sex	  partner”	  in	  the	  Act	  (CBC	  2012).	  One	  impact	  of	  changing	  the	  definition	  of	  
“spouse”	  was	  that	  it	  became	  more	  expensive	  for	  employers	  administering	  DB	  plans	  
since	  they	  were	  now	  responsible	  to	  a	  new	  group	  of	  people	  who	  were	  entitled	  to	  
pensions.	  This	  created	  a	  situation	  where	  some	  plans	  became	  underfunded	  overnight.	  	  
In	  this	  environment,	  case	  law	  can	  be	  a	  driver	  of	  policy	  change	  that	  expands	  over	  
federal	  and	  provincial	  jurisdictions.	  Moreover,	  a	  court	  case	  can	  catalyze	  a	  chain	  reaction	  
of	  events	  through	  government	  in	  the	  form	  of	  legislative	  change	  to	  stakeholders,	  such	  as	  
employers	  who	  find	  the	  funding	  status	  of	  their	  pension	  negatively	  impacted.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada’s	  ruling	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  spouse	  generated	  a	  
gap	  in	  the	  PBA,	  which	  affected	  the	  solvency	  of	  plans	  and	  the	  individuals	  entitled	  to	  
these	  plans.	  The	  public	  service	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  then	  had	  to	  examine	  how	  this	  
ruling	  would	  impact	  the	  PBA	  and	  related	  stakeholders,	  then	  consult	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  




to	  make	  a	  decision.	  In	  response,	  some	  employers	  may	  decide	  these	  changes	  put	  too	  
much	  risk	  on	  them,	  negatively	  impacting	  their	  view	  on	  providing	  a	  DB	  pension	  plan.	  As	  a	  
result,	  this	  tension	  could	  potentially	  find	  its	  way	  to	  the	  collective	  bargaining	  table,	  
where	  the	  discussion	  shifts	  to	  introducing	  a	  DC	  plan.	  	  
One	  case	  that	  was	  often	  cited	  by	  participants	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  
contentiousness	  that	  court	  ruling	  could	  incite	  was	  Monsanto	  Canada	  Inc.	  v.	  Ontario	  
(Superintendent	  of	  Financial	  Services).	  One	  government	  official	  described	  this	  ruling	  as:	  
“…the	  poster	  child	  for	  employer	  concerns	  about	  courts	  sort	  of	  running	  amok”.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  many	  court	  rulings	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  were	  
often	  seen	  as	  labour	  friendly,	  leading	  to	  the	  disgruntlement	  of	  many	  employers.	  
Another	  government	  official	  described	  how	  the,	  “legislation	  was	  loose	  on	  a	  lot	  of	  
things…so	  you	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  lobbying,	  especially	  on	  the	  employer’s	  side	  to	  remedy	  court	  
decisions”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  December	  2014).	  As	  more	  case	  rulings	  were	  delivered	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  case	  law	  became	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  pension	  policy	  
change.	  This	  trend	  was	  increasingly	  worrisome	  for	  policymakers.	  The	  same	  government	  
official	  reflected:	  "You	  know,	  20	  years	  of	  no	  pension	  legislation,	  letting	  courts	  decide	  
was	  from	  the	  bureaucrats’	  point	  of	  view	  not	  a	  good	  thing"	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  December	  
2014).	  Consequently,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  case	  law	  rulings	  led	  to	  growing	  tension	  






Economic	  variables	  produced	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  do	  not	  drive	  policy	  reform	  alone;	  
rather	  these	  factors	  pass	  through	  an	  ideological	  lens	  adopted	  by	  various	  governing	  
parties	  and	  policymakers,	  that	  are	  in	  turn	  linked	  to	  pre-­‐existing,	  path-­‐dependent	  
institutional	  practices	  (Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  2009).	  Chapter	  Four	  discussed	  the	  
gradual	  shift	  from	  Victorian	  notions	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  
century,	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  corporate	  welfarism	  of	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	  These	  
shifting	  philosophical	  doctrines,	  embedded	  in	  state	  apparatuses,	  identified	  who	  was	  
responsible	  for	  caring	  for	  the	  elderly	  and	  provided	  justification	  to	  particular	  policy	  
decisions.	  Subsequently,	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  adopted	  by	  a	  state	  provides	  the	  
ideological	  lens	  through	  which	  policymakers	  decide	  who	  should	  provide	  retirement	  
income.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  the	  case	  that	  the	  ideological	  position	  of	  a	  governing	  party	  can	  
often	  differ	  from	  its	  own	  bureaucracy	  or	  between	  ministries.	  Government	  is	  constituted	  
by	  a	  collection	  of	  different	  ministries	  with	  their	  own	  legal	  jurisdiction,	  bureaucracy	  and	  
institutional	  memory	  (Abrams	  1977).	  As	  such,	  the	  ideological	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  
manage	  the	  bureaucracy	  of	  a	  ministry	  can	  generate	  tension	  with	  a	  minister	  with	  a	  
different	  perspective.	  	  
Ideology	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  class	  interests.	  Policies	  that	  arise	  in	  an	  era	  of	  
neoliberalism	  heighten	  the	  connection	  between	  capital	  and	  the	  state,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  
adopts	  the	  interests	  of	  capital	  over	  labour.	  Harvey	  (2005)	  characterizes	  neoliberal	  
ideology	  as	  a	  class	  project	  that	  is	  used	  by	  economic	  elites	  to	  reestablish	  domination	  over	  




Neoliberal	  ideology,	  therefore,	  establishes	  a	  conceptual	  apparatus,	  whose	  ideas	  
originate	  from	  economic	  elite,	  but	  is	  adopted	  by	  governing	  institutions.	  Policymakers	  
embedded	  in	  these	  state	  apparatuses	  produce	  “policy	  experiments”	  that	  embody	  and	  
“stumble”	  towards	  neoliberal	  ideals	  of	  governance	  (Harvey	  2005:	  9).	  This	  does	  not	  
mean,	  however,	  that	  these	  policy	  experiments	  will	  be	  successful	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  
2005).	  
There	  have	  been	  successive	  rounds	  of	  pension	  debates	  in	  which	  neoliberal	  
ideology	  has	  attempted	  to	  claw	  back	  benefits	  or	  steer	  pension	  policy	  towards	  market-­‐
based	  reforms,	  at	  both	  provincial	  and	  federal	  levels.	  One	  round	  occurred	  during	  the	  
1980s	  when	  the	  federal	  government	  attempted	  to	  de-­‐index	  Old	  Age	  Security	  (OAS)	  
benefits	  (Gee	  and	  McDaniel	  1993;	  Battle	  1997;	  Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005).	  Neoliberal	  
ideology	  has	  also	  informed	  recent	  pension	  debates	  in	  Ontario	  and	  Canada	  since	  2010.	  
For	  example,	  as	  concern	  grew	  over	  shrinking	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada	  following	  the	  
global	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008,	  a	  campaign	  for	  expanding	  CPP	  took	  shape	  led	  by	  the	  
Canadian	  Labour	  Congress	  (CLC).	  The	  federal	  government	  led	  by	  Stephen	  Harper	  refused	  
to	  expand	  CPP	  since	  he	  claimed	  Canada’s	  economy	  was	  “too	  weak”	  to	  support	  an	  
increase	  to	  payroll	  deductions.	  Furthermore,	  powerful	  private	  sector	  lobby	  groups	  that	  
included	  the	  Canadian	  Federation	  of	  Independent	  Business	  (CFIB)	  and	  the	  Canadian	  
Health	  and	  Life	  Insurance	  Association	  (CHLIA)	  vehemently	  rejected	  CPP	  expansion,	  
calling	  the	  proposal	  a	  “new	  tax”	  on	  business.	  Harper’s	  introduction	  of	  Pooled	  Registered	  
Pension	  Plans	  (PRPPs)	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  expanding	  CPP	  was	  understood	  by	  many	  as	  a	  




retirement,	  not	  government	  or	  employers	  (Townson	  2011).	  Indeed,	  the	  claim	  that	  
individuals	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  saving	  for	  retirement	  without	  the	  aid	  of	  employers	  
or	  government	  represent	  an	  ideological	  position	  that	  reflect	  a	  particular	  class	  interest,	  
thus	  shaping	  the	  character	  of	  policy	  proposals.	  	  
Ideological	  positions	  also	  resonate	  in	  debates	  on	  the	  viability	  and	  importance	  of	  
DB	  and	  DC	  plans	  and	  the	  use	  of	  Retirement	  Registered	  Saving	  Plans	  (RRSPs)	  and	  Tax-­‐
Free	  Savings	  Accounts	  (TFSAs).	  One	  participant	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  ideology	  in	  
policymaking	  as	  follows:	  "So	  you	  take	  it	  out	  of	  an	  employment	  context	  and	  make	  it	  
possible	  for	  individuals	  to	  save	  more,	  which	  would	  contribute	  to	  shutting	  down	  DB	  plans	  
and	  would	  instead	  divert	  the	  savings	  to	  RRSPs	  and	  TFSAs,	  or	  to	  DC	  plans.	  And	  that's	  
where	  the	  risk	  is	  -­‐	  deliberately	  moved	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  ideological	  position,	  or	  the	  
values	  of	  the	  people	  running	  the	  show"	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  2015).	  Ideological	  and	  economic	  
factors	  drive	  particular	  issues	  into	  the	  view	  of	  governments	  and	  policymakers.	  It	  is	  the	  
ideological	  lens	  that	  limits	  which	  types	  of	  remedies	  are	  considered	  to	  mitigate	  particular	  
policy	  issues.	  Consequently,	  due	  to	  the	  federal	  Conservative’s	  neoliberal	  position	  that	  
government	  should	  only	  provide	  individual	  retirement	  savings	  vehicles	  rather	  than	  
expand	  social	  policy,	  this	  established	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  national	  pension	  debate	  
between	  2010	  and	  2015.	  What	  ensued	  was	  the	  rancorous	  struggle	  between	  various	  
provincial	  and	  federal	  governments	  and	  interest	  groups	  over	  public	  pension	  policy	  in	  a	  
post-­‐global	  financial	  crisis	  context.	  The	  role	  of	  ideology	  will	  be	  further	  elaborated	  upon	  






How	  do	  ideas	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process?	  According	  to	  various	  participants,	  this	  
question	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  source,	  size,	  and	  content	  of	  an	  idea.	  There	  are	  multiple	  
entry	  points	  for	  ideas	  to	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  which	  typically	  come	  from	  
stakeholders	  or	  the	  bureaucracy.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  different	  streams	  of	  
policymaking,	  where	  ideas,	  interests	  and	  ideology	  interact	  differently	  contingent	  of	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  issue.	  As	  such,	  ideational	  processes	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  political	  party	  in	  
power,	  the	  expertise	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  of	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  (i.e.	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  the	  Minister	  is	  familiar	  with	  pension	  law	  and	  the	  historical	  and	  institutional	  
politics	  surrounding	  the	  pension	  file),	  the	  party	  platform,	  and	  what	  stakeholders	  lobby	  
for	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  	  
One	  government	  official	  describes	  ideas	  as	  generally	  moving	  upwards,	  often	  
originating	  from	  stakeholder	  groups	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  towards	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  
and	  Cabinet	  rather	  than	  top	  down.	  Several	  participants	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  many	  
finance	  ministers	  do	  not	  have	  a	  strong	  grasp	  of	  pension	  issues	  (given	  the	  technical	  
aspects	  of	  this	  file),	  generally	  giving	  the	  bureaucracy	  more	  impetus.	  For	  example,	  the	  
Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP)	  led	  by	  Harry	  Arthurs	  from	  2006	  to	  2008	  
was	  an	  item	  policy	  staff	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance’s	  public	  service	  had	  been	  pushing	  for	  
years	  (to	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  section	  three).	   
	  Ideas	  also	  come	  from	  stakeholders	  who	  will	  lobby	  the	  minister	  on	  particular	  
issues	  that	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  might	  respond	  to	  and	  direct	  bureaucrats	  to	  work	  on.	  




and/or	  Premier,	  whose	  ideas	  are	  in	  turn	  shaped	  by	  class	  relations,	  professional	  training,	  
personal	  ties	  to	  other	  ruling	  elites	  and	  socioeconomic	  background	  (Miliband	  1969).	  For	  
example,	  one	  participant	  describes	  how	  the	  current	  Ontario	  Registered	  Pension	  Plan	  
(ORPP)	  proposal	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  came	  from	  the	  premier,	  given	  its	  central	  place	  on	  the	  
Liberal	  Party’s	  platform	  during	  the	  2014	  provincial	  election.	  	  
The	  size,	  content	  and	  entry	  of	  point	  of	  an	  idea	  will	  affect	  how	  this	  idea	  moves	  
through	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  thus	  characterizing	  different	  trajectories	  of	  
policymaking.	  For	  instance,	  the	  public	  service’s	  desire	  to	  initiate	  a	  review	  of	  pension	  
policy	  led	  by	  an	  independent	  commissioner	  was	  a	  large	  idea	  that	  would	  impact	  the	  
whole	  pension	  community.	  The	  Commissioner	  undertook	  multiple	  rounds	  of	  
consultations	  and	  the	  OECP	  had	  a	  clear	  mandate	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  by	  ministry	  
bureaucrats	  (in	  negotiation	  with	  Commissioner	  Harry	  Arthurs),	  in	  which	  bureaucrats	  
were	  pressuring	  the	  finance	  minister	  to	  organize	  a	  commission.	  Furthermore,	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  Commissioner’s	  work,	  multiple	  rounds	  of	  extensive	  consultations	  took	  place	  with	  
stakeholder	  groups	  across	  the	  province.	  This	  gave	  different	  stakeholder	  groups	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  mobilize	  and	  transfer	  policy	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  mitigate	  the	  shortcomings	  
of	  the	  PBA	  through	  the	  Commissioner.	  
Then	  there	  are	  smaller	  matters,	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  when	  several	  Multiple	  
Employer	  Pension	  Plans	  (MEPPs)	  in	  2007	  requested	  temporary	  relief	  from	  funding	  
requirements	  outlined	  in	  the	  PBA.	  Many	  of	  these	  MEPPs	  (primarily	  located	  in	  
construction	  and	  supermarket	  industries)	  were	  allowed	  to	  transfer	  their	  plan	  into	  a	  new	  




temporarily	  excluded	  them	  from	  particular	  funding	  deficiencies	  (Coughlin	  2007).	  Here,	  
the	  scale	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  more	  localized,	  where	  a	  policy	  idea	  comes	  from	  a	  
stakeholder	  source,	  enters	  the	  bureaucracy,	  is	  discussed	  by	  policy	  advisors	  and	  political	  
staff,	  and	  then	  a	  decision	  is	  made.	  	  
The	  receptiveness	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  discussing	  the	  issue	  is	  partly	  contingent	  
on	  the	  ideological	  disposition	  of	  the	  bureaucrats,	  Minister,	  and	  their	  political	  staff	  and	  
the	  political	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves.	  Conservative	  political	  
leaders	  will	  have	  more	  of	  an	  ear	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  employers	  (such	  as	  been	  the	  case	  
regarding	  CPP	  expansion),	  and	  vice	  versa	  for	  employee	  groups	  if	  the	  Liberals	  or	  NDP	  is	  in	  
power	  (such	  as	  been	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Ontario	  Liberal	  Party	  establishing	  the	  ORPP),	  
given	  material	  conditions	  of	  production	  at	  the	  time	  permit	  this	  approach.	  However,	  if	  
Ontario	  is	  in	  an	  economic	  crisis,	  for	  example,	  this	  may	  change.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  space	  where	  
ideas	  interact	  with	  ideological	  perspectives	  of	  bureaucrats,	  political	  staff	  and	  the	  
broader	  conditions	  of	  Ontario’s	  political	  economy.	  	  	  
Stakeholder	  groups	  will	  strategize	  with	  whom	  they	  contact	  in	  government,	  often	  
lobbying	  different	  contact	  points	  to	  insert	  their	  ideas	  and	  interests	  into	  the	  policymaking	  
process.	  Sometimes	  stakeholders	  will	  write	  the	  Minister,	  or	  they	  will	  approach	  staff	  at	  
various	  levels,	  and	  depending	  on	  which	  party	  is	  in	  office,	  the	  reception	  they	  receive	  will	  
be	  different.	  The	  status,	  along	  with	  political	  and	  economic	  capital	  of	  any	  given	  
stakeholder	  will	  influence	  who	  in	  government	  responds	  to	  an	  issue	  –	  a	  CEO	  of	  a	  large	  
pension	  fund	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  Minister	  compared	  to	  a	  small	  




several	  CEOs	  of	  large	  public	  sector	  occupational	  funds	  in	  Ontario	  (including	  OMERS	  and	  
the	  Ontario	  Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan)	  and	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  entertained	  the	  
idea	  of	  using	  pension	  fund	  capital	  for	  investment	  in	  Ontario	  infrastructure	  projects	  
(Howlett	  2005).	  This	  idea	  was	  initiated	  by	  CEOs	  of	  these	  large	  public	  sector	  funds	  and	  
met	  with	  Finance	  Minister	  Greg	  Sorbara	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  private/public	  
partnership	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  “P3s”).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  CEO	  communicated	  directly	  with	  
the	  Finance	  Minister,	  meeting	  in	  the	  Minister’s	  boardroom	  along	  with	  the	  Deputy	  
Minister	  and	  senior	  advisors.	  
	   	  
Legislative	  jurisdictions	  	  
To	  what	  extent	  does	  federal	  minimum	  standards	  pension	  legislation	  interact	  with	  
provincial	  minimum	  standards	  pension	  legislation	  and	  policymaking?	  Very	  little,	  
according	  to	  interview	  participants	  who	  had	  worked	  as	  officials	  in	  the	  Ontario	  
government.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  must	  work	  closely	  with	  their	  
provincial	  colleagues	  when	  contemplating	  changes	  to	  the	  CPP,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  workplace	  
pension	  policy,	  what	  happens	  federally	  does	  not	  directly	  affect	  the	  work	  of	  policymaking	  
in	  Ontario:	  "…in	  terms	  of	  pension	  legislation,	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  a	  minor	  player",	  
asserts	  one	  government	  official.	  Federal	  and	  provincial	  pension	  regulators	  do	  meet	  on	  a	  
regular	  basis	  through	  the	  Canadian	  Association	  of	  Pension	  Supervisory	  Authorities	  
(CAPSA)	  to	  discuss	  harmonization	  and	  efficiency	  within	  Canada’s	  pension	  regulatory	  
system.	  But	  there	  is	  not	  a	  forum	  on	  the	  government	  side	  similar	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  CAPSA.	  




provincial	  governments.	  However,	  as	  another	  government	  official	  claims,	  it	  is	  the	  
federal	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  (ITA)	  that	  "fuses	  everything	  in	  the	  pension	  world"	  (Policy	  Analyst	  
3,	  December	  2014).	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  ITA	  and	  minimum	  standards	  in	  Ontario	  was	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  The	  establishment	  of	  tax	  law	  catalyzed	  trustee	  and	  pension	  
law	  and	  also	  shaped	  collective	  bargaining	  practices.	  The	  ITA	  facilitated	  the	  creation	  of	  
pension	  law	  since	  tax	  law	  allowed	  pension	  funds	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tax	  shelter	  for	  
employers,	  incentivizing	  employers	  to	  set	  up	  a	  their	  own	  funds.	  However,	  as	  large	  pools	  
of	  money	  began	  to	  accumulate,	  trust	  law	  developed	  to	  deal	  with	  custodianship	  of	  these	  
pools	  of	  money.	  To	  make	  certain	  trustees	  were	  behaving	  properly	  government	  
implemented	  a	  pension	  regulator.	  It	  is	  during	  this	  time	  that	  pensions	  become	  viewed	  as	  
deferred	  wages	  and,	  consequently,	  negotiators	  at	  the	  collective	  bargaining	  table	  started	  
to	  define	  the	  placement	  of	  money	  into	  a	  pension	  plan	  as	  part	  of	  the	  employment	  
relationship.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  that	  minimum	  standards	  were	  established	  that	  set	  
the	  ground	  rules	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  people	  who	  would	  eventually	  benefit	  
from	  the	  money	  in	  the	  pension	  fund.	  Minimum	  standard	  pension	  legislation	  (such	  as	  the	  
PBA)	  ensures	  that	  the	  money	  is	  administered	  appropriately	  and	  inappropriate	  
investment	  risks	  are	  avoided.	  In	  sum,	  the	  federal	  government	  most	  directly	  shapes	  






Bureaucratic	  imperative	  	  
To	  what	  extent	  is	  there	  a	  bureaucratic	  imperative?	  According	  to	  participants	  who	  have	  
worked	  in	  government,	  this	  does	  not	  exist,	  and	  if	  it	  did,	  would	  violate	  their	  duty	  as	  
public	  servants.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  bureaucrats	  can	  (and	  sometime	  do)	  attempt	  to	  
shape	  the	  options	  presented	  to	  their	  minister	  and	  other	  political	  staff,	  the	  policy	  
analysts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  project	  saw	  their	  job	  in	  very	  clear	  terms:	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  to	  
identify	  the	  options	  to	  a	  policy	  issue	  and	  then	  communicate	  these	  options	  to	  political	  
staff.	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  policy	  staff	  to	  emphasize	  which	  options	  they	  think	  are	  the	  
best.	  But	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  political	  side	  to	  decide,	  and	  the	  bureaucrat’s	  job	  to	  provide	  all	  
the	  options	  available.	  It	  is	  sometimes	  the	  case	  that	  a	  bureaucrat	  will	  leave	  out	  certain	  
options	  if	  they	  know	  their	  political	  superiors	  are	  not	  going	  to	  like	  it;	  but	  this	  would	  be	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  bureaucrat	  exerting	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  policymaking,	  according	  to	  
participants.	  	  
	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  bureaucrats	  do	  not	  have	  priorities	  or	  ideological	  
assumptions	  that	  impact	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  For	  instance,	  during	  the	  2000s,	  
bureaucrats	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  had	  pushed	  hard	  for	  an	  independent	  commission	  
of	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  and	  hired	  an	  independent	  consultant	  to	  examine	  Canada’s	  
retirement	  income	  system.	  Both	  reports	  served	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  ideation	  from	  
stakeholders	  and	  consultants	  into	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Bureaucrats	  were	  largely	  
responsible	  for	  establishment	  of	  these	  reports.	  Ideologically,	  what	  is	  revealing	  is	  whom	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  chose	  to	  conduct	  these	  two	  reports:	  Harry	  Arthurs	  and	  Bob	  




law	  professor	  specializing	  in	  labour	  relations	  and	  Bob	  Baldwin	  is	  the	  former	  Director	  of	  
Social	  and	  Economic	  Policy	  Department	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Labour	  Congress.	  Looking	  at	  
these	  choices,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  Ministry	  of	  Finance’s	  pension	  division,	  at	  that	  point,	  
held	  an	  ideological	  perspective	  that	  was	  labour	  friendly.	  These	  are	  factors	  that	  impact	  
the	  policymaking	  process	  that	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  bureaucrat	  as	  objective	  
observer	  of	  policy	  options.	  
	  
Election	  cycles,	  brokerage	  politics,	  and	  confusion	  
Similar	  to	  other	  policy	  domains,	  election	  cycles	  significantly	  impact	  the	  work	  of	  
bureaucrats.	  Governments,	  "want	  to	  do	  big	  changes	  early	  in	  their	  mandate…"	  says	  one	  
participant,	  so	  bureaucrats	  "try	  to	  instigate	  their	  priorities"	  during	  this	  time	  (Policy	  
Analyst	  2,	  December	  2014).	  The	  year	  before	  an	  election,	  political	  parties	  spend	  much	  of	  
their	  time	  preparing	  for	  the	  election	  and	  the	  governing	  party	  will	  not	  embark	  on	  new	  
policy	  programs,	  particularly	  a	  file	  that	  is	  deemed	  contentious.	  Therefore,	  election	  
cycles,	  “[compress]	  the	  whole	  period	  that	  is	  available	  for	  initiatives"	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  
December	  2014).	  For	  example,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  
Commission	  on	  Pensions	  was	  formed	  just	  before	  a	  provincial	  election	  to—in	  the	  words	  
of	  a	  former	  political	  official—“bunt”	  the	  pension	  to	  the	  next	  election	  cycle	  (Lawyer	  2,	  
November	  2014).	  	  
When	  government	  is	  interested	  in	  addressing	  the	  pension	  file,	  one	  of	  the	  
limitations	  posed	  by	  a	  voluntary	  pension	  system	  is	  that	  government	  cannot	  unilaterally	  




income.	  Since	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  PBA	  in	  1965,	  no	  government	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  
make	  workplace	  pensions	  mandatory,	  including	  the	  NDP	  during	  the	  1990s.	  This	  is	  
because	  any	  change	  to	  pension	  policy	  comes	  with	  political	  risk.	  Several	  participants	  
spoke	  of	  the	  “toxicity”	  of	  the	  pension	  file	  in	  Ontario	  that	  grew	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  
2000s,	  defined	  by	  issues	  such	  as	  control	  over	  surplus,	  rising	  interest	  rates,	  and	  particular	  
case	  rulings.	  Pensions	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “p-­‐word”,	  meaning	  political	  leaders	  often	  
saw	  pension	  policy	  as	  a	  “political	  nightmare”.	  Commissioner	  Harry	  Arthurs	  asserts	  that:	  
“The	  politics	  of	  pension	  reform…have	  been	  so	  bitter	  that	  they	  had	  effectively	  stymied	  
pension	  reform	  in	  Ontario	  for	  20	  years	  or	  more”	  (Arthurs	  2009).	  As	  a	  result,	  pension	  
policymaking	  was	  increasingly	  characterized	  by	  a	  dynamic	  of	  governments	  trying	  “…to	  
find	  the	  shifting	  coalition	  that	  satisfies	  a	  variety	  of	  interests”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  
December	  2014),	  espousing	  practices	  of	  “brokerage	  politics”.	  But	  given	  the	  contentious	  
political	  environment,	  if	  government	  could	  not	  establish	  a	  coalition,	  pension	  policy	  was	  
ignored,	  which	  is	  what	  happened	  during	  this	  time.	  	  
One	  pension	  lawyer	  who	  had	  worked	  in	  government	  during	  the	  2000s	  claimed	  
that	  confusion	  was	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  pension	  policy	  change.	  This	  participant	  depicted	  
the	  policymaking	  process	  as	  very	  unpredictable	  and	  irrational,	  where	  government	  would	  
try	  to	  do	  what	  they	  thought	  was	  right,	  but	  was	  often	  "screamed	  at”	  by	  employers	  or	  
unions	  (Policy	  Analyst	  4,	  October	  2014).	  There	  was	  a	  sense	  of	  intransigence,	  confusion,	  
and	  trust	  issues	  that	  ground	  the	  policymaking	  process	  to	  a	  slow	  pace.	  Given	  the	  
complexity	  of	  pension	  issues	  (that	  include	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  jurisdictional	  




very	  threatened	  regarding	  the	  security	  of	  their	  retirement	  income.	  This	  dynamic	  of	  fear,	  
confusion	  and	  political	  contentiousness	  has	  been	  documented	  in	  The	  Third	  Rail:	  
Confronting	  Our	  Pension	  Failures,	  authored	  by	  former	  president	  of	  the	  Ontario	  
Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  Jim	  Leech	  and	  business	  reporter	  Jacquie	  McNish	  (2013).	  The	  
authors	  argued	  Canada	  (and	  internationally)	  had	  entered	  an	  era	  of	  “the	  third	  rail”,	  a	  
term	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  reluctance	  of	  politicians	  to	  tackle	  the	  enormous	  challenge	  of	  
repairing	  the	  pension	  system,	  making	  the	  state	  of	  pension	  policy	  dire.	  Given	  these	  
dynamics,	  confusion,	  public	  opinion	  and	  brokerage	  politics	  reflect	  how	  the	  political	  




Pension	  policy	  can	  broadly	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  class	  interests	  of	  employers	  attempting	  to	  
control	  the	  level	  and	  type	  of	  provision	  they	  provide	  to	  employees	  against	  the	  demands	  
of	  employees	  who	  seek	  to	  protect	  established	  coverage	  or	  minimize	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  
involved	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  retirement	  benefit	  plans.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  
in	  Chapter	  Five,	  the	  role	  of	  pension	  professionals38	  since	  the	  1980s	  has	  also	  grown,	  
becoming	  a	  source	  of	  ideation	  stemming	  from	  their	  possession	  of	  specialized	  knowledge	  
and	  informed	  by	  broader	  professional	  practices.	  	  
Clients	  who	  procure	  the	  services	  of	  these	  consultants	  typically	  represent	  
employer/management	  interests,	  or	  member/employee	  interests.	  It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “pension	  professional”	  to	  refer	  primarily	  to	  professionals	  with	  backgrounds	  in	  




companies	  and	  firms	  providing	  actuarial	  and	  legal	  services	  to	  work	  exclusively	  with	  one	  
type	  of	  client	  group	  (i.e.	  employer	  or	  employee	  clients).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  pension	  
professionals	  often	  share	  ideological	  affinities	  with	  their	  clients	  regarding	  assumptions	  
of	  who	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  providing	  retirement	  income	  provision,	  particularly	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  labour	  negotiations.	  	  
Yet	  professionals	  have	  a	  separate	  class	  position	  with	  their	  own	  set	  of	  interests.	  
Geographically	  and	  occupationally,	  professionals	  are	  separate	  from	  the	  group	  interests	  
of	  employers	  and	  employees.	  In	  Ontario,	  pension	  professionals	  are	  centralized	  in	  
Toronto’s	  downtown	  financial	  district.	  Lawyers,	  actuaries,	  investment	  firms	  and	  
corporate	  head	  offices	  of	  large	  workplace	  pension	  funds	  all	  make	  their	  place	  in	  the	  
towers	  of	  Toronto’s	  financial	  district.	  These	  professionals	  work	  in	  this	  financial	  district	  
apart	  from	  the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Ontarians	  who	  work	  across	  the	  province,	  
tasked	  with	  the	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  invest	  contributions	  and	  maintain	  the	  solvency	  of	  
pension	  plans.	  	  
Just	  north	  of	  the	  financial	  district	  lies	  Queen’s	  Park,	  headquarters	  of	  the	  
Government	  of	  Ontario.	  Pension	  policymakers	  are	  thus	  in	  close	  geographic	  proximity	  
with	  the	  pension	  professional	  community.	  As	  one	  former	  government	  official	  claimed:	  
“…the	  regulator	  hangs	  out	  more	  with	  the	  industry	  it’s	  supposed	  to	  regulate	  than	  with	  
the	  people	  it’s	  supposed	  to	  be	  protecting…they’re	  influenced	  by	  the	  people	  they	  hang	  
out	  with,	  even	  if	  they’re	  very	  skeptical”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  1,	  December	  2014).	  This	  
community	  of	  white-­‐collar	  workers	  makes	  their	  livings,	  develop	  their	  careers,	  and	  build	  




contributes	  to	  pension	  policy	  debates,	  professionals	  working	  in	  pension	  consultancy	  
exist	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  within	  the	  broader	  social	  formation	  of	  pension	  policy	  in	  
Ontario.	  	  	  
	  
The	  rising	  role	  of	  professionals	  
The	  growing	  influence	  of	  pension	  professionals	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  expanding	  economic	  
power	  of	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  Canadian	  pension	  plans	  are	  worth	  over	  a	  
trillion	  dollars	  and	  have	  grown	  to	  become	  key	  institutional	  investors	  in	  Canadian	  and	  
global	  financial	  markets.	  In	  the	  private	  sector,	  due	  to	  their	  growing	  size	  and	  
demographic	  pressures,	  pension	  plans	  have	  become	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  corporate	  
restructurings	  in	  Canada,	  where	  the	  size	  of	  pension	  liabilities	  have	  threatened	  the	  
solvency	  of	  some	  companies	  requiring	  government	  bailouts.	  	  
As	  corporate	  transactions	  and	  restructuring	  increasingly	  center	  on	  pension	  fund	  
issues,	  the	  demand	  for	  actuarial	  and	  legal	  consultation	  has	  spiked.	  Corporate	  and	  labour	  
law	  firms	  vigorously	  compete	  for	  new	  clients	  in	  this	  expanding	  legal	  field	  that	  include	  
unions,	  creditors	  and	  investors	  requiring	  legal	  advice.	  As	  one	  professional	  magazine	  for	  
lawyers,	  claims:	  “It	  is	  becoming	  clear	  that	  given	  their	  control	  of	  massive	  pools	  of	  capital,	  
pension	  funds	  are	  a	  current	  and	  future	  engine	  of	  Canadian	  economic	  well-­‐being…There	  
is	  little	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  direct,	  and	  indirect,	  financial	  importance	  of	  pension-­‐related	  work	  
to	  major	  law	  firms”	  (Melnitzer	  2004:	  4-­‐5).	  During	  the	  2000s,	  pension	  law	  moved	  from	  




legal	  fields.	  Furthermore,	  class	  action	  pension	  litigation	  has	  become	  a	  growing	  legal	  field	  
as	  disgruntled	  retirees	  fear	  companies	  defaulting	  on	  their	  pension	  promise.	  	  
The	  growth	  of	  these	  massive	  pools	  of	  pension	  capital	  in	  turn	  has	  expanded	  the	  
power	  of	  pension	  professionals	  who	  make	  a	  living	  consulting,	  managing	  and	  investing	  
this	  capital.	  Part	  of	  this	  power	  stems	  from	  the	  complexity	  of	  managing	  and	  maintaining	  
a	  healthy	  pension	  plan	  necessitating	  the	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  
pension	  experts.	  For	  instance,	  pension	  lawyers	  are	  involved	  in	  pension	  jurisprudence,	  
working	  with	  regulators,	  lobbying	  for	  legislative	  and	  regulative	  reform	  and	  resolving	  
disputes	  over	  issues	  such	  as	  surplus	  sharing	  and	  “contribution	  holidays”	  (i.e.	  a	  fund	  
sponsor	  take	  a	  break	  from	  funding	  a	  plan	  if	  there	  is	  a	  surplus).	  Pension	  lawyers	  are	  also	  
involved	  in	  establishing	  new	  funds	  and	  winding	  up	  mature	  funds,	  corporate	  
restructuring,	  mergers,	  acquisitions	  and	  developing	  public/private	  partnerships	  (P3s).	  
Actuaries,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  employed	  by	  fund	  managers	  to	  provide	  valuation	  
reports.	  Their	  job	  is	  to	  determine	  expenses,	  forecast	  interest	  rates	  and	  contributions	  
and	  calculate	  how	  much	  funding	  a	  plan	  will	  need	  over	  the	  long	  run	  to	  stay	  at	  a	  particular	  
level	  of	  funding,	  usually	  over	  a	  fifteen-­‐year	  period.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  esoteric	  nature	  of	  this	  knowledge,	  corporate	  and	  trustee	  boards	  that	  
have	  the	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  to	  manage	  pension	  assets	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  
members	  rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  expertise	  and	  consultancy	  of	  these	  professional	  groups.	  
Control	  of	  this	  knowledge	  places	  considerable	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  pension	  




persuade	  their	  clients	  in	  one	  direction	  of	  the	  other.	  As	  one	  fund	  manager	  with	  
experience	  in	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  funds	  describes:	  	  
All	  those	  clients,	  even	  the	  large	  sophisticated	  clients	  out	  there	  did	  not	  -­‐	  they	  weren't	  
pension	  experts,	  they	  were	  experts	  at	  running	  their	  business,	  or	  they	  were	  HR	  experts.	  
So	  the	  role	  of	  the	  actuary	  was	  pretty	  powerful	  in	  that	  they	  would	  walk	  into	  a	  pension	  
committee	  meeting	  or	  Board,	  and	  nobody	  had	  the	  knowledge	  to	  challenge	  or	  maybe	  to	  
ask	  the	  right	  questions	  around	  'what	  if	  interest	  rates	  continued	  to	  decline,	  or	  what	  if	  
people	  continue	  to	  live	  long.’	  They	  hadn't	  asked	  from	  my	  view	  the	  right	  questions.	  So	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  actuary	  was	  actually	  very	  powerful	  (Actuary,	  April	  2015).	  
	  
As	  this	  participant	  highlights,	  the	  complexity	  of	  managing	  a	  pension	  fund	  and	  the	  
technical	  proficiency	  required	  to	  provide	  legal	  advice	  or	  write	  a	  valuation	  report	  
decreases	  the	  ability	  of	  their	  clients	  to	  question	  the	  legal	  and	  actuarial	  advice	  they	  
receive.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  Weberian	  notion	  of	  rational-­‐legal	  authority,	  this	  possession	  of	  
technical	  knowledge	  serves	  as	  basis	  of	  domination,	  in	  which	  professional	  practices	  are	  
legitimated	  as	  a	  source	  of	  authority	  (Weber	  1978).	  Domination,	  according	  to	  Weber	  is	  
the,	  “…probability	  that	  certain	  specific	  commands…will	  be	  obeyed	  by	  a	  given	  group	  of	  
persons”	  (Weber	  1978:	  53).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  pension	  consultancy,	  as	  described	  by	  this	  
participant,	  experts	  can	  successfully	  garner	  the	  deference	  of	  their	  clients	  depending	  on	  
the	  ability	  (or	  inability)	  of	  their	  clients	  to	  ask	  appropriate	  questions.	  	  	  
Across	  a	  professional	  industry,	  common	  practices	  develop	  and	  can	  become	  
standardized.	  Pension	  professionals	  as	  an	  interest	  group	  assert	  their	  collective	  voice	  
through	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Canadian	  Institute	  of	  Actuaries	  (CIA),	  the	  Association	  
of	  Canadian	  Pension	  Management	  (ACPM)	  and	  the	  Ontario	  Bar	  Association	  (OBA).	  These	  




recommendation	  reports	  that	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  professionals	  as	  a	  stakeholder	  
in	  the	  pension	  community.	  	  
	  
Professional	  practices	  and	  representing	  client	  interests	   	  
Several	  participants	  opined	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  professional	  consultants	  have	  adopted	  
their	  client’s	  interests	  as	  their	  own,	  generating	  a	  narrow	  perspective	  that	  limits	  their	  
ability	  to	  analyze	  pension	  issues	  from	  a	  “big	  picture”	  perspective.	  Commissioner	  Harry	  
Arthurs	  claimed	  that:	  “Pension	  professionals	  –	  lawyers	  and	  actuaries	  –	  become	  by	  
default	  spokespersons	  for	  the	  clientele	  community	  they	  represent”	  (Arthurs	  2009:	  7).	  
Often	  professionals	  had	  distorted	  knowledge	  that	  stemmed	  from	  their	  clients	  who	  
employ	  them,	  providing	  ideological	  and	  financial	  affinities.	  This	  dynamic	  hindered	  their	  
ability,	  according	  to	  one	  participant,	  "...to	  think	  about	  system	  issues",	  in	  which	  
professionals	  often	  framed	  contentious	  pension	  policy	  issues	  in	  anecdotal	  terms	  
(Lawyer	  3,	  November	  2014).	  This	  participant	  provided	  two	  examples.	  First,	  several	  
professionals	  whose	  clients	  were	  employers	  argued	  DB	  pension	  plan	  coverage	  was	  
decreasing	  because	  of	  over-­‐regulation	  and	  the	  financial	  burdens	  they	  produced	  on	  
employers.	  In	  fact,	  only	  a	  small	  set	  of	  industries	  have	  DB	  pensions,	  such	  as	  
manufacturing,	  unionized	  workers	  and	  the	  public	  sector.	  This	  participant	  pointed	  out	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  union	  density	  and	  DB	  coverage,	  with	  80%	  of	  
DB	  members	  belonging	  to	  a	  union:	  "As	  manufacturing	  shrunk,	  pension	  coverage	  shrunk.	  
So,	  ok	  that’s	  one	  case	  where	  this	  tendency	  to	  analyze	  anecdotally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  advice	  




November	  2014).	  The	  other	  example	  involved	  Ontario’s	  Pension	  Benefit	  Guarantee	  
Fund	  (PBGF),	  a	  government	  run	  insurance	  fund	  in	  Ontario	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  protect	  
the	  pensions	  of	  workers	  of	  a	  company	  that	  has	  become	  insolvent.	  Many	  actuaries	  
claimed	  the	  PBGF	  promoted	  risky	  behavior	  since	  it	  would	  bailout	  bad	  pension	  
investment	  behavior.	  When	  looking	  at	  how	  many	  companies	  actually	  had	  to	  draw	  from	  
the	  PBGF	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  fund	  had	  only	  been	  used	  a	  handful	  of	  times,	  
contradicting	  what	  many	  actuaries	  were	  claiming.	  
Another	  participant	  that	  works	  for	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  plan	  critiques	  the	  
actuarial	  profession	  by	  arguing	  that	  when	  writing	  valuation	  reports,	  actuaries	  tend	  to	  
analyze	  issues	  facing	  a	  pension	  fund	  from	  a	  math	  perspective	  rather	  than	  
contextualizing	  more	  broadly	  some	  of	  the	  social	  dimensions	  into	  the	  pension	  problems.	  	  
So	  there	  are	  bigger	  social	  issues…	  So	  even	  though	  I	  would	  say	  actuaries	  are	  pension	  
experts,	  they	  don't,	  all	  of	  them	  don't	  always	  see	  the	  large	  picture.	  I'm	  not	  trying	  to	  be	  
hard	  on	  the	  profession	  that	  I	  studied	  on,	  but	  like	  any	  profession,	  you	  need	  facts	  to	  make	  
an	  informed	  decision.	  If	  your	  facts	  are	  all	  private	  sector	  based,	  and	  because	  accounting	  
rules	  and	  low	  interest	  rates,	  a	  lot	  of	  private	  sector	  companies	  are	  shutting	  down	  their	  
DB	  programs	  (Actuary,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
These	  actuaries	  often	  adopt	  the	  same	  positivistic	  perspective	  as	  investment	  
professionals	  when	  looking	  at	  how	  to	  cut	  costs,	  such	  as	  erasing	  the	  early	  retirement	  
provision	  of	  a	  plan.	  Given	  that	  most	  actuaries	  work	  for	  private	  sector	  employer	  
sponsored	  plans,	  their	  perspectives	  dominate	  mainstream	  actuarial	  practices.	  These	  
practices	  have	  been	  used	  in	  writing	  valuation	  reports	  for	  public	  sector	  plans	  that	  
function	  under	  a	  different	  set	  of	  regulatory	  and	  social	  circumstances.	  According	  to	  this	  




government,	  the	  actuarial	  community,	  and	  plan	  sponsors	  together.	  The	  economist	  math	  
lens	  used	  by	  many	  actuaries	  with	  private	  sector	  clients	  will	  not	  adequately	  address	  
problems	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  for	  example,	  losing	  sight	  of	  the	  broader	  social	  implications	  
and	  function	  that	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  play	  in	  labour	  markets	  and	  society.	  	  
These	  practices	  can	  also	  discount	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  knowledge	  on	  
workforce	  composition	  and	  economic	  conditions.	  Before	  the	  2000s,	  one	  participant	  
describes	  how	  employer	  pension	  decisions	  were	  typically	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  human	  
resource	  (HR)	  management	  that	  was	  intimately	  familiar	  with	  a	  company’s	  workforce,	  
their	  union,	  and	  the	  community	  in	  which	  this	  workforce	  was	  embedded.	  However,	  as	  
interest	  rates	  increased,	  pension	  surpluses	  disappeared	  and	  accounting	  standards	  
tightened,	  forcing	  pension	  liabilities	  onto	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  companies	  for	  the	  first	  
time,	  pension	  issues	  became	  a	  concern	  of	  accountants	  and	  chief	  financial	  officers	  (CFO):	  
So	  then	  who	  are	  the	  decision	  makers	  [of	  pension	  funds]?	  Well,	  for	  traditional	  corporate	  
GM	  type	  plan	  you	  got	  your	  head	  of	  HR	  who	  used	  to	  be	  the	  head	  of	  the	  plan,	  because	  he	  
was	  the	  head	  of	  human	  resources.	  But	  increasingly	  it	  becomes	  a	  financial	  object,	  right.	  
This	  big	  massive	  liability	  shows	  up	  on	  the	  balance	  sheet,	  the	  big	  assets	  pay	  for	  it,	  it	  all	  
needs	  investing	  somewhere,	  it	  all	  needs	  hedging,	  it	  all	  needs	  constant	  maintenance.	  It	  
becomes	  kind	  of	  a	  CFO	  type	  function	  (Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014).	  
	  
This	  is	  one	  example	  in	  which	  changes	  occurring	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  
shape	  stakeholder	  debate	  at	  the	  micro	  level.	  This	  participant	  noted	  how	  heads	  of	  office	  
move	  abroad	  to	  compete	  on	  a	  more	  global	  level,	  where	  many	  CFOs	  are	  no	  longer	  
Canadian,	  do	  not	  have	  an	  adequate	  understanding	  of	  labour	  relations	  and	  are	  more	  
likely	  to	  talk	  to	  other	  financial	  professionals	  rather	  than	  labour	  lawyers	  for	  example,	  




from	  local	  decision-­‐making	  structures,	  perspectives	  on	  the	  value	  of	  DB	  plans	  and	  how	  to	  
manage	  these	  plans	  in	  a	  context	  of	  corporate	  restructurings	  occurs,	  changing	  the	  
character	  of	  stakeholder	  debate	  at	  the	  micro	  level.	  	  
To	  summarize,	  pension	  debates	  are	  informed	  by	  professional	  practices	  through	  
the	  control	  of	  specialist	  technical	  knowledge.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  pension	  professionals	  
impact	  the	  policymaking	  process	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  conjecture.	  However,	  to	  be	  sure,	  
transformations	  within	  the	  workplace	  pension	  industry	  have	  elevated	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
pension	  expert	  as	  another	  source	  of	  opinion	  in	  pension	  debates.	  Industry	  practices	  that	  
are	  espoused	  by	  central	  professional	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Canadian	  Institute	  of	  Actuaries	  
legitimate	  particular	  perspectives	  on	  specific	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  viability	  of	  DB	  plans.	  
Organizations	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  pension	  professionals	  regularly	  produce	  
policy	  recommendation	  reports	  and	  are	  present	  during	  consultation	  processes	  
conducted	  by	  government	  policymakers.	  	  
	  
Case	  Study	  –	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  
	  
The	  first	  two	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  have	  discussed	  mostly	  in	  abstract	  terms	  variables	  
that	  drive	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario.	  To	  ground	  this	  discussion	  empirically,	  the	  Ontario	  
Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP)	  is	  examined	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  contextualize	  the	  
interaction	  between	  the	  factors	  outlined	  through	  Sections	  1	  and	  2.	  What	  factors	  and	  
conditions	  prompted	  the	  commission?	  What	  processes	  and	  actors	  fed	  into	  its	  




opinion?	  Using	  this	  case	  study,	  the	  interaction	  between	  ideas,	  interests,	  institutions,	  and	  
material	  conditions	  is	  explored.	  
	  
Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  
The	  political-­‐economic	  conditions	  that	  prompted	  the	  OECP	  in	  2006	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  
multitude	  of	  ideational,	  institutional	  and	  group	  interest	  factors,	  producing	  the	  second	  
major	  round	  of	  reform	  the	  PBA	  since	  its	  enactment	  in	  1965.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  
workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  disarray,	  following	  two	  
tumultuous	  decades	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  characterized	  by	  corporate	  restructurings	  
and	  a	  shrinking	  manufacturing	  sector	  that	  eliminated	  many	  high-­‐value	  fulltime	  jobs	  in	  
the	  private	  sector.	  Corporate	  restructurings	  were	  producing	  asset	  transfer	  problems	  
regarding	  pension	  savings	  for	  workers	  and	  employers,	  becoming	  an	  impediment	  to	  
business	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  December	  2014).	  While	  Ontario’s	  economy	  deepened	  its	  
participation	  within	  global	  chains	  of	  economic	  production,	  vitriolic	  class	  struggles	  over	  
ownership	  of	  fund	  surpluses	  between	  workers	  and	  employers	  ensued.	  This	  tinderbox	  of	  
tension	  engendered	  a	  political	  culture	  of	  inertia	  and	  avoidance	  amongst	  political	  leaders	  
who	  feared	  severe	  political	  backlash	  (Leech	  and	  McNish	  2013;	  Myles	  2013).	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  political	  action,	  case	  law	  became	  a	  major	  source	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  
the	  1990s,	  playing	  arbiter	  in	  disputes	  over	  pension	  surplus	  that	  were	  producing	  
unintended	  consequences	  for	  stakeholders	  and	  policymakers	  (Kaplan	  and	  Fraser	  2013).	  
	   The	  result	  of	  these	  events	  was	  an	  institutional	  response	  from	  Ontario’s	  Ministry	  




2000s,	  pension	  officials	  in	  Ontario’s	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  were	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  
the	  state	  of	  pension	  policy.	  In	  their	  opinion,	  the	  PBA	  had	  become	  deficient	  in	  dealing	  
with	  Ontario’s	  changing	  economic	  and	  labour	  force	  context.	  Letting	  the	  courts	  decide	  
was	  not	  deemed	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  Within	  this	  institutional	  context,	  pension	  
officials	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  were	  the	  first	  to	  voice	  the	  idea	  of	  forming	  an	  
independent	  expert	  commission	  to	  examine	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  to	  provide	  
policy	  recommendations	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  reform	  the	  PBA.	  Some	  officials	  claimed	  
that	  they	  had	  been	  “lobbying	  furiously”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  3,	  December	  2014)	  for	  a	  
commission	  to	  address	  a	  system	  that	  “was	  very	  long	  in	  the	  tooth”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  
December	  2014).	  	  
The	  contentious	  political	  culture	  that	  had	  been	  produced	  by	  class	  struggles	  to	  
determine	  ownership	  of	  pension	  surplus	  also	  shaped	  the	  initial	  parameters	  for	  new	  
ideas	  to	  come	  to	  life.	  Officials	  first	  approached	  Conservative	  Finance	  Minister	  Janet	  
Ecker	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  about	  forming	  a	  commission,	  trying	  to	  convince	  Ecker	  that	  
reforms	  could	  be	  made	  that	  would	  not	  be	  politically	  controversial.	  While	  sympathetic	  to	  
the	  idea,	  Ecker	  rejected	  their	  proposal	  due	  to	  the	  current	  political	  climate,	  claiming	  she	  
could	  not	  take	  their	  proposal	  to	  her	  colleagues	  in	  Cabinet.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  Eves	  
Conservative	  government	  was	  embroiled	  in	  the	  fallout	  of	  Bill	  198	  that	  forced	  Ecker	  and	  
Eves	  to	  rescind	  pension	  legislation	  from	  the	  bill	  one	  month	  later,	  contributing	  to	  their	  
political	  defeat	  during	  the	  provincial	  election	  the	  following.	  It	  would	  take	  several	  more	  




During	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  McGuinty	  government’s	  mandate,	  while	  pension	  
officials	  continued	  to	  lobby	  for	  an	  independent	  commission,	  the	  perception	  of	  pensions	  
as	  being	  toxic	  remained,	  and	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  first	  term	  in	  office	  the	  Liberals	  
were	  reluctant	  to	  touch	  the	  pension	  file	  (Lawyer	  2,	  November	  2014).	  But	  this	  changed	  
towards	  the	  end	  of	  their	  first	  term.	  Finance	  Minister	  Greg	  Sorbara,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  
Premier	  McGuinty,	  agreed	  that	  issues	  such	  as	  solvency,	  contributions	  and	  the	  shrinking	  
percentage	  of	  workers	  in	  DB	  plans	  required	  the	  work	  of	  an	  independent	  commissioner	  
to	  examine	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  Concern,	  too,	  was	  growing	  in	  
other	  jurisdictions	  over	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  (including	  
B.C.,	  Alberta	  and	  Quebec).	  	  
The	  timing	  in	  which	  the	  Liberal	  government	  formally	  initiated	  the	  OECP	  
highlights	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Sorbara	  and	  the	  Liberal	  government	  viewed	  the	  
commission	  as	  a	  useful	  political	  tool	  to	  manage	  public	  opinion	  between	  election	  cycles.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  initiating	  a	  commission	  symbolized	  the	  government’s	  intent	  to	  
address	  simmering	  pension	  issues,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  postponed	  the	  
government	  having	  to	  make	  any	  controversial	  decisions	  leading	  up	  to	  an	  election	  
period.	  Indeed,	  temporal	  and	  political	  factors	  facilitated	  the	  ideational	  process	  of	  
establishing	  an	  expert	  pension	  commission.	  The	  commissioner	  would	  be	  busy	  
conducting	  work	  while	  the	  government	  campaigned,	  allowing	  the	  government	  to	  “bunt”	  
pension	  issues	  from	  election	  cycle	  to	  the	  next	  (Lawyer	  2,	  November	  2014).	  
As	  such,	  the	  idea	  of	  forming	  an	  independent	  commission	  found	  success	  through	  




new	  provincial	  government	  that	  was	  not	  directly	  embroiled	  in	  a	  pension	  political	  crisis;	  
the	  actions	  of	  other	  provincial	  governments	  that	  sought	  to	  reform	  their	  respective	  
pension	  legislation;	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  an	  upcoming	  election	  that	  generated	  a	  political	  
opportunity	  to	  conduct	  an	  independent	  commission.	  All	  were	  factors	  facilitating	  the	  
birth	  of	  the	  OECP.	  	  
	  
Analysis	  
Ultimately,	  at	  the	  macro	  structural	  level,	  it	  was	  the	  levers	  of	  expanding	  economic	  
globalization	  and	  the	  transforming	  conditions	  of	  production	  in	  Ontario	  that	  drove	  new	  
ideas	  into	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process	  in	  Ontario.	  Shifts	  in	  Ontario’s	  economic	  
structure	  fueled	  corporate	  restructuring,	  contracted	  the	  province’s	  manufacturing	  
sector,	  and	  galvanized	  class	  conflict	  over	  the	  ownership	  of	  pension	  surplus,	  exposing	  the	  
inadequacies	  of	  existing	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  juncture	  
that	  institutional,	  ideational	  and	  group	  interests	  intersected	  to	  produce	  the	  OECP.	  	  
The	  PBA	  had	  been	  last	  reformed	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  to	  address	  economic	  
conditions	  of	  that	  period,	  in	  which	  cradle	  to	  grave	  employment	  remained	  an	  economic	  
reality	  for	  millions	  of	  private	  sector	  employees,	  for	  whom	  pension	  coverage	  had	  yet	  to	  
drop	  dramatically.	  But	  as	  these	  circumstances	  changed,	  this	  version	  of	  the	  PBA	  had	  
become	  antiquated,	  unable	  to	  sufficiently	  address	  emerging	  political-­‐economic	  
conditions	  presented	  by	  economic	  globalization.	  As	  well,	  pension	  policymaking	  became	  
the	  de	  facto	  responsibility	  of	  the	  courts	  through	  case	  law,	  whereby	  rulings	  were	  passed	  




Structural	  changes	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  shifted	  ideation	  occurring	  at	  the	  
institutional	  level.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  one,	  ideas	  can	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
at	  multiple	  points.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  OECP,	  the	  initial	  idea	  for	  a	  commission	  to	  mitigate	  
the	  toxic	  conditions	  of	  Ontario’s	  pension	  file	  came	  from	  the	  bureaucracy	  within	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  moving	  upwards,	  fueled	  by	  the	  constant	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  
bureaucratic	  officials	  whose	  mandate	  was	  to	  monitor	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system.	  One	  
government	  official	  described	  this	  process	  as	  follows:	  
…we	  had	  at	  that	  point	  [in	  the	  early	  2000s]	  begun	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  for	  a	  pension	  
commission,	  then	  we	  brought	  that	  forward	  with	  the	  new	  government.	  And	  so	  that	  was,	  
this	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  smooth	  the	  way	  for	  pension	  reform	  on	  a	  go-­‐forward	  
basis.	  This	  is	  bottom	  up	  now,	  and	  just	  us	  trying	  to	  make	  these	  things	  possible.	  And	  it	  was	  
actually	  very	  neat	  that	  you	  could	  have	  Sorbara	  who	  had	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  premier	  
and	  he	  saw	  that	  and	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  support	  this	  endeavor	  (Policy	  Analyst	  2,	  
December	  2014).	  	  
 
Indeed,	  the	  control	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  proximity	  of	  pension	  officials	  and	  
regulators	  within	  the	  provincial	  government	  to	  the	  structural	  issues	  facing	  the	  pension	  
system	  as	  a	  whole	  facilitated	  the	  bureaucracy	  as	  a	  key	  site	  of	  ideation.	  	  
At	  this	  juncture,	  one	  can	  observe	  the	  interaction	  between	  ideology	  and	  ideation,	  
in	  which	  the	  former	  provides	  the	  institutional	  parameters	  for	  the	  latter.	  The	  ideological	  
disposition	  and	  commitment	  to	  a	  particular	  interest	  group	  within	  a	  governing	  party	  and	  
bureaucracy	  shaped	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  OECP’s	  mandate	  and	  preemptively	  charted	  
the	  direction	  of	  the	  OECP	  by	  choosing	  Arthurs	  as	  its	  commissioner.	  This	  nod	  towards	  
labour	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  exemplified	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  longer-­‐term	  pattern	  that	  
had	  begun	  in	  the	  1980s,	  which	  saw	  political	  leaders	  respond	  to	  some	  of	  the	  collective	  




political	  leaders,	  and	  bureaucrats	  were	  embracing	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  
interests	  of	  employees.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  during	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Pension	  
Commission	  of	  Ontario	  (PCO)	  had	  been	  given	  increased	  regulatory	  powers	  to	  ensure	  
employee	  interests	  were	  provided	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  during	  arbitration	  and	  appeals	  
made	  by	  employers,	  who	  typically	  could	  afford	  independent	  legal	  counsel	  (Kaplan	  and	  
Frazer	  2013).	  Secondly,	  the	  class	  struggle	  over	  ownership	  of	  pension	  surplus	  and	  the	  
moratorium	  placed	  on	  surplus	  withdrawal	  reflected	  the	  effective	  impact	  of	  labour	  and	  
public	  opinion	  on	  political	  leaders.	  The	  Liberal	  party	  in	  1980	  had	  also	  introduced	  
Canada’s	  only	  workplace	  pension	  government	  sponsored	  pension	  insurance	  system	  with	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Guarantee	  Fund	  (PBGF).	  Moreover,	  the	  
Liberal	  party	  had	  witnessed	  the	  severe	  political	  backlash	  endured	  by	  the	  Conservative	  
Party	  led	  by	  Premier	  Ernie	  Eves	  with	  Bill	  198	  in	  2002.	  A	  commissioner	  with	  labour	  
credentials	  fit	  the	  political	  climate	  and	  ideological	  position	  of	  the	  Liberal	  party	  and	  
pension	  bureaucracy.	  	  	  
At	  the	  micro	  level,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  OECP,	  the	  media	  and	  
public	  opinion	  played	  less	  of	  an	  influence	  in	  establishing	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  
policymaking	  process.	  This	  differed,	  for	  example,	  from	  changes	  to	  Bill	  198,	  when	  
Premier	  Eves	  and	  Finance	  Minister	  Ecker	  were	  compelled	  to	  rescind	  pension	  legislation	  
from	  their	  2002	  Budget	  Bill	  as	  public	  opinion	  erupted	  over	  wording	  that	  was	  interpreted	  
as	  limiting	  workers’	  rights	  to	  pension	  surplus.	  In	  this	  case,	  intense	  media	  coverage,	  along	  
with	  damning	  public	  opinion	  and	  worker	  activism	  shaped	  policy	  changes	  to	  Bill	  198,	  




Once	  the	  OECP	  had	  been	  established,	  institutional	  dynamics	  between	  different	  
groups	  within	  government	  competed	  to	  define	  the	  ideational	  parameters	  of	  the	  OECP’s	  
mandate.	  Several	  participants	  familiar	  with	  the	  OECP	  discussed	  how	  officials	  in	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Finance	  were	  adamant	  that	  Arthurs	  not	  use	  the	  OECP	  to	  make	  
recommendations	  for	  CPP	  expansion,	  or	  propose	  a	  provincial	  public	  pension	  plan.	  One	  
participant	  speculated	  that	  it	  was	  to	  “protect	  the	  Ministry”	  (Lawyer	  3,	  November	  2014).	  
Officials	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  were	  seeking	  technical	  solutions	  to	  the	  PBA’s	  
problems,	  rather	  than	  reforming	  the	  pension	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  would	  
significantly	  reshape	  the	  work	  conducted	  within	  their	  office.	  However,	  as	  the	  
commission	  conducted	  initial	  consultations	  during	  the	  development	  a	  White	  Paper	  
outlining	  the	  major	  issues	  facing	  the	  pension	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  Arthurs	  reported	  back	  
to	  government	  that	  many	  stakeholders	  were	  discussing	  these	  larger	  ideas,	  and	  it	  was	  
incumbent	  upon	  the	  commissioner	  to	  report	  these	  ideas,	  even	  if	  they	  did	  move	  beyond	  
the	  OECP’s	  mandate.	  Conflict	  between	  the	  commissioner	  and	  staff	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Finance	  ensued;	  however,	  it	  was	  noted	  by	  one	  participant	  that	  the	  commissioner	  had	  
the	  unflinching	  support	  of	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  to	  pursue	  an	  expanded	  mandate.	  On	  this	  
account,	  the	  OECP’s	  mandate	  became	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  embedded	  within	  an	  
institutional	  nexus	  between	  the	  Minister,	  members	  of	  his	  staff,	  and	  the	  commissioner,	  
in	  which	  different	  groups	  sought	  to	  control	  ideational	  processes,	  limiting	  the	  reach	  of	  
particular	  ideas.	  The	  product	  of	  these	  struggles	  came	  to	  determine	  the	  broader	  contours	  




Once	  the	  commission	  had	  formed	  with	  a	  secure	  mandate,	  the	  ideation	  process	  
also	  changed.	  Now	  stakeholders	  outside	  the	  institutional	  level	  become	  an	  important	  
source	  of	  ideas.	  The	  OECP	  systematically	  consulted	  all	  pension	  stakeholders,	  from	  large	  
lobby	  associations	  representing	  employer	  and	  employee	  interests,	  to	  retiree	  groups,	  
academics,	  professional	  associations,	  and	  individual	  concerned	  citizens.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  a	  broader	  mandate	  facilitated	  entry	  of	  bigger	  ideas	  into	  the	  OECP.	  In	  this	  context,	  
the	  commission	  provided	  more	  opportunity	  for	  ideas	  from	  the	  “bottom”	  to	  enter	  the	  
policymaking	  process.	  These	  ideas	  from	  stakeholder	  groups	  found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  
OECP’s	  recommendations	  that	  were	  then	  used	  to	  draft	  Bills	  236	  and	  120,	  which	  
reformed	  the	  PBA	  in	  2010.	  These	  bills	  updated	  the	  PBA	  on	  issues	  including:	  partial	  
windups	  of	  pension	  plans;	  grow-­‐in	  rights;	  immediate	  vesting	  rules;	  simplified	  asset	  
transfers	  rules;	  improved	  member	  communications	  for	  plan	  amendments;	  and	  clearer	  
surplus	  entitlement	  rules	  (Faba	  2011)	  (see	  Chapter	  Five).	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  stage	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  OECP,	  the	  struggle	  to	  
define	  its	  mandate,	  and	  the	  ideational	  space	  the	  commission	  created	  once	  it	  began	  
stakeholder	  consultations,	  exemplifies	  the	  different	  combinations	  in	  which	  institutions,	  
ideas	  and	  interests	  interact,	  driving	  pension	  policymaking.	  To	  be	  sure,	  “ideas	  are	  always	  
and	  necessarily	  tied	  to	  particular	  interests	  and	  enciphered	  in	  particular	  relations	  of	  
power,	  and	  tied	  to	  particular	  power/knowledge	  configurations	  (McLaren	  2016:	  xxv).	  For	  
ideas	  to	  mobilize	  and	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process	  certain	  institutional	  conditions	  




conditions	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  machinations	  of	  global	  economic	  expansion	  and	  the	  impact	  




This	  chapter	  has	  presented	  a	  series	  of	  variables	  that	  inform	  the	  policymaking	  process	  
and	  drive	  policy	  change,	  as	  described	  by	  pension	  experts	  in	  Ontario	  interviewed	  for	  this	  
project.	  Furthermore,	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  institutional	  context	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
OECP	  was	  examined	  to	  provide	  an	  empirical	  example	  of	  how	  different	  variables	  
intersect	  to	  shape	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process.	  The	  multitude	  of	  variables	  
discussed	  is	  not	  ordered	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  importance	  nor	  does	  this	  chapter	  claim	  to	  
provide	  an	  exhaustive	  analysis	  of	  every	  category	  of	  variables	  that	  informs	  policy	  change.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  model	  presented	  here	  rejects	  linear	  models	  of	  policy	  change	  premised	  on	  
the	  ordering	  of	  variables	  that	  can	  be	  analyzed	  for	  their	  predictive	  capabilities.	  Instead,	  
by	  exploring	  the	  interrelationships	  between	  interest	  groups,	  ideas	  and	  institutions,	  a	  
wider	  perspective	  is	  provided	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  single	  theoretical	  account	  of	  policy	  
change	  (Skocpol	  1992;	  Helco	  1994;	  Lieberman	  2002).	  Put	  differently,	  the	  relationship	  
between	  these	  variables	  must	  be	  examined	  as	  a	  whole.	  By	  using	  the	  model	  presented	  in	  
section	  one,	  one	  can	  better	  understand	  how	  the	  broader	  political-­‐economic	  context	  
shapes	  the	  actions	  of	  interest	  groups,	  the	  pressure	  these	  interests	  puts	  on	  governing	  
institutions,	  and	  the	  ideas	  that	  circulate	  to	  change	  political	  processes:	  “In	  trying	  to	  




interests	  and	  institutions],	  and	  it	  is	  largely	  arbitrary	  at	  which	  point	  we	  cut	  into	  the	  
chain”	  (Helco	  1994:	  380).	  
	   Drawing	  from	  this	  perspective,	  a	  model	  was	  introduced	  defining	  three	  
qualitative	  levels	  that	  drive	  policy	  change	  and	  a	  figure	  that	  illustrated	  the	  relationship	  
between	  these	  variables	  and	  their	  respective	  qualitative	  level.	  This	  model	  considers	  the	  
interrelationships	  between	  political-­‐economic	  structures	  such	  as	  globalization	  and	  
economic	  cycles,	  mid-­‐level	  variables	  that	  include	  temporal,	  institutional,	  ideational,	  and	  
interest	  groups	  factors,	  along	  with	  micro	  level	  factors	  such	  as	  stakeholder	  debate.	  An	  
account	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  was	  then	  described,	  providing	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  
general	  understanding	  of	  the	  formal	  governmental	  process	  of	  drafting	  new	  legislation	  
and	  regulation.	  From	  here,	  other	  institutional	  factors	  were	  considered,	  such	  as	  the	  role	  
of	  case	  law,	  election	  cycles	  and	  jurisdictional	  dynamics	  that	  can	  shape	  the	  timing	  and	  
direction	  of	  pension	  policy.	  
	   Simultaneously,	  the	  role	  and	  movement	  of	  ideas	  is	  examined	  in	  this	  section.	  
Ideological	  apparatuses	  of	  government	  and	  interest	  groups	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  
particular	  groups	  or	  cause	  struggles	  for	  others,	  impacting	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  particular	  
policy	  ideas	  are	  considered.	  By	  considering	  ideational	  processes,	  this	  chapter	  illustrated	  
how	  the	  size	  and	  scope	  of	  an	  idea	  will	  enter	  the	  policymaking	  process	  differently.	  
	   The	  second	  section	  examined	  the	  growing	  role	  of	  pension	  professionals	  who	  
have	  profited	  from	  the	  expanding	  economic	  power	  of	  some	  pension	  plans.	  Their	  
command	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  around	  legal,	  actuarial	  and	  investment	  dimensions	  of	  




in	  policy	  debates.	  Pension	  professionals,	  as	  an	  interest	  group,	  are	  both	  united	  through	  
professional	  associations,	  but	  also	  fundamentally	  divided	  by	  their	  financial	  and	  
ideological	  affinities	  to	  their	  clients’	  interests,	  who	  are	  either	  employers	  or	  employees.	  
As	  a	  consequence,	  pension	  professionals	  can	  adopt	  narrow	  perspectives	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  
anecdotal	  analyses	  of	  important	  social	  aspects	  of	  the	  pension	  system,	  feeding	  political	  
discourse	  over	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  in	  Ontario.	  
	   To	  ground	  the	  abstract	  analysis	  provided	  in	  section	  one	  and	  the	  description	  of	  
the	  role	  and	  power	  of	  interest	  groups	  in	  section	  two,	  section	  three	  examined	  the	  OECP	  
as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  to	  illustrate	  the	  interrelationship	  
between	  variables.	  The	  OECP	  was	  the	  product	  of	  policy	  reforms	  made	  to	  the	  PBA	  in	  the	  
1980s,	  in	  which	  class	  struggle	  over	  pension	  surplus	  ownership	  was	  not	  resolved,	  where	  
two	  decades	  of	  acrimonious	  debate	  and	  court	  rulings	  compelled	  risk	  adverse	  political	  
leaders	  to	  avoid	  the	  minefield	  the	  province’s	  pension	  file.	  It	  was	  through	  a	  combination	  
of	  variables,	  including	  economic,	  temporal,	  bureaucratic,	  political	  and	  interpersonal	  
factors	  that	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  OECP	  in	  2006.	  	  
	   What	  is	  clear	  is	  the	  complexity	  of	  factors	  that	  impact	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  
By	  recognizing	  the	  mutually	  conditioning	  relationship	  between	  this	  mix	  of	  factors,	  one	  
can	  begin	  to	  unravel	  why	  particular	  ideas	  become	  policy	  and	  the	  variables	  that	  have	  





CHAPTER	  7	  –	  RISK,	  INDIVIDUALIZATION,	  AND	  RETIREMENT	  INCOME	  SYSTEMS	  
 
 
“So	  this	  shared-­‐risk	  thing	  is	  more	  or	  less	  about	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  defined	  benefit”	  
(Lawyer	  4,	  July	  2014)	  
	  
	  
“In	  DC	  [defined	  contribution],	  everybody	  is	  doing	  their	  own	  thing.	  How	  much	  do	  I	  save?	  You're	  
either	  going	  to	  save	  too	  much	  or	  too	  little.	  Usually	  you're	  going	  to	  save	  too	  little	  because	  not	  
only	  do	  you	  not	  know	  your	  life	  expectancy,	  you	  don't	  even	  know	  how	  much	  to	  save.”	  (Policy	  
Analyst	  1,	  December	  2014).	  
 
	  
“We	  maintain	  that	  it	  was	  absolutely	  necessary	  for	  the	  government	  to	  respect	  our	  
contract,	  to	  honour	  our	  contract”	  (cited	  from	  CBC	  2015).	  These	  were	  the	  vehement	  
words	  of	  Clifford	  Kennedy,	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  Pension	  Coalition	  NB	  in	  August	  2015,	  a	  
new	  lobby	  organization	  representing	  13,000	  public	  sector	  pensioners	  in	  New	  Brunswick	  
who	  had	  just	  sued	  the	  provincial	  government	  over	  recent	  pension	  reforms.	  	  In	  2012,	  the	  
government	  of	  New	  Brunswick	  introduced	  Target	  Benefit	  Pension	  Plans	  (TBPs)	  (also	  
known	  as	  ‘shared	  risk	  pension	  plans’)	  by	  reforming	  the	  province’s	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act.	  
Target	  benefit	  pension	  plans	  were	  designed	  to	  “split”	  the	  risk	  of	  defined	  benefit	  (DB)	  
government	  plans	  between	  the	  government	  and	  employees	  as	  a	  cost-­‐savings	  measure.	  
New	  Brunswick’s	  DB	  plans	  had	  been	  hit	  hard	  by	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  and	  been	  
subject	  to	  years	  of	  poor	  management.	  Following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  these	  plans	  
were	  significantly	  underfunded.	  This	  new	  “shared	  risk”	  model	  of	  target	  benefit	  plans	  




mechanisms	  to	  limit	  the	  risk	  government	  employers	  were	  exposed	  to	  by	  DB	  plans	  as	  the	  
funding	  status	  of	  many	  plans	  plummeted,	  requiring	  more	  tax	  dollars	  to	  save.	  	  
Within	  this	  context,	  the	  New	  Brunswick	  government	  replaced	  the	  Public	  Service	  
Superannuation	  Act	  (PSSA)	  with	  the	  Public	  Service	  Shared	  Risk	  Pension	  (PSSRP).	  Changes	  
included	  removing	  early	  retirement	  provisions	  and	  replacing	  the	  formula	  used	  to	  
calculate	  pension	  benefits	  from	  the	  “best	  five	  years”	  to	  “career	  average”	  of	  earnings.	  
Also,	  inflation	  protection	  via	  indexation	  was	  no	  longer	  guaranteed;	  instead,	  it	  was	  
contingent	  on	  the	  pension	  plan’s	  financial	  status.	  By	  replacing	  the	  province’s	  DB	  plans	  
with	  target	  benefit	  plans	  that	  exposed	  retirees	  and	  members	  to	  more	  risk,	  the	  
government	  of	  New	  Brunswick	  unilaterally	  reneged	  on	  their	  pension	  promise	  to	  retired	  
government	  workers.	  In	  2014,	  retirees	  organized	  Coalition	  NB,	  a	  political	  organization	  
whose	  mandate	  is	  to	  lobby	  the	  government	  to	  protect	  retiree’s	  DB	  plans.	  Coalition	  NB	  
began	  a	  legal	  fund	  and	  in	  2014	  sued	  the	  government	  of	  New	  Brunswick	  under	  the	  
Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  on	  behalf	  of	  13,000	  pensioners	  over	  pension	  
reforms,	  arguing	  these	  changes	  to	  pension	  benefits	  infringe	  their	  rights	  to	  life	  and	  
security	  and	  discriminate	  against	  them	  based	  on	  their	  age.	  The	  coalition	  began	  
fundraising	  for	  their	  legal	  fund	  and	  hired	  the	  high	  profile	  Toronto-­‐based	  law	  firm	  Koskie	  
Minsky,	  which	  specializes	  in	  pension	  and	  union-­‐side	  labour	  law,	  to	  represent	  their	  
interests	  in	  court.	  
	   This	  case	  reflects	  the	  multifaceted	  dynamics	  characterizing	  the	  relationship	  
between	  risk,	  pension	  policy,	  and	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  (RIS),	  highlighting	  




Six.	  Chapter	  Seven	  explores	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  has	  
been	  individualized	  onto	  workers	  in	  Ontario	  and	  other	  Canadian	  jurisdictions.	  The	  
transfer	  of	  risk	  in	  this	  context	  is	  multifaceted,	  characterized	  by	  the	  complexity	  of	  
intersecting	  factors.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  analysis,	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  
risk	  from	  employer	  to	  employee	  is	  not	  linear,	  but	  occurs	  incrementally	  and	  is	  contingent	  
on	  the	  interplay	  between	  social,	  demographic,	  economic	  and	  institutional	  factors	  that	  
expose	  some	  groups	  of	  workers	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  risk	  compared	  to	  others.	  This	  
argument	  builds	  on	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  but	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  
policymaking	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization	  structured	  by	  broader	  
political-­‐economic	  forces.	  This	  chapter,	  therefore,	  explores	  levels	  of	  risk	  between	  those	  
with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  and	  those	  without,	  while	  also	  discussing	  shifts	  of	  risk	  amongst	  
individuals	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension.	  While	  Ontario	  will	  be	  given	  special	  attention,	  
other	  Canadian	  jurisdictions—provincial	  and	  federal—are	  also	  discussed,	  so	  as	  to	  
develop	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  this	  broad	  structural	  process.	  
The	  first	  substantive	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  provides	  a	  descriptive	  statistical	  
sketch	  of	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  coverage.	  This	  section	  provides	  a	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  of	  
Canada’s	  RIS	  as	  a	  whole.	  Here,	  inequality	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Canada’s	  RIS	  is	  discussed	  to	  provide	  a	  
fuller	  understanding	  of	  how	  risk	  is	  both	  pooled	  within	  DB	  pension	  plans,	  and	  
individualized	  within	  other	  pillars	  of	  the	  RIS.	  The	  relationship	  between	  Canada’s	  aging	  
workforce,	  workplace	  pension	  coverage,	  receipt	  of	  publicly	  funded	  pensions	  such	  as	  Old	  
Age	  Security	  (OAS),	  poverty	  levels	  amongst	  seniors,	  and	  interest	  rates	  from	  the	  1970s	  to	  




social	  and	  demographic	  factors	  and	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  coverage,	  while	  
discussing	  the	  relationship	  between	  individualization	  and	  inequality.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  section,	  two	  recent	  labour	  disputes	  are	  described	  to	  illustrate	  
how	  the	  process	  of	  individualization	  occurs	  during	  periods	  of	  economic	  restructuring	  in	  
both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  in	  Canada.	  Here,	  labour	  disputes	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  
Air	  Canada	  in	  2011	  are	  examined,	  exploring	  how	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation	  played	  a	  
contributing	  role	  in	  the	  political	  struggle	  to	  individualize	  risk	  onto	  workers.	  The	  section	  
considers	  how	  demands	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  systems	  are	  shaped	  
through	  the	  nexus	  among	  labour,	  austerity,	  and	  industrial	  pluralism	  (Stevens	  and	  
Nesbitt	  2014;	  Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016).	  These	  case	  studies	  will	  then	  be	  referenced	  
through	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  remaining	  chapter	  to	  further	  contextualize	  the	  intersection	  
between	  other	  factors	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  
The	  shift	  from	  DB	  to	  DC	  will	  also	  be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  by	  interrogating	  
the	  economic	  and	  political	  dynamics	  that	  surround	  this	  shift	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  means	  for	  
individual	  workers.	  The	  final	  section	  draws	  from	  interview	  transcription	  data.	  This	  
section	  explores	  what	  various	  professionals	  in	  the	  pension	  field	  perceive	  as	  the	  different	  
types	  of	  risks	  facing	  the	  pension	  industry	  and	  individual	  workers	  and	  how	  these	  risks	  
have	  changed.	  Furthermore,	  this	  section	  investigates	  what	  these	  professionals	  think	  the	  
future	  holds	  for	  Ontario’s	  pension	  system	  given	  current	  trends	  in	  Ontario’s	  economy,	  





Pensions,	  Inequality,	  and	  Risk	  
	  
Workplace	  pension	  legislation	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  'minimum	  standards'	  are	  being	  
implemented	  for	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension.	  For	  workers	  without	  a	  plan,	  the	  
Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  has	  nothing	  to	  say.	  Indeed,	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  in	  
Ontario	  and	  across	  Canada	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  replicating	  structures	  of	  income	  
inequality	  because	  legislation	  is	  designed	  only	  to	  protect	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  
pension.	  As	  one	  government	  official	  claimed:	  	  
[R]etirement	  income...basically	  parallels	  or	  duplicates	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  workforce.	  So	  
if	  there's	  inequities,	  if	  there's	  high	  and	  low	  incomes,	  poverty,	  it's	  replicated	  in	  the	  
pension	  world.	  Because	  it's	  high	  valued	  added	  jobs,	  it's	  those	  highly	  remunerative	  jobs	  
where	  employers	  have	  to	  think	  about	  attracting	  employees	  and	  are	  offering	  pension	  
plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  (Policy	  Analyst	  1,	  December	  2014).	  	  
	  
When	  the	  PBA	  was	  enacted	  in	  1965,	  the	  Ontario	  government	  was	  setting	  out	  “minimum	  
standards”	  for	  those	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  interests	  were	  
indeed	  vested	  and	  protected	  by	  law.	  Public	  pensions,	  such	  as	  OAS,	  the	  
Canadian/Quebec	  Pension	  Plan	  (C/QPP)	  and	  Guaranteed	  Income	  Supplement	  (GIS),	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  were	  designed	  to	  combat	  poverty	  levels	  amongst	  seniors.	  These	  were	  
national	  policies	  specifically	  designed	  for	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  in	  society	  as	  part	  
of	  Canada’s	  welfare	  state.	  With	  this	  distinction	  in	  mind	  between	  the	  purpose	  of	  private	  
and	  public	  pension	  policy,	  what	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  inequality,	  poverty	  and	  




When	  discussing	  the	  individualization	  of	  risk,	  it	  must	  be	  done	  so	  in	  relationship	  
to	  other	  policies	  and	  savings	  vehicles.	  Workplace	  pension	  plans	  are	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  
integrated	  RIS.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  Canada’s	  RIS	  is	  constituted	  by	  three	  pillars:	  	  
	  
1) Publicly	  financed	  programs	  generated	  from	  tax	  revenue	  available	  to	  the	  elderly	  
based	  on	  age,	  plus	  years	  of	  residence	  or	  citizenship	  (i.e.	  OAS,	  GIS	  and	  other	  
provincial	  programs);	  
2) Compulsory	  pension	  programs	  designed	  to	  replace	  pre-­‐retirement	  earnings	  (i.e.	  
C/QPP);	  
3) Private	  savings,	  individual	  tax	  assisted	  retirement	  savings	  accounts	  and	  privately	  
administered	  retirement	  income	  plans.	  
	  
Pillars	  1	  and	  2	  have	  been	  structured	  to	  ensure	  retired	  workers	  have	  a	  basic	  income	  base	  
that	  will	  replace	  a	  percentage	  of	  their	  pre-­‐retirement	  income.	  Consequently,	  the	  intent	  
of	  these	  first	  two	  pillars	  has	  been	  to	  distribute	  risk	  across	  Canadian	  society	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  national	  risk	  pool.	  The	  third	  pillar,	  however,	  is	  voluntary.	  It	  is	  this	  segment	  of	  
Canada’s	  RIS	  in	  which	  risk	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  individualized.	  A	  worker	  may	  not	  have	  a	  
workplace	  pension	  plan	  at	  all	  and	  instead	  rely	  on	  personal	  investments,	  purchasing	  
RRSPs,	  or	  using	  tax-­‐free	  savings	  accounts,	  or	  some	  combination	  thereof.	  A	  worker	  may	  
have	  some	  form	  of	  a	  defined	  contribution	  (DC)	  plan,	  a	  target	  benefit	  plan,	  or	  a	  secure	  
defined	  benefit	  (DB)	  plan.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  individualization	  of	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  




must	  examine	  the	  issue	  in	  relationship	  to	  other	  policies	  and	  savings	  vehicles.	  By	  
adopting	  this	  frame	  of	  analysis,	  one	  can	  discuss	  the	  relationship	  between	  workplace	  
pension	  policy,	  poverty	  and	  inequality.	  Using	  descriptive	  statistical	  data	  from	  the	  OECD	  
and	  Statistics	  Canada,	  the	  following	  section	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  poverty	  levels	  
amongst	  seniors	  in	  Canada	  and	  trends	  in	  types	  of	  pension	  coverage	  amongst	  Ontario	  
workers	  to	  illustrate	  the	  broader	  contours	  of	  Canada’s	  RIS,	  highlighting	  which	  workers	  
are	  most	  likely	  to	  experience	  individualized	  risk	  for	  saving	  for	  retirement.	  	  
	  
Senior	  poverty	  in	  Canada	  
Internationally,	  Canada	  ranks	  in	  the	  top	  10	  for	  the	  lowest	  levels	  of	  poverty	  amongst	  
seniors,	  with	  6.7	  percent	  aged	  65	  and	  up	  living	  in	  poverty.	  This	  puts	  Canada	  ahead	  of	  
countries	  such	  as	  New	  Zealand	  (16th),	  Sweden	  (18th),	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (24th),	  the	  
United	  States	  (29th)	  and	  Australia	  (33rd).	  However,	  the	  disparity	  between	  men	  and	  
women	  in	  Canada	  is	  less	  praise	  worthy,	  in	  which	  poverty	  levels	  for	  men	  are	  4.9	  percent,	  
whereas	  the	  number	  nearly	  doubles	  for	  women,	  with	  8.2	  percent	  of	  females	  65	  and	  up	  















Table	  7.1:	  Income	  poverty	  rates	  by	  age	  and	  gender	  in	  OECD	  countries	  (Percentage	  with	  
incomes	  less	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  median	  household	  disposable	  income)	  	  
	  
By	  age	   By	  gender	  Country	   All	  65+	  
66-­75	   76+	   Men	   Women	  
Whole	  
population	  1.	  Netherlands	   2.0	   1.8	   2.3	   1.7	   2.3	   7.9	  2.	  Iceland	   2.8	   2.8	   2.8	   2.5	   3.0	   6.3	  3.	  Czech	  Republic	   2.8	   2.7	   3.0	   1.5	   3.8	   5.3	  4.	  Luxembourg	   3.0	   3.2	   2.7	   3.0	   3.1	   8.4	  5.	  Slovak	  Republic	   3.6	   3.2	   4.3	   0.7	   5.3	   8.4	  6.	  France	   3.8	   2.7	   5.0	   3.0	   4.4	   8.1	  7.	  Norway	   4.1	   2.2	   6.9	   1.8	   6.0	   8.1	  8.	  Denmark	   4.6	   2.7	   7.4	   3.1	   5.8	   5.4	  
9.	  Canada	   6.7	   6.6	   6.9	   4.9	   8.2	   11.8	  10.	  Spain	   6.7	   6.4	   7.1	   5.7	   7.6	   14.0	  11.	  Greece	   6.9	   5.9	   8.1	   5.6	   8.0	   15.1	  12.	  Ireland	   6.9	   6.5	   7.5	   6.9	   7.0	   8.4	  13.	  Finland	   7.8	   4.1	   12.7	   5.1	   9.7	   7.1	  14.	  Portugal	   8.1	   6.4	   9.9	   6.8	   9.0	   13.0	  15.	  Poland	   8.2	   10.4	   5.6	   4.4	   10.5	   10.2	  16.	  New	  Zealand	   8.2	   8.0	   8.5	   5.5	   10.5	   9.9	  17.	  Hungary	   8.6	   7.8	   9.9	   5.0	   10.6	   10.1	  18.	  Sweden	   9.3	   6.6	   13.5	   6.6	   11.6	   9.0	  19.	  Italy	   9.4	   9.5	   9.2	   6.4	   11.5	   12.7	  20.	  Germany	   9.4	   8.1	   10.8	   6.3	   12.3	   8.4	  21.	  Belgium	   10.7	   10.2	   11.4	   9.7	   11.5	   10.2	  22.	  Austria	   11.4	   11.2	   11.6	   9.0	   13.2	   9.6	  23.	  Estonia	   12.1	   12.3	   11.8	   6.9	   14.6	   12.3	  24.	  United	  Kingdom	   13.4	   10.9	   16.6	   10.9	   15.5	   10.5	  25.	  Slovenia	   15.8	   11.7	   21.3	   8.7	   20.7	   9.4	  26.	  Turkey	   17.2	   15.9	   19.3	   15.9	   18.3	   17.8	  27.	  Chile	   18.4	   17.7	   19.3	   N/A	   N/A	   16.3	  28.	  Japan	   19.4	   16.6	   22.8	   N/A	   N/A	   16.0	  29.	  United	  States	   21.5	   17.5	   27.2	   16.5	   25.6	   17.6	  30.	  Switzerland	   23.4	   18.8	   30.5	   19.8	   26.4	   9.1	  31.	  Israel	   24.1	   19.7	   30.0	   21.2	   26.4	   18.6	  32.	  Mexico	   27.0	   25.3	   30.0	   26.0	   27.9	   18.9	  33.	  Australia	   33.5	   30.5	   37.8	   31.0	   35.7	   14.0	  34.	  Korea	   49.6	   46.1	   N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   14.6	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
OECD	   12.4	   10.9	   14.7	   8.4	   12.4	   11.3	  	  Source:	  OECD	  Income	  Distribution	  Database,	  www.oecd.org/social/income-­‐distribution-­‐database.htm.	  	  




During	  the	  twenty	  years	  between	  the	  mid	  1970s	  and	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  low-­‐income	  
rate	  amongst	  seniors	  dropped	  dramatically	  from	  a	  high	  of	  33.1	  percent	  in	  1977	  to	  a	  low	  
of	  3.9	  percent	  in	  1995.	  This	  change	  reflects	  the	  success	  of	  the	  GIS	  and	  the	  maturation	  of	  
C/QPP	  (Baldwin	  2009;	  Myles	  2000).	  Since	  1996,	  however,	  low-­‐income	  rates	  have	  
steadily	  increased	  until	  2011	  from	  3.9	  percent	  to	  13.2	  percent.	  For	  women,	  low-­‐income	  
rates	  rose	  from	  4.7	  percent	  in	  1995	  to	  16.1	  percent	  in	  2010.	  	  
	  
Figure	  7.1:	  Low	  income	  measure	  (LIM)	  after	  tax	  in	  Canada,	  age	  65+,	  1976-­‐2013	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  CANSIM	  table	  206-­‐0041.	  
	  
Figure	  7.1	  illustrates	  how	  income	  security	  amongst	  seniors	  first	  substantially	  
decreased	  in	  the	  final	  quarter	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  but	  then	  steadily,	  albeit	  at	  a	  
slower	  pace,	  increased	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  this	  increase	  illustrate	  









































































Employer	  sponsored	  pension	  coverage	  	  
Employer	  sponsored	  pension	  coverage	  tells	  a	  different	  story	  from	  poverty	  
measurements.	  What	  is	  most	  striking	  about	  Figure	  7.2	  (see	  below)	  are	  the	  varying	  
trajectories	  of	  pension	  coverage	  for	  men	  and	  women	  with	  DB	  plans.	  Pension	  coverage	  
for	  men	  in	  Canada	  grew	  rapidly	  between	  1945	  and	  1970s.	  But	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  
coverage	  had	  plateaued,	  and	  has	  since	  steadily	  decreased	  from	  a	  high	  of	  50.4	  percent	  to	  
a	  low	  of	  36.9	  percent	  in	  2011.	  For	  women,	  the	  story	  has	  been	  different.	  Coverage	  grew	  
steadily	  from	  1945	  to	  1993,	  hitting	  a	  high	  point	  of	  42.4	  percent.	  Since	  1993,	  pension	  
coverage	  for	  women	  has	  remained	  around	  the	  40	  percent	  level,	  while	  for	  men,	  coverage	  
continued	  to	  decrease.	  In	  2004,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history,	  pension	  coverage	  for	  
women	  surpassed	  men.	  In	  2011,	  female	  pension	  coverage	  sat	  at	  40.1	  percent,	  whereas	  
men	  continued	  to	  decline	  to	  36.1	  percent.	  	  
	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  Four	  and	  Five,	  these	  changes	  in	  pension	  coverage	  
reflect	  broader	  social	  transformations	  to	  Canada’s	  labour	  market	  and	  economy.	  More	  
women	  began	  to	  enter	  the	  workforce	  in	  the	  1970s,	  moving	  into	  public	  sector	  jobs,	  while	  
many	  large-­‐employer	  private	  sector	  industrial	  male-­‐dominated	  jobs	  requiring	  less	  
education	  diminished.	  This	  occurred	  simultaneously	  as	  Canada’s	  economy	  restructured	  
to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  economic	  globalization,	  in	  which	  many	  manufacturing	  jobs	  
were	  sent	  overseas.	  These	  trends	  were	  particularly	  felt	  in	  Ontario,	  Canada’s	  largest	  and	  
most	  industrialized	  province.	  Public	  sector	  DB	  plans	  have	  been	  resilient	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
economic	  cycles	  since	  the	  1970s,	  where	  today	  public	  sector	  pension	  funds	  have	  grown	  




more	  women	  than	  men	  in	  public	  sector	  jobs	  in	  Canada,	  thus	  explaining	  higher	  pension	  
coverage	  for	  women	  today.	  	  
	   When	  we	  shift	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  types	  of	  registered	  pension	  plans	  workers	  in	  
Ontario	  have,	  since	  records	  have	  been	  kept,	  we	  see	  that	  DC	  plans	  for	  men	  and	  women	  
have	  been	  steadily	  increasing	  since	  1974.	  Over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years	  the	  number	  of	  
workers	  with	  a	  DC	  plan	  has	  doubled	  for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  7.2:	  Type	  of	  registered	  pension	  plan	  (RPP)	  by	  number	  of	  members,	  by	  sex,	  
Ontario,	  1974	  to	  2014	  
	  
Note:	  Data	  available	  every	  second	  year	  until	  1992.	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  CANSIM	  table	  280-­‐0008.	  
	  
The	  number	  of	  men	  with	  a	  DB	  plan	  illustrates	  the	  most	  dramatic	  change	  in	  pension	  
























































































to	  a	  low	  of	  738,470	  in	  2014.	  Women	  with	  DB	  plans,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  continued	  to	  rise	  
until	  the	  early-­‐2000s,	  and	  since	  then	  as	  remained	  at	  approximately	  86,000	  workers	  in	  
Ontario.	  	  
	   The	  story	  becomes	  clearer	  when	  pension	  coverage	  is	  broken	  down	  by	  sector.	  
Private	  sector	  male	  workers	  have	  experienced	  the	  sharpest	  decrease	  in	  DB	  coverage,	  
while	  public	  sector	  female	  workers	  have	  experienced	  steady	  growth	  in	  DB	  coverage.	  The	  
retirement	  security	  offered	  by	  government	  pension	  plans	  represents	  the	  most	  secure	  
source	  of	  retirement	  income	  in	  the	  form	  of	  DB	  pension	  coverage,	  where,	  as	  discussed	  
above,	  women	  increasingly	  fill	  these	  jobs.	  Even	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  coverage	  rates	  for	  
women	  are	  higher	  than	  for	  men.	  	  
	  
Figure	  7.3:	  Registered	  pension	  plan	  (RPP)	  by	  number	  of	  members,	  by	  sector,	  by	  sex,	  
Ontario,	  1974	  -­‐	  2014	  
	  
Note:	  Data	  available	  every	  second	  year	  until	  1992.	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Table	  7.2	  describes	  pension	  coverage	  by	  type	  of	  plan,	  gender	  and	  industry	  in	  
Canada.	  In	  2012,	  one	  in	  three	  women	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  DB	  pension	  plan,	  while	  the	  
ratio	  is	  one	  in	  four	  for	  men.	  The	  four	  industries	  with	  the	  highest	  coverage	  are:	  1)	  public	  
administration;	  2)	  educational	  services;	  3)	  health	  care	  and	  social	  assistance;	  4)	  finance,	  
insurance	  and	  real	  estate.	  All	  four	  industries	  employ	  more	  women	  than	  men	  and	  
typically	  provide	  secure	  DB	  plans.	  Men	  have	  higher	  levels	  of	  pension	  coverage	  in	  
industries	  such	  as	  construction,	  manufacturing,	  wholesale	  and	  retail,	  and	  
accommodation,	  retail	  and	  other	  services.	  Overall,	  however,	  these	  male	  dominated	  
industries	  have	  smaller	  pension	  coverage	  rates	  and	  require	  lower	  educational	  
qualifications.	  Men	  (11	  percent)	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  a	  DC	  or	  hybrid	  pension	  than	  

























Table	  7.2:	  Pension	  coverage	  by	  gender,	  industry	  and	  pension	  type,	  2012	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  employees	  with	  
RPPs	   DB	  RPPs	   DC	  or	  hybrid	  RPPs	  
	  
Men	   Women	   Men	   Women	   Men	   Women	  
Industries	   35.6	   41.2	   24.3	   32.6	   11.4	   8.7	  
Agriculture,	  mining	  
and	  utilities	  
38.9	   45.2	   18.2	   19.4	   20.7	   25.9	  
Construction	   28.1	   F	   21.5	   F	   6.6	   F	  
Manufacturing	   30.8	   26.5	   16.8	   11.8	   14.0	   14.7	  
Wholesale	  and	  retail	  
trade	  
22.4	   16.4	   6.3	   6.7	   16.1	   9.7	  
Transportation	  and	  
warehousing	  
39.5	   39.0	   28.0	   29.7	   11.6	   F	  
Finance,	  insurance	  and	  
real	  estate	  
51.8	   62.1	   29.1	   36.8	   22.8	   25.3	  
Professional,	  scientific	  
and	  technical	  services	  
18.3	   14.3	   9.8	   F	   8.5	   9.6	  
Management	  of	  
companies	  
F	   F	   F	   F	   F	   F	  
Educational	  services	   74.1	   74.0	   67.5	   68.7	   F	   5.3	  
Health	  care	  and	  social	  
assistance	  
55.0	   51.1	   48.8	   46.5	   F	   4.7	  
Information	  and	  
cultural	  services	  
32.5	   34.7	   14.9	   20.1	   17.6	   14.6	  
Accommodation,	  food,	  
and	  other	  services	  
15.1	   9.3	   F	   F	   F	   F	  
Public	  Administration	   84.7	   85.0	   79.8	   81.0	   4.9	   4.1	  
	  
F	  too	  unreliable	  to	  be	  published.	  
Note:	  Includes	  employees	  aged	  25	  to	  54.	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Longitudinal	  and	  International	  Study	  of	  Adults,	  2012.	  Cited	  from,	  
Drolet,	  Marie	  and	  René	  Morissette	  (2014).	  New	  facts	  on	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada,	  Statistics	  
Canada.	  
	  
	   Table	  7.3	  highlights	  the	  relationship	  between	  level	  of	  education	  and	  type	  of	  
pension	  coverage,	  where	  the	  level	  pension	  coverage	  grows	  with	  the	  level	  educational	  




coverage	  at	  41.9	  percent,	  whereas	  only	  29.7	  percent	  of	  men	  with	  a	  university	  degree	  
are	  covered.	  	  
	  
Table	  7.3:	  Pension	  coverage	  by	  education,	  age,	  gender	  and	  pension	  type,	  2012	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  employees	  with	  
RPPs	   DB	  RPPs	   DC	  or	  hybrid	  RPPs	  	  
	  
	  
Men	   Women	   Men	   Women	   Men	   Women	  
Age	   Percentage	  
25	  to	  54	   35.6	   41.2	   24.3	   32.6	   11.4	   8.7	  
High	  school	  
diploma	  or	  less	  	  
26.7	   27.8	   17.2	   18.0	   9.5	   9.9	  
Trade	  or	  
apprenticeship	  
36.9	   33.3	   24.4	   F	   12.6	   F	  
CEGEP	  or	  college	   37.5	   41.3	   25.0	   32.9	   12.5	   8.4	  
University	  
degree	  	  
41.6	   50.2	   29.7	   41.9	   11.8	   8.3	  
	  
F	  too	  unreliable	  to	  be	  published	  
Note:	  Includes	  employees	  aged	  25	  to	  54.	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Longitudinal	  and	  International	  Study	  of	  Adults,	  2012.	  Cited	  from,	  
Drolet,	  Marie	  and	  René	  Morissette	  (2014).	  New	  facts	  on	  pension	  coverage	  in	  Canada,	  Statistic	  
Canada.	  
	  
In	  Canada,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  with	  either	  a	  DB	  or	  DC/hybrid	  pension	  
plan	  is	  growing,	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  coverage	  is	  decreasing.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  number	  
of	  workers	  entering	  the	  labour	  force	  is	  growing	  faster	  than	  the	  number	  of	  new	  pension	  
members.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  pension	  coverage	  is	  also	  being	  driven	  down	  by	  the	  
diminishing	  rate	  of	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  for	  men.	  As	  Figure	  7.3	  highlights,	  the	  level	  of	  
DB	  plans	  for	  women,	  along	  with	  DC/hybrid	  plans	  for	  both	  genders,	  has	  been	  increasing,	  
while	  for	  men,	  the	  decrease	  in	  DB	  plans	  has	  been	  striking	  by	  comparison.	  Within	  the	  




administration	  have	  become	  Canada’s	  most	  secure	  jobs	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  saving	  for	  
retirement,	  in	  that	  they	  provide	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  secure	  DB	  pension	  coverage.	  These	  
tables	  illustrate	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk	  across	  male	  and	  female	  workers	  
in	  the	  province,	  within	  a	  context	  in	  which	  the	  overall	  trend	  of	  pension	  coverage	  is	  
diminishing.	  	  
As	  such,	  secure,	  DB	  pension	  plans	  in	  Canada	  play	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  the	  
distribution	  of	  wealth	  in	  society	  that	  impacts	  both	  the	  individual	  worker	  and	  the	  family	  
unit.	  In	  this	  case	  risk	  is	  not	  only	  individualized,	  but	  familialized,	  in	  that	  families	  without	  
any	  type	  of	  registered	  pension	  plan	  (RPP)	  assets	  experience	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  
insecurity,	  pointing	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  and	  
inequality.	  Messacar	  and	  Morissette	  (2015)	  compare	  the	  wealth	  holdings	  of	  family	  units	  
covered	  by	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  with	  other	  family	  units	  by	  comparing	  data	  from	  the	  
Survey	  of	  Financial	  Security	  (SFS)	  for	  the	  years	  1999	  and	  2012.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  
families	  with	  workplace	  pensions	  (when	  excluding	  pension	  assets)	  have	  a	  family	  median	  
net	  worth	  of	  $210,600,	  approximately	  three	  times	  higher	  than	  the	  median	  net	  worth	  of	  
families	  with	  no	  RPP	  assets	  ($64,000).	  When	  pension	  assets	  are	  included,	  the	  gap	  
widens	  even	  further,	  where	  the	  median	  net	  worth	  of	  families	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  
grows	  to	  $350,000.	  The	  report	  also	  highlights	  a	  wealth	  difference	  of	  $100,000	  between	  
families	  in	  which	  the	  major	  income	  recipient	  had	  a	  DB	  plan	  compared	  to	  families	  whose	  
main	  earner	  had	  a	  DC	  plan.	  Moreover,	  the	  gap	  between	  families	  with	  and	  without	  RPP	  
assets	  has	  expanded	  over	  time,	  where	  the	  income	  of	  families	  in	  which	  the	  major	  income	  





Figure	  7.4:	  Median	  net	  worth,	  families	  with	  and	  without	  RPP	  assets,	  1999	  -­‐	  2012	  
	  
Notes:	  Includes	  family	  units	  where	  the	  major	  income	  recipient	  is	  aged	  30	  to	  54	  and	  employed	  as	  
a	  paid	  worker.	  Family	  units	  with	  business	  equity	  of	  $1,000	  or	  more	  (in	  2012	  dollars)	  are	  
excluded.	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Survey	  of	  Financial	  Security,	  1999	  and	  2012.	  Cited	  from	  Messacar	  and	  
Morissette	  (2015).	  Employer	  Pensions	  and	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Canadian	  Families,	  Statistics	  Canada.	  
	  
	  
	   When	  examining	  other	  characteristics	  between	  families	  with	  and	  without	  a	  
workplace	  pension,	  Mesacar	  and	  Morissette	  claim:	  “…those	  in	  families	  with	  RPP	  assets	  
were	  more	  educated;	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  born	  in	  Canada	  and	  be	  in	  couples;	  more	  often	  
unionized	  or	  employed	  in	  public	  administration,	  education,	  health	  care	  and	  social	  
assistance;	  and	  had	  longer	  job	  tenure	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  families	  without	  RPP	  
assets”	  (2015:	  3).	  Indeed,	  workplace	  pensions	  lie	  at	  the	  crux	  of	  different	  socio-­‐
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worth	  between	  families	  with	  and	  without	  RPP	  assets	  is	  so	  large.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
authors	  found	  that	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  were	  25	  percent	  more	  likely	  to	  
hold	  registered	  retirement	  savings	  plans	  (RRSPs),	  locked-­‐in-­‐retirement	  accounts	  (LIRAs)	  
or	  principal	  residence	  equity	  (Mesacar	  and	  Morissette	  2015).	  
The	  income	  security	  that	  DB	  plans	  provide	  workers	  with	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
DB	  plans	  augment	  a	  family’s	  net	  assets	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  
workplace	  pensions	  and	  income	  inequality.	  It	  is	  a	  minority	  group	  of	  workers	  within	  
Canada’s	  and	  Ontario’s	  labour	  force	  that	  have	  access	  to	  the	  security	  offered	  by	  a	  DB	  
pension	  plan,	  and	  access	  to	  this	  security	  is	  often	  contingent	  on	  the	  level	  of	  one’s	  
education	  and	  the	  industry	  in	  which	  they	  work.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  workplace	  pension	  
policies	  such	  as	  Ontario’s	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA)	  are	  not	  designed	  to	  redistribute	  
wealth,	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  system	  that	  offers	  
protection	  from	  risk	  for	  a	  minority	  group	  of	  workers,	  while	  failing	  to	  cover	  the	  majority	  
of	  workers	  in	  the	  labour	  force.	  Insecure	  employment	  that	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  
standard	  employment	  relationship,	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  is	  being	  both	  
individualized	  and	  familialized,	  in	  that	  the	  family	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  experience	  more	  
income	  inequality	  if	  the	  major	  income	  earner	  of	  the	  family	  does	  not	  have	  a	  workplace	  
pension	  plan.	  Moreover,	  for	  those	  who	  do	  have	  a	  workplace	  pension	  plan,	  the	  RPP	  is	  
both	  a	  symbol	  of	  wealth	  and	  facilitates	  wealth	  creation	  along	  with	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  
education	  and	  occupation.	  Risk,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  is	  individualized	  is	  thus	  shaped	  





Labour	  Disputes,	  Pensions,	  Policymaking	  and	  Risk	  
	  
Thus	  far,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  workplace	  pensions	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  
relationship	  to	  the	  whole	  retirement	  income	  system	  (i.e.	  pillars	  one	  through	  three).	  This	  
points	  to	  the	  indirect	  structural	  relationship	  that	  exists	  between	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  
pension	  system	  and	  income	  inequality.	  Workplace	  pensions	  have	  become	  a	  vehicle	  of	  
wealth	  creation	  for	  a	  shrinking	  group	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  Canadian	  workforce,	  while	  
income	  inequality	  expands	  for	  other	  groups.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  pension	  coverage	  rates	  
have	  been	  shrinking	  and	  the	  use	  of	  DC	  plans	  has	  been	  increasing,	  what	  other	  variables	  
shape	  this	  process?	  Beyond	  examining	  risk	  using	  pension	  coverage	  levels,	  one	  must	  also	  
examine	  the	  political-­‐economic	  context	  that	  has	  shaped	  how	  risk	  is	  individualized.	  This	  
allows	  one	  to	  consider	  how	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  are	  used	  by	  competing	  interest	  
groups	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  economic	  restructuring	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
‘risk	  society’	  has	  emerged	  in	  Canada	  through	  the	  struggle	  over	  pensions.	  For	  instance,	  
what	  groups	  are	  challenging	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  and	  what	  role	  have	  the	  federal	  and	  
various	  provincial	  governments	  played	  in	  this	  process?	  Furthermore,	  has	  Canada’s	  aging	  
workforce	  and	  plan	  maturity	  transformed	  pension	  fund	  managerial	  practices	  and	  expert	  
consultation?	  Using	  interview	  data,	  this	  section	  examines	  the	  economic,	  political	  
demographic,	  pension	  sponsorship,	  and	  policymaking	  variables	  that	  	  






Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada	  
First,	  to	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  political	  economic	  dynamics,	  two	  mini-­‐case	  studies	  are	  
introduced	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  economic	  restructuring,	  political	  
institutions,	  ideology,	  and	  labour	  markets	  interact	  to	  determine	  how	  risk	  is	  
individualized	  within	  the	  context	  of	  workplace	  pension	  benefits.	  In	  recent	  years,	  large	  
employers	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  have	  demanded	  the	  introduction	  of	  
two-­‐tiered	  pension	  systems	  for	  new	  hires,	  in	  which	  the	  future	  of	  their	  DB	  pension	  plans	  
became	  a	  central	  battleground	  of	  labour	  unrest.	  This	  was	  most	  clearly	  exemplified	  by	  
the	  high	  profile	  lockout	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  strikes	  at	  Air	  Canada	  in	  2011.	  Each	  
organization’s	  pension	  plans	  have	  struggled	  in	  recent	  years	  due	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  
mismanagement,	  aging	  workforce,	  economic	  conditions,	  and	  new	  austerity	  measures	  
introduced	  by	  respective	  employers.	  Additionally,	  these	  labour	  conflicts	  were	  further	  
complicated	  through	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  federal	  government,	  then	  under	  the	  
leadership	  of	  Stephen	  Harper,	  which	  rapidly	  drafted	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation	  in	  both	  
disputes,	  erasing	  each	  union’s	  leverage	  during	  these	  negotiations.	  	  	  
	   To	  begin,	  the	  Canadian	  Union	  of	  Postal	  Workers	  (CUPW)	  has	  been	  engaged	  in	  a	  
protracted	  fight	  over	  the	  past	  six	  years	  against	  Canada	  Post,	  which	  has	  demanded	  that	  a	  
two-­‐tiered	  pension	  system	  for	  new	  hires	  be	  implemented	  –	  something	  that	  is	  common	  
practice	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  but	  unusual	  in	  the	  typically	  secure	  public	  sector.	  
Negotiations	  between	  Canada	  Post	  and	  CUPW	  began	  October	  2010,	  culminating	  in	  a	  
strike	  vote	  in	  April	  2011	  by	  CUPW	  members	  as	  negotiations	  stalled.	  As	  CUPW	  prepared	  




on	  June	  14,	  2011.	  The	  stalemate	  ended	  promptly	  with	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation	  
established	  by	  former	  federal	  Labour	  Minister	  Lisa	  Raitt	  who	  introduced	  the	  Restoring	  
Mail	  Delivery	  for	  Canadians	  Act	  (Bill	  C-­‐6),	  imposing	  Final	  Offer	  arbitration	  on	  CUPW.	  This	  
arbitration	  removed	  bargaining	  leverage	  from	  workers	  and	  imposed	  a	  series	  of	  wage	  
cuts	  and	  a	  new	  pension	  system	  for	  new	  hires.	  This	  bill	  was	  subsequently	  challenged	  in	  
court	  by	  CUPW,	  refuting	  the	  legality	  of	  legislated	  arbitration	  procedure,	  and	  was	  
eventually	  found	  to	  be	  unconstitutional	  (Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016).	  CUPW	  and	  critics	  
viewed	  these	  actions	  of	  the	  previous	  federal	  government	  as	  a	  direct	  assault	  on	  the	  
rights	  of	  labour	  with	  the	  intent	  on	  removing	  job	  security	  from	  public	  sector	  workers	  
(Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016;	  Camfield	  2016;	  Hooger	  et	  al.	  2016).	  	  
Canada	  Post’s	  demands	  for	  a	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  system	  has	  attempted	  to	  divide	  
workers	  along	  generational	  lines,	  calling	  for	  a	  system	  that	  allows	  younger	  generations	  to	  
shoulder	  more	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  protecting	  secure	  
retirement	  benefits	  for	  current	  workers.	  Here,	  DC	  plans	  would	  be	  imposed	  on	  new	  
workers,	  thus	  breaking	  the	  security	  attached	  to	  traditional	  DB	  plans.	  This	  occurred	  along	  
with	  demands	  to	  change	  their	  collective	  agreement	  that	  would	  allow	  increased	  use	  of	  
part-­‐time	  and	  casual	  labour,	  leading	  many	  observers	  to	  claim	  austerity	  measures	  were	  
now	  being	  imposed	  onto	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  replicate	  the	  development	  of	  precarious	  
work	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  (Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016;	  Hoogers	  et	  al.	  2016).	  	  Union	  leaders,	  
for	  their	  part,	  adamantly	  rejected	  any	  proposal	  for	  a	  two-­‐tier	  system,	  claiming	  that	  it	  
would	  pit	  younger	  workers	  against	  older	  workers.	  They	  asserted,	  along	  with	  others	  (see	  




also	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  other	  negotiations	  in	  different	  bargaining	  units,	  especially	  in	  the	  
public	  sector,	  opening	  the	  floodgates	  of	  austerity	  that	  would	  legitimize	  the	  permanent	  
implementation	  of	  less	  secure,	  precarious	  working	  conditions.	  CUPW	  resisted	  a	  two-­‐tier	  
pension	  system	  and	  organized	  a	  public	  campaign,	  including	  a	  national	  “Rally	  for	  
Pensions,	  Pay	  Equity	  and	  Public	  Postal	  Service”	  August	  6th	  at	  Trudeau’s	  MP	  office	  in	  
Montreal,	  maintaining	  DB	  pensions	  as	  a	  central	  pillar	  of	  secure	  working	  conditions	  for	  
current	  and	  future	  postal	  workers.	  
	   The	  current	  round	  of	  collective	  bargaining	  in	  2016	  unfolded	  under	  a	  different	  set	  
of	  circumstances.	  The	  federal	  government	  did	  not	  provide	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation	  and	  
the	  court	  ruling	  that	  found	  the	  arbitrator’s	  binding	  2011	  decision	  as	  unconstitutional	  
limited	  the	  power	  of	  Canada	  Post.	  In	  late	  August,	  Canada	  Post	  reached	  a	  tentative	  deal	  
with	  CUPW,	  averting	  job	  action.	  The	  new	  collective	  agreement	  was	  for	  only	  for	  two	  
years,	  rather	  than	  the	  normal	  four-­‐year	  duration.	  In	  this	  agreement,	  CUPW	  successfully	  
protected	  DB	  pension	  benefits	  for	  new	  hires	  for	  at	  least	  the	  next	  two	  years	  (CBC	  2016).	  
This	  result	  stands	  in	  stark	  difference	  to	  Unifor’s	  September	  2016	  agreement	  with	  
General	  Motors	  Canada,	  in	  which	  Unifor	  agreed	  DC	  plans	  for	  new	  hires,	  potentially	  
spelling	  the	  end	  of	  the	  DB	  plan	  in	  the	  auto-­‐manufacturing	  sector	  (Ryan	  2016)	  (to	  be	  
discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  Eight).	  	  
Workers	  at	  Air	  Canada	  have	  been	  in	  a	  similar	  fight,	  in	  which	  successive	  rounds	  of	  
corporate	  restructuring	  was	  made	  possible	  largely	  through	  concessions	  by	  employees	  




that	  initiated	  DC	  plans	  to	  the	  company’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  
2014).	  	  
An	  organizational	  overhaul	  of	  Air	  Canada	  occurred	  after	  filing	  for	  bankruptcy	  
under	  the	  Companies	  Creditors	  Arrange	  Act	  in	  2003	  following	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  
9/11,	  the	  dot-­‐com	  collapse,	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  Severe	  Acute	  Respiratory	  Syndrome	  
(SARS)	  in	  Toronto	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  2014).	  Significant	  concessions	  made	  by	  Air	  
Canada’s	  main	  unions	  representing	  approximately	  20,000	  employees	  had	  made	  this	  
restructuring	  possible.	  Concessions	  included	  wage	  reductions,	  layoffs,	  increased	  
employee	  contributions	  to	  benefit	  plans,	  and	  cuts	  in	  overtime	  pay,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  
Importantly,	  “Air	  Canada’s	  workers	  and	  their	  unions	  permitted	  the	  company	  to	  extend	  
the	  amortization	  of	  unfunded	  pension	  liabilities	  from	  five	  years,	  as	  required	  by	  law,	  to	  
ten”	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  2014:	  126).	  These	  compromises	  facilitated	  Air	  Canada’s	  rise	  
from	  bankruptcy,	  while	  its	  executives	  carved	  Air	  Canada	  into	  separate	  financial	  entities,	  
further	  complicating	  labour	  relations	  with	  the	  company.	  
The	  restructuring	  of	  labour	  relations	  post-­‐2004	  crumbled	  in	  2008	  following	  the	  
global	  financial	  crisis.	  Air	  Canada’s	  pension	  plans	  were	  only	  90	  percent	  funded	  as	  the	  
organization	  “endured	  a	  $1	  billion	  loss	  and	  was	  compelled	  to	  contribute	  nearly	  $500	  
million	  to	  its	  struggling	  pension	  funds”	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  2014:	  126).	  Rather	  than	  
systematically	  funding	  its	  pension	  plans,	  since	  2004	  Air	  Canada	  has	  paid	  over	  $5	  billion	  
to	  investors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  special	  distributions	  and	  share	  buybacks,	  prioritizing	  the	  
interests	  of	  shareholders	  over	  pensioners	  (Gold	  2009).	  The	  costs	  of	  the	  economic	  events	  




sought	  to	  implement	  a	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  system	  that	  would	  provide	  DC	  benefits	  for	  new	  
hires,	  while	  reducing	  pension	  benefits	  for	  workers	  who	  opt	  for	  early	  retirement	  (Thomas	  
and	  Tufts	  2016).	  
Once	  a	  fresh	  round	  of	  collective	  bargaining	  began	  in	  2011,	  there	  was	  a	  collective	  
hangover	  amongst	  union	  leaders	  and	  members	  over	  the	  concessions	  imposed	  over	  the	  
previous	  ten	  years.	  And	  again,	  similar	  to	  the	  events	  at	  Canada	  Post,	  labour	  relations	  
were	  complicated	  by	  the	  Federal	  government’s	  threat	  or	  use	  of	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation.	  
After	  ten	  weeks	  of	  negotiations,	  on	  June	  14,	  2011,	  sales	  and	  service	  workers	  went	  on	  
strike.	  Negotiations	  with	  CAW	  Local	  2002,	  representing	  Air	  Canada’s	  3800	  sales	  and	  
service	  workers	  broke	  down	  over	  management’s	  demand	  for	  pension	  concessions.	  
Federal	  labour	  minister	  Lisa	  Raitt	  introduced	  the	  Continuing	  Air	  Services	  for	  Passengers	  
Act	  (Bill	  C-­‐5)	  following	  threats	  by	  the	  Harper	  government	  that	  failed	  to	  break	  the	  
standstill	  between	  management	  and	  CAW	  Local	  2002.	  This	  bill	  did	  not	  become	  law,	  
however,	  as	  bargaining	  between	  both	  parties	  resumed.	  
Negotiations	  with	  flight	  attendants	  (represented	  by	  CUPE’s	  Air	  Canada	  
Component)	  also	  broke	  down,	  again,	  due	  to	  Air	  Canada	  demanding	  concessions	  on	  
pensions.	  Once	  again,	  Raitt	  claimed	  she	  would	  introduce	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation,	  
prompting	  both	  parties	  to	  concede	  to	  binding	  arbitration.	  	  
Finally,	  negotiations	  with	  pilots	  fell	  apart	  in	  February	  2012,	  in	  which	  workers	  
(represented	  by	  the	  International	  Association	  of	  Machinists	  and	  Aerospace	  Workers)	  
voted	  down	  a	  tentative	  agreement	  as	  Air	  Canada	  sought	  pension	  concessions,	  insisting	  




cut	  in	  half	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  2014).	  Labour	  minister	  Raitt	  pass	  the	  Protecting	  Air	  
Services	  Act	  (Bill	  C-­‐33),	  preemptively	  banning	  action	  by	  workers,	  requiring	  both	  parties	  
to	  agree	  to	  final	  offer	  selection.	  
In	  each	  instance,	  labour	  disputes	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada	  centered	  on	  
pension	  concessions	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  systems,	  where	  workers	  
were	  systematically	  disarmed	  by	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation.	  These	  austerity	  measures	  
imposed	  on	  postal	  and	  airline	  workers	  illustrate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  labour	  is	  expected	  
to	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  restructuring	  to	  meet	  new	  economic	  conditions,	  where	  
cost	  savings	  measures	  are	  made	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  pension	  benefits.	  From	  a	  different	  
perspective,	  risk	  that	  is	  created	  by	  globalizing	  competition	  and	  neoliberal	  governance	  
practices	  is	  transferred	  to	  individual	  workers	  through	  successive	  rounds	  of	  corporate	  
restructuring,	  collective	  bargaining,	  and	  the	  coercive	  use	  of	  the	  state,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  
case	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada.	  In	  this	  context,	  security	  sits	  at	  the	  crux	  of	  labour	  
relations,	  where	  cost	  savings	  are	  made	  through	  the	  exit	  of	  pension	  provision.	  The	  extent	  
to	  which	  risk	  is	  individualized	  within	  bargaining	  units	  is	  contingent	  on	  institutional	  
factors	  (e.g.	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state),	  economic	  factors	  (economic	  cycles)	  and	  the	  strength	  
of	  union	  power	  to	  procure	  leverage	  over	  employers.	  	  
What	  is	  also	  clear	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  is	  the	  role	  the	  state	  plays	  in	  
institutionalizing	  new	  risks	  on	  workers.	  The	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  actions	  of	  the	  previous	  federal	  
government	  illustrated	  the	  state’s	  active	  involvement	  of	  imposing	  new	  risks	  on	  federally	  
regulated	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  workers	  by	  hastily	  legislating	  measures	  that	  support	  




Air	  Canada	  and	  Canada	  Post	  through	  legislation	  and	  anti-­‐labour	  discourse,	  the	  Harper	  
government	  deployed	  the	  ideological	  class	  interests	  of	  these	  employers	  onto	  workers.	  
	  
Defined	  benefit	  pension	  plans	  
Not	  all	  DB	  plans	  are	  equally	  secure.	  Pension	  plans	  vary	  widely	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  capital	  
they	  control	  and	  the	  size	  of	  their	  membership.	  The	  type	  of	  plan	  workers	  will	  find	  
themselves	  belonging	  to	  depend	  primarily	  on	  the	  sector	  and	  industry	  in	  which	  they	  
work.	  Consequently,	  Ontario	  pension	  law	  regulates	  various	  pension	  plans	  differently.	  
Since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  many	  of	  Ontario’s	  largest	  public	  sector	  pension	  plans	  have	  
adopted	  “shared-­‐risk”	  models.	  These	  are	  multi-­‐employer	  pension	  plans	  (MEPPs)	  and	  
include	  pension	  funds	  such	  as	  Ontario	  Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  (OTPP),	  Ontario	  Municipal	  
Employees	  Retirement	  System	  (OMERS),	  Healthcare	  of	  Ontario	  Pension	  Plan	  (HOOPP),	  
and	  OPTrust	  (responsible	  for	  administering	  the	  Ontario	  Public	  Service	  Employees	  Union	  
pension	  fund).	  These	  plans	  are	  known	  in	  Ontario	  as	  jointly	  sponsored	  pension	  plans	  
(JSPPs),	  where	  each	  fund	  has	  a	  joint	  trusteeship	  management	  structure.	  This	  means	  that	  
there	  are	  both	  employee	  and	  employer	  trustee	  representatives	  on	  the	  Board	  of	  
Trustees	  who	  share	  the	  fiduciary	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  plan.	  Importantly,	  employees	  
and	  employers	  are	  equally	  responsible	  for	  the	  solvency	  of	  the	  plan	  as	  each	  group	  
contributes	  to	  the	  fund,	  and	  must	  work	  together	  to	  meet	  funding	  targets	  and	  ensure	  
members	  received	  their	  pension	  income.	  There	  is	  also	  special	  legislation	  in	  the	  PBA	  that	  
exempts	  JSPPs	  from	  specific	  funding	  requirements.	  JSPPs	  administer	  DB	  plans	  and	  are	  




pension	  funds	  in	  Canada	  and	  internationally,	  and	  are	  viewed	  as	  successful	  models	  for	  
other	  funds	  to	  follow.	  So	  while	  risk	  is	  shared	  through	  joint	  trusteeship,	  this	  model	  of	  
pension	  fund	  management	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  secure.	  
	   Conversely,	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  such	  as	  automotive,	  manufacturing,	  and	  
transportation,	  funds	  are	  typically	  single	  employer	  pension	  plans	  (SEPPs).	  These	  plans	  
are	  not	  shared-­‐risk.	  The	  employer—as	  the	  sole	  sponsor	  of	  the	  plan—is	  responsible	  for	  
administering	  benefits.	  This	  means	  the	  scale	  of	  these	  plans	  is	  much	  more	  modest	  since	  
their	  membership	  is	  smaller.	  Compared	  to	  OTPP	  that	  controls	  over	  $154	  billion	  in	  assets,	  
a	  SEPP	  may	  only	  manage	  several	  hundred	  million	  in	  assets	  and	  therefore	  lack	  the	  
sufficient	  scale	  to	  get	  the	  performance	  of	  low	  cost	  that	  a	  JSPP	  has.	  It	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  
an	  employer	  to	  contract	  out	  management	  of	  their	  SEPP—or	  more	  recently,	  purchase	  
group	  annuities	  from	  a	  private	  insurance	  company—whereas	  JSPPs	  have	  large	  in-­‐house	  
actuarial	  and	  investment	  professionals,	  sometimes	  with	  offices	  located	  internationally	  
to	  further	  diversify	  their	  portfolio	  into	  foreign	  markets.	  	  
	   The	  different	  fortunes	  that	  face	  public	  and	  private	  pension	  plans	  today	  are	  the	  
product	  of	  events	  spanning	  back	  to	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Following	  WWII,	  unions	  were	  
not	  interested	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  workplace	  pension	  funds,	  since	  
doing	  so	  was	  viewed	  at	  the	  time	  as	  diminishing	  the	  power	  of	  unions	  to	  collectively	  
bargain	  (Weitz	  1992).	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  many	  unions	  in	  the	  immediate	  
post-­‐war	  era	  were	  campaigning	  for	  a	  universal	  pension	  system	  across	  industries	  rather	  
than	  workplace	  pensions,	  a	  struggle	  that	  ultimately	  failed	  (Klein	  2003;	  Quarter	  et	  al.	  




perspectives	  on	  the	  role	  labour	  should	  play	  in	  pension	  fund	  management.	  This	  was	  
period	  of	  rising	  dominance	  of	  public	  sector	  unions	  in	  which	  public	  sector	  pension	  plans	  
were	  substantially	  growing	  due	  to	  contributions	  from	  both	  employee	  and	  employer39.	  
This	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  wage	  stagnation,	  a	  shrinking	  manufacturing	  sector,	  an	  
expanding	  service	  sector,	  and	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  finance	  (Quarter	  et	  al.	  2008),	  
serving	  to	  diminish	  the	  power	  of	  many	  private	  sector	  SEPPs.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  
conditions,	  in	  1986	  the	  Canadian	  Labour	  Congress	  endorsed	  the	  idea	  of	  achieving	  
greater	  control	  of	  pension	  investments.	  Given	  public	  sector	  union	  members	  contributed	  
to	  their	  pensions	  and	  that	  the	  size	  of	  their	  pensions	  was	  growing,	  they	  sought	  to	  protect	  
their	  monies	  “by	  removing	  them	  out	  of	  the	  consolidated	  revenue	  funds	  of	  provincial	  
governments	  across	  Canada	  and	  into	  trusteed	  pension	  funds	  and,	  in	  particular,	  into	  joint	  
trusteeship”	  (Quarter	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  
In	  Ontario,	  in	  1987	  Premier	  David	  Peterson	  appointed	  Malcolm	  Rowan	  to	  lead	  a	  
task	  force	  examining	  the	  economics	  of	  Ontario’s	  large	  public	  sector	  pension	  plans.	  
Within	  a	  year,	  Rowan	  published	  Whose	  Interest?	  Report	  of	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  the	  
Investment	  of	  Public	  Sector	  Pension	  Funds,	  arguing	  that	  public	  pension	  plans	  should	  be	  
subject	  to	  the	  same	  financial	  and	  disclosure	  standards	  as	  corporate	  plans.	  These	  plans	  
should	  become	  independent	  legal	  entities	  that	  reflect	  industry	  best	  practices	  and	  must	  
not	  be	  used	  to	  further	  government	  public	  policy	  aims;	  instead,	  only	  stakeholder	  
interests	  ought	  to	  be	  considered.	  The	  Rowan	  Report	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  joint-­‐
sponsorship	  model	  in	  public	  sector	  plans,	  which	  famously	  helped	  establish	  the	  Ontario	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  In	  many	  private	  sector	  plans,	  contributions	  were	  only	  made	  by	  employers,	  also	  known	  as	  a	  




Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  (OTPP),	  turning	  it	  from	  an	  underfunded	  “arcane,	  inflexible,	  
inefficient”	  government	  agency	  to	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  successful	  public	  sector	  
workplace	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  world	  (Ambachtsheer	  and	  Ezra	  1998:	  158).	  	  
While	  the	  move	  to	  joint-­‐trusteeship	  has	  turned	  public	  sector	  employers	  into	  
global	  institutional	  leaders	  of	  financial	  investment,	  the	  success	  of	  Ontario’s	  private	  
sector	  plans	  has	  paled	  in	  comparison.	  Quarter	  et	  al.	  describe	  private	  sector	  plans	  as	  
having	  a	  “dismal	  record	  of	  governance	  practices”	  (2008:	  3).	  Pension	  expert	  Keith	  
Ambachtsheer	  claims	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  are	  “seriously	  ill”	  since	  the	  risk	  
embedded	  in	  private	  sector	  pension	  plans	  is	  poorly	  understood,	  fueling	  sustained	  
conflict	  between	  stakeholder	  groups	  (2007:	  xxviii).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  these	  divergent	  
trajectories,	  pension	  members	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  today	  face	  significantly	  higher	  
degrees	  of	  risk	  that	  their	  pensions	  will	  be	  compromised	  upon	  retirement	  compared	  to	  
public	  sector	  members.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  government	  and	  others	  (see	  Ontario	  
Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions)	  view	  JSPPs	  as	  more	  preferable,	  SEPPs	  have	  remained	  
the	  status	  quo	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Indeed,	  the	  risk	  society	  (Beck	  1992)	  is	  emerging	  in	  
more	  definite	  terms	  in	  Ontario’s	  private	  sector	  compared	  to	  the	  public	  sector,	  as	  DB	  
coverage	  in	  SEPPs	  diminishes	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  replaced	  with	  DC	  plans,	  or	  two-­‐tier	  
pension	  systems.	  Workers	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  with	  a	  DC	  plan,	  or	  some	  hybrid	  DB/DC	  
form,	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  calculating	  “longevity	  risk”	  connected	  to	  their	  life	  span	  post	  
work,	  and	  how	  to	  invest	  their	  retirement	  savings	  accordingly.	  
One	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  smaller	  bargaining	  units	  




employer.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  structure	  in	  which	  unions	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  typically	  
not	  interested	  in	  becoming	  involved	  in	  pension	  management.	  According	  to	  one	  fund	  
manager,	  unions	  with	  SEPPs	  bargaining	  with	  single	  employers	  look	  at	  shared-­‐risk	  models	  
and	  say,	  “I’m	  not	  particularly	  interested	  in	  shared	  risk,	  because	  what’s	  the	  reward?	  I	  
don’t	  want	  to	  take	  on	  more	  risk	  than	  I	  have	  now.	  I’d	  prefer	  if	  the	  employer	  just	  honored	  
his	  or	  her	  obligations”	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  Given	  that	  the	  union’s	  traditional	  
relationship	  with	  the	  employer	  is	  a	  bargaining	  relationship,	  “the	  idea	  of	  the	  employer	  
on-­‐boarding	  a	  union	  into	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  pension	  plan	  is	  just	  uncomfortable”	  
(Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  The	  structure	  of	  this	  relationship	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  has	  made	  
it	  more	  difficult	  for	  joint-­‐trusteeship	  to	  develop,	  diminishing	  the	  ability	  of	  workers	  to	  
pool	  risk	  outside	  of	  their	  bargaining	  unit40.	  
This	  also	  generates	  new	  risks	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Today,	  
employers	  sponsoring	  SEPPs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  exit	  providing	  pension	  provision	  since	  
they	  are	  deemed	  too	  expensive,	  contribution	  levels	  are	  too	  volatile,	  and	  regulations	  are	  
too	  cumbersome.	  Consequently,	  any	  new	  minimum	  standards	  legislation	  increases	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  an	  employer	  wanting	  to	  exit	  the	  provision	  of	  pension	  benefits	  since	  the	  
fund	  is	  much	  smaller	  and	  is	  costlier	  to	  meet	  any	  new	  regulatory	  change	  that	  places	  more	  
burdens	  on	  the	  sponsor.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  section,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  are	  
rapidly	  diminishing.	  The	  current	  fate	  of	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  is	  not	  only	  the	  result	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  FSCO,	  Ontario’s	  pension	  regulator,	  is	  currently	  conducting	  a	  risk	  assessment	  program	  that	  
identifies	  “at	  risk”	  pension	  plans	  (which	  are	  primarily	  SEPPs).	  These	  plans	  are	  monitored	  in	  the	  




bargaining	  structures,	  but	  more	  importantly	  political-­‐economic	  transformations	  to	  the	  
Canadian	  and	  Ontario	  economies	  characterized	  by	  economic	  globalization.	  Ontario’s	  
industrial	  restructuring	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  that	  sent	  many	  fulltime	  manufacturing	  jobs	  
overseas,	  while	  diminishing	  union	  density,	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  cause	  of	  decreasing	  
private	  sector	  DB	  plans.	  Rising	  service	  sector	  industries	  have	  not	  replaced	  the	  security	  
provided	  by	  DB	  plans.	  This	  trend	  has	  continued	  into	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  in	  which	  
new	  austerity	  measures	  imposed	  by	  governments	  and	  employers,	  particularly	  following	  
the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  have	  attempted	  to	  impose	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  systems,	  pushing	  
new	  hires	  into	  less	  secure	  DC	  plans	  to	  save	  existing	  DB	  obligations.	  This	  is	  a	  trend	  that	  
has	  also	  begun	  to	  creep	  into	  the	  public	  sector.	  Employers	  with	  Air	  Canada	  and	  Canada	  
Post	  since	  2011	  have	  tried	  to	  impose	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  systems	  on	  employees	  with	  the	  
support	  of	  back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation	  by	  the	  Conservative	  federal	  government	  under	  
Stephen	  Harper,	  leading	  to	  significant	  labour	  unrest	  and	  prompting	  several	  major	  strikes	  
(Stevens	  and	  Nebsitt	  2014;	  Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016;	  Hoogers	  et	  al.	  2016).	  	  
	  
From	  DB	  to	  DC	  
The	  increasing	  percentage	  of	  workers	  with	  a	  DC	  plan	  and	  the	  push	  for	  two-­‐tiered	  
pension	  plans	  by	  some	  employers	  is	  perhaps	  the	  clearest	  representation	  of	  how	  the	  risk	  
of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  is	  becoming	  individualized	  for	  those	  with	  a	  workplace	  plan.	  But	  
beyond	  the	  political-­‐economic	  structures	  such	  as	  deindustrialization,	  decreasing	  union	  
density,	  growing	  service	  industries	  and	  expansion	  of	  precarious	  working	  conditions	  that	  




inequality,	  what	  role	  have	  employees	  and	  employers	  played	  in	  this	  transferring	  of	  risk?	  
This	  question	  speaks	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  this	  process,	  pointing	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  
considering	  how	  employees,	  employers	  and	  policymakers	  understand	  “risk”	  in	  
relationship	  to	  saving	  for	  retirement	  and	  the	  broader	  RIS.	  	  	  
Understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  risk	  and	  pension	  coverage	  is	  not	  
straightforward,	  but	  is,	  as	  discussed	  earlier,	  linked	  to	  political	  economic	  cycles,	  
corporate	  governance	  practices	  and	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  neoliberalsm	  within	  
governing	  institutions	  (Thomas	  and	  Tufts	  2016).	  But	  it	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  workers	  and	  sponsors	  see	  opportunities	  to	  de-­‐risk	  and/or	  take	  advantage	  of	  
favorable	  investment	  returns.	  For	  instance,	  the	  growth	  of	  DC	  plans	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  
shaped	  partially	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  employees	  who	  sought	  labour	  mobility,	  often	  
viewing	  DB	  plans	  as	  “golden	  handcuffs”	  that	  hindered	  their	  ability	  to	  move	  freely	  in	  the	  
labour	  market.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  for	  the	  growing	  cadre	  of	  educated	  professionals	  
in	  Ontario’s	  labour	  force	  whose	  skills	  were	  in	  increasing	  demand	  as	  the	  economy	  shifted	  
to	  expanding	  service	  based	  industries	  requiring	  their	  expertise.	  In	  this	  context,	  
Ambachtsheer	  and	  Ezra	  argue	  that,	  “Quite	  correctly,	  mobile	  employees	  question	  the	  
value	  of	  a	  traditional	  DB	  plan	  as	  the	  primary	  retirement	  vehicle”	  (1998:	  184).	  
The	  expanding	  use	  of	  DC	  plans	  in	  the	  1980s	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  this	  dynamic.	  
Dekanic	  (2001)	  discusses	  how	  during	  the	  1980s	  workers	  and	  employers	  alike	  were	  
attracted	  to	  DC	  plans,	  albeit	  for	  different	  reasons.	  High	  interest	  rates	  at	  the	  time	  made	  
DC	  plans	  more	  lucrative	  financially	  compared	  to	  DB	  benefits.	  Consequently,	  workers	  




with	  a	  DB	  plan	  had	  fixed	  benefits	  that	  could	  not	  capitalize	  on	  favorable	  investment	  
returns	  at	  the	  time.	  One	  union	  representative	  I	  interviewed	  who	  was	  involved	  in	  
collective	  bargaining	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  discussed	  how,	  “We	  did	  have	  a	  fight	  over	  our	  
members	  wanting	  to	  go	  into	  DC	  plans”	  (Union	  Official	  1,	  August	  2014).	  This	  participant	  
remembered	  how	  some	  members	  requested	  their	  union	  provide	  DC	  plans	  and	  educate	  
members	  on	  how	  to	  invest	  pension	  funds	  so	  they	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  investment	  
returns.	  Employers	  also	  liked	  them	  since	  they	  lowered	  administrative	  costs	  and	  were	  
deemed	  as	  less	  risky.	  Given	  this	  example,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  retirement	  income	  security,	  
the	  emergence	  of	  risk	  society	  is	  not	  simply	  contingent	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  industrial	  
institutions	  to	  mitigate	  risks,	  but	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  workers	  see	  
opportunity	  in	  other	  retirement	  savings	  vehicles.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  workers	  did	  not	  
view	  pension	  plans	  in	  terms	  of	  risk,	  but	  rather	  profitability,	  opting	  for	  DC	  plans	  that	  are	  
riskier	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  
Today,	  employers	  continue	  to	  find	  DC	  plans	  attractive,	  whereas	  workers	  are	  
going	  on	  strike	  to	  protect	  their	  DB	  plans,	  as	  witnessed	  during	  the	  strikes	  and	  lockouts	  at	  
Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  large	  industrial	  employers	  including	  Boeing	  
and	  the	  St.	  Lawrence	  Seaway,	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  The	  current	  prolonged	  period	  of	  
low	  interest	  rates	  and	  economic	  growth	  has	  stoked	  public	  fears	  over	  the	  future	  of	  the	  
retirement	  benefits,	  leading	  to	  bitter	  disputes	  over	  retirement	  income	  security—as	  
exemplified	  by	  the	  case	  of	  public	  sector	  retirees	  in	  New	  Brunswick—and	  increased	  calls	  
for	  government	  action.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  politicians	  and	  government	  




feelings	  of	  risk	  and	  diminished	  income	  security	  are	  factors	  that	  play	  into	  policymaking.	  
Consequently,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  perceptions	  of	  risk	  are	  therefore	  linked	  to	  economic	  
cycles	  and	  a	  balance	  of	  class	  forces,	  which	  in	  turn	  impact	  calls	  upon	  policymakers	  to	  
respond	  with	  new	  policies.	  	  
	   However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  DB	  plans	  are	  shrinking,	  there	  has	  not	  
been	  a	  mass	  exodus	  to	  DC	  plans.	  As	  Figure	  6.3	  illustrates,	  levels	  of	  DC	  coverage	  in	  
Ontario	  remain	  significantly	  lower	  than	  DB	  pension	  coverage,	  with	  only	  an	  incremental	  
increase	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years.	  Moreover,	  unions	  in	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors	  
have	  been	  fighting	  to	  protect	  existing	  DB	  plans	  in	  the	  face	  of	  austerity	  measures	  and	  
neoliberalism.	  It	  is	  unclear	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  levels	  of	  DC	  will	  continue	  to	  increase.	  	  
	   What	  is	  perhaps	  the	  largest	  risk	  posed	  by	  the	  gradual	  shift	  to	  DC	  plans	  is	  that	  the	  
impact	  of	  DC	  plans	  is	  relatively	  unknown,	  particularly	  around	  issues	  of	  retirement	  
behavior,	  labour	  mobility,	  the	  allocation	  of	  pension	  assets	  and	  financial	  markets	  
(Baldwin	  2008;	  Baldwin	  and	  Fitzgerald	  2010).	  One	  research	  officer	  for	  a	  large	  Canadian	  
union	  argued	  that	  pension	  research	  in	  Canada	  is	  often	  “narrowly	  constructed”:	  
	  …the	  gap	  in	  research	  I	  would	  identify	  is,	  try	  to	  find	  a	  serious	  paper	  that	  examines	  the	  
experience	  of	  workers	  in	  DC	  plans	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  incomes	  they	  end	  up	  with	  as	  a	  
consequence,	  the	  variation	  on	  those	  incomes,	  and	  even	  more	  interesting	  from	  my	  
perspective,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  a	  retiree,	  from	  a	  DC	  type	  of	  arrangement,	  …[where]	  
you	  don't	  you	  use	  your	  lump	  sum	  to	  buy	  an	  annuity,	  …[but]	  instead	  you	  do	  what	  advisors	  
now	  advise,	  which	  is	  you	  invest	  it,	  you	  keep	  it	  (Union	  Official	  2,	  March	  2014).	  	  
	  
This	  union	  official	  points	  out	  that	  the	  sociological	  impact	  of	  the	  “deaccumulation”	  phase	  
in	  which	  a	  worker’s	  individual	  DC	  fund	  diminishes	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  retirement,	  
and	  how	  effectively	  individual	  workers	  manage	  their	  retirement	  income	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  




the	  advantages	  of	  DB	  plans	  since	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  calculate	  the	  age	  expectancy	  of	  a	  large	  
group	  rather	  than	  an	  individual.	  As	  one	  former	  government	  official	  put	  it:	  “I	  can’t	  tell	  
you	  what	  your	  life	  expectancy	  is.	  I	  can’t	  tell	  what	  my	  life	  expectancy	  is.	  But	  the	  larger	  
the	  group,	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  calculate	  fairly	  precisely	  the	  average	  life	  expectancy	  and	  
therefore	  how	  much	  you	  have	  to	  fund	  for”	  (Policy	  Analyst	  1,	  December	  2014).	  Along	  
with	  being	  exposed	  to	  new	  market	  risks	  for	  those	  with	  a	  DC	  plan,	  longevity	  risk	  is	  
produced	  as	  another	  source	  of	  insecurity	  since	  savings	  cannot	  be	  pooled	  with	  other	  
workers.	  
	  
Perceptions	  of	  risk	  and	  policymaking	  
To	  what	  extent	  do	  workers,	  employers	  and	  policymakers	  perceive	  and	  understand	  
pension	  policy	  in	  relationship	  to	  risk?	  One	  former	  government	  official	  who	  now	  works	  
for	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  workplace	  pension	  fund	  discussed	  the	  public	  perception	  of	  risk	  
and	  the	  effect	  this	  has	  on	  political	  leaders	  (Policy	  Analyst	  4,	  October	  2014).	  For	  instance,	  
this	  participant	  asserted	  that	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  significantly	  increased	  awareness	  
among	  the	  public	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  retirement	  savings	  and	  vulnerability	  of	  different	  
savings	  schemes.	  This	  public	  concern	  ascribed	  a	  larger	  role	  for	  government	  to	  provide	  
secure	  retirement	  savings.	  This	  government	  official	  contended	  that	  risk,	  therefore,	  could	  
be	  this	  general	  feeling	  that	  shapes	  how	  the	  public	  perceives	  certain	  policy	  issues,	  such	  
as	  secure	  DB	  pensions	  and	  their	  future	  income	  security	  during	  retirement.	  	  
However,	  other	  experts,	  in	  response	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  relationship	  




in	  terms	  of	  “risk”	  when	  contemplating	  pension	  reform.	  One	  pension	  lawyer	  involved	  
with	  establishing	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP)	  did	  not	  think	  risk,	  broadly	  
understood,	  “…is	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  policymaking	  in	  a	  conscious	  way”.	  Although	  this	  
participant	  agreed	  that	  risk	  is	  a	  “design	  element”	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ORPP,	  “…I	  
don’t	  think	  that	  the	  premier	  got	  out	  of	  bed	  one	  morning	  and	  said,	  ‘I’d	  really	  like	  to	  
spread	  risk,	  that	  would	  really	  be	  amazing’.	  I	  think	  she	  got	  out	  of	  bed	  and	  said,	  ‘I	  don’t	  
think	  people	  are	  saving	  enough,	  I’d	  like	  to	  help	  them	  save,	  I’d	  like	  them	  to	  have	  a	  little	  
more	  secure	  retirement’”	  (Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  Accordingly,	  politicians,	  such	  as	  a	  
minister	  or	  a	  premier	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of,	  “…who	  wins,	  who	  loses,	  what	  
are	  the	  stakeholders	  going	  to	  think,	  how	  complex	  is	  this,	  who’s	  going	  to	  be	  mad	  if	  we	  do	  
it”	  (Lawyer	  1,	  March	  2015).	  	  
This	  perspective	  speaks	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  and	  how	  the	  
general	  population	  understands	  the	  issues	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Six).	  One	  former	  
politician	  I	  interviewed	  with	  experience	  working	  on	  Ontario	  pension	  policy	  during	  the	  
mid-­‐2000s	  agreed	  with	  this	  position.	  Although	  expanding	  coverage	  is	  about	  decreasing	  
financial	  risk	  during	  retirement,	  this	  participant	  claimed	  politicians	  do	  not	  communicate	  
risk	  in	  these	  terms,	  maintaining	  that,	  	  
…there	  is	  virtually	  no	  appetite	  for	  [pension	  policy]	  at	  a	  retail	  political	  level.	  Most	  people,	  
their	  eyes	  glaze	  over	  when	  you	  talk	  about	  it.	  I	  would	  never	  go	  out	  to	  the	  hustings	  and	  
say,	  ‘ladies	  and	  gentlemen,	  today	  I’m	  going	  to	  talk	  to	  you	  about	  our	  efforts	  to	  
strengthen	  the	  private	  pension	  system.’	  People	  will	  say,	  ‘why	  is	  he	  here?’	  But	  these	  are	  
important	  issues	  and	  you	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  them	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  a	  balance	  between	  
competing	  interests,	  and	  then	  market	  it	  politically	  in	  a	  way	  that	  you	  don’t	  try	  to	  make	  it	  






According	  to	  this	  former	  politician,	  talking	  about	  pension	  coverage	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  is	  
discursively	  ineffective	  in	  a	  political	  context.	  Workers,	  retirees,	  and	  sponsors	  –	  they	  are	  
all	  concerned	  about	  whether	  their	  pensions	  will	  be	  protected	  and	  what	  the	  government	  
is	  going	  to	  do	  about	  it.	  On	  that	  account,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  political	  leaders	  to	  view	  
pension	  reforms	  in	  political	  terms	  and	  the	  level	  of	  contentiousness	  they	  will	  bring	  from	  
different	  groups	  within	  society.	  	  
	   Similarly,	  this	  speaks	  to	  workers	  calling	  on	  their	  union	  to	  negotiate	  DC	  pensions	  
in	  place	  of	  their	  DB	  plans	  when	  interest	  rates	  were	  high	  during	  the	  1980s.	  These	  workers	  
did	  not	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  risk,	  but	  rather	  how	  much	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  save.	  Pension	  
policymaking,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  risk,	  but	  rather	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  
how	  to	  best	  balance	  a	  set	  of	  interests.	  
	  
Policy	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  risk	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  government	  officials	  do	  not	  think	  directly	  in	  terms	  of	  “risk”,	  
“risk-­‐sharing”	  lies	  at	  the	  center	  of	  some	  recent	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  some	  even	  attempt	  
to	  place	  responsibility	  squarely	  on	  individual	  workers.	  Moreover,	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  
from	  employer	  to	  worker	  and	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  risk	  governments	  are	  willing	  to	  assume	  
is	  hotly	  contested,	  as	  the	  recent	  case	  of	  New	  Brunswick’s	  adoption	  of	  target	  benefit	  
plans	  illustrates.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  struggle	  over	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  occurs	  both	  provincially	  and	  federally,	  depending	  on	  




with	  the	  ideological	  underpinnings	  of	  various	  governments,	  also	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  risk	  is	  
distributed	  (as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  Canada	  Post	  and	  Air	  Canada	  cases,	  in	  which	  both	  
industries	  are	  federally	  regulated).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Ontario,	  the	  provincial	  government	  has	  
adopted	  a	  mixed	  approach	  to	  pension	  policymaking,	  one	  that	  has	  both	  set	  out	  to	  
protect	  secure	  DB	  plans	  and	  expand	  government	  pension	  coverage,	  while	  
simultaneously	  establishing	  legislative	  frameworks	  that	  expose	  individuals	  to	  more	  risks.	  
However,	  the	  Ontario	  government	  has	  continuously	  challenged	  neoliberal	  pension	  
policy	  proposals	  promoted	  by	  small	  business	  and	  insurance	  groups	  that	  have	  been	  
supported	  by	  the	  Harper	  federal	  government	  (see	  Chapter	  Five	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  
discussion).	  	  
	   There	  is	  a	  spectrum	  of	  pension	  policy	  proposals	  that	  lie	  at	  the	  intersection	  
between	  federal	  and	  provincial	  politics	  and	  policymaking.	  Located	  at	  this	  intersection	  
are	  ideological	  commitments	  to	  opposing	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  employers	  
should	  be	  required	  to	  provide	  retirement	  provision	  for	  employees,	  and	  more	  broadly,	  
how	  much	  government	  should	  be	  involved.	  On	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  calls	  are	  
made	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  and	  OAS,	  while	  also	  seeking	  to	  protect	  and	  expand	  the	  
DB	  system	  as	  means	  to	  promote	  economic	  growth	  and	  employee	  attachment.	  On	  the	  
right	  side	  there	  has	  been	  a	  series	  of	  new	  policy	  initiatives	  that	  include	  Pooled	  Registered	  
Pension	  Plans	  (PRPPs)	  and	  target	  benefit	  plans	  (TBPs).	  Proponents	  view	  PRPPs	  as	  a	  
market-­‐based	  solution	  to	  address	  decreasing	  coverage,	  remedying	  the	  need	  to	  expand	  




between	  DB	  and	  DC—are	  the	  best	  way	  to	  mitigate	  the	  volatility	  of	  pension	  contributions	  
for	  sponsors,	  while	  maintaining	  some	  DB	  benefits.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  decreasing	  pension	  coverage	  was	  becoming	  a	  
growing	  concern	  for	  policymakers	  across	  Canada	  following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  in	  
2007/8.	  Public	  fears	  over	  the	  solvency	  of	  many	  pension	  funds	  spiked,	  leading	  many	  to	  
believe	  there	  was	  a	  “pension	  crisis”.	  The	  federal	  government’s	  response	  was	  to	  refuse	  
any	  expansion	  of	  CCP	  and	  instead,	  it	  introduced	  PRPPs—	  a	  voluntary,	  “low-­‐cost,	  tax-­‐
assisted	  option	  to	  increase	  retirement	  savings”.	  What	  is	  attractive	  about	  PRPPs	  is	  their	  
conformity	  to	  neoliberal	  ideals	  of	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  to	  social	  problems.	  PRPPs	  are	  
voluntary.	  Employers	  do	  not	  have	  to	  provide	  them;	  the	  onus	  of	  saving	  belongs	  to	  the	  
individual.	  The	  federal	  government,	  for	  its	  part,	  saw	  its	  role	  as	  a	  facilitator,	  providing	  
new	  options	  for	  individual	  workers	  without	  a	  workplace	  pension	  to	  pool	  their	  money	  
with	  other	  individual	  workers	  who	  wished	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  This	  position	  fit	  in	  with	  
Harper’s	  broader	  commitment	  to	  business	  interests	  and	  his	  government’s	  intent	  to	  
impose	  neoliberal	  austerity	  measures	  that	  repressed	  labour	  relations	  through	  coercive	  
back-­‐to-­‐work	  legislation,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  2011	  during	  the	  Air	  Canada	  and	  Canada	  Post	  
strikes	  (Stevens	  and	  Nesbitt	  2014;	  Hoogers	  et	  al.	  2016).	  	  
Target	  Benefit	  Plans	  (TBPs),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  introduced	  by	  the	  federal	  
government	  to	  address	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk	  within	  a	  workplace	  pension	  fund.	  TBPs	  
would	  allow	  federally	  regulated	  private	  sector	  and	  Crown	  Corporation	  employers	  “to	  
convert	  an	  existing	  DB	  or	  DC	  pension	  plan	  into	  a	  TBP”	  (Morneau	  Shepell	  2014:	  1).	  The	  




the	  volatility	  of	  employer	  contributions”	  (Morneau	  Shepell	  2014:	  1).	  This	  is	  designed	  to	  
address	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  funding	  deficit	  arises.	  Rather	  than	  the	  sponsor	  being	  solely	  
responsible	  for	  funding	  any	  shortfalls	  in	  the	  pension	  fund	  by	  increasing	  their	  level	  of	  
contributions,	  a	  TBP	  can	  reduce	  accrued	  benefits,	  decreasing	  some	  of	  the	  volatility	  for	  
employers	  sponsoring	  a	  workplace	  pension	  plan.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  worker’s	  pension	  is	  
promised	  if	  a	  set	  of	  financial	  conditions	  occurs.	  But	  the	  risk	  involved	  with	  economic	  
downturns	  that	  threaten	  the	  solvency	  of	  the	  plan	  will	  be	  shared	  with	  plan	  members	  by	  
enabling	  the	  employer	  to	  reduce	  member	  benefits.	  The	  federal	  legislation	  was	  modeled	  
on	  New	  Brunswick’s	  pioneering	  Shared	  Risk	  Pension	  Plans	  that	  were	  introduced	  in	  2012	  
(discussed	  above).	  The	  difference	  in	  the	  federal	  government’s	  framework	  is	  that	  it	  was	  
not	  intended	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  public	  sector	  workers,	  unlike	  in	  New	  Brunswick,	  creating	  
a	  host	  of	  conflicts	  that	  led	  to	  Coalition	  NB	  suing	  the	  provincial	  government	  over	  a	  
violation	  of	  their	  Charter	  of	  Rights.	  Several	  provinces—including	  Ontario,	  Quebec,	  Nova	  
Scotia,	  Saskatchewan,	  British	  Columbia	  and	  Alberta—have	  introduced	  legislation	  
allowing	  for	  target	  benefit	  plans,	  but	  have	  yet	  to	  proclaim	  this	  legislation	  into	  force.	  
New	  Brunswick	  is	  the	  only	  province	  that	  has	  the	  full	  legislative	  structure	  required	  to	  
operate	  TBPs.	  
It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  “shared-­‐risk”	  proposals	  have	  been	  politically	  contentious,	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  viewed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  saving	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  
by	  members	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  TBPs	  reflect	  a	  “re-­‐imagining”	  
discourse	  that	  has	  emerged	  since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s.	  In	  simple	  terms,	  TBPs	  take	  the	  middle	  




volatility	  is	  removed	  for	  employers,	  encouraging	  employers	  to	  remain	  as	  plan	  sponsors	  
with	  the	  hope	  that	  this	  will	  maintain	  higher	  levels	  of	  pension	  coverage	  for	  more	  
workers.	  However,	  risk	  has	  now	  been	  shifted	  over	  to	  workers,	  where	  their	  pension	  is	  
only	  promised	  if	  economic	  conditions	  permit.	  Along	  with	  the	  federal	  and	  some	  
provincial	  governments,	  the	  former	  president	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  Jim	  
Leech	  has	  also	  publicly	  supported	  shared-­‐risk	  models.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  his	  
book,	  The	  Third	  Rail,	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  to	  mitigate	  Canada’s	  
“pension	  crisis”,	  championing	  New	  Brunswick’s	  adoption	  of	  TBP	  legislation.	  But	  some	  
from	  the	  labour	  side,	  including	  Harry	  Arthurs	  (as	  part	  of	  his	  recommendations	  as	  
commissioner	  of	  the	  OECP)	  have	  also	  called	  for	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  risk	  sharing.	  On	  both	  
sides	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  many	  recognize	  that	  current	  economic,	  demographic	  and	  
regulatory	  conditions	  make	  sponsorship	  of	  new	  DB	  plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  highly	  
unlikely.	  For	  instance,	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  in	  Ontario,	  no	  new	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  
have	  been	  offered	  to	  workers.	  	  
Alternatively,	  many	  labour	  activists	  initially	  saw	  the	  federal	  government’s	  TBP	  
proposals	  as	  a	  veiled	  attempt	  to	  kill	  public	  sector	  DB	  plans,	  setting	  a	  precedent	  for	  other	  
jurisdictions.	  What’s	  more,	  critics	  question	  whether	  “risk	  “is	  indeed	  being	  shared	  at	  all.	  
As	  on	  pension	  lawyer	  put	  it:	  	  
But	  they've	  literally	  transferred	  all	  of	  the	  problem	  on	  to	  the	  employee	  [in	  New	  
Brunswick].	  And	  then	  you	  step	  back	  and	  say	  who's	  best	  positioned	  to	  absorbed	  this	  
shared	  risk	  -­‐	  they're	  not	  really	  shared	  risk,	  they're	  employee	  risk.	  The	  employer	  has	  risk	  
only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  have	  to	  pay	  their	  monthly	  and	  that's	  it.	  It	  already	  had	  that	  
obligation.	  They	  haven't	  taking	  on	  anything	  new.	  They've	  only	  gotten	  rid	  of	  problems	  






Many	  share	  this	  perspective,	  and	  as	  consequence,	  different	  groups	  that	  include	  retirees,	  
labour	  activists	  and	  pension	  professionals	  have	  vehemently	  challenged	  proposed	  risk-­‐
sharing	  models.	  	  
This	  debate	  over	  shared	  risk	  has	  fed	  into	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario,	  
shaping	  political	  dynamics	  between	  the	  province	  and	  federal	  government.	  Ontario’s	  
adoption	  of	  PRPPs	  and	  TBPs	  has	  occurred	  while	  the	  Ontario	  government	  has	  demanded	  
the	  federal	  government	  expand	  CPP	  and	  OAS.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  has	  sought	  new	  ways	  
to	  protect	  DB	  plans	  (see	  Chapter	  Five).	  Moreover,	  in	  2014	  Ontario	  established	  
groundwork	  to	  form	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP)—which	  if	  it	  had	  
formally	  launched,	  would	  have	  been	  Canada’s	  first	  public	  provincial	  plan	  since	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Quebec	  Pension	  Plan	  (QPP)	  in	  1965.	  The	  ORPP	  is	  the	  first	  time	  a	  
province	  has	  attempted	  to	  expand	  government	  administered	  pension	  coverage	  
independently	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  CPP.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  this	  move	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  political	  strategy	  to	  pressure	  the	  
federal	  government	  and	  other	  provinces	  into	  taking	  action	  on	  CPP.	  Harper’s	  refusal	  to	  
act	  on	  the	  issue	  limited	  Ontario	  from	  addressing	  this	  key	  social	  policy,	  deeply	  frustrating	  
the	  Ontario	  government,	  becoming	  a	  key	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  Ontario’s	  and	  the	  
federal	  government’s	  acrimonious	  relationship.	  As	  Canada’s	  largest	  industrial	  base,	  
Ontario	  had	  witnessed	  most	  acutely	  the	  vanishing	  of	  secure	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  
since	  the	  1980s.	  	  
Following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008,	  pensions	  had	  been	  polling	  well	  and	  




platform.	  As	  recent	  events	  attest,	  this	  was	  a	  political	  tactic	  that	  paid	  off.	  In	  June	  2016,	  
the	  Trudeau	  federal	  government	  and	  provinces	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Quebec	  and	  
Manitoba)	  have	  agreed	  to	  expand	  CPP	  benefits.	  Premier	  Wynn	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  
Trudeau	  forged	  a	  new	  alliance,	  melting	  past	  provincial-­‐federal	  hostilities.	  On	  22	  June	  
2016,	  Ontario	  was	  identified	  on	  the	  front	  page	  of	  The	  Globe	  &	  Mail	  as	  a	  “catalyst	  for	  CPP	  
expansion”	  with	  the	  claim	  that,	  “Ontario’s	  strong	  threat	  to	  go	  it	  alone	  on	  pension	  
reform	  was	  the	  key	  factor	  in	  getting	  skeptics…to	  support	  the	  first	  major	  expansion	  of	  
the	  CPP	  in	  its	  50-­‐year	  history”	  (Curry	  and	  Taber	  2016:	  A1).	  These	  actions	  illustrate	  the	  
limit	  to	  which	  the	  Ontario	  government	  is	  willing	  to	  allow	  individual	  workers	  to	  be	  
exposed	  to	  market	  risks	  involved	  with	  saving	  for	  retirement	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  pressure	  
other	  governments	  into	  action	  contained	  with	  Canada’s	  federal	  political	  structure.	  	  
When	  the	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  set	  up	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  
Pensions	  in	  2006,	  the	  mandate	  was	  designed	  to	  explore	  options	  to	  protect	  Ontario’s	  DB	  
pension	  system.	  The	  first	  principle	  of	  the	  report	  set	  out	  by	  its	  mandate	  stated	  that:	  
“public	  policy	  in	  Ontario	  ought	  to	  maintain	  and	  encourage	  DB	  pension	  plans”	  (OECP	  
2008:	  19)	  (original	  emphasis).	  The	  government	  was	  intent	  on	  using	  the	  Expert	  
Commission	  to	  conduct	  a	  systemic	  review	  of	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  with	  a	  
mandate	  to	  protect	  DB	  plans,	  as	  opposed	  to	  looking	  for	  a	  new	  alternative.	  This	  was	  a	  
commitment	  by	  the	  Ontario	  government	  to	  protect	  accrued	  retirement	  savings	  for	  
those	  with	  DB	  plans,	  while	  searching	  for	  new	  ways	  to	  expand	  pension	  coverage.	  This	  




this	  system	  as	  an	  important	  mechanism	  to	  provide	  retirement	  income	  security	  into	  the	  
future.	  	  
At	  the	  federal	  level,	  Ontario	  has	  combated	  market-­‐based	  proposals,	  leading	  to	  
an	  acrimonious	  public	  dispute	  with	  the	  federal	  government.	  Former	  Finance	  Minister	  
Dwight	  Duncan	  made	  discussing	  CPP	  and	  OAS	  expansion	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  if	  
Ontario	  was	  to	  introduce	  new	  legislation	  that	  would	  make	  the	  federal	  government’s	  
PRPPs	  available	  to	  Ontarians.	  Duncan	  claimed	  that	  PRPPs,	  “…on	  their	  own…are	  not	  
effective”	  (Artuso	  2012).	  The	  subsequent	  failure	  by	  Ontario	  and	  other	  provinces	  to	  
persuade	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  expand	  CPP	  was	  a	  major	  reason	  for	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  ORPP.	  	  
Given	  Ontario’s	  prominent	  role	  in	  calling	  for	  CPP	  expansion,	  developing	  the	  
Expert	  Commission	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  the	  province’s	  DB	  system,	  their	  initial	  
rejection	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  PRPP	  proposals,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
country’s	  first	  proposed	  public	  provincial	  plan	  since	  the	  1960s,	  these	  actions	  point	  to	  
Ontario’s	  left-­‐of-­‐center	  ideological	  stance	  regarding	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individual	  
workers	  in	  the	  province	  should	  shoulder	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement.	  On	  the	  
pension	  file,	  neoliberal	  market	  based	  solutions	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  retirement	  savings	  
have	  not	  been	  embraced	  whole	  heartedly.	  This	  speaks	  to	  Ontario’s	  strong	  labour	  
movement,	  large	  industrial	  base,	  and	  the	  central	  role	  workplace	  pensions	  have	  played	  
within	  the	  collective	  bargaining	  relationship	  within	  Ontario’s	  tradition	  of	  industrial	  
pluralism.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  province	  is	  currently	  consulting	  stakeholders	  on	  




solutions	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  and	  the	  
acrimonious	  dispute	  between	  Ontario	  and	  the	  previous	  federal	  government	  led	  by	  
Stephen	  Harper.	  	  	  
	  
Plan	  maturity	  
Similar	  to	  other	  industrialized	  countries,	  Canada’s	  workforce	  is	  rapidly	  aging	  and	  living	  
longer.	  In	  2010,	  Canada’s	  first	  cohort	  of	  baby	  boomers	  began	  to	  retire.	  This	  
demographic	  trend	  has	  placed	  new	  risks	  on	  DB	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  form	  “plan	  
maturity”,	  meaning	  that	  the	  number	  of	  retirees	  begins	  to	  outnumber	  active	  members,	  
creating	  pressures	  to	  raise	  more	  money	  to	  maintain	  the	  plan’s	  funding	  status.	  This	  is	  
made	  more	  difficult	  as	  Canadian	  life	  expectancy	  increases,	  in	  which	  DB	  pension	  funds	  
must	  pay	  benefits	  for	  longer	  periods	  of	  time.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  plan	  maturity	  was	  not	  an	  
issue	  since	  there	  were	  not	  a	  lot	  of	  members	  retiring	  and	  because	  plan	  surpluses	  were	  so	  
large	  that	  funding	  was	  still	  well	  over	  100	  percent.	  This	  changed	  in	  the	  2000s.	  As	  one	  
actuary	  quipped	  when	  describing	  this	  transformation,	  "[T]oday,	  the	  ongoing	  joke	  for	  the	  
last	  ten	  years	  is	  GM	  is	  a	  pension	  plan	  who	  also	  makes	  cars"	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  maturing	  of	  pension	  plans	  in	  many	  industries,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
manufacturing	  sector,	  has	  required	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  attention	  and	  resources	  to	  




Table	  7.4:	  Life	  expectancy	  at	  by	  birth,	  by	  sex,	  1920	  –	  2009	  
	  
Years	   Males	   Females	  
1920	  to	  1922	   59	   61	  
1930	  to	  1932	   60	   62	  
1940	  to	  1942	   63	   66	  
1950	  to	  1952	   66	   71	  
1960	  to	  1962	   68	   74	  
1970	  to	  1972	   69	   76	  
1980	  to	  1982	   72	   79	  
1990	  to	  1992	   75	   81	  
2000	  to	  2002	   77	   82	  
2007	  to	  2009	   79	   83	  
	  
Source:	  Statistics	  Canada,	  CANSIM,	  table	  102-­‐0512	  and	  Catalogue	  no.	  84-­‐537-­‐XIE	  
	  
	   Participants	  involved	  with	  plan	  governance	  interviewed	  for	  this	  project	  described	  
the	  2000s	  as	  a	  period	  in	  which	  employers	  sought	  to	  exit	  pension	  provision	  due	  to	  their	  
volatile	  nature.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  the	  volatility	  involved	  with	  sponsoring	  a	  
plan	  had	  threatened	  many	  employers’	  bottom	  line	  too	  frequently.	  This,	  coupled	  with	  
low	  interest	  rates,	  plan	  maturity,	  and	  strict	  accounting	  standards	  led	  to	  a	  "rollercoaster"	  
effect.	  As	  one	  actuary	  claims,	  “risk	  tolerance	  is	  what	  business	  are	  discussing	  and	  now	  
that	  they've	  survived	  through	  the	  global	  recession	  and	  some	  of	  the	  darkest	  economic	  
clouds	  have	  dissipated,	  they	  want	  to	  de-­‐risk,	  or	  shift	  that	  risk	  off	  their	  books	  onto	  the	  
workers	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	   This	  actuary	  describes	  the	  management	  of	  maturity	  risk	  by	  employers	  and	  fund	  
administrators	  as	  a	  “balancing	  act”,	  where	  there	  are	  different	  “levers”	  available	  to	  the	  
fund	  manager.	  One	  lever	  is	  tolerance	  for	  investment	  risk:	  investing	  more	  in	  equity	  




Canada	  and	  internationally,	  many	  pension	  funds	  are	  seeking	  broader	  diversification	  in	  
their	  portfolios	  to	  sustain	  plans,	  particularly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  plan	  maturity.	  For	  instance,	  
according	  to	  the	  Towers	  Watson	  Global	  Pensions	  Asset	  Study	  2015,	  since	  2004,	  
Canadian	  funds	  have	  increased	  their	  investments	  in	  “alternative	  assets”	  (i.e.	  non-­‐
traditional	  investments	  that	  are	  often	  less	  liquid	  and	  include	  assets	  such	  as	  
infrastructure	  and	  venture	  capital-­‐related	  projects)	  from	  13	  percent	  in	  2004	  to	  22	  
percent	  in	  2014.	  This	  diversification	  is	  to	  address	  risk	  tolerance:	  how	  tolerant	  are	  plans	  
to	  different	  types	  of	  risk?	  If	  a	  fund	  manager	  does	  not	  want	  to	  increase	  contribution	  
levels,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  get	  their	  investments	  working	  harder,	  especially	  in	  an	  
environment	  where	  yields	  and	  interest	  rates	  have	  come	  way	  down.	  	  	  
Another	  lever	  is	  buying	  group	  annuities.	  Over	  the	  past	  several	  years,	  many	  
pension	  funds	  in	  Canada	  have	  become	  fully	  funded.	  This	  has	  led	  some	  to	  purchase	  
group	  annuities	  (which	  are	  very	  expensive),	  in	  which	  the	  asset	  and	  liability	  risk	  of	  the	  
fund	  is	  shifted	  from	  the	  plan	  sponsor	  to	  the	  insurer.	  In	  2013,	  group	  annuity	  purchases	  in	  
Canada	  hit	  $2.2	  billion,	  symbolizing	  the	  strong	  funding	  status	  of	  pension	  funds	  and	  the	  
desire	  of	  fund	  sponsors	  to	  expel	  the	  liability	  risk	  off	  their	  balance	  sheets	  (McFarland	  and	  
Nelson	  2014).	  	  
Fund	  managers,	  alternatively,	  can	  increase	  contribution	  levels	  from	  active	  
members	  to	  offset	  plan	  maturity	  risks.	  But	  as	  this	  participant	  points	  out,	  this	  option	  also	  
poses	  its	  own	  risks:	  "So	  as	  that	  contribution	  tool	  gets	  smaller	  and	  smaller,	  you	  have	  to	  
figure	  out	  what	  you're	  going	  to	  do	  on	  the	  benefit	  tool,	  like	  introducing	  conditional	  




back"	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  As	  such,	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  aging	  workforce	  can	  pressure	  
fund	  managers	  into	  making	  decisions	  about	  how	  to	  mitigate	  the	  risks	  involved	  with	  plan	  
maturity.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  tension	  will	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  
for	  each	  plan,	  such	  as	  plan	  size,	  the	  industry,	  and	  sector	  the	  plan’s	  workers	  belong	  to	  
and	  the	  plan’s	  governance	  structure.	  Consequently,	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  an	  aging	  
workforce	  in	  the	  form	  of	  plan	  maturity	  presents	  fund	  managers	  and	  sponsors	  with	  a	  
series	  of	  challenges	  that	  can	  make	  sponsoring	  a	  plan	  undesirable	  to	  an	  employer,	  while	  
also	  compelling	  sponsors	  to	  make	  key	  decisions	  around	  contribution	  rates	  and	  
investment	  decisions.	  The	  risks	  posed	  by	  plan	  maturity	  that	  stem	  from	  an	  aging	  
workforce	  is	  one	  set	  of	  dynamics	  that	  play	  into	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  secure	  DB	  plans	  to	  
individualized	  DC	  plans.	  	  
	  
Workforce	  composition	  and	  risk	  
Workforce	  composition	  is	  also	  a	  factor	  in	  whether	  an	  employer	  is	  interested	  in	  providing	  
a	  DB	  plan	  or	  not.	  A	  maturing	  plan	  will	  have	  members	  and	  a	  workforce	  that	  values	  their	  
DB	  plan	  because	  retirement	  is	  on	  their	  horizon,	  so	  paying	  into	  it	  is	  worth	  it.	  This	  can	  also	  
be	  a	  communication	  issue	  in	  that	  the	  pension	  plan	  communicates	  well	  with	  members	  in	  
describing	  the	  value	  of	  their	  plan.	  Conversely,	  for	  a	  company	  with	  a	  younger	  workforce	  
composition,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  much	  lower	  value	  proposition	  to	  the	  employer	  offering	  a	  
DB	  plan.	  So	  the	  company	  will	  ask	  themselves,	  ‘is	  this	  money	  worth	  putting	  into	  a	  DB	  
plan,	  or	  a	  DC	  plan,	  or	  health	  benefits?’	  One	  participant	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  blindfold	  




dynamics	  occurring	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  and	  the	  type	  of	  plan	  that	  is	  
established:	  	  
So	  they've	  placed	  huge	  value	  on	  their	  pension	  plan	  and	  they're	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  it.	  
Where	  another	  employer,	  you	  might	  have	  a	  younger	  workforce:	  ‘retirement	  is	  not	  on	  
my	  horizon,	  I	  don't	  care	  if	  you're	  putting	  25	  percent	  of	  my	  compensation	  package,	  I'd	  
rather	  put	  that	  in	  my	  pocket.’	  So	  they	  don't	  understand	  necessarily,	  they	  don't	  have	  the	  
highest	  value,	  whether	  it's	  a	  communication	  fault	  of	  the	  plan,	  or	  the	  workforce	  
composition.	  So	  those	  employers	  are	  ripe	  to	  say,	  ‘it's	  all	  about	  value	  for	  dollar.	  Am	  I	  
better	  to	  put	  it	  in	  their	  pay	  package,	  or	  into	  dental,	  or	  into	  DC	  plans	  so	  they	  can	  manage	  
their	  own	  account.’	  From	  an	  HR	  perspective,	  unless	  you're	  willing	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  value	  
composition,	  again,	  members,	  ‘oh	  we're	  getting	  rid	  of	  our	  DB	  plan	  and	  replacing	  it	  with	  
a	  DC	  plan,	  you	  control	  it	  and	  you	  take	  it	  where	  you	  go’	  –	  [it	  is]	  easy	  to	  blindfold	  people	  
on	  that	  tradeoff.	  So	  I	  think	  that’s	  -­‐	  I	  wouldn't	  say	  it's	  necessarily	  driving	  the	  exit,	  but	  it's	  
a	  factor	  in	  that	  if	  there's	  no	  value	  proposition	  to	  the	  employer	  offering	  a	  DB,	  they're	  
going	  to	  get	  out	  of	  it	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
	  
This	  participant	  claims	  that	  employers	  can	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  strong	  DB	  
plans,	  since	  putting	  all	  your	  employees	  in	  a	  DC	  plan,	  witnessing	  a	  global	  financial	  crisis	  
where	  workers	  lose	  much	  of	  their	  retirement	  savings	  and	  then	  laying	  them	  off,	  this	  is	  a	  
much	  more	  challenging	  conversation	  to	  have	  and	  is	  poor	  workforce	  management.	  	  
	  
Government,	  pension	  law	  and	  risk	  
When	  asked	  about	  risk	  and	  pensions,	  several	  professionals	  spoke	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  
legislation	  and	  regulatory	  rules	  pose	  to	  the	  voluntary	  workplace	  pension	  system	  in	  
Ontario.	  One	  fund	  manager	  described	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  growing	  scope	  of	  
regulatory	  rules	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  can	  make	  sponsoring	  a	  pension	  fund	  less	  attractive	  to	  
an	  employer:	  "Ever	  since	  Conrad	  Black	  took	  money	  out	  of	  the	  Dominion	  pension	  plan,	  
the	  regulators	  predominately	  have	  looked	  at	  every	  employer	  pension	  plan	  as	  the	  evil	  




every	  time	  we	  tighten	  the	  rule,	  one	  or	  two	  more	  employers	  say,	  ‘I've	  had	  enough’.	  So	  I	  
think	  we	  need	  the	  legislative	  environment	  to	  evolve	  better"	  (Actuary	  1,	  April	  2015).	  
Another	  pension	  expert	  with	  experience	  working	  as	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  
provincial	  government	  spoke	  of	  the	  unforeseen	  consequences	  of	  developing	  workplace	  
pension	  legislation	  within	  a	  voluntary	  based	  system.	  When	  asked	  if	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  
Act	  (PBA)	  had	  a	  structural	  relationship	  to	  inequality	  in	  that	  it	  only	  protects	  those	  with	  a	  
workplace	  pension,	  the	  participant	  said	  that,	  "pension	  law	  is	  intended	  to	  manage	  risks	  
of	  a	  different	  sort",	  that	  being	  financial	  risk.	  But	  a	  body	  of	  pension	  law	  manages	  that	  risk	  
by	  imposing	  increasing	  obligations	  on	  plan	  administrators,	  the	  investment	  managers,	  
and	  plan	  sponsors.	  This	  participant	  went	  on	  to	  claim:	  
…we	  create	  a	  disincentive	  to	  employers	  making	  any	  pension	  promise	  at	  all	  to	  their	  
workers.	  And	  so	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  it	  can	  subvert	  that	  aspect	  of	  social	  policy.	  And	  so	  in	  aid	  
of	  protecting	  against	  this	  type	  of	  risk,	  we're	  also	  precluding	  the	  expansion	  of	  that	  kind	  of	  
tool	  to	  achieve	  that	  public	  policy	  goal	  (Lawyer	  5,	  April	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  desire	  to	  protect	  one	  group	  of	  workers	  through	  legislating	  minimum	  standards	  can	  
create	  an	  incentive	  for	  employers	  to	  want	  to	  get	  out	  of	  providing	  pensions	  altogether.	  In	  
other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  how	  much	  regulation	  a	  government	  can	  establish	  before	  
employers	  decide	  they	  want	  to	  exit	  from	  the	  provision	  of	  pensions.	  	  
Another	  participant	  who	  worked	  as	  a	  government	  official	  drew	  a	  direct	  link	  
between	  diminishing	  pension	  coverage	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  expand	  government	  plans.	  The	  
source	  of	  this	  shrinkage	  in	  coverage	  stems	  from	  the	  volatility	  in	  funding,	  impacted	  by	  
fluctuating	  economic	  markets,	  “…and	  what	  we’re	  requiring	  employers	  to	  do”.	  Thus	  




funds	  in	  a	  system	  that	  is	  voluntary.	  This	  was	  a	  concern	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  the	  




This	  chapter	  began	  with	  a	  story	  about	  policymaking	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  New	  Brunswick,	  the	  provincial	  government’s	  introduction	  of	  target	  benefit	  pension	  
plans	  eventually	  led	  to	  legal	  action	  by	  a	  group	  of	  angry	  public	  sector	  pensioners	  whose	  
benefits	  were	  threatened.	  The	  premise	  of	  their	  lawsuit	  is	  the	  “right	  to	  security”,	  as	  
protected	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights.	  This	  is	  one	  example	  of	  a	  larger	  struggle	  
over	  the	  transferring	  of	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  onto	  the	  individual,	  highlighting	  the	  
dynamics	  between	  policymaking,	  government,	  employers	  and	  workers.	  As	  such,	  the	  
transferring	  of	  risk	  is	  multifaceted	  and	  cannot	  be	  measured	  with	  a	  single	  metric.	  This	  
process	  occurs	  incrementally	  and	  includes	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  struggles	  located	  in	  different	  
economic	  jurisdictions,	  involving	  various	  policies	  and	  regulations,	  while	  often	  lying	  at	  
the	  intersection	  of	  federal	  and	  provincial	  politics.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  risk	  is	  
simply	  becoming	  more	  individualized	  following	  a	  linear	  line	  from	  employer	  to	  employee.	  
Instead,	  risk	  shifts	  between	  employers,	  workers	  and	  the	  state	  and	  is	  shaped	  by	  broader	  
economic	  cycles	  and	  structures	  of	  inequality.	  The	  strength	  of	  union	  representatives	  at	  
the	  bargaining	  table,	  retiree	  activism,	  business	  lobbying	  and	  ideological	  beliefs	  of	  
governing	  parties	  mold	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk	  in	  society,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  New	  




The	  first	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  discussed	  risk	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  
Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  inequality,	  
poverty	  and	  workplace	  pensions.	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  low-­‐income	  rates	  dramatically	  
decreased	  for	  men	  and	  women	  until	  the	  mid	  1990s,	  from	  which	  point	  levels	  has	  slowly	  
increased.	  Decreasing	  poverty	  rates	  and	  low	  income	  amongst	  seniors	  was	  due	  largely	  to	  
the	  success	  of	  CPP,	  OAS	  and	  GIS.	  For	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  in	  Canada,	  since	  
the	  1970s,	  coverage	  has	  steadily	  shrunk	  for	  men,	  while	  growing	  for	  women,	  where	  
today	  pension	  coverage	  is	  higher	  for	  women.	  These	  trends	  are	  explained	  by	  changes	  in	  
the	  labour	  force,	  in	  which	  secure	  public	  sector	  jobs	  have	  increasingly	  been	  filled	  by	  
women,	  whereas	  employment	  in	  private	  sector	  industrial	  sectors	  dominated	  by	  men	  has	  
decreased	  dramatically.	  This	  section	  concluded	  with	  Figure	  7.4,	  illustrating	  families	  
whose	  primary	  earner	  has	  a	  workplace	  pension—especially	  if	  they	  have	  DB	  benefits—
have	  dramatically	  higher	  levels	  of	  household	  assets	  than	  families	  without.	  Those	  with	  a	  
DB	  plan	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  more	  education,	  be	  born	  in	  Canada,	  have	  a	  unionized	  job	  in	  
the	  public	  sector,	  and	  have	  longer	  job	  tenure.	  While	  overall	  pension	  coverage	  is	  
shrinking,	  those	  who	  do	  have	  a	  DB	  plan	  are	  significantly	  more	  secure.	  This	  dynamic	  
sheds	  light	  on	  the	  socioeconomic	  implications	  of	  workplace	  pensions,	  where	  the	  
workplace	  pension	  system	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  protect	  white-­‐collar	  Canadian	  born	  
professionals.	  In	  this	  light,	  workplace	  pensions	  become	  variable	  of	  inequality,	  expressed	  
along	  class	  lines.	  
	   The	  second	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  explored	  the	  dynamics	  of	  risk	  transfer	  




most	  secure	  are	  those	  who	  belong	  to	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  jointly	  sponsored	  pension	  
plan	  (JSPP).	  The	  scale	  of	  these	  plans	  makes	  them	  the	  most	  secure	  plans	  in	  Canada	  after	  
CPP.	  Conversely,	  single	  employer	  DB	  plans	  (i.e.	  SEPPs)	  in	  which	  the	  employer	  is	  the	  sole	  
sponsor	  and	  administrator	  operate	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale	  and	  are	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  facing	  
issues	  of	  insolvency.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  Canada’s	  collective	  agreement	  
system	  and	  the	  competitive	  dynamic	  between	  companies	  within	  the	  same	  industry,	  
which	  makes	  joint	  sponsorship	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  more	  unlikely.	  It	  is	  also	  due	  to	  other	  
factors,	  such	  as	  an	  aging	  workforce,	  plan	  maturity,	  and	  workforce	  composition.	  
Considering	  that	  employers	  sponsoring	  a	  SEPP	  are	  responsible	  for	  keeping	  the	  plan	  fully	  
funded,	  contribution	  volatility,	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  regulatory	  rules,	  coupled	  with	  plan	  
maturity	  risk,	  are	  factors	  that	  have	  compelled	  many	  employers	  to	  adopt	  “de-­‐risking”	  
strategies	  that	  include	  eliminating	  their	  sponsorship	  of	  DB	  plans	  or	  purchasing	  group	  
annuities.	  As	  such,	  workers	  in	  DB	  plans	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  at	  a	  higher	  risk	  of	  losing	  
benefits	  or	  being	  moved	  into	  a	  DC	  plan,	  or	  some	  form	  of	  hybrid	  plan.	  	  
	   The	  result	  of	  decreasing	  rates	  of	  private	  sector	  DB	  plans	  has	  fueled	  the	  growth	  of	  
DC	  plans,	  which	  represent	  the	  clearest	  example	  of	  risk	  transfer	  to	  the	  individual	  worker,	  
where	  pooled	  retirement	  savings	  transform	  into	  individual	  savings	  accounts.	  
Consequently,	  the	  shift	  to	  DC	  can	  currently	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  experiment	  in	  risk	  
redistribution,	  in	  which	  the	  social,	  economic	  and	  policy	  impacts	  of	  this	  risk	  transfer	  are	  
largely	  unknown.	  Ring	  (2003)	  calls	  the	  move	  to	  DC	  the	  shift	  of	  “unpredictability”.	  One	  
can	  assume	  that	  individual	  experiences	  managing	  DC	  income	  will	  vary	  widely	  depending	  




DC	  plan,	  workers	  are	  not	  pooled	  together,	  but	  rather	  sit	  on	  an	  island	  of	  personal	  savings	  
that	  they	  must	  invest	  appropriately	  if	  it	  is	  to	  provide	  adequate	  retirement	  income	  until	  
their	  death.	  What	  is	  not	  clear	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  with	  a	  DC	  plan	  are	  
successfully	  achieving	  this	  end.	  “Longevity”	  risk	  thus	  also	  becomes	  individualized,	  since	  
one	  must	  now	  calculate	  on	  their	  own	  how	  long	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  live,	  and	  then	  invest	  
their	  DC	  assets	  appropriately.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  whether	  DC	  plans	  will	  increase	  
poverty	  levels	  amongst	  seniors	  in	  the	  future?	  
	   Understanding	  risk	  transfer	  is	  further	  complicated	  given	  that	  many	  workers	  
during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  with	  secure	  DB	  plans	  preferred	  to	  have	  a	  DC	  plan,	  in	  part,	  to	  
capitalize	  on	  attractive	  invest	  conditions.	  This	  points	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  
economic	  cycles,	  a	  transforming	  labour	  force	  and	  perceptions	  of	  risk	  and	  security	  
amongst	  workers.	  	  
	   However,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  growing	  popularity	  of	  DC	  plans	  in	  Ontario	  and	  
elsewhere,	  DB	  plans	  still	  significantly	  outnumber	  the	  use	  of	  DC	  plans.	  The	  fight	  over	  
protecting	  DB	  plans	  from	  the	  implementation	  of	  DC	  plans	  has	  been	  strong,	  as	  the	  Air	  
Canada	  and	  Canada	  post	  strikes	  of	  2011	  illustrate.	  Importantly,	  there	  are	  other	  policy	  
initiatives	  that	  factor	  into	  the	  struggle	  over	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk,	  such	  as	  the	  recent	  
introduction	  of	  PRPPs	  and	  TBPs	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  The	  former	  Conservative	  
federal	  government	  used	  PRPPs	  as	  a	  market	  based	  solution	  to	  expand	  pension	  coverage	  
without	  requiring	  contributions	  from	  employers.	  Similarly,	  TBPs	  are	  designed	  to	  shield	  
private	  and	  public	  sector	  employers	  from	  the	  volatility	  of	  sponsoring	  a	  fully	  funded	  




place	  higher	  levels	  of	  risk	  on	  the	  individual	  worker.	  As	  more	  and	  more	  employers	  
attempt	  to	  move	  away	  from	  DB	  plans,	  many	  view	  TBPs	  as	  one	  means	  to	  protect	  pension	  
coverage	  by	  shifting	  some	  of	  the	  volatility	  on	  to	  employees.	  	  
	   Examining	  risk	  and	  policymaking	  is	  further	  complicated	  given	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  government	  thinks	  in	  terms	  of	  risk.	  According	  to	  some	  participants,	  
they	  are	  more	  attuned	  to	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  pension	  coverage	  and,	  given	  the	  historical	  
contentiousness	  of	  government	  pension	  files,	  particularly	  in	  Ontario,	  political	  leaders	  
consider	  very	  carefully	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  how	  new	  policy	  proposals	  will	  affect	  
employers,	  employees,	  and	  retirees.	  Ideology	  is	  also	  an	  important	  variable	  in	  this	  
instance,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  government	  believes	  individuals	  
should	  be	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  retirement.	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  a	  government	  does	  think	  
workers	  should	  be	  more	  responsible	  for	  saving,	  they	  will	  then	  provide	  more	  
opportunities	  to	  save	  more	  through	  vehicles	  such	  as	  PRPPs,	  RRSPs,	  and	  TFSAs.	  In	  this	  
instance,	  risk	  is	  deliberately	  moved	  away	  from	  an	  employment	  context	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
ideological	  position.	  Arguably,	  this	  has	  been	  the	  case	  within	  recent	  federal	  pension	  
policymaking.	  It	  would	  seem,	  therefore,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  risk	  society	  is	  dependent	  on	  
not	  only	  structural	  factors	  determined	  by	  industrial	  development,	  but	  also	  ideological	  
perspectives	  embedded	  in	  governing	  institutions.	  
	   As	  for	  Ontario,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  since	  2003	  has	  erred	  on	  the	  ideological	  
side	  of	  government	  playing	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  helping	  workers	  save	  for	  retirement.	  The	  
Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  mandated	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  to	  find	  solutions	  




as	  Commissioner,	  a	  law	  professor	  who	  was	  known	  to	  be	  labour	  friendly.	  Ontario	  was	  a	  
vocal	  supporter	  of	  CPP	  expansion,	  and	  ideological	  conflicts	  between	  former	  Finance	  
Minister	  Dwight	  Duncan	  and	  his	  provincial	  and	  federal	  conservative	  counterparts	  over	  
the	  implementation	  of	  PRPPs	  are	  well	  documented.	  Premier	  Wynne’s	  establishment	  of	  
the	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  Plan	  spoke	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  Ontario	  
government	  to	  expand	  pension	  coverage	  in	  the	  province,	  with	  or	  without	  the	  support	  of	  
the	  federal	  government.	  Pension	  policymaking	  in	  this	  context	  illustrates	  the	  central	  role	  
government	  plays	  in	  how	  risk	  is	  distributed	  in	  society	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  retirement	  savings.	  	  
	   Given	  the	  sum	  of	  these	  factors,	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  is	  distributed	  differently	  
across	  various	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  Ontario	  and	  other	  jurisdictions	  in	  Canada.	  
Public	  sector	  employees	  belonging	  to	  JSPPs	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  “success	  stories”	  who’s	  
families	  experience	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  financial	  security.	  However,	  the	  size	  of	  this	  
group	  is	  not	  growing.	  For	  others	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  particularly	  service	  industries,	  
where	  short	  work	  tenures	  that	  are	  often	  part	  time	  will	  often	  not	  have	  a	  workplace	  
pension.	  And	  for	  those	  who	  do,	  workers	  are	  increasingly	  being	  offered	  DC	  plans	  as	  
employers	  administering	  SEPPs	  seek	  to	  exit	  the	  provision	  of	  retirement	  income.	  
Ideologically,	  the	  Ontario	  provincial	  government	  believes	  the	  market	  alone	  will	  
not	  mitigate	  the	  risks	  involved	  with	  decreasing	  pension	  coverage,	  and	  therefore	  had	  
embarked	  on	  a	  new	  public	  provincial	  plan.	  Ontario	  was	  successful	  in	  using	  the	  ORPP	  to	  
pressure	  the	  federal	  and	  other	  provincial	  governments	  to	  agree	  to	  CPP	  benefit	  
expansion.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  will	  decrease	  risk	  is	  unclear,	  given	  new	  benefits	  will	  




this	  path-­‐departing	  policy	  reform	  does	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
individualization,	  pointing	  to	  a	  new	  willingness	  of	  some	  governments	  to	  provide	  more	  





CHAPTER	  8	  -­‐	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
	  
“A	  good	  pension	  system	  delivers	  adequate,	  predictable,	  and	  secure	  income	  to	  retired	  workers.	  
By	  that	  benchmark,	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  are	  not	  doing	  well”	  –	  Elizabeth	  Shilton,	  
Empty	  Promises:	  Why	  Workplace	  Pension	  Law	  Doesn’t	  Deliver	  Pensions,	  2016	  
	  
“What	  drove	  the	  expansion	  of	  CPP?	  The	  biggest	  single	  factor	  was	  the	  dire	  state	  of	  the	  traditional	  
company	  pension”	  –	  Janet	  McFarland	  and	  Ian	  McGugan,	  The	  Global	  &	  Mail,	  22	  June	  2016	  
	  
	  
This	  concluding	  chapter	  revisits	  key	  points	  of	  previous	  chapters	  to	  develop	  a	  broader	  
narrative	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policy,	  tying	  research	  findings	  into	  a	  larger	  picture	  to	  
establish	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  political	  context	  underpinning	  
employer,	  employee	  and	  state	  relations,	  and	  what	  these	  trends	  mean	  for	  the	  future	  of	  
pension	  policymaking.	  The	  first	  section	  provides	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  key	  findings	  from	  
each	  chapter,	  followed	  by	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  utility	  of	  theories	  of	  risk	  and	  
individualization	  to	  adequately	  explain	  pension	  politics	  and	  policy	  change.	  The	  third	  
section	  discusses	  the	  changing	  contours	  of	  the	  public/private	  dichotomy	  of	  pension	  
benefits,	  examining	  how	  recent	  trends	  points	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  rebalancing	  of	  risk	  
in	  Canadian	  society,	  away	  from	  employers	  onto	  individuals	  and	  governments.	  The	  fourth	  
section	  describes	  the	  contributions	  of	  this	  dissertation	  to	  scholarship	  on	  Canadian	  
pension	  policy.	  Finally,	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  dissertation	  are	  discussed,	  along	  with	  




Summary	  of	  Key	  Findings	  
	  
In	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  this	  dissertation	  asked:	  
Why	  has	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  shifted,	  and	  what	  factors	  have	  driven	  this?	  	  
This	  question	  links	  the	  policymaking	  process	  to	  processes	  of	  risk,	  while	  the	  focus	  on	  
Ontario	  provides	  insight	  into	  broader	  trends	  in	  pension	  policymaking	  outside	  the	  
province.	  	  
Chapter	  Two	  established	  pension	  policymaking	  as	  situated	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  
economic-­‐structural	  and	  institutional-­‐political	  contexts.	  Furthermore,	  Chapter	  Four	  
highlights	  this	  intersection	  and	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  historical	  growth	  of	  pension	  systems	  
reflect	  the	  tensions,	  struggles	  and	  contradictions	  of	  industrial	  development	  and	  the	  
material	  reproduction	  of	  social	  formations.	  While	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  is	  
well	  documented	  by	  scholars	  (Bryden	  1974;	  Myles	  1989;	  Weitz	  1991;	  Finkel	  2012;	  Rice	  
and	  Prince	  2013),	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  recent	  policymaking	  at	  the	  
provincial	  level	  is	  absent.	  The	  focus	  on	  Ontario	  is	  thus	  unique,	  providing	  insight	  into	  
broader	  trends	  in	  pension	  policymaking	  outside	  the	  province.	  	  
	   What	  is	  also	  unique	  to	  this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  
framework	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	  Beck’s	  “reflexive	  modernity”	  was	  used	  to	  
theorize	  pension	  policymaking	  as	  connected	  to	  individualization,	  which	  represents	  the	  
wider,	  social-­‐cultural-­‐political	  context	  that	  informs	  policy	  change.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  
reflexive	  modernity	  was	  used	  to	  investigate	  the	  broader	  institutional	  context	  of	  a	  new	  




understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  “ethics	  of	  everyday	  life”	  (Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐
Gernsheim	  2002)	  and	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  This	  framework	  also	  placed	  the	  
interaction	  between	  ideas,	  material	  interests	  and	  existing	  institutional	  practices	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  analysis,	  where	  historical	  institutionalism	  was	  used	  to	  consider	  how	  
institutions	  conditioned	  the	  actions	  of	  policymakers,	  while	  ideational	  analysis	  was	  used	  
to	  interpret	  how	  notions	  of	  risk	  materialize	  in	  policy	  change.	  Risk	  and	  indvidualization	  
were	  thus	  considered	  determining	  factors	  that	  drove	  policy	  change,	  while	  also	  
maintaining	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  class	  struggle	  in	  shaping	  pension	  policy.	  	  
	   Feminist	  political	  economy	  was	  also	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  3	  to	  theorize	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  gendered	  and	  racialized	  worker	  both	  historically	  and	  how	  pension	  systems	  have	  
structurally	  disadvantaged	  women	  compared	  to	  men.	  This	  approach	  discussed	  the	  rise	  
of	  pension	  systems	  in	  a	  white-­‐settler	  society	  characterized	  a	  process	  of	  national	  building	  
that	  sought	  to	  form	  a	  	  “white”	  Canada.	  As	  a	  result,	  feminist	  political	  economy	  
significantly	  broadened	  discussion	  provided	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  illustrating	  how	  
women’s	  work	  historically	  has	  been	  undervalued,	  in	  which	  the	  earner	  was	  assumed	  to	  
be	  male.	  Moreover,	  this	  approach	  highlighted	  how	  immigrant	  and	  racialized	  groups	  
have	  been	  excluded	  from	  pension	  systems	  in	  Canada,	  constituting	  both	  a	  gendered	  and	  
racial	  bias	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  early	  pension	  systems.	  	  
	   Using	  Ontario	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  Chapter	  Five	  concluded	  that	  Ontario’s	  pension	  
policymaking	  process	  since	  the	  1960s	  is	  cyclical,	  in	  which	  demand	  for	  new	  policy	  
reforms	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  economic	  cycles	  and	  interest	  rates.	  This	  chapter	  also	  




employers	  increasingly	  sought	  to	  exit	  the	  provision	  of	  secure,	  defined	  benefit	  (DB)	  
pension	  plans.	  The	  1990s	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  recent	  labour	  struggles	  in	  both	  the	  private	  
and	  public	  sectors	  in	  Ontario,	  pointing	  to	  broader	  transformations	  in	  Ontario’s	  labour	  
market	  and	  union	  power.	  	  
	   Using	  the	  Ontario	  Expert	  Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP)	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  
Chapter	  Six	  characterizes	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process	  as	  non-­‐linear,	  contingent	  on	  
intersecting	  economic,	  political,	  institutional	  and	  ideational	  factors.	  Findings	  drawn	  from	  
interview	  data	  reveal	  that	  the	  OECP	  was	  partially	  the	  result	  of	  policy	  reforms	  made	  in	  
the	  late	  1980s	  to	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  (PBA).	  These	  reforms	  led	  to	  a	  sustained	  period	  
of	  policy	  drift,	  where	  successive	  governments	  through	  the	  1990s	  failed	  to	  resolve	  class	  
conflicts	  over	  the	  ownership	  of	  pension	  surplus,	  spurring	  demand	  for	  an	  expert	  
commission	  to	  review	  Ontario’s	  pension	  statute.	  	  
Chapter	  Seven	  returned	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization,	  where	  several	  
conclusions	  were	  drawn	  using	  statistical	  and	  interview	  data	  and	  secondary	  literature.	  
Data	  revealed	  how	  the	  transferring	  of	  risk	  occurs	  incrementally	  at	  different	  geographical	  
locations	  in	  the	  economy.	  The	  distribution	  of	  risk	  is	  deeply	  contested	  by	  employees	  and	  
employers,	  struggling	  to	  assert	  the	  extent	  each	  group	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  
providing	  secure	  retirement	  income.	  Risk	  does	  not	  transfer	  in	  a	  linear	  fashion	  from	  
employer	  to	  employee,	  but	  rather	  shifts	  between	  employers,	  workers	  and	  the	  state.	  
This	  struggle	  is	  informed	  by	  broader	  economic	  cycles	  and	  structures	  of	  inequality	  at	  the	  





continuously	  contested.	  Deepening	  individualization	  may	  occur,	  but	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  
this	  since	  workers	  and	  policymakers	  have	  resisted	  this	  process	  when	  they	  believed	  too	  
much	  risk	  was	  resting	  on	  their	  shoulders.	  Put	  differently,	  while	  the	  consciousness	  of	  
workers	  may	  be	  characterized	  by	  the	  increasing	  culture	  of	  individualization	  (Beck	  and	  
Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2002),	  in	  the	  context	  of	  retirement	  income	  in	  Canada,	  notions	  of	  
collective	  responsibility	  established	  in	  postwar	  industrial	  society	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  
displaced.	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  clearest	  example	  of	  individualized	  
risk	  has	  occurred	  with	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  DC	  plans,	  where	  retirement	  savings	  was	  no	  
longer	  pooled,	  but	  individualized	  into	  personal	  savings	  accounts.	  Longevity	  risk	  has	  thus	  
become	  the	  new	  mantra	  for	  workers	  who	  become	  responsible	  for	  calculating	  how	  long	  
they	  will	  likely	  live	  and	  how	  to	  spend	  their	  retirement	  savings	  to	  ensure	  it	  lasts	  through	  
the	  course	  of	  their	  old	  age.	  	  
	   	  
Theoretical	  Reflections	  on	  Risk,	  Individualization	  and	  Workplace	  Pensions	  
	  
The	  current	  struggle	  over	  risk	  distribution	  exemplified	  by	  labour	  disputes	  such	  as	  
Canada	  Post,	  Air	  Canada,	  and	  retired	  public	  sector	  workers	  in	  New	  Brunswick	  point	  to	  
broader	  structural	  changes	  occurring	  between	  the	  market,	  state	  and	  labour	  movement.	  
Since	  the	  1990s,	  employers,	  predominately	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  have	  successfully	  
pressured	  unions	  to	  bend	  to	  their	  demands	  of	  introducing	  less	  secure	  pension	  plans,	  
either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  two-­‐tier	  benefit	  systems	  for	  new	  hires,	  or	  the	  introduction	  of	  




hires	  is	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  the	  auto-­‐manufacturing	  sector.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  these	  trends,	  
along	  with	  recent	  CPP	  reforms,	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  we	  claim	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  
retirement	  has	  conformed	  to	  the	  individualization	  thesis?	  
To	  a	  certain	  degree,	  Beck	  and	  Giddens’	  theories	  of	  modernity	  adequately	  
capture	  dimensions	  of	  changes	  to	  Ontario	  and	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  systems.	  At	  
the	  institutional	  level,	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  in	  advanced	  industrial	  societies	  have	  
undergone	  significant	  transformation	  within	  the	  current	  epoch	  of	  reflexive	  modernity.	  
This	  can	  be	  observed	  through	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  standard-­‐employment	  
relationship	  towards	  less	  secure,	  part-­‐time,	  contractual	  employment	  in	  economies	  with	  
diminishing	  manufacturing	  sectors	  and	  expanding	  service	  sectors.	  As	  the	  economy	  and	  
social	  relations	  of	  production	  are	  transformed,	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  (that	  had	  
been	  premised	  on	  full-­‐time	  secure	  employment)	  struggles	  to	  maintain	  pension	  coverage	  
for	  workers,	  and	  thus	  poses	  a	  new	  set	  of	  challenges	  for	  the	  worker	  who	  is	  increasingly	  
left	  to	  address	  the	  social	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves.	  The	  postwar	  ‘social	  
contract’	  of	  full-­‐time	  employment	  premised	  on	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model	  of	  social	  
reproduction	  was	  actively	  dismantled	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  during	  a	  prolonged	  period	  
of	  economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  and	  other	  industrialized	  societies	  (Beck	  
2001;	  Porter	  2003;	  Harvey	  2005;	  McBride	  2005).	  For	  Beck,	  this	  was	  the	  time	  in	  which	  
the	  ‘risk	  society’	  emerged	  and	  reflexive	  modernization	  took	  root.	  The	  off	  shoring	  of	  
much	  of	  North	  America’s	  manufacturing	  sectors,	  stagnating	  wages,	  growing	  service	  
sector	  industries,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  diminishing	  unionization	  density	  combined	  to	  




workers	  were	  becoming	  more	  exposed	  to	  new	  threats	  of	  unemployment,	  stagnating	  
wages,	  and	  rapid	  inflation	  as	  workplace	  pension	  coverage	  began	  to	  diminish	  through	  the	  
1980s	  to	  the	  current	  period.	  	  
The	  securities	  provided	  by	  DB	  pension	  plans	  eroded,	  often	  replaced	  by	  less	  
secure	  DC	  plans	  that	  shifted	  the	  risk	  of	  retirement	  savings	  onto	  the	  individual.	  Since	  DC	  
plans	  are	  individualized	  retirement	  savings	  accounts	  that	  the	  employee	  and	  employer	  
contribute	  to,	  as	  a	  worker	  edged	  closer	  to	  retirement,	  they	  were	  faced	  with	  an	  array	  of	  
options	  on	  how	  to	  invest	  their	  retirement	  savings.	  For	  example,	  retired	  workers	  today	  
can	  buy	  annuities	  (either	  fixed,	  indexed,	  or	  variable)	  or	  Registered	  Retirement	  Savings	  
Plans	  (RRSPs).	  They	  can	  also	  organize	  an	  investment	  portfolio	  built	  around	  mutual	  funds,	  
bonds	  and/or	  equities.	  Workers	  wishing	  to	  retire	  early	  can	  transfer	  their	  accrued	  
pension	  savings	  into	  a	  Locked-­‐in	  Retirement	  Account	  (LIRA).	  Once	  retired,	  those	  wishing	  
to	  access	  their	  RRSPs	  or	  LIRA	  accounts	  can	  open	  a	  Registered	  Retirement	  Income	  Fund	  
(RRIF)	  or	  a	  Life	  Income	  Fund	  (LIF).	  As	  of	  2015,	  workers	  with	  no	  workplace	  pension	  can	  
opt-­‐in	  to	  a	  Pooled	  Registered	  Pension	  Plan	  (PRPPs)	  that	  enables	  individual	  workers	  to	  
participate	  in	  a	  large,	  pooled	  pension	  plan.	  	  
Describing	  these	  different	  investment	  tools	  illustrates	  how	  current	  and	  retiring	  
workers	  without	  a	  traditional	  DB	  plan	  have	  to	  make	  important	  financial	  decisions	  about	  
how	  to	  save	  for	  retirement.	  It	  is	  here	  where	  the	  individualization	  thesis	  becomes	  useful.	  
As	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  is	  restructured,	  workers	  must	  become	  financially	  
prudent,	  capable	  of	  managing	  their	  assets	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  their	  security	  during	  




retirement	  than	  previous	  generations	  of	  workers.	  To	  further	  complicate	  the	  issue,	  to	  
make	  sound	  financial	  decisions,	  individual	  workers	  must	  factor	  in	  how	  old	  they	  expect	  to	  
live	  and	  how	  to	  best	  spread	  their	  financial	  assets	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  remaining	  lives	  
before	  death.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  challenged	  by	  one’s	  gender,	  age,	  race	  and	  ethnicity.	  Only	  
certain	  groups	  of	  workers	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	  DB	  and	  DC	  pension	  benefits,	  while	  many	  
others	  will	  not.	  And	  for	  those	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  DC	  pension,	  depending	  on	  
one’s	  gender,	  age,	  and	  marital	  status,	  longevity	  risk	  will	  be	  further	  complicated	  by	  life	  
expectancy,	  future	  care	  giving	  of	  dependents,	  both	  young	  and	  old.	  As	  life-­‐expectancy	  
levels	  rise,	  facilitated	  by	  healthier	  lifestyles	  and	  healthcare	  technologies,	  those	  who	  live	  
into	  their	  late	  80s,	  90s	  and	  older	  face	  the	  risk	  of	  their	  retirement	  savings	  drying	  up	  
during	  their	  most	  vulnerable	  years	  (which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  job	  they	  had	  
before	  retirement).	  Insurance	  companies	  and	  pension	  funds	  call	  this	  “longevity	  risk”	  –	  
that	  is,	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  increasing	  life	  expectancy	  of	  policyholders	  or	  
pensioners41.	  Indeed,	  the	  consciousness	  of	  workers	  saving	  for	  retirement	  is	  affected	  by	  
individualization.	  	  
“Retirement	  planning”	  and	  “financial	  literacy”	  are	  terms	  that	  are	  abundant	  in	  the	  
reflexive	  modernization	  epoch	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  retirement.	  This	  is	  the	  precipice	  of	  post	  
work,	  the	  “tyranny	  of	  choice”	  enforced	  upon	  workers,	  leading	  to	  a	  “nomadic”	  existence	  
of	  retirement	  planning.	  As	  Beck	  and	  Giddens	  argue,	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  modernity	  is	  
a	  question	  of	  routinely	  choosing	  among	  alternatives	  or	  possible	  worlds.	  Consequently,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Shilton	  (2016)	  also	  identifies	  “interest	  rate”	  risk	  (i.e.	  having	  to	  calculate	  how	  changing	  interest	  
levels	  will	  impact	  one’s	  retirement	  savings)	  and	  “investment”	  risk	  (i.e.	  exposure	  to	  fluctuations	  





as	  Giddens	  claims,	  “Living	  in	  the	  ‘risk	  society’	  means	  living	  with	  a	  calculative	  attitude	  to	  
the	  open	  possibilities	  of	  action,	  positive	  and	  negative,	  with	  which,	  as	  individuals	  and	  
globally,	  we	  are	  confronted	  in	  a	  continuous	  way	  in	  our	  contemporary	  social	  existence”	  
(1991:	  28).	  The	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  of	  the	  individual	  is	  shaped	  by	  this	  new	  late-­‐modern	  
identity,	  the	  personal	  dilemma	  of	  where	  to	  put	  one’s	  resources	  and	  to	  calculate	  how	  
long	  these	  resources	  will	  be	  needed	  before	  the	  end	  of	  one’s	  life.	  Concerns	  about	  how	  
the	  strength	  of	  global	  financial	  markets	  and	  the	  level	  of	  interest	  rates	  will	  impact	  
individual	  retirement	  savings	  must	  be	  reflected	  upon	  by	  the	  individual	  worker,	  thus	  
linking	  the	  global	  to	  one’s	  local,	  everyday	  lived	  experiences.	  Local	  practices	  must	  be	  
replaced	  with	  “expert	  knowledges”	  to	  mitigate	  these	  personal	  risks,	  placing	  trust	  into	  
financial	  advisors	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  establishing	  of	  one’s	  ontological	  security	  during	  post-­‐
work	  life.	  Retirement	  for	  many	  is	  now	  a	  question	  of	  calculation.	  	  
	  
The	  Pillars	  or	  Retirement	  Income:	  Wither	  Individualization?	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  risk	  theory	  and	  the	  individualization	  thesis	  provide	  an	  adequate	  description	  the	  
ontological	  experience	  of	  workers	  who	  have	  a	  hybrid	  DB/DC	  plan,	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  DB	  
plan,	  or	  never	  had	  one	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  However,	  as	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation	  
revealed,	  the	  transfer	  of	  risk	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  risk	  has	  been	  individualized	  is	  
highly	  contested	  (at	  different	  sites	  of	  labour	  negotiations	  and	  policymaking)	  and	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  how	  much	  risk	  is	  individualized	  in	  the	  political	  realm	  of	  pension	  policy.	  




nuanced	  understanding	  to	  sufficiently	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  
pension	  policy	  change.	  
Scholars	  of	  risk,	  citizenship	  and	  social	  policy	  (Giddens	  1998;	  Culpitt	  1999;	  
Edwards	  and	  Glover	  2001;	  Brodie	  2007)	  have	  asserted	  that	  social	  policy	  in	  the	  risk	  
society	  is	  qualitatively	  changing.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  this	  perspective	  claims	  
the	  ‘traditional’	  welfare	  state	  characterized	  by	  social	  entitlements	  has	  changed	  towards	  
welfare	  ‘consumerism’.	  Individuals	  have	  transformed	  from	  citizen-­‐recipients	  into	  
rational	  citizen	  consumers	  in	  the	  risk	  society.	  Brodie	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  
individualization—as	  the	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	  of	  contemporary	  
modernization—has	  become	  increasingly	  embedded	  in	  neoliberal	  social	  policy	  reform	  
processes	  in	  Canada	  and	  other	  Western	  democracies.	  Contemporary	  social	  policymaking	  
is	  depicted	  as	  being	  dominated	  by	  hegemonic	  assumptions	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  
individual,	  in	  which	  the	  state	  must	  facilitate	  the	  needs	  of	  rational,	  risk-­‐taking	  citizen.	  
Also,	  Beck	  (1992;	  1999)	  and	  Giddens	  (1991;	  1994;	  1998)	  argued	  that	  globalization	  
(economic,	  political	  and	  cultural)	  has	  limited	  the	  freedoms	  of	  national	  governments	  to	  
address	  risks	  posed	  by	  the	  risk	  society.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  confidence	  in	  policymakers	  
has	  diminished,	  bringing	  into	  question	  their	  abilities	  to	  adequately	  reform	  policies	  to	  
mitigate	  threats	  posed	  by	  globalization	  (Edwards	  and	  Glover	  2001).	  In	  the	  field	  of	  
workplace	  pensions,	  this	  transformation	  of	  the	  policy/citizen	  nexus	  is	  questionable,	  in	  
that	  attempts	  to	  introduce	  pension	  reforms	  that	  establish	  neoliberal	  political	  
rationalities	  have	  been	  mostly	  rejected.	  As	  findings	  in	  Chapter	  Five	  suggest,	  there	  is	  a	  




finding	  parallels	  other	  scholarship	  claiming	  that	  neoliberal	  pension	  policy	  reform	  has	  
been	  largely	  unsuccessful	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005;	  Karimi	  2012;	  Myles	  2013).	  
Subsequently,	  if	  individualization	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  individuals	  are	  separated	  from	  
the	  traditional	  securities	  of	  industrial	  society,	  then	  recent	  policy	  changes	  that	  are	  
attempting	  to	  strengthen	  pension	  rights	  brings	  into	  question	  this	  process.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
say	  individualization	  has	  not	  occurred.	  Rather,	  it	  means	  that	  the	  response	  of	  workers	  to	  
this	  context	  has	  fuelled	  the	  desire	  for	  renewed	  collectivization.	  
To	  fully	  capture	  why	  this	  has	  come	  to	  be,	  this	  dissertation	  examined	  the	  
changing	  relationship	  between	  the	  pillars	  of	  retirement	  income	  in	  Ontario	  and	  Canada	  
and	  the	  role	  of	  risk.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Seven,	  the	  risk	  involved	  with	  providing	  
secure	  retirement	  income	  is	  distributed	  among	  individuals,	  employers	  and	  
governments.	  Risk,	  however,	  is	  also	  distributed	  between	  pillars,	  and	  the	  placement	  of	  
risk	  is	  politically	  driven	  by	  jurisdictional	  and	  institutional	  factors,	  along	  with	  the	  balance	  
of	  class	  forces.	  
First,	  employees	  and	  employers	  vigorously	  fight	  over	  who	  should	  be	  responsible	  
for	  the	  risks	  of	  involved	  with	  retirement	  income	  security.	  Chapter	  Seven	  highlighted	  
examples	  of	  these	  struggles,	  including	  labour	  conflicts	  at	  Air	  Canada,	  Canada	  Post	  and	  
legal	  action	  by	  retired	  public	  sector	  workers	  against	  the	  Government	  of	  New	  Brunswick.	  
Since	  the	  1990s,	  large	  employers	  in	  private	  and	  public	  sectors	  have	  been	  exiting	  the	  
provision	  of	  secure	  DB	  plans,	  replacing	  (or	  attempting	  to	  replace)	  them	  with	  less	  secure	  
DC	  plans,	  hybrid	  DC/DB	  plans,	  and/or	  introducing	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  systems.	  Statistical	  




sector	  in	  Ontario	  and	  across	  Canada.	  Since	  the	  1980s,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  downward	  trend	  
in	  workplace	  pension	  coverage,	  showcasing	  the	  overall	  shift	  of	  risk	  onto	  the	  individual	  
worker.	  	  
However,	  governments	  over	  the	  past	  ten	  years	  have	  responded	  to	  this	  trend.	  
Governments	  assume	  some	  degree	  of	  risk	  when	  regulating	  workplace	  pension	  systems,	  
either	  through	  legislation	  (such	  as	  minimum	  standards)	  or	  other	  government	  actions	  
(such	  as	  providing	  government	  bailouts).	  In	  Ontario	  and	  elsewhere,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  
government	  officials	  to	  ensure	  that	  workplace	  pension	  benefits	  promised	  to	  workers	  
and	  retirees	  are	  protected.	  If	  a	  group	  of	  workers	  is	  suddenly	  stripped	  of	  their	  retirement	  
benefits	  (usually	  due	  to	  their	  employer	  becoming	  bankrupt),	  workers	  will	  call	  upon	  
government	  to	  either	  bail	  out	  their	  pension	  benefits,	  or	  provide	  other	  social	  supports	  to	  
establish	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  security.	  This	  occurs	  as	  other	  workers	  witness	  these	  events	  
and	  fear	  their	  pensions	  could	  suffer	  a	  similar	  fate.	  Indeed,	  past	  bankruptcies	  that	  have	  
eliminated	  or	  substantially	  reduced	  pension	  benefits	  have	  motivated	  new	  legislation	  to	  
establish	  minimum	  standards	  of	  protection.	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  in	  Ontario	  in	  Chapter	  Five	  documented	  this	  
process,	  where	  the	  Ontario	  government,	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time,	  had	  assumed	  a	  
degree	  of	  risk	  involved	  with	  securing	  retirement	  income	  for	  workers.	  One	  example	  was	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Guarantee	  Fund	  (PBGF)	  in	  1980,	  which	  
launched	  the	  Ontario	  government	  into	  the	  role	  of	  administering	  Canada’s	  first	  and	  only	  
insurance	  scheme	  for	  failing	  workplace	  pension	  plans.	  This	  increased	  the	  government’s	  




bankrupt	  employers	  who	  could	  no	  longer	  pay	  pension	  benefits.	  Another	  example	  was	  
the	  bailouts	  provided	  by	  the	  Ontario	  and	  federal	  governments	  during	  bankruptcy	  
negotiations	  through	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  to	  protect	  the	  solvency	  of	  large,	  private	  sector	  
pension	  plans.	  	  
Governments	  will	  also	  identify	  and	  respond	  to	  conditions	  that	  are	  deemed	  too	  
risky	  for	  individual	  workers.	  For	  example,	  this	  occurred	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  
crisis	  during	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  when	  several	  provincial	  governments	  (Alberta,	  British	  
Columbia,	  Ontario	  and	  Nova	  Scotia)	  became	  concerned	  with	  decreasing	  coverage,	  
catalyzing	  provincial	  reviews	  of	  the	  sustainability	  of	  their	  respective	  workplace	  pension	  
systems.	  The	  findings	  of	  these	  reports	  made	  clear	  workplace	  pension	  systems	  required	  
new	  fixes,	  through	  “improving	  the	  operation	  of	  existing	  plans	  by	  contemplating	  new	  
arrangements	  better	  adapted	  to	  current	  conditions”	  (Baldwin	  and	  FitzGerald	  2010:	  13).	  
For	  instance,	  Alberta,	  British	  Columbia,	  and	  Nova	  Scotia	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  
provincial	  pension	  plans,	  while	  Ontario	  proposed	  large	  pension	  plans	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  
pension	  administrative	  services	  to	  small	  organization	  and	  individuals	  (Baldwin	  and	  
FitzGerald	  2010).	  	  	  
It	  is	  at	  this	  juncture	  that	  we	  can	  observe	  how	  the	  political	  context	  of	  Pillar	  Three	  
(i.e.	  workplace	  pensions)	  impresses	  upon	  the	  politics	  of	  Pillar	  Two	  (CPP),	  altering	  the	  
public/private	  dichotomy	  of	  pension	  benefits	  in	  Canada.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  these	  
reports	  did	  not	  directly	  recommend	  CPP	  expansion	  as	  a	  policy	  solution	  to	  decreasing	  
coverage,	  these	  reports	  nonetheless	  acknowledged	  that	  workplace	  pensions	  systems	  




Canadian	  workers	  in	  their	  current	  state.	  The	  economic	  conditions	  following	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  intensified	  concerns	  about	  workplace	  pension	  systems,	  fueling	  new	  
discussions	  regarding	  CPP	  expansion.	  As	  documented	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  since	  2010,	  
Ontario	  played	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  demanding	  the	  federal	  and	  other	  provincial	  
governments	  expand	  CPP	  along	  with	  other	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Canadian	  Labour	  
Congress	  (CLC).	  Ontario	  continuously	  pestered	  the	  Harper	  federal	  government,	  first	  with	  
demands	  to	  expand	  CPP	  expansion,	  then	  resisting	  Harper’s	  Pooled	  Registered	  Pension	  
Plans	  (PRPPs),	  then	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  proposed	  Ontario	  Retirement	  Pension	  
Plan	  (ORPP).	  The	  risks	  posed	  by	  slumping	  coverage	  levels	  in	  Ontario	  were	  viewed	  as	  a	  
threat	  both	  to	  workers	  and	  to	  government,	  because	  eventually	  government	  would	  have	  
to	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  retired	  workers	  with	  inadequate	  retirement	  income	  with	  
other	  policy	  tools	  if	  no	  reform	  occurred.	  Consequently,	  risk	  became	  an	  object	  of	  
negotiation	  between	  provincial	  and	  federal	  policymaking	  processes,	  traversing	  multiple	  
pillars	  within	  the	  retirement	  income	  system,	  renegotiating	  the	  public/private	  policy	  
divide.	  Arguably,	  Ontario	  was	  unwilling	  to	  assume	  increasing	  levels	  of	  risk	  by	  itself,	  as	  a	  
single	  governing	  institution.	  
At	  the	  individual	  level,	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  risk	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  
associated	  with	  economic	  cycles	  and	  interest	  rates.	  The	  economic	  hit	  suffered	  by	  many	  
pensions	  plans	  following	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  heightened	  concerns	  of	  workers	  and	  
retirees	  over	  the	  security	  of	  their	  pension	  benefits.	  Pensions	  began	  to	  poll	  well	  in	  
Ontario,	  where	  voters	  gave	  the	  Ontario	  Liberal	  Party	  a	  fresh	  majority	  government	  in	  




plans	  to	  expand	  CPP.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  interest	  rates	  remained	  low,	  decreasing	  the	  
value	  of	  DC	  accounts,	  RRSPs,	  and	  other	  individual	  savings	  vehicles.	  The	  value	  placed	  on	  
DB	  plans	  was	  different	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  interest	  rate	  levels	  were	  high,	  leading	  
some	  workers	  to	  request	  that	  their	  unions	  provide	  DC	  plans	  rather	  than	  DB	  plans	  to	  
capitalize	  on	  high	  return	  rates.	  Risk	  in	  that	  context	  was	  associated	  with	  remaining	  with	  a	  
DB	  plan	  that	  imposed	  smaller	  returns	  in	  a	  fixed	  benefit	  context.	  	  	  
The	  assertion	  by	  risk	  theorists	  that	  globalizing	  forces	  are	  transforming	  the	  
welfare/citizenship	  nexus	  away	  from	  a	  model	  premised	  on	  risk	  sharing	  to	  one	  in	  which	  
the	  state	  must	  facilitate	  the	  needs	  of	  rational,	  risk	  taking	  citizens	  does	  not	  ring	  true	  for	  
pensions	  in	  Ontario	  (and	  Canada).	  Governing	  institutions	  such	  as	  Ontario	  and	  citizens	  
alike	  called	  for	  CPP	  expansion	  as	  one	  remedy	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  workplace	  pension	  
systems.	  In	  the	  current	  economic	  context	  characterized	  by	  low	  interest	  rates,	  precarious	  
labour	  markets,	  stagnating	  wages	  and	  growing	  income	  inequality,	  what	  is	  deemed	  
rational	  by	  many	  is	  the	  pooling	  of	  risk.	  Beck’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  new	  social	  
movements	  does	  not	  satisfactorily	  describe	  pension	  politics	  in	  Canada,	  because	  to	  a	  
large	  extent,	  sub-­‐national	  governing	  institutions	  have	  played	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  pushing	  
for	  policy	  reform.	  Moreover,	  unions,	  rather	  than	  interest	  groups,	  still	  provide	  leadership	  
on	  protecting	  the	  pension	  benefits	  of	  workers	  and	  advocating	  politically	  for	  pension	  
reform.	  In	  other	  words,	  given	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  class	  forces	  that	  facilitated	  the	  
emergence	  of	  workplace	  pension	  benefits,	  current	  changes	  to	  this	  balance	  provide	  




the	  context	  of	  workplace	  pensions,	  the	  “sub-­‐politics”	  in	  which	  interest	  group	  “from	  
below”	  lobbying	  political	  officials	  does	  not	  adequately	  explain	  Canada’s	  pension	  politics.	  	  	  
This	  claim	  that	  class	  remains	  a	  central	  factor	  in	  explaining	  pension	  policy	  is	  made	  
clearer	  by	  interrogating	  Beck’s	  notion	  of	  class	  as	  a	  “zombie”	  category	  in	  reflexive	  
modernization.	  Zombie	  categories,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Three,	  are	  traditional	  
discourses	  and	  cultural	  practices	  of	  industrial	  modernity	  that	  live	  on	  in	  the	  risk	  society,	  
even	  though	  their	  constitutive	  power	  as	  a	  social	  institution	  is	  diminishing	  as	  society	  “de-­‐
traditionalizes”.	  Some	  examples	  include	  the	  nuclear	  family,	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  and	  
neighborhood.	  Beck	  also	  claims	  that	  class	  and	  full	  employment	  are	  zombie	  categories	  
(Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2002).	  For	  example,	  as	  post-­‐industrializing	  societies	  
experience	  growth	  in	  part	  time,	  flextime	  work,	  these	  emerging	  economic	  conditions	  
come	  to	  characterize	  reflexive	  modernity,	  while	  the	  fulltime	  industrial	  wage	  become	  a	  
category	  of	  the	  past,	  or	  a	  “zombie”	  category.	  Government	  attempts	  to	  respond	  to	  these	  
changes	  are	  ill	  fated	  because	  they	  rely	  on	  antiquated	  categories	  to	  prescribe	  new	  
policies.	  In	  this	  light,	  class	  also	  becomes	  a	  zombie	  category.	  According	  to	  Beck,	  in	  
reflexive	  modernity,	  examining	  how	  these	  economic	  changes	  affect	  workers’	  
consciousness	  using	  class	  analysis	  does	  not	  satisfactorily	  capture	  what	  is	  actually	  
occurring	  in	  people’s	  heads.	  Class	  has	  become	  a	  zombie	  category	  because	  the	  
experience	  of	  living	  in	  poverty,	  or	  belonging	  to	  a	  working	  class,	  has	  qualitatively	  
changed	  (Beck	  and	  Beck-­‐Gernsheim	  2002).	  As	  a	  result,	  society	  becomes	  more	  
differentiated	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  cultures	  of	  individualization,	  spawning	  a	  new	  




The	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation	  dispute	  aspects	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  class	  is	  a	  
zombie	  category,	  given	  the	  historical	  and	  ongoing	  role	  unions	  play	  in	  protecting	  pension	  
benefits	  for	  workers.	  Because	  unions	  are	  still	  the	  primary	  institution	  that	  protects	  
pension	  benefits	  for	  workers,	  class	  identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  pension	  politics	  continues	  to	  be	  
important:	  that	  is,	  the	  identity	  of	  workers	  and	  their	  retirement	  income	  benefits	  remain	  
intertwined	  with	  their	  union	  membership.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  class	  is	  a	  “zombie”	  
category	  in	  other	  dimensions	  of	  one’s	  personal	  life	  (through	  involvement	  in	  subcultures	  
of	  individualization,	  such	  as	  environmental	  or	  dietary	  issues).	  But	  the	  struggle	  to	  protect	  
one’s	  pension	  is	  defined	  by	  workers	  seeking	  protect	  their	  benefits	  through	  union	  
membership.	  For	  workers	  who	  are	  not	  unionized,	  and	  who	  do	  not	  have	  pension	  
benefits,	  indeed,	  class	  is	  a	  “zombie	  category”.	  But	  for	  unionized	  workers	  with	  pension	  
benefits,	  collective	  identity	  continues	  to	  be	  important,	  expressed	  through	  collective	  
bargaining,	  acts	  of	  solidarity,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  engagement.	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  true,	  according	  to	  Beck,	  that	  politics	  is	  increasingly	  related	  to	  
individual	  freedom,	  individuals	  also	  remain	  free	  to	  choose	  to	  remain	  within	  the	  
collective,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  union,	  or	  seeking	  to	  protect	  pension	  benefits	  with	  other	  
workers	  through	  other	  means,	  such	  as	  legal	  action	  (e.g.	  NB	  Pension	  Coalition).	  In	  this	  
context,	  governments	  are	  not	  reacting	  to	  subcultures	  of	  individualization,	  but	  are	  
instead	  reacting	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  workers	  to	  collectivize	  retirement	  income	  risks.	  
Recent	  CPP	  reforms	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  this	  light.	  This	  argument	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  
existence	  of	  reflexive	  modernization	  or	  individualization	  in	  the	  contours	  of	  pension	  




be	  revised	  to	  account	  for	  individuals	  that	  seek	  collectivization,	  or	  an	  individualization	  
that	  leads	  to	  collectivization.	  In	  this	  light,	  class	  is	  not	  a	  zombie	  category,	  but	  a	  category	  
that	  is	  alive.	  	  	  	  
With	  this	  said,	  recent	  CPP	  changes	  can	  be	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  federal	  
government	  responding	  to	  individualization.	  In	  October	  2016,	  Federal	  Finance	  Minister	  
Bill	  Morneau	  said	  Canadians	  should	  get	  used	  to	  short-­‐term	  employment	  (The	  Canadian	  
Press	  2016).	  He	  envisioned	  a	  new	  role	  for	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  
support	  precariously	  employed	  Canadians	  that	  will	  encounter	  more	  frequent	  career	  
changes.	  Morneau	  described	  recent	  CPP	  changes	  as	  one	  move	  in	  this	  direction,	  calling	  it,	  
“a	  recognition	  that	  people	  aren’t	  going	  to	  have	  the	  same	  pension	  benefits”	  as	  past	  
generations	  (The	  Canadian	  Press	  2016).	  Addressing	  the	  needs	  of	  all	  workers,	  not	  just	  
those	  with	  workplace	  pensions,	  Morneau	  depicts	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  having	  to	  
modernize	  its	  approach,	  by	  abandoning	  the	  zombie	  category	  of	  fulltime	  industrial	  
employment.	  CPP	  expansion	  has	  been	  used	  to	  serve	  this	  need.	  Ironically,	  the	  federal	  
government’s	  response	  to	  emerging	  labour	  conditions	  has	  been	  to	  collectivize	  
retirement	  income	  risk	  by	  expanding	  CPP.	  	  
Through	  this	  lens,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  pension	  politics,	  the	  effects	  of	  
individualization	  are	  thus	  different	  between	  workers	  with	  a	  workplace	  pension	  and	  the	  
broader	  labour	  force.	  Transformations	  in	  the	  retirement	  income	  system	  have	  different	  
meanings	  for	  workers	  with	  or	  without	  a	  workplace	  pension,	  establishing	  different	  
institutional	  connections	  between	  employment	  and	  retirement	  income	  security.	  




while	  non-­‐unionized	  workers	  must	  express	  their	  demands	  through	  other	  means,	  
generating	  different	  forms	  of	  individualization	  and	  therefore	  consciousness.	  These	  
differences	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  contradictions	  present	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  
individualization	  and	  pension	  policy.	  	  
	  
Renegotiating	  Pension	  Politics	  
	  
Today,	  the	  political	  dynamics	  between	  public	  and	  private	  pensions	  is	  entering	  a	  new	  
critical	  juncture	  of	  policy	  change.	  What	  is	  occurring	  is	  the	  movement	  of	  two	  tides:	  the	  
retrenching	  of	  workplace	  pensions	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  pension	  system.	  	  This	  
points	  to	  two	  trends:	  1)	  a	  changing	  terrain	  of	  class	  power	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  retirement	  
income	  security;	  and	  2)	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  period	  of	  pension	  politics	  that	  is	  
transforming	  how	  risk	  is	  distributed	  between	  employers,	  employees,	  and	  the	  state.	  The	  
result	  of	  these	  trends	  is	  that	  new	  ideas	  are	  modifying	  the	  path-­‐dependency	  of	  governing	  
institutions	  and	  policymaking	  processes.	  	  	  
These	  trends	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  several	  locations	  of	  the	  workforce	  and	  public	  
debate	  and	  are	  linked	  to	  changing	  labour	  force	  conditions.	  Characterizing	  this	  current	  
period	  of	  reform	  is	  the	  growing	  chorus	  of	  voices	  that	  seriously	  question	  the	  future	  
viability	  of	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  to	  ever	  provide	  adequate	  income	  
security	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  workers.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Federal	  Finance	  Minister	  Bill	  
Morneau	  in	  October	  2016	  said	  Canadians	  should	  get	  used	  to	  short-­‐term	  employment	  




Morneau’s	  conclusions	  are	  similar	  recent	  scholarship	  on	  pensions.	  In	  her	  recent	  book	  
Empty	  Promises:	  Why	  Workplace	  Pension	  Law	  Does	  Not	  Deliver	  Pensions,	  Elizabeth	  
Shilton	  (2016)	  portrays	  Canada’s	  workplace	  pension	  system	  as	  a	  “failure”	  (p.	  173),	  in	  
which	  “workplace	  pension	  plans	  have	  had	  their	  day”	  (p.	  182).	  In	  her	  blunt	  critique,	  
Shilton	  details	  how	  voluntary	  system	  has	  been	  structured	  to	  service	  the	  interests	  of	  
employers,	  leaving	  workers	  little	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  strong	  pensions.	  The	  only	  way	  in	  
which	  to	  mitigate	  the	  structural	  inadequacies,	  according	  to	  Shilton,	  is	  renewed	  state	  
action.	  	  
This	  perspective	  can	  be	  also	  found	  in	  debates	  within	  the	  labour	  movement	  
regarding	  high	  profile	  labour	  negotiations	  at	  Canada	  Post	  and	  the	  auto	  manufacturing	  
industry.	  Unifor’s	  recent	  acceptance	  of	  a	  two-­‐tier	  pension	  benefits	  system	  for	  new	  hires	  
stirred	  controversy.	  Sam	  Gindin,	  former	  director	  of	  research	  for	  the	  Canadian	  Auto	  
Workers	  Union,	  describes	  Unifor’s	  recent	  agreement	  as	  a	  “betrayal”,	  in	  which	  the	  
Canadian	  labour	  is	  facing	  a	  broader	  crisis	  that	  is	  “wide	  and	  deep”	  (Gindin	  2016a).	  Gindin	  
claims	  Unifor	  is	  taking	  the	  union	  down	  a	  “dead	  end	  street”	  of	  permanent	  cuts	  to	  pay	  
and	  pension	  benefits	  (Gindin	  2016b).	  Similarly,	  Sid	  Ryan,	  former	  president	  of	  the	  
Ontario	  Federation	  of	  Labour,	  characterizes	  Unifor’s	  deal	  as	  selling	  out	  future	  workers,	  
setting	  a	  new	  precedent	  of	  labour	  negotiations	  that	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  “cancer”,	  that	  will	  
“spread	  like	  wild	  fire	  into	  every	  workplace	  in	  the	  country,	  across	  public	  and	  private	  
sectors	  alike”	  (Ryan	  2016).	  Bill	  Murnighan,	  Unifor’s	  current	  director	  of	  research	  and	  
member	  of	  the	  Master	  Bargaining	  Committee,	  in	  response	  to	  Sam	  Gindin’s	  vitriolic	  




enhanced	  CPP	  “will	  be	  in	  force	  by	  the	  time	  they	  retire”	  (Murnighan	  2016).	  This	  debate	  
highlights	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  actors	  in	  both	  government	  and	  the	  labour	  movement	  
believe	  government	  must	  provide	  new	  measures	  address	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  workplace	  
pension	  system.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  events	  of	  2016	  underline	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  new	  period	  
of	  pension	  politics	  is	  emerging,	  characterized	  by	  deepening	  individual	  risk	  as	  employers	  
secure	  new	  victories	  over	  workers	  that	  place	  the	  risk	  of	  retirement	  income	  security	  
increasingly	  onto	  workers.	  	  
As	  more	  risk	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  individual	  workers,	  this	  generates	  new	  
provincial/federal	  political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pension	  policy,	  where	  the	  failure	  of	  
Canada’s	  private	  pension	  systems	  is	  impacting	  the	  welfare	  state	  politics	  of	  Canada.	  The	  
decrease	  in	  private	  benefits	  is	  leading	  to	  growing	  inequalities	  across	  Canadian	  society,	  
generating	  new	  political	  tensions	  that	  intensify	  pressure	  on	  governments	  to	  respond.	  
Consequently,	  as	  unions	  are	  unable	  to	  protect	  existing	  pension	  benefits,	  a	  link	  can	  be	  
made	  between	  growing	  individual	  risk	  and	  ideation.	  New	  ideas,	  such	  as	  the	  expansion	  of	  
CPP	  benefits,	  are	  inserted	  into	  policy	  reform	  discussions,	  where	  class	  struggle,	  
individualized	  risk,	  and	  ideation	  become	  factors	  that	  drive	  policy	  reform.	  	  	  	  
These	  dynamics	  highlight	  the	  theoretical	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  In	  this	  
emerging	  period	  of	  pension	  politics,	  the	  public-­‐private	  dichotomy	  is	  taking	  on	  a	  new	  
meaning,	  where	  one	  policy	  area	  (workplace	  pension	  policy)	  is	  affecting	  other	  policy	  
areas	  (public	  pension	  policy).	  Since	  private	  pension	  policy	  is	  provincially	  regulated42,	  
examining	  the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  retirement	  income	  at	  the	  provincial	  level	  provides	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





an	  effective	  starting	  point	  to	  investigate	  how	  class	  struggles	  in	  the	  workplace	  impact	  
trends	  outside	  of	  the	  province.	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  proposed	  reforms	  made	  to	  the	  CPP	  in	  
June	  of	  2016,	  can	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  embedded	  in	  provincial	  dynamics	  of	  
workplace	  pension	  politics.	  Furthermore,	  by	  investigating	  pension	  policy	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  reflexive	  modernization,	  a	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  differing	  dynamics	  
between	  workers	  with	  and	  without	  workplace	  pensions	  and	  expressions	  of	  
individualization	  is	  provided.	  What	  is	  revealed	  is	  a	  set	  of	  contradictory	  dynamics	  in	  





The	  primary	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  examine	  pension	  policy	  change	  
through	  the	  sociological	  lens	  of	  risk	  and	  individualization,	  while	  investigating	  the	  
constitutive	  role	  of	  class	  struggle	  and	  ideation.	  Moreover,	  a	  methodological	  contribution	  
has	  been	  made	  through	  using	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  dynamics	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  
explain	  what	  has	  driven	  current	  public	  pension	  changes	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  In	  doing	  so,	  
this	  dissertation	  moves	  beyond	  the	  focus	  of	  recent	  scholarship	  that	  has	  examined	  
institutional	  (Béland	  and	  Myles	  2005),	  class	  (Karimi	  2012),	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  (Shilton	  
2016).	  
The	  conclusions	  discussed	  above	  do	  confirm	  findings	  of	  scholarship	  positing	  
pension	  policy	  as	  the	  least	  affected	  arena	  in	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  public	  policy,	  albeit	  for	  




Canada	  have	  been	  unsuccessful	  in	  depicting	  Canada’s	  system	  as	  unfair,	  since	  a	  
disproportionate	  amount	  of	  benefits	  goes	  to	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  the	  income	  ladder.	  
Neoliberal	  rhetoric	  has	  thus	  not	  taken	  hold.	  Similarly,	  Karimi	  (2012)	  also	  asserts	  that	  
neoliberal	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  public	  retirement	  income	  programs	  have	  failed.	  Instead,	  
however,	  he	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  Canadian	  political	  discourse	  on	  
national	  unity,	  serving	  to	  maintain	  principles	  of	  collectivity	  and	  universalism	  (p.	  352).	  
National	  political	  settings	  (such	  as	  the	  need	  to	  unite	  Anglophone	  and	  Francophone	  
regions)	  shape	  the	  interplay	  between	  class,	  party	  and	  nation,	  providing	  a	  specific	  
variation	  of	  Keynesianism	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  that	  has	  resisted	  neoliberal	  policy	  
experiments	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  retirement	  income	  security	  (p.	  358).	  	  
Indeed,	  conclusions	  drawn	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  congruent	  to	  these	  findings,	  
illustrating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  workers	  will	  reject	  continuing	  trends	  of	  individualized	  
risk	  in	  the	  workplace,	  leading	  to	  growing	  calls	  for	  government	  action.	  Given	  recent	  CPP	  
reforms,	  neoliberal	  pension	  reformers	  have	  been	  silenced	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  However,	  
this	  conclusion	  has	  been	  formed	  through	  the	  examination	  of	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  
while	  adopting	  the	  theoretical	  lens	  of	  risk	  society,	  illustrating	  one	  significant	  
contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  The	  recent	  changes	  to	  CPP	  cannot	  be	  only	  understood	  
as	  neoliberal	  pension	  reformers	  lacking	  legitimacy,	  or	  as	  the	  product	  Canada’s	  national	  
political	  setting.	  Although	  the	  author	  agrees	  these	  are	  contributing	  factors	  at	  the	  
discursive	  and	  structural	  level,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  illustrated	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
emergence	  of	  this	  current	  period	  of	  pension	  politics	  is	  fueled	  by	  the	  politics	  of	  provincial	  




Research	  Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  
	  
One	  major	  limitation	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  “pension	  
experts”.	  That	  is,	  white	  collar,	  professionally	  trained	  individuals	  whose	  involvement	  with	  
pension	  issues	  is	  typically	  based	  on	  their	  educational	  background	  and	  professional	  
status.	  This	  dissertation	  did	  not	  interview	  retirees,	  pension	  members,	  or	  workers	  with	  
any	  pension	  benefits	  due	  to	  limitations	  of	  parsimony.	  Consequently,	  the	  data	  gathered	  
through	  interviews	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  views	  of	  one	  group	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  groups.	  
Their	  experience	  of	  transformations	  to	  the	  workplace	  pension	  system	  in	  Ontario	  is	  likely	  
different	  from	  other	  classes	  of	  workers.	  	  
Another	  limitation	  is	  that	  this	  dissertation	  does	  not	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  race,	  
nor	  explore	  in	  deeper	  terms	  the	  role	  of	  gender	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  pension	  policymaking.	  
To	  what	  extent	  has	  pension	  policy	  been	  structured	  along	  racial	  lines?	  What’s	  more,	  how	  
has	  race	  intersected	  with	  gender	  and	  how	  is	  this	  reflected	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process?	  
This	  dissertation	  also	  lacks	  comparative	  dimensions	  with	  other	  jurisdictions,	  both	  
at	  the	  provincial	  level	  in	  Canada	  and	  internationally.	  How	  do	  other	  sub-­‐national	  
jurisdictions	  of	  pension	  policymaking	  compare	  to	  Ontario’s	  regarding	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  risk	  has	  been	  individualized?	  And	  do	  the	  politics	  of	  pensions	  in	  other	  sub	  national	  
jurisdictions	  inform	  broader	  national	  public	  policies	  similarly	  or	  differently	  than	  Canada?	  
	   These	  limitations	  provide	  future	  research	  opportunities.	  In	  terms	  of	  risk,	  as	  
others	  have	  pointed	  out,	  we	  know	  very	  little	  about	  the	  long	  term	  social	  effects	  of	  DC	  




Embracing	  DC	  plans	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  workplace	  pension	  plans	  is	  an	  “experiment”	  
in	  which	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact.	  Ring	  (2003)	  claims	  that	  the	  
greater-­‐use	  of	  DC	  plans	  has	  transferred	  the	  “unpredictability”	  associated	  with	  providing	  
pension	  benefits,	  such	  as	  increased	  longevity	  and	  fluctuating	  investment	  returns.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  unloading	  of	  risk	  is	  typically	  transferred	  onto	  workers	  with	  “modest	  
incomes”	  (Ring	  2003:	  69).	  Given	  this	  reality,	  future	  research	  should	  examine	  the	  long-­‐
term	  effects	  of	  risk	  transfer	  in	  workplace	  pension	  benefits	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context.	  One	  
can	  also	  investigate	  how	  these	  processes	  are	  gendered	  and	  radicalized	  to	  reveal	  new	  
inequalities	  that	  exist	  within	  the	  retirement	  income	  system.	  As	  such,	  findings	  of	  this	  
dissertation	  provide	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  which	  to	  examine	  emerging	  trends	  in	  class	  power	  





What	  is	  novel	  about	  the	  current	  period	  of	  pension	  politics	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  many	  
are	  claiming	  the	  days	  of	  secure	  workplace	  pensions	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  numbered.	  
One	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  expansion	  of	  CPP	  benefits	  is	  that	  some	  governments,	  unions,	  
and	  other	  stakeholder	  groups	  are	  acknowledging	  in	  clearer	  terms	  that	  workplace	  
pensions	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  provide	  secure	  retirement	  income	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  This	  
brings	  into	  question	  how	  pensions	  will	  be	  organized	  over	  the	  following	  decades,	  which	  if	  




altogether.	  As	  the	  industrial	  employment	  relationship	  changes,	  workers	  are	  not	  
afforded	  levels	  of	  income	  security	  experienced	  by	  previous	  generations.	  This	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  mean	  that	  Canada’s	  pension	  system	  will	  be	  fully	  influenced	  by	  
individualization.	  What	  it	  does	  mean,	  however,	  is	  that	  governments	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  
called	  upon	  by	  workers,	  retirees,	  unions,	  and	  other	  governing	  institutions	  to	  mitigate	  
the	  effects	  of	  individualization	  in	  the	  field	  of	  pension	  policy.	  The	  future	  welfare	  state,	  
therefore,	  must	  respond	  to	  these	  transforming	  working	  conditions	  in	  new	  ways	  that	  
enable	  workers	  to	  pool	  risk	  across	  sectors,	  enabling	  workers	  to	  establish	  new	  forms	  of	  
security	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  Governments	  will	  have	  to	  strengthen	  public	  
pensions	  as	  the	  most	  practical	  institutional	  response	  to	  growing	  levels	  of	  





Appendix	  A	  -­‐	  Research	  Methods	  
	  
	  
This	  project	  uses	  a	  mixed-­‐method	  approach	  that	  draws	  from	  three	  data	  sources:	  
interview	  transcripts	  produced	  from	  22	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  pension	  
professionals,	  descriptive	  statistics	  retrieved	  from	  Statistics	  Canada,	  and	  Hansard	  




The	  largest	  source	  of	  data	  originated	  from	  interview	  transcriptions.	  22	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  with	  pension	  experts	  were	  conducted.	  Interview	  length	  ranged	  from	  30	  to	  
270	  minutes,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  interviews	  averaging	  60	  minutes.	  Interviews	  were	  
conducted	  between	  March	  2014	  and	  June	  2015.	  Two	  participants	  were	  contacted	  for	  a	  
follow-­‐up	  interview.	  21	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Toronto,	  and	  one	  in	  
Ottawa.	  Types	  of	  professionals	  interviewed	  included	  the	  following:	  
	  
• One	  pension	  regulator;	  
• Three	  pension	  lawyers	  (two	  government	  lawyers	  and	  one	  labour	  lawyer);	  
• Eight	  government	  officials	  (five	  policy	  analysts,	  one	  politician,	  one	  pension	  
regulator,	  and	  one	  contract	  researcher);	  
• Seven	  union	  pension	  staff	  (three	  pension	  officers;	  four	  research	  officers);	  
• One	  stakeholder	  (pension	  expert	  -­‐	  private	  sector	  lobby	  organization);	  




The	  purpose	  of	  these	  interviews	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  “experts	  account”	  of	  a	  set	  
of	  different	  professionals	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  issues	  in	  Ontario	  and	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  saving	  for	  retirement	  has	  been	  individualized	  since	  the	  
mid-­‐1980s.	  I	  chose	  to	  interview	  professionals	  given	  their	  direct	  involvement	  or	  close	  
proximity	  to	  the	  pension	  policymaking	  process	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  experts	  are	  
best	  able	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  relationship	  between	  institutions	  and	  ideas.	  	  
Although	  all	  my	  participants	  are	  all	  pension	  “experts”,	  I	  interviewed	  a	  broad	  
range	  of	  experts—women	  and	  men—whose	  ideological	  affinities	  lay	  on	  either	  side	  of	  
the	  structural	  antagonism	  between	  employers	  and	  employees,	  and	  who	  work	  in	  
different	  professions	  (such	  as	  actuaries	  and	  lawyers).	  I	  interviewed	  bureaucrats,	  political	  
staff	  and	  regulators	  to	  analyze	  different	  institutional	  perspectives	  located	  within	  the	  
state.	  Union	  officials	  with	  collective	  bargaining	  experience	  in	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  
were	  also	  interviewed.	  Therefore,	  experts	  that	  participated	  in	  my	  research	  are	  
heterogeneous	  to	  some	  extent.	  	  
I	  have	  used	  these	  interviews	  to	  chart	  an	  historical	  account	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  
events	  leading	  to	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  reforms	  to	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  and	  
other	  related	  statutes	  in	  Ontario.	  Furthermore,	  these	  interviews	  were	  used	  to	  learn	  
about	  key	  debates	  and	  other	  specific	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  factors	  that	  have	  
fed	  into	  the	  broad	  contour	  of	  pension	  policy	  reform	  in	  Ontario.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  rounds	  of	  interviews.	  In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  this	  research,	  I	  had	  
very	  little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  field	  of	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  in	  Ontario,	  and	  given	  this	  




interviews	  were	  used	  for	  educational	  purposes	  for	  learning	  about	  important	  issues	  and	  
key	  events.	  These	  interviews	  served	  to	  develop	  knowledge	  about	  relevant	  historical	  
economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  events	  that	  have	  shaped	  Ontario’s	  pension	  policy.	  I	  also	  
built	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  administrative	  aspects	  of	  policymaking,	  including	  how	  
pension	  legislation	  and	  regulations	  is	  drafted	  and	  the	  basic	  procedures	  of	  managing	  a	  
pension	  plan.	  It	  was	  through	  this	  exploratory	  process	  that	  I	  learned	  about	  other	  specific	  
issues	  facing	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  sector,	  including,	  for	  example:	  the	  economic	  
relationship	  between	  interest	  rates	  and	  fund	  surpluses;	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Guarantee	  
Fund;	  differences	  between	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  pension	  plans;	  and	  the	  
relationships	  of	  pension	  plan	  maturation,	  plan	  solvency,	  and	  company	  size.	  These	  are	  
themes	  and	  issues	  that	  were	  brought	  to	  my	  attention	  through	  my	  interviews,	  which	  was	  
fundamental	  to	  the	  analysis	  provided	  in	  this	  project.	  	  
Once	  I	  had	  established	  a	  strong	  understanding	  of	  Ontario’s	  workplace	  pension	  
system,	  the	  remaining	  interviews	  were	  used	  to	  explore	  specific	  topics	  that	  came	  to	  light	  
during	  the	  first	  round	  of	  interviews.	  This	  round	  of	  interviews	  explored	  in	  closer	  detail	  
the	  ‘expert’s	  account’	  of	  how	  workplace	  pension	  policy	  has	  changed	  and	  why.	  I	  asked	  
participants	  what	  they	  viewed,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  of	  why	  a	  specific	  event	  occurred,	  or	  
what,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  they	  saw	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  particular	  pension	  commission,	  
decreasing	  interest	  rates,	  or	  factors	  feeding	  into	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  legislative	  reform	  etc.	  
Participants	  would	  then	  give	  their	  accounts	  as	  experts	  and	  professionals	  who	  have	  




Nineteen	  interviews	  were	  audio	  recorded	  and	  transcribed	  using	  ExpressScribe.	  
These	  transcriptions	  were	  then	  uploaded	  into	  NVivo	  and	  analyzed	  thematically,	  
grouping	  data	  into	  specific	  thematic	  categories	  relating	  to	  policymaking	  and	  the	  broader	  
political	  and	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  policy	  change	  occurs.	  The	  goal	  of	  thematic	  
analysis	  is	  to	  summarize	  the	  dataset	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  research	  question	  (Aguinaldo	  
2012:	  796).	  The	  content	  of	  the	  data	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  method,	  from	  which	  data	  is	  then	  
grouped	  into	  specific	  categories	  to	  “describe	  a	  particular	  social	  phenomenon”	  
(Aguinaldo	  2012:	  796).	  This	  method	  was	  used	  to	  code	  topics	  of	  conversation,	  collating	  
them	  into	  themes	  to	  create	  a	  ‘thematic	  map’	  to	  organize	  the	  dataset	  into	  categories.	  
This	  allows	  to	  me	  to	  both	  provide	  summaries	  of	  what	  my	  participants	  discussed	  and	  to	  
develop	  an	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  shaped	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  
As	  I	  coded	  each	  transcription,	  I	  wrote	  extensive	  memos	  summarizing	  topics	  of	  
conversations	  into	  my	  own	  words.	  These	  memos	  were	  also	  used	  to	  synthesize	  patterns	  
and	  themes	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  interview	  data.	  These	  memos	  were	  then	  further	  
developed	  into	  the	  analysis	  provided	  in	  various	  chapters.	  
	   To	  reconstruct	  a	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process	  of	  Ontario’s	  
workplace	  pension	  policy,	  I	  triangulated	  the	  accounts	  given	  by	  various	  participants,	  
comparing	  similarities,	  differences	  and	  contradictions.	  These	  accounts	  of	  pension	  
experts	  were	  brought	  together	  with	  historical	  academic	  literature,	  grey	  literature,	  and	  
media	  publications.	  I	  do	  not	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  single	  historical	  account	  that	  




accounts	  that	  contain	  some	  differences	  and	  contradictions,	  along	  with	  similarities,	  that	  
together	  provided	  a	  historical	  description	  Ontario’s	  pension	  policymaking	  process.	  	  
	  
Hansard	  Parliamentary	  Transcriptions	  
To	  supplement	  the	  historical	  data	  gathered	  from	  the	  interview	  data,	  I	  analyzed	  Hansard	  
Parliamentary	  transcriptions	  accessed	  online	  from	  1987	  to	  the	  current	  period.	  These	  
transcriptions	  were	  analyzed	  thematically,	  while	  providing	  historical	  knowledge	  of	  key	  
issues	  during	  specific	  historical	  periods.	  These	  transcriptions	  were	  an	  important	  source	  
of	  historical	  and	  institutional	  data	  on	  evolving	  political	  debates	  concerning	  different	  
aspects	  of	  pension	  policy.	  The	  data	  provided	  a	  textured	  account	  of	  how	  class	  tensions	  
over	  particular	  pension	  issues	  were	  expressed	  through	  partisan	  debate.	  These	  
transcriptions	  also	  captured	  ideational	  processes,	  illustrating	  the	  origin	  of	  particular	  idea	  
and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  particular	  ideas	  become	  law	  and	  others	  that	  died	  at	  hands	  of	  
partisan	  debate.	  	  
	  
Descriptive	  statistics	  
Descriptive	  statistical	  data	  was	  used	  to	  examine	  Ontario	  and	  Canada’s	  retirement	  
income	  system	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  inequality	  and	  poverty	  levels	  from	  a	  structural	  perspective.	  This	  
data	  illustrates	  longitudinally	  the	  broader	  structural	  context	  in	  which	  pension	  policy	  in	  
Ontario	  and	  across	  Canada	  occurs,	  providing	  key	  insights	  into	  changing	  levels	  poverty	  
and	  pension	  coverage	  along	  gendered,	  occupational,	  and	  educational	  lines.	  One	  can	  also	  




jurisdictions.	  Data	  sources	  include	  the	  Organization	  for	  Cooperation	  and	  Economic	  
Development	  (OECD)	  and	  Statistics	  Canada.	  Data	  was	  drawn	  from	  either	  statistical	  
analysis	  provided	  in	  publications,	  or	  generated	  using	  data	  building	  functions	  online	  




Appendix	  B	  –	  Ontario	  pension	  policy	  timeline	  
	  
	  
• 1950s	  –	  companies	  became	  interested	  in	  pensions	  funds	  because	  they	  could	  use	  
it	  as	  a	  tax	  shelter	  for	  their	  profits.	  Accounting	  standards	  at	  the	  time	  did	  not	  force	  
companies	  to	  put	  pension	  liability	  expenses	  on	  their	  books.	  Funding	  rules	  did	  not	  
exist	  at	  the	  time	  and	  companies	  would	  pay-­‐as-­‐you	  go	  into	  their	  pension	  funds.	  	  
• 1950s-­‐1960s	  –	  several	  high	  profile	  company	  closures	  take	  place	  in	  Ontario	  that	  
wipe	  out	  retirement	  savings	  for	  many	  workers	  because	  pensions	  were	  being	  paid	  
from	  payroll.	  	  
o Starts	  impetus	  to	  put	  in	  place	  pension	  legislation.	  
• 1965	  –	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  begins,	  January	  1st.	  
o Purpose	  of	  legislation	  to	  was	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  benefits	  by	  
establishing	  funding	  rules	  separate	  from	  the	  organization	  through	  
prefunding	  –	  ‘minimum	  standards’.	  	  
o Required	  trust	  funds	  to	  be	  established	  and	  regular	  financial	  reviews.	  
o Legislation	  introduces	  concept	  of	  funding	  for	  benefits	  and	  concept	  of	  
accrual.	  	  
• 1960s-­‐70s	  –	  Prefunded	  pension	  plans	  were	  mostly	  group	  annuity	  contracts	  with	  
insurance	  companies.	  
• 1970s	  –	  interest	  rates	  begin	  to	  rise	  and	  companies	  see	  opportunity	  to	  manage	  
company	  pension	  fund	  in-­‐house	  to	  collect	  profits	  rather	  than	  pay	  an	  insurance	  
company	  to	  administer	  benefits.	  	  
o Companies	  set	  up	  trust	  funds	  and	  move	  away	  from	  insurance	  business.	  
o Easy	  to	  generate	  good	  returns	  in	  global	  bull	  market.	  
• 1980	  –	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Guarantee	  Fund	  (PBGF).	  
• 1980	  –	  The	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Women	  	  
o Highlighted	  the	  disproportionate	  level	  of	  women	  living	  in	  poverty	  during	  
retirement	  	  
o 	  Served	  to	  active	  a	  national	  debate	  that	  would	  continue	  through	  the	  80s	  
about	  improving	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  system	  to	  better	  help	  
women	  by	  doubling	  CPP	  benefits.	  
• 1981	  –	  Report	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Pensions	  in	  Ontario	  (Haley	  Report)	  	  
• 1982	  –	  Canadian	  economy	  sinks	  into	  recession	  
• 1984	  –	  Ontario	  Proposals	  for	  Pension	  Reform	  (led	  by	  provincial	  treasurer	  Larry	  
Grossman)	  
• Early	  1980s	  -­‐	  Honda	  plant	  closure	  that	  took	  away	  a	  group	  of	  workers’	  early	  
pension	  benefits	  helped	  lead	  to	  PBA	  reform	  
• Mid	  1980s	  –	  Dominion	  Case	  (Conrad	  Black)	  	  
o Institutionally,	  this	  case	  served	  to	  make	  the	  Pension	  Commission	  of	  
Ontario	  (provincial	  regulator)	  more	  conservative	  after	  severe	  backlash	  to	  




• Early	  to	  mid	  1980s	  –	  Canada	  adopts	  new	  American	  accounting	  standards	  that	  
force	  business	  to	  put	  pension	  solvency	  onto	  accounting	  statements,	  substantially	  
increasing	  the	  liability	  and	  expense	  of	  pension	  plans.	  	  
o Surpluses	  begin	  to	  decrease.	  
• 1987	  -­‐	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  –	  Second	  major	  reform	  of	  the	  PBA	  
o Bill	  170	  receives	  Royal	  Assent	  in	  Ontario	  Parliament,	  legislation	  begins,	  
January	  1st.	  
• 1987	  –	  Premier	  Peterson	  organizes	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  the	  Investment	  of	  Public	  
Sector	  Pension	  Funds	  chaired	  by	  Malcolm	  Rowan	  to	  address	  the	  low	  funding	  
status	  of	  the	  government	  agencies	  administering	  public	  sector	  pension	  funds	  in	  
Ontario.	  
o Produces	  the	  report,	  In	  Whose	  Interest?	  Report	  of	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  the	  
Investment	  of	  Public	  Sector	  Pension	  Funds.	  
 The	  report	  argued	  that	  public	  pension	  plans	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  
the	  same	  financial	  and	  disclosure	  standards	  as	  corporate	  plans.	  
These	  plans	  should	  become	  independent	  legal	  entities	  that	  reflect	  
industry	  best	  practices	  and	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  further	  
government	  public	  policy	  aims	  –	  only	  stakeholder	  interests	  should	  
be	  considered.	  
 Report	  laid	  ground	  work	  for	  joint-­‐sponsorship	  model	  in	  public	  
sector	  plans,	  which	  famously	  helped	  establish	  the	  Ontario	  
Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  (OTPP),	  turning	  it	  from	  an	  underfunded	  
“arcane”	  government	  agency	  to	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  
successful	  public	  sector	  occupational	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  world.	  
• 1987	  –	  October	  19th	  –	  ‘Black	  Monday’	  stock	  market	  crash.	  	  
• 1987	  -­‐	  Friedman	  Task	  Force	  recommends	  that	  companies	  can	  only	  withdraw	  
surplus	  pension	  funds	  if	  they	  have	  provided	  partial	  indexing	  for	  future	  retirees.	  
Current	  retirees,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  receive	  non-­‐indexed	  pensions,	  are	  
ignored.	  	  
o Reform	  proposals	  were	  mostly	  unsuccessful	  through	  the	  90s	  and	  indexing	  
pensions	  benefits	  remains	  a	  contentious	  issue.	  	  
• Late	  1980s	  –	  pension	  system	  is	  awash	  in	  surplus	  due	  to	  high	  interest	  rates	  for	  
most	  of	  the	  decade,	  leading	  to	  court	  cases	  on	  how	  to	  divide	  surplus.	  
o Leads	  to	  acrimonious	  debate	  over	  who	  owns	  surplus.	  
o Government	  introduces	  moratorium	  on	  surplus	  refunds.	  
• 1980s	  –	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  pensions	  
was	  a	  reward	  for	  long	  service	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  differed	  compensation.	  
• 1980s	  –	  change	  in	  philosophy	  towards	  joint-­‐sharing	  for	  publics	  sector	  plans.	  
• 1990	  –	  January	  1st,	  Ontario	  Teachers’	  Pension	  Plan	  was	  established.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  
OTPP	  had	  been	  sponsored	  solely	  by	  the	  Ontario	  government.	  Assets	  of	  the	  plan	  
had	  been	  invested	  in	  government	  bonds	  only.	  
• 1990s	  –	  interest	  rates	  steadily	  decline	  through	  the	  1990s.	  




o Recession	  leads	  to	  significant	  downsizing	  of	  large	  corporate	  employers	  in	  
Ontario,	  where	  company	  pension	  plans	  are	  becoming	  viewed	  more	  as	  a	  
liability.	  
• Early	  1990s	  –	  Pension	  Commission	  of	  Pensions	  is	  restructured,	  sending	  policy	  
office	  to	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  sending	  regulatory	  duties	  into	  what	  eventually	  
becomes	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Commission	  of	  Ontario	  (FSCO).	  
• 1992	  –	  NDP	  gives	  ‘too	  big	  to	  fail’	  status	  to	  large	  companies	  like	  Algoma,	  Stelco	  
and	  GM.	  
o The	  government	  allows	  certain	  companies	  in	  1992	  to	  not	  fund	  their	  
pensions	  on	  a	  solvency	  basis,	  and	  instead	  asked	  them	  to	  pay	  higher	  
premiums	  into	  the	  PBGF.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  is	  exposing	  the	  government	  to	  
higher	  risk.	  
o Most	  companies	  apply	  for	  bankruptcy	  protection	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  and	  
sought	  government	  bailouts.	  	  
• 1995	  –	  January	  1st	  -­‐	  OPTrust	  begins	  operations	  –	  administers	  Ontario	  Public	  
Service	  members	  pensions	  through	  joint-­‐trusteeship	  (similar	  to	  OTPP),	  
transferring	  benefits	  from	  the	  Public	  Service	  Pension	  Plan.	  	  
o Made	  possible	  through	  legislation,	  “Ontario	  Public	  Service	  Employees’	  
Union	  Pension	  Act,	  1994”.	  
• 1997-­‐98	  –	  FSCO	  is	  created	  –	  consolidation	  of	  financial	  service	  regulation	  under	  
Harris	  government	  in	  attempt	  to	  cut	  costs.	  
o Removes	  policy	  component	  from	  regulator	  to	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  
diminishes	  resources	  of	  regulator	  to	  do	  job.	  
• Late	  1990s	  –	  Downward	  trend	  in	  private	  sector	  DB	  pension	  continues.	  
• Early	  2000s	  –	  the	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  busy	  with	  surplus	  sharing,	  large	  
bankruptcies,	  marriage	  breakdown	  rules	  (Bill	  133).	  
• Early	  2000s	  –	  pension	  surpluses	  increase	  again	  due	  to	  the	  dot	  com	  bubble,	  good	  
stock	  market	  returns	  and	  higher	  interest	  rates.	  	  
• 2002	  –	  Monsanto	  Canada	  Inc.	  –	  Ontario	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  rules	  in	  favour	  of	  146	  
former	  employees,	  saying	  the	  partial	  wind-­‐up	  of	  their	  pension	  plan	  entitles	  them	  
to	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  $19	  million	  surplus.	  
• 2002	  –	  Nov.	  28	  –	  Bill	  198	  –	  Tories	  Budget	  Bill	  where	  pension	  legislation	  was	  
excised	  from	  Bill	  following	  political	  struggle	  over	  surplus	  sharing	  for	  occupation	  
pension	  plans	  that	  are	  wound	  up.	  
o Bill	  had	  been	  viewed	  as	  employer	  friendly.	  
• Mid-­‐2000s	  –	  Algoma,	  Stelco,	  GM	  and	  Nortel	  bankruptcies.	  
o These	  events	  took	  up	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  the	  pension	  division’s	  
resources	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  pension	  division	  expanded	  during	  this	  
period	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  issues.	  	  
• 2008	  –	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  
o Interest	  rates	  drop	  and	  pension	  liabilities	  dramatically	  increase.	  
• 2008	  –	  Harry	  Arthurs	  Report	  is	  published,	  October	  31st.	  Ontario	  Expert	  
Commission	  on	  Pensions	  (OECP):	  A	  Fine	  Balance:	  Safe	  Pensions,	  Affordable	  Plans,	  




o Connection	  between	  Harry	  Arthurs	  Report,	  BC	  and	  AB	  report.	  	  
o 2008	  –	  BC	  and	  Alberta	  joint	  report	  on	  pensions	  published,	  November	  
14th.	  Getting	  Our	  Acts	  Together:	  Alberta/British	  Columbia	  Pension	  
Standards	  Review	  –	  Joint	  Expert	  Panel	  on	  Pension	  Standards.	  
• 2009	  –	  October	  27	  –	  “Experts	  Day”,	  attended	  by	  Jack	  Mintz,	  Bob	  Baldwin	  and	  
others	  in	  the	  field	  to	  discuss	  the	  health	  and	  state	  of	  Canada’s	  retirement	  income	  
system.	  
o This	  event	  gets	  cited	  regularly	  as	  an	  important	  meeting	  for	  establishing	  a	  
new	  understanding	  of	  pension	  issues	  moving	  forward.	  	  
• 2009	  –	  November	  -­‐	  Bob	  Balwin	  Report	  is	  published:	  Research	  Study	  on	  the	  
Canadian	  Retirement	  Income	  System	  
o Jack	  Mintz’s	  work	  served	  to	  catalyze	  Baldwin’s	  report,	  organized	  by	  the	  
Onario	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  in	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  conservative	  
reputation	  of	  Mintz’s	  work.	  
o Finance	  Minister	  committee	  form	  income	  adequacy	  committee,	  hire	  
Mintz.	  
o Mintz	  report	  published	  December	  8th,	  2009.	  
• 2010	  –	  Baldwin’s	  paper	  for	  Ontario	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  feeds	  into	  Dwight	  
Duncan’s	  decision	  to	  endorse	  CPP	  expansion	  in	  June	  2010.	  
• 2010	  -­‐	  Bill	  236	  An	  Act	  to	  amend	  the	  Pensions	  Benefits	  Act	  (Influenced	  by	  the	  
conclusions	  of	  the	  OECP).	  Bill	  eliminates	  partial	  wind-­‐ups	  of	  pension	  plans	  and	  
provides	  that	  grow-­‐in	  benefits	  will	  apply	  to	  persons	  whose	  employment	  is	  
terminated	  by	  the	  employer	  otherwise	  than	  for	  cause.	  
• 2010	  -­‐	  Bill	  120	  An	  Act	  to	  amend	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  Act	  and	  the	  Pension	  Benefits	  
Amendment	  Act,	  2010	  (Influenced	  by	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  OECP)	  
• 2011	  –	  Bill	  133	  New	  Ontario	  Pension	  Division	  on	  Marriage	  Breakdown	  Rules.	  
2013	  –	  February	  –	  Kathleen	  Wynne	  becomes	  new	  Premier	  of	  Ontario.	  
o Wynne	  names	  Charles	  Sousa	  as	  new	  Finance	  Minister	  of	  Ontario.	  
o Sousa	  agrees	  to	  developing	  supporting	  provincial	  legislation	  on	  federal	  
pooled	  registered	  pension	  plans	  (PRPPs)	  legislation.	  
• 2015	  –	  May	  26	  -­‐	  Bill	  57	  –	  Pooled	  Registered	  Pension	  Plans	  Bill	  passes	  in	  Ontario	  
Legislature	  (An	  Act	  to	  create	  a	  framework	  for	  pooled	  registered	  pension	  plans	  
and	  to	  make	  consequential	  amendments	  to	  other	  Acts).	  
• 2016	  –	  June	  –	  Ontario	  Registered	  Pension	  Plan	  (ORPP)	  shelved	  following	  the	  
expansion	  of	  CPP.	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